discussion doctrine in Michigan

1965In Teller and In re Bromley's Estate, 113 Mich 53 , and In re Grow's Estate, 299 Mich 133 , the presumption was held to have been rebutted by proof that the will had been executed, as here, after the testator had secured independent legal counsel in preparation and execution of his will.

1965In Teller and In re Bromley’s Estate, 113 Mich 53 , and In re Grow’s Estate, 299 Mich 133 , the presumption was held to have been rebutted by proof that the will had been executed, as here, after the testator had secured independent legal counsel in preparation and execution of his will.

1965I am unwilling to join in overruling In re Teller's Estate, 288 Mich 193 , or in washing out the discussion of the presumption question in the case of In re Jennings' Estate, 335 Mich 241 , as mere dictum or overruling it by implication or otherwise.

1965I am unwilling to join in overruling In re Teller’s Estate, 288 Mich 193 , or in washing out the discussion of the presumption question in the case of In re Jennings’ Estate, 335 Mich 241 , as mere dictum or overruling it by implication or otherwise.

1965In Teller and In re Bromley's Estate, 113 Mich 53 , and In re Grow's Estate, 299 Mich 133 , the presumption was held to have been rebutted by proof that the will had been executed, as here, after the testator had secured independent legal counsel in preparation and execution of his will.

1965In Teller and In re Bromley’s Estate, 113 Mich 53 , and In re Grow’s Estate, 299 Mich 133 , the presumption was held to have been rebutted by proof that the will had been executed, as here, after the testator had secured independent legal counsel in preparation and execution of his will.

1965I am unwilling to join in overruling In re Teller's Estate, 288 Mich 193 , or in washing out the discussion of the presumption question in the case of In re Jennings' Estate, 335 Mich 241 , as mere dictum or overruling it by implication or otherwise.

1965I am unwilling to join in overruling In re Teller’s Estate, 288 Mich 193 , or in washing out the discussion of the presumption question in the case of In re Jennings’ Estate, 335 Mich 241 , as mere dictum or overruling it by implication or otherwise.

1915Eq. at page 340, 24 Atl. at page 392) that we quote it: “ ‘The law, deducible from these principles and the authorities applicable to this case, is that where there is a general scheme or plan, adopted and made public by the owner of a tract, for the development and improvement of the property, by which it is divided into streets, avenues, and lots, and contemplating a restriction as to the uses to which buildings or lots may be put, to be secured by a covenant embodying the restriction to be inserted in each deed to a purchaser, and it appears, by writings or by the circumstances, that such c

1905The court, after a full discussion of the principle and the authorities, so clearly states the law (page 340) that we quote it: “Thelaw, deducible from these principles and the authorities applicable to this case, is that where there is a general scheme or plan, adopted and made public by the owner of a tract, for the development and improvement of the property, by which it is divided into streets, avenues, and lots, and contemplating a restriction as to the uses to which buildings or lots may be put, to be secured by a covenant embodying the restriction to be inserted in each deed to a purcha

1915Eq. at page 340, 24 Atl. at page 392) that we quote it: “ ‘The law, deducible from these principles and the authorities applicable to this case, is that where there is a general scheme or plan, adopted and made public by the owner of a tract, for the development and improvement of the property, by which it is divided into streets, avenues, and lots, and contemplating a restriction as to the uses to which buildings or lots may be put, to be secured by a covenant embodying the restriction to be inserted in each deed to a purchaser, and it appears, by writings or by the circumstances, that such c

1905The court, after a full discussion of the principle and the authorities, so clearly states the law (page 340) that we quote it: “Thelaw, deducible from these principles and the authorities applicable to this case, is that where there is a general scheme or plan, adopted and made public by the owner of a tract, for the development and improvement of the property, by which it is divided into streets, avenues, and lots, and contemplating a restriction as to the uses to which buildings or lots may be put, to be secured by a covenant embodying the restriction to be inserted in each deed to a purcha

2022Meadowlanes Ltd, 437 Mich at 486 .

2020Defendant’s sole and entire appellate argument that “[d]efense trial counsel’s failure to challenge these jurors, whose initial, and most reliable responses were that they ‘thought’ they could be impartial, was objectively unreasonable” is not supported by the record. 5 People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 443 ; 212 NW2d 922 (1973). 6 People v Wright, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered January 7, 2020 (Docket No. 348900). -7- In Johnson, this Court rejected the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel premised on defense counsel’s failure to make further inquiry of the juror.

2020Defendant’s sole and entire appellate argument that “[d]efense trial counsel’s failure to challenge these jurors, whose initial, and most reliable responses were that they ‘thought’ they could be impartial, was objectively unreasonable” is not supported by the record. 5 People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 443 ; 212 NW2d 922 (1973). 6 People v Wright, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered January 7, 2020 (Docket No. 348900). -7- In Johnson, this Court rejected the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel premised on defense counsel’s failure to make further inquiry of the juror.

