discussion issue in California

2025Maria requests this court to deem “all the issues raised in this appeal waived for failure to present [the facts] properly [Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 881 ].” We conclude that John, in challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings on the assault claim, failed to “set forth, discuss, and analyze all the evidence on that point, both favorable and unfavorable.” (Doe v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Cashel & Emly, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at p. 218 .) “Because [John] has failed in his obligations concerning the discussion and analysis of a substantial e

2025Because [mother] has failed in [her] obligations concerning the discussion and analysis of a substantial evidence issue, we deem the issue waived.” (Doe v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Cashel & Emly (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 209, 218 .) Even if mother had not forfeited the issue, substantial evidence supports the court’s findings.

2016(Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 860 (Aguilar).) We apply the same three-step process as the trial court.

2015(Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 860 (Aguilar).) The trial court‟s stated reasons for granting summary judgment are not binding on the reviewing court, “which reviews the trial court‟s ruling, not its rationale.” (Ramalingam v. Thompson (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 491, 498 .) We apply the same three-step process as the trial court.

2025DISCUSSION Because defendant appeals from a postconviction ruling, the procedures set forth in Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436 do not apply. ( Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 226, 231.) Nevertheless, our Supreme Court has directed that, when a defendant files a supplemental brief in a postconviction appeal where appointed counsel finds no arguable issues, we must “evaluate the specific arguments presented in that brief,” but need not conduct an independent review of the entire record.

2024DISCUSSION Because defendant appeals from a postconviction ruling, the procedures set forth in People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 do not apply. ( Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 226, 231.) Nevertheless, our Supreme Court has directed that, when a defendant files a supplemental brief in a postconviction appeal where appointed counsel finds no arguable issues, we must “evaluate the specific arguments presented in that brief,” but need not conduct an independent review of the entire record.

2015(People v. Mendez (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1084, 1088 (Mendez); § 1237.5.) After review of the record, defendant’s court-appointed counsel filed an opening brief asking this court to review the record independently under the holding of People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441 , and advised defendant of his opportunity to file a supplemental brief.

2014(People v. Mendez (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1084, 1088 (Mendez); § 1237.5.) After review of the record, appellant’s court-appointed counsel filed an opening brief asking this court to review the record independently pursuant to the holding of People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441 , and advised defendant of his opportunity to file a supplemental brief.

2014(See Concerned Citizens of South Central L.A. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 826, 848-849 [upholding findings based on substantial evidence in the record with no suggestion that citations to the evidence were required].) “Detailed findings on an issue are not required if the basis for the agency’s decision is found in the EIR and the agency’s findings incorporate or adopt the EIR’s discussion and analysis. [Citations.]” (2 Kostka & Zischke, supra, § 17.37, p. 17-38.) The requirement is that the findings disclose the reasons for the agency’s decision.

2014(See Concerned Citizens of South Central L.A. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 826, 848-849 [upholding findings based on substantial evidence in the record with no suggestion that citations to the evidence were required].) “Detailed findings on an issue are not required if the basis for the agency’s decision is found in the EIR and the agency’s findings incorporate or adopt the EIR’s discussion and analysis. [Citations.]” (2 Kostka & Zischke, supra, § 17.37, p. 17-38.) The requirement is that the findings disclose the reasons for the agency’s decision.

2007Discussion At issue here, section 209.5(a) provides: “Any person who, during the commission of a caijacking and in order to facilitate the commission of the carjacking, kidnaps another person who is not a principal in the commission of the carjacking shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life with the possibility of parole.” For section 209.5(a) to apply, the victim must be moved “beyond [what is] merely incidental to the commission of the carjacking” and “a substantial distance from the vicinity of the caijacking,” and “the movement of the victim increases the risk of harm

2007Discussion At issue here, section 209.5(a) provides: “Any person who, during the commission of a caijacking and in order to facilitate the commission of the carjacking, kidnaps another person who is not a principal in the commission of the carjacking shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life with the possibility of parole.” For section 209.5(a) to apply, the victim must be moved “beyond [what is] merely incidental to the commission of the carjacking” and “a substantial distance from the vicinity of the caijacking,” and “the movement of the victim increases the risk of harm

2002Discussion The standard for reviewing whether a claim will violate a no contest clause was stated by the Supreme Court in Burch v. George (1994) 7 Cal.4th 246, 254-255 [ 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 165 , 866 P.2d 92 ]: “An in terrorem or no contest clause in a will or trust instrument creates a condition upon gifts and dispositions provided therein. [Citation.] In essence, a no contest clause conditions a beneficiary’s right to take the share *1128 provided to that beneficiary under such an instrument upon the beneficiary’s agreement to acquiesce to the terms of the instrument. [Citation.] “No contest clau

2002Discussion The standard for reviewing whether a claim will violate a no contest clause was stated by the Supreme Court in Burch v. George (1994) 7 Cal.4th 246, 254-255 [ 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 165 , 866 P.2d 92 ]: “An in terrorem or no contest clause in a will or trust instrument creates a condition upon gifts and dispositions provided therein. [Citation.] In essence, a no contest clause conditions a beneficiary’s right to take the share *1128 provided to that beneficiary under such an instrument upon the beneficiary’s agreement to acquiesce to the terms of the instrument. [Citation.] “No contest clau

2001“The reviewing court gives the complaint a reasonable interpretation, and treats the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded. [Citations.] The court does not, however, assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law. [Citation.] The judgment must be affirmed ‘if any one of the several grounds of demurrer is well taken. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] However, it is error for a trial court to sustain a demurrer when the plaintiff has stated a cause of action under any possible legal theory. [Citation.] And it is an abuse of discretion to sustain a demurrer without

