discussion motion in Connecticut

2000See P.B. § 10-39 (a)(1); Ferryman v. Groton , 212 Conn. 138 , 142 (1989).

1994Ferryman v. Groton , 212 Conn. 138 , 142 , 561 A.2d 432 (1989).

1995Discussion The motion to dismiss is the "proper vehicle for claiming any lack of jurisdiction in the trial court." Upson v. State, 190 Conn. 622 , 624-25 n. 4, 461 A.2d 991 (1983). "[W]hen a motion to dismiss does not seek to introduce facts outside the record it . . . admits all well-pleaded facts, the complaint being construed most favorably to the plaintiff." American Laundry Machine, Inc. v. State, 190 Conn. 212 , 217 , 459 A.2d 1031 (1983).

1995Discussion The motion to dismiss is the "proper vehicle for claiming any lack of jurisdiction in the trial court." Upson v. State, 190 Conn. 622 , 624-25 n. 4, 461 A.2d 991 (1983). "[W]hen a motion to dismiss does not seek to introduce facts outside the record it . . . admits all well-pleaded facts, the complaint being construed most favorably to the plaintiff." American Laundry Machine, Inc. v. State, 190 Conn. 212 , 217 , 459 A.2d 1031 (1983).

1995Discussion The motion to dismiss is the "proper vehicle for claiming any lack of jurisdiction in the trial court." Upson v. State, 190 Conn. 622 , 624-25 n. 4, 461 A.2d 991 (1983). "[W]hen a motion to dismiss does not seek to introduce facts outside the record it . . . admits all well-pleaded facts, the complaint being construed most favorably to the plaintiff." American Laundry Machine, Inc. v. State, 190 Conn. 212 , 217 , 459 A.2d 1031 (1983).

1995Discussion The motion to dismiss is the "proper vehicle for claiming any lack of jurisdiction in the trial court." Upson v. State, 190 Conn. 622 , 624-25 n. 4, 461 A.2d 991 (1983). "[W]hen a motion to dismiss does not seek to introduce facts outside the record it . . . admits all well-pleaded facts, the complaint being construed most favorably to the plaintiff." American Laundry Machine, Inc. v. State, 190 Conn. 212 , 217 , 459 A.2d 1031 (1983).

2001Connelly v. Housing Authority of New Haven , 213 Conn. 354 (1990).

1994Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Connelly v. Housing Authority, 213 Conn. 354 , 364 , 567 A.2d 1212 (1990).

1995DISCUSSION The motion for summary judgment is "designed to eliminate CT Page 1782 delay and expenses of litigating an issue when there is no real issue to be tried." Wilson v. New Haven, 213 Conn. 277 , 279 , 567 A.2d 829 (1989).

1995DISCUSSION The motion for summary judgment is "designed to eliminate CT Page 1782 delay and expenses of litigating an issue when there is no real issue to be tried." Wilson v. New Haven, 213 Conn. 277 , 279 , 567 A.2d 829 (1989).

1995The motion "shall always be filed with a supporting memorandum of law, and when appropriate, with supporting affidavits as to facts not apparent on the record." Tamm v. Burns, 222 Conn. 280 , 282 n. 2, 610 A.2d 590 (1992).

1995The motion "shall always be filed with a supporting memorandum of law, and when appropriate, with supporting affidavits as to facts not apparent on the record." Tamm v. Burns, 222 Conn. 280 , 282 n. 2, 610 A.2d 590 (1992).

1994We begin with a discussion of the standard for appellate review of a trial court’s dismissal of a complaint for lack of jurisdiction. “[T]he doctrine of sovereign immunity implicates subject matter jurisdiction and is therefore a basis for granting a motion to dismiss.” Amore v. Frankel, 228 Conn. 358, 364 , 636 A.2d 786 (1994).

