discussion defendant in Rhode Island

2018Discussion The defendant argues to this Court that the trial justice erred in refusing to pass the case because, even though her statement was stricken, the jury still heard Dr. Kissoon's statement "[t]hat [Megan's] disclosure was consistent with sexual abuse." A trial justice should pass the case if the challenged testimony inflames the passions of the jury and is "so flagrantly impermissible that even a precautionary instruction would have been insufficient to dispel the prejudice in the jurors' minds and to assure defendant a fair and impartial trial." State v. Ordway , 619 A.2d 819 , 826 (

2018It is well settled that the raise-or-waive rule "precludes us from considering at the appellate level issues not properly presented before the trial court." State v. Yon , 161 A.3d 1118 , 1128 (R.I. 2017) (quoting State v. Merida , 960 A.2d 228 , 236 (R.I. 2008) ).

2018Discussion The defendant argues to this Court that the trial justice erred in refusing to pass the case because, even though her statement was stricken, the jury still heard Dr. Kissoon's statement "[t]hat [Megan's] disclosure was consistent with sexual abuse." A trial justice should pass the case if the challenged testimony inflames the passions of the jury and is "so flagrantly impermissible that even a precautionary instruction would have been insufficient to dispel the prejudice in the jurors' minds and to assure defendant a fair and impartial trial." State v. Ordway , 619 A.2d 819 , 826 (

2018State v. Oliveira , 961 A.2d 299 , 308 (R.I. 2008). 2 Discussion The defendant argues that without Dr. Kaplan's testimony, the trial justice may not have found the physical injury element of the charge to have been met, and therefore could have found defendant guilty of a lesser-included offense of simple assault.

2018It is well settled that the raise-or-waive rule "precludes us from considering at the appellate level issues not properly presented before the trial court." State v. Yon , 161 A.3d 1118 , 1128 (R.I. 2017) (quoting State v. Merida , 960 A.2d 228 , 236 (R.I. 2008) ).

2018State v. Ceppi , 91 A.3d 320 , 331 (R.I. 2014). 2 Discussion The defendant admits that he did not specifically reference Rule 16 during the trial or in his post-trial motion, but he argues that "the parties and the [c]ourt were clearly discussing and referencing the obligation of the prosecution to provide advance notice of proposed expert testimony." The state counters that, because the trial justice never specifically ruled on a Rule 16 violation, there is no ruling for this Court to review, and, thus, the issue has been waived.

2014The defendant relies heavily on State v. Aponte, 649 A.2d 219 (R.I.1994) in support of his contention.

2013Evidence that may otherwise be admissible under Rule 404(b) is still subject to the Rule 403 balancing test, which excludes otherwise relevant evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury * * Therefore, Rule 403 “is always a consideration in a trial justice’s ruling on the admissibility of Rule 404(b) evidence,” State v. Mlyniec, 15 A.3d 983, 997 (R.I.2011) (quoting State v. Gaspar, 982 A.2d 140, 148 (R.I.2009)), and “the trial justice must carefully weigh the probative value of the evidence agai

2012The doctrine of res judicata, with respect to postconviction relief, has been articulated by this Court as follows: “Section 10-9.1-8, which codifies [sic ] the doctrine of res judicata within the postconviction-relief context, bars ‘reliti-gation of the same issues between the same parties’ after a final judgment has entered in a prior proceeding. * * * An applicant is likewise precluded from raising new issues in a subsequent application, where such issues were not set forth in the first postconviction-relief application, and the applicant fails to establish a reason why his or her claims co

2011It is well established that “[t]his Court’s ‘review of a hearing justice’s decision in a probation-violation proceeding is limited to considering whether the hearing justice acted arbitrarily or capriciously in finding a violation.’ ” Sylvia, 871 A.2d at 957 (quoting State v. Rioux, 708 A.2d 895, 897 (R.I.1998)). ill Discussion The defendant argues that the state’s proffered evidence was “dubious” and that “the hearing justice acted arbitrarily and capriciously” in determining that defendant violated his probation.

2010Therefore, “[sjueh determinations are entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed unless the trial justice has overlooked or misconceived relevant and material evidence or was otherwise clearly wrong.” Id. 2 Discussion The defendant argues that the trial justice overlooked and misconceived the material evidence, both when she adjudicated defendant guilty and in her decision on the motion for a new trial.

2006Discussion The issue before us is similar to the question we resolved in Chatigny v. Gancz, 84 R.I. 255 , 123 A.2d 140 (1956), viz., “whether a probate court is warranted in entertaining a petition for leave to file a claim out of time when the facts show that a final distribution has been made, although without prior order of the probate court, and that there are no assets in the estate.” Id. at 257 , 123 A.2d at 141 .

2006Discussion The issue before us is similar to the question we resolved in Chatigny v. Gancz, 84 R.I. 255 , 123 A.2d 140 (1956), viz., “whether a probate court is warranted in entertaining a petition for leave to file a claim out of time when the facts show that a final distribution has been made, although without prior order of the probate court, and that there are no assets in the estate.” Id. at 257 , 123 A.2d at 141 .

1987For a discussion of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, see generally Parrillo v. Giroux Co., 426 A.2d 1313 (R.I.1981). 2 .

1971I. 451, 16 A.2d 331 . 4 From at least 1889 until 1925 a statute of general application provided that the sheriffs and their deputies, the town sergeants, constables, and the chiefs of police of the several cities and towns should constitute the state police.

1968I. 335, 161 A. 139 ; Hutson v. Cavicchia, 53 R.

1968I. 354, 121 Atl. 531 .