2013It correctly notes the five statutory GTLA exceptions, but does not meaningfully address the other areas in which the Legislature has waived immunity. “[T]here are other areas outside the GTLA where the Legislature has allowed specific actions against the government to stand, such as the Civil Rights Act.” Mack v Detroit, 467 Mich 186, 195 ; 649 NW2d 47 (2002), citing MCL 37.2103(g), MCL 37.2202(a), and Manning v City of Hazel Park, 202 Mich App 685, 699 ; 509 NW2d 874 (1993) (recognizing that governmental immunity is not a defense to claims brought under the Civil Rights Act because the act s

2013It correctly notes the five statutory GTLA exceptions, but does not meaningfully address the other areas in which the Legislature has waived immunity. “[T]here are other areas outside the GTLA where the Legislature has allowed specific actions against the government to stand, such as the Civil Rights Act.” Mack v Detroit, 467 Mich 186, 195 ; 649 NW2d 47 (2002), citing MCL 37.2103(g), MCL 37.2202(a), and Manning v City of Hazel Park, 202 Mich App 685, 699 ; 509 NW2d 874 (1993) (recognizing that governmental immunity is not a defense to claims brought under the Civil Rights Act because the act s

2013It correctly notes the five statutory GTLA exceptions, but does not meaningfully address the other areas in which the Legislature has waived immunity. “[T]here are other areas outside the GTLA where the Legislature has allowed specific actions against the government to stand, such as the Civil Rights Act.” Mack v Detroit, 467 Mich 186, 195 ; 649 NW2d 47 (2002), citing MCL 37.2103(g), MCL 37.2202(a), and Manning v City of Hazel Park, 202 Mich App 685, 699 ; 509 NW2d 874 (1993) (recognizing that governmental immunity is not a defense to claims brought under the Civil Rights Act because the act s

2013It correctly notes the five statutory GTLA exceptions, but does not meaningfully address the other areas in which the Legislature has waived immunity. “[T]here are other areas outside the GTLA where the Legislature has allowed specific actions against the government to stand, such as the Civil Rights Act.” Mack v Detroit, 467 Mich 186, 195 ; 649 NW2d 47 (2002), citing MCL 37.2103(g), MCL 37.2202(a), and Manning v City of Hazel Park, 202 Mich App 685, 699 ; 509 NW2d 874 (1993) (recognizing that governmental immunity is not a defense to claims brought under the Civil Rights Act because the act s

2010THE DOCTRINE OF CHANCES The doctrine of chances is used to establish the relevancy of certain types of past acts evidence and to avoid the prohibition against character evidence.10 Basically, it states that, when someone suffers a specific type of accident with extraordinary 6 People v Crawford, 458 Mich 376, 384 ; 582 NW2d 785 (1998). 7 Id. 8 Id. at 385 . 9 Crawford, 458 Mich at 390 . 10 Imwinkelried, An evidentiary paradox: Defending the character evidence prohibition by upholding a non-character theory of logical relevance, The doctrine of chances, 40 U Rich L R 419, 422 (2006).

2010THE DOCTRINE OF CHANCES The doctrine of chances is used to establish the relevancy of certain types of past acts evidence and to avoid the prohibition against character evidence.10 Basically, it states that, when someone suffers a specific type of accident with extraordinary 6 People v Crawford, 458 Mich 376, 384 ; 582 NW2d 785 (1998). 7 Id. 8 Id. at 385 . 9 Crawford, 458 Mich at 390 . 10 Imwinkelried, An evidentiary paradox: Defending the character evidence prohibition by upholding a non-character theory of logical relevance, The doctrine of chances, 40 U Rich L R 419, 422 (2006).

2010Relying on the discussion of the requirement of finality in the context of a taking claim in Paragon, 452 Mich. at 578-579 , 550 N.W.2d 772 , plaintiffs, the trial court, and the Court of Appeals majority appear to have proceeded on the assumption that Paragon 's ripeness and finality rules can never apply to an ostensibly "facial" attack on a zoning ordinance, i.e., one premised on an exclusionary zoning theory.

2010Relying on the discussion of the requirement of finality in the context of a taking claim in Paragon, 452 Mich at 578-579 , plaintiffs, the trial court, and the Court of Appeals majority appear to have proceeded on the assumption that Paragon’s ripeness and finality rules can never apply to an ostensibly “facial” attack on a zoning ordinance, i.e., one premised on an exclusionary zoning theory.

2006Justice Scalia refers us to Reynolds v United States, 98 US (8 Otto) 145, 158-159; 25 L Ed 244 (1879), for a discussion of this doctrine.

2002The best discussion of this principle is found in People v Needham, 8 Mich App 679 ; 155 NW2d 267 (1967).

2002The best discussion of this principle is found in People v Needham, 8 Mich App 679 ; 155 NW2d 267 (1967).

1999Peckham, J., in Wright v Bank of the Metropolis ( 110 NY 237 ) [ 18 NE 79 (1888)], remarked, after reviewing numerous decisions: “In all this discussion as to the rule of damages, we have assumed that the defendant acted in good faith, in an honest mistake.” (p 249). *156 The “reasonable time” has been greatly narrowed over the years.