1994We begin with a discussion of the standard for appellate review of a trial court’s dismissal of a complaint for lack of jurisdiction. “[T]he doctrine of sovereign immunity implicates subject matter jurisdiction and is therefore a basis for granting a motion to dismiss.” Amore v. Frankel, 228 Conn. 358, 364 , 636 A.2d 786 (1994).

1992"In ruling on a motion to strike, the court must construe the facts alleged in the complaint in the manner most favorable to the plaintiff." Rowe v. Godou, 209 Conn. 273 , 278 , 550 A.2d 1073 (1988).

1992"In ruling on a motion to strike, the court must construe the facts alleged in the complaint in the manner most favorable to the plaintiff." Rowe v. Godou, 209 Conn. 273 , 278 , 550 A.2d 1073 (1988).

2021Having the benefit of the supplemental briefing of the parties, and guided by the discussion and analysis contained in our Supreme Court’s opinion in State v. Rhodes, 335 Conn. 226, 238 , 249 A.3d 683 (2020), regarding the ‘‘ ‘line between permissible inference and impermissible speculation,’ ’’ we respectfully have reached an outcome different from the one reached by the 2019 panel of this court, which had determined that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict.

2020In this opinion the other judges concurred. 1 Gurpreet Ahuja died on December 28, 2016, several months after the commencement of this action, and the executor of her estate has been substituted as a defendant. 2 See Zeller v. Consolini, 59 Conn. App. 545 , 758 A.2d 376 (2000), for a discussion of this doctrine. 3 The seventh count, alleging tortious interference with business expecta- tions, was subsequently withdrawn and is not at issue in this appeal.

2020In this opinion the other judges concurred. 1 Gurpreet Ahuja died on December 28, 2016, several months after the commencement of this action, and the executor of her estate has been substituted as a defendant. 2 See Zeller v. Consolini, 59 Conn. App. 545 , 758 A.2d 376 (2000), for a discussion of this doctrine. 3 The seventh count, alleging tortious interference with business expecta- tions, was subsequently withdrawn and is not at issue in this appeal.

2018"The exercise of our supervisory powers is an extraordinary remedy to be invoked only when circumstances are such that the issue at hand, while not rising to the level of a constitutional violation, is nonetheless of utmost seriousness, not only for the integrity of a particular trial but also for the perceived fairness of the judicial system as a whole." (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lockhart , supra, 298 Conn. at 576 , 4 A.3d 1176 .

2018"The exercise of our supervisory powers is an extraordinary remedy to be invoked only when circumstances are such that the issue at hand, while not rising to the level of a constitutional violation, is nonetheless of utmost seriousness, not only for the integrity of a particular trial but also for the perceived fairness of the judicial system as a whole." (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lockhart , supra, 298 Conn. at 576 , 4 A.3d 1176 .

2010For this reason, the due process analysis in Justice Schaller's concurring and dissenting opinion is flawed. [78] *79 Justice Schaller's analysis suffers from another fatal infirmity, namely, his assertion that the trial court incorrectly concluded that State v. Anonymous (1986-1), supra, 40 Conn.Supp. at 498 , 516 A.2d 156 , placed the defendant on notice of the born alive rule because the court's discussion of the rule in Anonymous was merely dictum. [79] Contrary to Justice Schaller's contention, the court in Anonymous relied expressly on the born alive rule in concluding that a fetus kille

2009Upon receipt of such application, the panel shall, after notice, hold a hearing and the panel, by a majority vote, may disclose any such part of the record when such disclosure is deemed by the panel to be in the public interest . . . .” 5 As the Appellate Court explained, “[t]he ultimate task of the investigatory grand jury is to make a finding to the court; it cannot indict. . . . ‘[Investigating grand juries neither try nor condemn nor accuse; they only inquire and report.’ In re Investigation of the Grand Juror, 188 Conn. 601, 605 , 452 A.2d 935 (1982). ‘The inquiry . . . is made by an ind

2009Upon receipt of such application, the panel shall, after notice, hold a hearing and the panel, by a majority vote, may disclose any such part of the record when such disclosure is deemed by the panel to be in the public interest . . . .” 5 As the Appellate Court explained, “[t]he ultimate task of the investigatory grand jury is to make a finding to the court; it cannot indict. . . . ‘[Investigating grand juries neither try nor condemn nor accuse; they only inquire and report.’ In re Investigation of the Grand Juror, 188 Conn. 601, 605 , 452 A.2d 935 (1982). ‘The inquiry . . . is made by an ind

2009Id., at 245, 941 A.2d 989 .