2001“The reviewing court gives the complaint a reasonable interpretation, and treats the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded. [Citations.] The court does not, however, assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law. [Citation.] The judgment must be affirmed ‘if any one of the several grounds of demurrer is well taken. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] However, it is error for a trial court to sustain a demurrer when the plaintiff has stated a cause of action under any possible legal theory. [Citation.] And it is an abuse of discretion to sustain a demurrer without

1996Just like the references to favorable aspects of the record required by Anders , the discussion requirement may forestall some motions to withdraw and will assist the court in passing on the soundness of the lawyer's conclusion that the appeal is frivolous." ( Ibid. [100 L.Ed.2d at p. 456].) Then, in Penson v. Ohio (1988) 488 U.S. 75 [ 102 L.Ed.2d 300 , 109 S.Ct. 346 ] (hereafter sometimes Penson ), the court applied Anders and its "safeguards" ( id. at p. 80 [ 102 L.Ed.2d at p. 308 ]) in a distinct factual setting.

1996Just like the references to favorable aspects of the record required by Anders , the discussion requirement may forestall some motions to withdraw and will assist the court in passing on the soundness of the lawyer's conclusion that the appeal is frivolous." ( Ibid. [100 L.Ed.2d at p. 456].) Then, in Penson v. Ohio (1988) 488 U.S. 75 [ 102 L.Ed.2d 300 , 109 S.Ct. 346 ] (hereafter sometimes Penson ), the court applied Anders and its "safeguards" ( id. at p. 80 [ 102 L.Ed.2d at p. 308 ]) in a distinct factual setting.

2016(People v. Cromer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 889 , 893–894.) 1.

2016(People v. Cromer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 889 , 893–894.) 1.

2015DISCUSSION The standard for judicial review of a criminal conviction challenged as lacking evidentiary support is well established: “the court must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence -- that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value -- such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578 .) We accord due deference to the verdict and will not substitute our conclusions for those of the trier of

1994Discussion The test on appeal for determining if substantial evidence supports a conviction is whether “ ‘a reasonable trier of fact could have found the prosecution sustained its burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’” (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576 [ 162 Cal.Rptr. 431 , 606 P.2d 738 , 16 A.L.R.4th 1255 ].) In making this determination, we “ ‘must view the evidence in a light most favorable to respondent and presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.’ ” (Ibid.) Prior to 1980, sec

2015(Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 860 (Aguilar).) The trial court‟s stated reasons for granting summary judgment are not binding on the reviewing court, “which reviews the trial court‟s ruling, not its rationale.” (Ramalingam v. Thompson (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 491, 498 .) We apply the same three-step process as the trial court.

2014(Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 860 [ 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 841 , 24 P.3d 493 ] (Aguilar).) The trial court’s stated reasons for granting summary judgment are not binding on the reviewing court, “which reviews the trial court’s ruling, not its rationale.” (Ramalingam v. Thompson (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 491, 498 [ 60 Cal.Rptr.3d 11 ].) We apply the same three-step process as the trial court.

2014It is well established that “[a] trial court’s failure to exercise discretion is itself an abuse of discretion, and we review such action in accordance with that standard of review. [Citations.]” (In re Marriage of Gray (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 504, 515 [ 66 Cal.Rptr.3d 87 ].) In the case sub judice, the trial court denied relief under sections 473 and 473.5, and yet declined to hear defendant’s motion under section 1179 as defendant was in default.

2014It is well established that “[a] trial court’s failure to exercise discretion is itself an abuse of discretion, and we review such action in accordance with that standard of review. [Citations.]” (In re Marriage of Gray (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 504, 515 [ 66 Cal.Rptr.3d 87 ].) In the case sub judice, the trial court denied relief under sections 473 and 473.5, and yet declined to hear defendant’s motion under section 1179 as defendant was in default.

2006Defense counsel objected to the references to Bobbitt and the Menendez brothers, but his objection was overruled. "`In general, prosecutors should refrain from comparing defendants to historic or fictional villains, especially where the comparisons are wholly inappropriate or unlinked to the evidence.'" ( People v. Jones (1997) 15 Cal.4th 119 , 180, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 386 , 931 P.2d 960 , quoting People v. Bloom (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1194, 1213 , 259 Cal.Rptr. 669 , 774 P.2d 698 .) In this case, the prosecutor did not compare defendant to either Bobbitt or the Menendez brothers, but referred to them to

2006Defense counsel objected to the references to Bobbitt and the Menendez brothers, but his objection was overruled. "`In general, prosecutors should refrain from comparing defendants to historic or fictional villains, especially where the comparisons are wholly inappropriate or unlinked to the evidence.'" ( People v. Jones (1997) 15 Cal.4th 119 , 180, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 386 , 931 P.2d 960 , quoting People v. Bloom (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1194, 1213 , 259 Cal.Rptr. 669 , 774 P.2d 698 .) In this case, the prosecutor did not compare defendant to either Bobbitt or the Menendez brothers, but referred to them to

2002(Knight v. Jewett, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 313 .) We review de novo the trial court’s determination on the issue of assumption of risk, and all doubts as to the propriety of granting a motion for summary judgment must be resolved in favor of the party opposing the motion.

1998As the Supreme Court recognized in Knight v. Jewett (1992) 3 Cal.4th 296, 309 [ 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 2 , 834 P.2d 696 ] (plurality opinion), assumption of risk has not been entirely subsumed by the doctrine of comparative negligence announced in Li v. Yellow Cab Co. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 804 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 858 , 532 P.2d 1226 , 78 A.L.R.3d 393 ].

1939(See, also, Webster v. Board of Regents, 163 Cal. 705 [ 126 Pac. 974 ], and cases cited.) Reference may also be made to Central Irr.

1939(See, also, Webster v. Board of Regents, 163 Cal. 705 [ 126 Pac. 974 ], and cases cited.) Reference may also be made to Central Irr.