1999Peckham, J., in Wright v Bank of the Metropolis ( 110 NY 237 ) [ 18 NE 79 (1888)], remarked, after reviewing numerous decisions: “In all this discussion as to the rule of damages, we have assumed that the defendant acted in good faith, in an honest mistake.” (p 249). *156 The “reasonable time” has been greatly narrowed over the years.

1998A As is made evident from this discussion of the doctrine of mitigation of damages, the Court of Appeals applied an erroneous rule of law in holding that "the evidence showed that plaintiff's own efforts to secure similar employment were not reasonable." 221 Mich.App. at 287 , 561 N.W.2d 469 .

1998A As is made evident from this discussion of the doctrine of mitigation of damages, the Court of Appeals applied an erroneous rule of law in holding that "the evidence showed that plaintiff's own efforts to secure similar employment were not reasonable." 221 Mich.App. at 287 , 561 N.W.2d 469 .

1986Law & Discussion The issue is narrow: Did the trial court err in applying the principles of Bennison, supra, to this dispute?

1986Transactional immunity has been defined as "immunity from prosecution for offenses to which compelled testimony relates.” Use immunity is defined as immunity from "use of compelled testimony and evidence derived therefrom.” Kastigar v United States, 406 US 441, 443 ; 92 S Ct 1653 ; 32 L Ed 2d 212 (1972); People v Patterson, 58 Mich App 727, 730 ; 228 NW2d 804 (1975), lv den 394 Mich 796 (1975).

1986Transactional immunity has been defined as "immunity from prosecution for offenses to which compelled testimony relates.” Use immunity is defined as immunity from "use of compelled testimony and evidence derived therefrom.” Kastigar v United States, 406 US 441, 443 ; 92 S Ct 1653 ; 32 L Ed 2d 212 (1972); People v Patterson, 58 Mich App 727, 730 ; 228 NW2d 804 (1975), lv den 394 Mich 796 (1975).

1986Transactional immunity has been defined as "immunity from prosecution for offenses to which compelled testimony relates.” Use immunity is defined as immunity from "use of compelled testimony and evidence derived therefrom.” Kastigar v United States, 406 US 441, 443 ; 92 S Ct 1653 ; 32 L Ed 2d 212 (1972); People v Patterson, 58 Mich App 727, 730 ; 228 NW2d 804 (1975), lv den 394 Mich 796 (1975).

1986Transactional immunity has been defined as "immunity from prosecution for offenses to which compelled testimony relates.” Use immunity is defined as immunity from "use of compelled testimony and evidence derived therefrom.” Kastigar v United States, 406 US 441, 443 ; 92 S Ct 1653 ; 32 L Ed 2d 212 (1972); People v Patterson, 58 Mich App 727, 730 ; 228 NW2d 804 (1975), lv den 394 Mich 796 (1975).

1981The discussion of these factors in People v Wilson, supra , is instructive: "If retroactivity were ordered it would have a significant impact on the administration of justice.

1981The discussion of these factors in People v Wilson, supra, is instructive: "If retroactivity were ordered it would have a significant impact on the administration of justice.

1979One of the first courts to reject application of the defense of contributory negligence in a factual setting involving safety devices was the New York Court of Appeals in Koenig v Patrick Construction Corp, 298 NY 313 ; 83 NE2d 133 (1948).

1979One of the first courts to reject application of the defense of contributory negligence in a factual setting involving safety devices was the New York Court of Appeals in Koenig v Patrick Construction Corp, 298 NY 313 ; 83 NE2d 133 (1948).

1970The recent discussion of the doctrine of governmental immunity by the Michigan Supreme Court began with Williams v. City of Detroit (1961), 364 Mich 231 . 2 In a five-to-three decision with three separate opinions, the Court eliminated prospectively the immunity of municipal corporations for their negligent acts.

1970Four of the justices were willing to say, “From this date forward the judicial doctrine of governmental immunity from ordinary torts no longer exists in Michigan.” 364 Mich at 250 .

1915Co., 86 Wis. 245 , [ 56 N. W. 465 ].” There is a discussion of the doctrine of respondeat superior in Hartley v. Miller, 165 Mich. 115 ( 130 N. W. 336 , 33 L.

1915Co., 86 Wis. 245 , [ 56 N. W. 465 ].” There is a discussion of the doctrine of respondeat superior in Hartley v. Miller, 165 Mich. 115 ( 130 N. W. 336 , 33 L.

1915Co., 86 Wis. 245 , [ 56 N. W. 465 ].” There is a discussion of the doctrine of respondeat superior in Hartley v. Miller, 165 Mich. 115 ( 130 N. W. 336 , 33 L.

1908See, also, Davis v. Insurance Co., 127 Mich. 559 ; Co-operative Telephone Co. v. Katus, 140 Mich. 367 ; McIlroy v. Richards, 148 Mich. 694 .