2008In the present case, the defendant devotes little more than a page of her original and reply briefs combined to the discussion of her claim, limiting her argument to the bare assertion that she should not be held legally liable for offer of judgment interest because she was not specifically named in the offer and no unified offer was made to all four defendants. 24 The only case on which she relies is Butts v. Francis, 4 Conn. 424 (1822), 25 in which the court concluded that, where two or more persons are sued on a joint contract, service must be made, if not by personal summons, then by leavi

2008In the present case, the defendant devotes little more than a page of her original and reply briefs combined to the discussion of her claim, limiting her argument to the bare assertion that she should not be held legally liable for offer of judgment interest because she was not specifically named in the offer and no unified offer was made to all four defendants. [24] The only case on which she relies is Butts v. Francis, 4 Conn. 424 (1822), [25] in which the court concluded that, where two or more persons are sued on a joint contract, service must be made, if not by personal summons, then by l

2004The defendant’s discussion of that claim merely consists of a direction to this court to “see court clerk’s comments on page twenty hereafter in this brief.” Although we are solicitous of the fact that the defendant is a pro se litigant, “the statutes and rules of practice cannot be ignored completely.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bennings v. Dept. of Correction, 59 Conn. App. 83, 84 , 756 A.2d 289 (2000).

2004The defendant’s discussion of that claim merely consists of a direction to this court to “see court clerk’s comments on page twenty hereafter in this brief.” Although we are solicitous of the fact that the defendant is a pro se litigant, “the statutes and rules of practice cannot be ignored completely.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bennings v. Dept. of Correction, 59 Conn. App. 83, 84 , 756 A.2d 289 (2000).

2003Corp. v. Peabody, N.E., Inc. , 239 Conn. 93 , 101 , 680 A.2d 1321 (1996). "[B]ecause the state can act only through its officers and agents, a suit against the state officer concerning a matter in which the officer represents the state, is in effect, against the state." Shay v. Rossi , 253 Conn. 134 , 168 , 749 A.2d 396 , cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1017 , 119 S.Ct. 542 , 142 L.Ed.2d 451 (1998).

2003Corp. v. Peabody, N.E., Inc. , 239 Conn. 93 , 101 , 680 A.2d 1321 (1996). "[B]ecause the state can act only through its officers and agents, a suit against the state officer concerning a matter in which the officer represents the state, is in effect, against the state." Shay v. Rossi , 253 Conn. 134 , 168 , 749 A.2d 396 , cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1017 , 119 S.Ct. 542 , 142 L.Ed.2d 451 (1998).

2003Corp. v. Peabody, N.E., Inc. , 239 Conn. 93 , 101 , 680 A.2d 1321 (1996). "[B]ecause the state can act only through its officers and agents, a suit against the state officer concerning a matter in which the officer represents the state, is in effect, against the state." Shay v. Rossi , 253 Conn. 134 , 168 , 749 A.2d 396 , cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1017 , 119 S.Ct. 542 , 142 L.Ed.2d 451 (1998).

2003Corp. v. Peabody, N.E., Inc. , 239 Conn. 93 , 101 , 680 A.2d 1321 (1996). "[B]ecause the state can act only through its officers and agents, a suit against the state officer concerning a matter in which the officer represents the state, is in effect, against the state." Shay v. Rossi , 253 Conn. 134 , 168 , 749 A.2d 396 , cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1017 , 119 S.Ct. 542 , 142 L.Ed.2d 451 (1998).

