discussion standard in Tennessee

2016Rather, the denial “must include both an enumei’ation of the evidence that was considered and a discussion of the factors considered and weight accorded each.” Pinkham, 955 S.W.2d at 960 ; see also Bell, 69 S.W.3d at 178 .

2014This Court held that the denial of pretrial diversion “must be in writing and must include ‘an enumeration of the evidence that was considered and a discussion of the factors considered and weight accorded each,’ ” id. at 157 (quoting State v. Pinkham, 955 S.W.2d 956, 960 (Tenn. 1997)), and that the ultimate decision is “presumptively correct, ... subject to review by the trial court only for an abuse of discretion,” id. at 158 (defining an abuse of discretion as “an absence of any substantial evidence to support the refusal”).

2011“If the district attorney general denies pretrial diversion, that denial must be written and must include both an enumeration of the evidence that was considered and a discussion of the factors considered and weight accorded each.” Pinkham, 955 S.W.2d at 960 (citing State v. Winsett, 882 S.W.2d 806, 810 (Tenn. Crim.

2011“If the district attorney general denies pretrial diversion, that denial must be written and must include both an enumeration of the evidence that was considered and a discussion of the factors considered and weight accorded each.” Pinkham, 955 S.W.2d at 960 (citing State v. Winsett, 882 S.W.2d 806, 810 (Tenn. Crim.

2007Discussion Our standard of review as to the granting of a motion to dismiss is set out *303 in Stein v. Davidson Hotel Co., 945 S.W.2d 714 (Tenn.1997).

2007Discussion Our standard of review as to the granting of a motion to dismiss is set out in Stein v. Davidson Hotel Co., 945 S.W.2d 714 (Tenn.1997).

2009With respect to legal issues, our review is conducted “under a pure de novo standard of review, according no deference to the conclusions of law made by the lower courts.” Southern Constructors, Inc. v. Loudon County Bd. of Educ., 58 S.W.3d 706, 710 (Tenn. 2001).

2009With respect to legal issues, our review is conducted “under a pure de novo standard of review, according no deference to the conclusions of law made by the lower courts.” Southern Constructor's, Inc. v. Loudon County Bd. of Educ., 58 S.W.3d 706, 710 (Tenn.2001).

2016Rather, the denial “must include both an enumei’ation of the evidence that was considered and a discussion of the factors considered and weight accorded each.” Pinkham, 955 S.W.2d at 960 ; see also Bell, 69 S.W.3d at 178 .

2007Rather, “[i]f the district attorney general denies pretrial diversion, that denial must be written and must include both an enumeration of the evidence that was considered and a discussion of the factors considered and weight accorded each.” Pinkham, 955 S.W.2d at 960 ; see also Bell, 69 S.W.3d at 178 (reiterating that the district attorney general must not only consider all relevant factors, including evidence favorable to the defendant, he or she must also weigh each factor and must explain in writing how a decision to deny pretrial diversion was determined).

2014This Court held that the denial of pretrial diversion “must be in writing and must include ‘an enumeration of the evidence that was considered and a discussion of the factors considered and weight accorded each,’ ” id. at 157 (quoting State v. Pinkham, 955 S.W.2d 956, 960 (Tenn. 1997)), and that the ultimate decision is “presumptively correct, ... subject to review by the trial court only for an abuse of discretion,” id. at 158 (defining an abuse of discretion as “an absence of any substantial evidence to support the refusal”).

2001State v. Curry, 988 S.W.2d 153, 157 (Tenn. 1999) (citing State v. Pinkham, 955 S.W.2d at 960 ).

2012“A district attorney general’s failure to consider and articulate all relevant factors constitutes an abuse of discretion.” McKim, 215 S.W.3d at 787 (citations omitted).

2009Our supreme court has also explained that when “determining whether to grant pretrial diversion, the district attorney general ‘has a duty to exercise his or her discretion by focusing on a defendant’s amenability for correction and by considering all of the relevant factors, including evidence that is favorable to a defendant.’ Any factors tending to reflect accurately upon whether the applying defendant will or will not become a repeat offender should be considered.” State v. McKim, 215 S.W.3d 781, 786 (citing State v. Bell, 69 S.W.3d 171 , 178 and Hammersley, 650 S.W.2d at 355 ).

2003Discussion The standard of review in determining whether a trial court was correct in granting a directed verdict is set forth in Wharton Transport Corp. v. Bridges, 606 S.W.2d 521, 525 (Tenn. 1980): On review of the grant of a directed verdict on motion of a defendant, it is not the office of an appellate court to weigh the evidence.

2003Discussion The standard of review in determining whether a trial court was correct in granting a directed verdict is set forth in Wharton Transport Corp. v. Bridges, 606 S.W.2d 521, 525 (Tenn.1980): On review of the grant of a directed verdict on motion of a defendant, it is not the office of an appellate court to weigh the evidence.

