discussion rule in Arkansas

1949“For a discussion of the doctrine of res judicata see McCarroll, Commissioner of Revenues v. Farrar, 199 Ark. 320, 134 S. W. 2d 561.

1949“For a discussion of the doctrine of res judicata see McCarroll, Commissioner of Revenues v. Farrar, 199 Ark. 320, 134 S. W. 2d 561.

2026Baltz v. Baltz, 2021 Ark.

2022Robinson v. Murphy, 2020 Ark.

2019Id.

2016In Jarrett, 371 Ark. at 104-05 , 263 S.W.3d at 542 , our supreme court held that “a request to proceed pro se is not an unequivocal request if it is an attempt on the part of the defendant to have another attorney appointed.” Jarrett had expressed his “extreme displeasure” with his attorney, but his displeasure “did not amount to an unequivocal request to take responsibility, be held accountable, and proceed pro se.” Id. at 105 , 263 S.W.3d at 542 .

2016In Jarrett, 371 Ark. at 104-05 , 263 S.W.3d at 542 , our supreme court held that “a request to proceed pro se is not an unequivocal request if it is an attempt on the part of the defendant to have another attorney appointed.” Jarrett had expressed his “extreme displeasure” with his attorney, but his displeasure “did not amount to an unequivocal request to take responsibility, be held accountable, and proceed pro se.” Id. at 105 , 263 S.W.3d at 542 .

2014Discussion Our standard of review for determining the sufficiency of the evidence in a delinquency case is the same as that used in a criminal case: considering only the evidence that tends to support the finding of guilt and viewing it in the light most favorable to the State, 4 Cite as 2014 Ark.

2010I believe the facts of Servewell Plumbing, LLC v. Summit Contractors, Inc., 362 Ark. 598 , 210 S.W.3d 101 (2005), are mostly distinguishable from the case at bar, rendering the discussion of waiver in that case dicta.

2010I believe the facts of Servewell Plumbing, LLC v. Summit Contractors, Inc., 362 Ark. 598 , 210 S.W.3d 101 (2005), are mostly distinguishable from the case at bar, rendering the discussion of waiver in that case dicta.

1981For a complete discussion of our rule and the exceptions to the lack of objections, see Wicks v. State, 270 Ark. 781 at 785 , 606 S.W. 2d 366 (1980).

1981For a complete discussion of our rule and the exceptions to the lack of objections, see Wicks v. State, 270 Ark. 781 at 785 , 606 S.W. 2d 366 (1980).

1972We quote as follows: “In Horner v. Barber (1964) 229 Cal App 2d 829, 40 Cal Rptr 570, 8 ALR 3d 966 , the plaintiff and the defendants occupied separate parts of the same building, the defendants conducting a garage, automobile repair, and automobile parts business in their portion.

1972If there were actually separate causes of action which could be brought by the carrier and the beneficiary, each acting independently, we could not have held, as we did in Superior Forwarding Company v. Sikes, 233 Ark. 932 , 349 S.W.2d 818 , that the tortfeasor was not prejudiced by the trial court's refusal to require the carrier to intervene in a tort action instituted by the employee against it. [2] See also, Varney v. Taylor, 71 N.M. 444 , 379 P.2d 84 (1963), where it was held that intervention by a compensation carrier should be allowed under such conditions as would protect all parties t

1972If there were actually separate causes of action which could be brought by the carrier and the beneficiary, each acting independently, we could not have held, as we did in Superior Forwarding Company v. Sikes, 233 Ark. 932 , 349 S.W.2d 818 , that the tortfeasor was not prejudiced by the trial court's refusal to require the carrier to intervene in a tort action instituted by the employee against it. [2] See also, Varney v. Taylor, 71 N.M. 444 , 379 P.2d 84 (1963), where it was held that intervention by a compensation carrier should be allowed under such conditions as would protect all parties t

1972If there were actually separate causes of action which could be brought by the carrier and the beneficiary, each acting independently, we could not have held, as we did in Superior Forwarding Company v. Sikes, 233 Ark. 932 , 349 S.W.2d 818 , that the tortfeasor was not prejudiced by the trial court's refusal to require the carrier to intervene in a tort action instituted by the employee against it. [2] See also, Varney v. Taylor, 71 N.M. 444 , 379 P.2d 84 (1963), where it was held that intervention by a compensation carrier should be allowed under such conditions as would protect all parties t

1972If there were actually separate causes of action which could be brought by the carrier and the beneficiary, each acting independently, we could not have held, as we did in Superior Forwarding Company v. Sikes, 233 Ark. 932 , 349 S.W.2d 818 , that the tortfeasor was not prejudiced by the trial court's refusal to require the carrier to intervene in a tort action instituted by the employee against it. [2] See also, Varney v. Taylor, 71 N.M. 444 , 379 P.2d 84 (1963), where it was held that intervention by a compensation carrier should be allowed under such conditions as would protect all parties t

1964Jur. 378 ; Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co. v. Kirven, 215 U. S. 252 .