2003Corp. v. Peabody, N.E., Inc. , 239 Conn. 93 , 101 , 680 A.2d 1321 (1996). "[B]ecause the state can act only through its officers and agents, a suit against the state officer concerning a matter in which the officer represents the state, is in effect, against the state." Shay v. Rossi , 253 Conn. 134 , 168 , 749 A.2d 396 , cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1017 , 119 S.Ct. 542 , 142 L.Ed.2d 451 (1998).

2003Corp. v. Peabody, N.E., Inc. , 239 Conn. 93 , 101 , 680 A.2d 1321 (1996). "[B]ecause the state can act only through its officers and agents, a suit against the state officer concerning a matter in which the officer represents the state, is in effect, against the state." Shay v. Rossi , 253 Conn. 134 , 168 , 749 A.2d 396 , cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1017 , 119 S.Ct. 542 , 142 L.Ed.2d 451 (1998).

2002CT Page 10756 The case of Zachs v. Zoning Board of Appeals , 218 Conn. 324 (1991) is the case which established the analysis on this issue.

2002"The trial court has the inherent power to set aside a jury verdict which, in the court's opinion, is either against the law or the evidence." Hunt v. Prior , 236 Conn. 421 , 428 n. 21, 673 A.2d 514 (1996).

2002"The trial court has the inherent power to set aside a jury verdict which, in the court's opinion, is either against the law or the evidence." Hunt v. Prior , 236 Conn. 421 , 428 n. 21, 673 A.2d 514 (1996).

2002He argues that "the law enforcement officers were not armed with either an arrest warrant or a search warrant, were not participating in a controlled buy, had received no information that a buy was occurring and did not see the defendant do anything that would suggest a crime had just occurred, was occurring or was about to occur." Defendant's Memorandum of Law in Support of Amended Motion to Suppress Tangible Evidence and Written and/or Verbal Statements Made by the Defendant (hereinafter Defendant's Memorandum), p. 19. "[E]ffective crime prevention and detection . . . [underlie] the recognit

2002He argues that "the law enforcement officers were not armed with either an arrest warrant or a search warrant, were not participating in a controlled buy, had received no information that a buy was occurring and did not see the defendant do anything that would suggest a crime had just occurred, was occurring or was about to occur." Defendant's Memorandum of Law in Support of Amended Motion to Suppress Tangible Evidence and Written and/or Verbal Statements Made by the Defendant (hereinafter Defendant's Memorandum), p. 19. "[E]ffective crime prevention and detection . . . [underlie] the recognit

2002"Under both the federal and the state constitutions, a warrantless search and seizure is per se unreasonable, subject to a few well defined exceptions." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Cooper , 65 Conn. App. 551 , 564 , 783 A.2d 100 , cert. denied, 258 Conn. 940 , 786 A.2d 427 (2001).

2002"Under both the federal and the state constitutions, a warrantless search and seizure is per se unreasonable, subject to a few well defined exceptions." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Cooper , 65 Conn. App. 551 , 564 , 783 A.2d 100 , cert. denied, 258 Conn. 940 , 786 A.2d 427 (2001).

2002(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Jaser v. Zoning Board of Appeals , 43 Conn. App. 545 , 547 , 684 A.2d 735 (1996).

2002(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Jaser v. Zoning Board of Appeals , 43 Conn. App. 545 , 547 , 684 A.2d 735 (1996).

2002"Under both the federal and the state constitutions, a warrantless search and seizure is per se unreasonable, subject to a few well defined exceptions." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Cooper , 65 Conn. App. 551 , 564 , 783 A.2d 100 , cert. denied, 258 Conn. 940 , 786 A.2d 427 (2001).

2002"Under both the federal and the state constitutions, a warrantless search and seizure is per se unreasonable, subject to a few well defined exceptions." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Cooper , 65 Conn. App. 551 , 564 , 783 A.2d 100 , cert. denied, 258 Conn. 940 , 786 A.2d 427 (2001).