2003Since this right is fundamental but not absolute, “[t]he federal and state constitutions require the opportunity for an individualized determination that a parent is either unfit or will cause substantial harm to his or her child before the fundamental right to the care and custody of the child can be taken away.” In re Swanson, 2 S.W.3d 180, 188 (Tenn.1999).

2003Since this right is fundamental but not absolute, “[t]he federal and state constitutions require the opportunity for an individualized determination that a parent is either unfit or will cause substantial harm to his or her child before the fundamental right to the care and custody of the child can be taken away.” In re Swanson, 2 S.W.3d 180, 188 (Tenn. 1999).

2000There must be "more than an abstract statement in the record that the district attorney general has considered these factors." State v. Herron, 767 S.W.2d 151, 156 (Tenn. 1989).

1999This “requirement entails more than an abstract statement in the record that the district attorney general has considered these factors.” State v. Herron, 767 S.W.2d 151, 156 (Tenn.1989).

1995Rather than analyze this issue in detail, we rely on the discussion and analysis of this issue by Judge Joe Duncan in State v. Wright, 618 S.W.2d 310, 315-17 (Tenn.Crim.App.1981).

1995Rather than analyze this issue in detail, we rely on the discussion and analysis of this issue by Judge Joe Duncan in State v. Wright, 618 S.W.2d 310, 315-17 (Tenn.Crim.App.1981); see Raybin, Tennessee Criminal Practice and.

1999Id. at 959-60 (quoting State v. Hammersley, 650 S.W.2d 352, 355 (Tenn.1983)). 3 If the district attorney general denies pretrial diversion, the denial must be in writing and must include “an enumeration of the evidence that was considered and a discussion of the factors considered and weight accorded each.” Pinkham, 955 S.W.2d at 960 .

1999Id. at 959-60 (quoting State v. Hammersley, 650 S.W.2d 352, 355 (Tenn.1983)). [3] If the district attorney general denies pretrial diversion, the denial must be in writing and must include "an enumeration of the evidence that was considered and a discussion of the factors considered and weight accorded each." Pinkham, 955 S.W.2d at 960 .

2003Discussion Our analysis in a termination of parental rights action begins with the well-established premise that “[a] parent has a fundamental right to the care, custody and control of his or her child.” Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 , 92 S.Ct. 1208 , 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972).

2003Discussion Our analysis in a termination of parental rights action begins with the well-established premise that “[a] parent has a fundamental right to the care, custody and control of his or her child.” Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 , 92 S.Ct. 1208 , 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972).

2026“A trial court abuses its discretion when it applies incorrect legal standards, reaches an illogical conclusion, bases its ruling on a clearly erroneous assessment of the proof, or applies reasoning that causes an injustice to the complaining party.” State v. Phelps, 329 S.W.3d 436, 443 (Tenn. 2010). 3 Discussion The motion before this Court is titled “Motion for Review of Bond Conditions.” The Defendants are asking this Court “to remove from their bond conditions the ‘no contact’ prohibition with their twenty-seven children, including the four minor children who lived with them on the day of

2016Cruse v. City of Columbia, 922 S.W.2d 492, 495 (Tenn. 1996).

2015Hawks v. City of Westmoreland, 960 S.W.2d 10, 14 (Tenn.1997) (citing Lucius v. City of Memphis, 925 S.W.2d 522, 525 (Tenn.1996)).

2015Hawks v. City of Westmoreland, 960 S.W.2d 10, 14 (Tenn.1997) (citing Lucius v. City of Memphis, 925 S.W.2d 522, 525 (Tenn.1996)).

2014In State v. Anderson, the Court of Criminal Appeals first used the phrase “substantial evidence” in the context of judicial diversion, reasoning that judicial diversion “is to be imposed within the discretion of the trial court subject only to the same constraints applicable to prosecutors in applying pretrial diversion.” 857 S.W.2d at 572 (emphasis added).

2012See, e.g., Cockburn v. Howard Johnson, Inc., 385 S.W.2d 101, 102 (Tenn. 1964).

2007See id. at 117-18, 119 S.Ct. 484 ; see also LaFave, 102 Mich. L.Rev. at 1869 (for a discussion of this doctrine).

2006See Taylor v. Butler, 142 S.W.3d 277, 284-85 (Tenn.2004)(citing Lewis Refrigeration Co. v. Sawyer Fruit, Vegetable & Cold Storage Co., 709 F.2d 427 , 435 n. 12 (6th Cir.1983)).

2006P. 9 interlocutory appeal on the “sole issue of whether the Trial Court’s Memorandum Opinion of February 8, 2006 ... was in conflict with Taylor v. Butler, 142 S.W.3d 277 (Tenn.2004), and if so, was that error by the Trial Court.” To these two questions contained in the sole issue before us, we answer “yes” and “yes.” Discussion The issue of whether an arbitration clause is unconscionable is a question of law.

2006See Taylor v. Butler, 142 S.W.3d 277, 284-85 (Tenn.2004)(citing Lewis Refrigeration Co. v. Sawyer Fruit, Vegetable & Cold Storage Co., 709 F.2d 427 , 435 n. 12 (6th Cir.1983)).