de novo standard in Montana

2018We independently examine the district court's decision, "reviewing the [municipal] court's findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard, its discretionary rulings for abuse of discretion, and its legal conclusions and mixed questions of law and fact under the de novo standard." Stanley v. Lemire , 2006 MT 304 , ¶ 26, 334 Mont. 489 , 148 P.3d 643 .

2018We independently examine the district court's decision, "reviewing the [municipal] court's findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard, its discretionary rulings for abuse of discretion, and its legal conclusions and mixed questions of law and fact under the de novo standard." Stanley v. Lemire , 2006 MT 304 , ¶ 26, 334 Mont. 489 , 148 P.3d 643 .

2011Relying on In re L.S., 2009 MT 83, ¶ 18 , 349 Mont. 518 , 204 P.3d 707 , D.K.D. urges us to apply a de novo standard to the District Court's legal conclusions and statutory interpretations, and an abuse of discretion standard to the court's discretionary rulings, which include administration and evidentiary issues.

2011Relying on In re L.S., 2009 MT 83, ¶ 18 , 349 Mont. 518 , 204 P.3d 707 , D.K.D. urges us to apply a de novo standard to the District Court’s legal conclusions and statutory interpretations, and an abuse of discretion standard to the court’s discretionary rulings, which include administration and evidentiary issues.

2011Citing In re S.C., 2000 MT 370, ¶ 8 , 303 Mont. 444 , 15 P.3d 861 , the State urges us to apply the clearly erroneous standard to the court’s findings of fact and the correctness standard to its conclusions of law. ¶12 We conclude that D.K.D.’s reliance on the standard of review as set forth in ¶ 18 of In re L.S. is inappropriate.

2011Citing In re S.C., 2000 MT 370, ¶ 8 , 303 Mont. 444 , 15 P.3d 861 , the State urges us to apply the clearly erroneous standard to the court’s findings of fact and the correctness standard to its conclusions of law. ¶12 We conclude that D.K.D.’s reliance on the standard of review as set forth in ¶ 18 of In re L.S. is inappropriate.

2011Relying on In re L.S., 2009 MT 83, ¶ 18 , 349 Mont. 518 , 204 P.3d 707 , D.K.D. urges us to apply a de novo standard to the District Court’s legal conclusions and statutory interpretations, and an abuse of discretion standard to the court’s discretionary rulings, which include administration and evidentiary issues.

2011Relying on In re L.S., 2009 MT 83, ¶ 18 , 349 Mont. 518 , 204 P.3d 707 , D.K.D. urges us to apply a de novo standard to the District Court’s legal conclusions and statutory interpretations, and an abuse of discretion standard to the court’s discretionary rulings, which include administration and evidentiary issues.

2010State v. Rardon, 2002 MT 345, ¶ 15 , 314 Mont. 321 , 61 P.3d 132 (Rardon II).

2010State v. Rardon, 2002 MT 345, ¶ 15 , 314 Mont. 321 , 61 P.3d 132 (Rardon II).

2010State v. Rardon, 2002 MT 345, ¶ 15 , 314 Mont. 321 , 61 P.3d 132 (Rardon II).

2010State v. Rardon, 2002 MT 345, ¶ 15 , 314 Mont. 321 , 61 P.3d 132 (Rardon II).

2004State v. Turner, 2000 MT 270, ¶ 47 , 302 Mont. 69, ¶ 47 , 12 P.3d 934, ¶ 47 .

2004State v. Turner, 2000 MT 270, ¶ 47 , 302 Mont. 69, ¶ 47 , 12 P.3d 934, ¶ 47 .

2002Jarman , ¶ 8 (citation omitted). ¶10 Appellants urge the Court to adopt a de novo standard of review for determinations of reasonable suspicion and cite Ornelas v. U.S (1996), 517 U.S. 690 , 116 S. Ct. 1657 , 134 L.Ed.2d 911 , as authority.

2002Jarman , ¶ 8 (citation omitted). ¶10 Appellants urge the Court to adopt a de novo standard of review for determinations of reasonable suspicion and cite Ornelas v. U.S (1996), 517 U.S. 690 , 116 S. Ct. 1657 , 134 L.Ed.2d 911 , as authority.

1993Yanzick v. School District No. 23, Etc. (1982), 196 Mont. 375 , 641 P.2d 431 .) The District Court determined that differences in the findings and conclusions of County Decision II from those of County Decision I were not improper because the District Court Decision I instructed Reynolds, upon remand, to review additional evidence which had been previously excluded.

1993Yanzick v. School District No. 23, Etc. (1982), 196 Mont. 375 , 641 P.2d 431 .) The District Court determined that differences in the findings and conclusions of County Decision II from those of County Decision I were not improper because the District Court Decision I instructed Reynolds, upon remand, to review additional evidence which had been previously excluded.

2026State v. Giffin, 2021 MT 190, ¶ 11 , 405 Mont. 78 , 491 P.3d 1288 (citations omitted).

2026State v. Giffin, 2021 MT 190, ¶ 11 , 405 Mont. 78 , 491 P.3d 1288 (citations omitted).

2023Ereth v. Cascade Cty., 2003 MT 328, ¶ 11 , 318 Mont. 355 , 81 P.3d 463 .19 19 As a narrow exception to the de novo standard of review under M.

2023Ereth v. Cascade Cty., 2003 MT 328, ¶ 11 , 318 Mont. 355 , 81 P.3d 463 .19 19 As a narrow exception to the de novo standard of review under M.

2021"We have, with minor exceptions not important here, applied the de novo standard in criminal cases where we consider mixed questions of law and fact . . ." Holt, ¶ 67 (Nelson, J., concurring); see State v. Grixti, 2005 MT 296,¶ 15 , 329 Mont. 330 , 124 P.3d 177 (ineffective assistance of counsel); State v. Favi, 2005 MT 288, ¶ 10 , 329 Mont. 273 , 124 P.3d 164 (voluntariness of plea); Stop Over Spending Mont. v. State, 2006 MT 178, ¶ 10 , 333 Mont. 42 , 139 P.3d 788 (issues surrounding ballot statements approved by the Attorney General).

2021"We have, with minor exceptions not important here, applied the de novo standard in criminal cases where we consider mixed questions of law and fact . . ." Holt, ¶ 67 (Nelson, J., concurring); see State v. Grixti, 2005 MT 296,¶ 15 , 329 Mont. 330 , 124 P.3d 177 (ineffective assistance of counsel); State v. Favi, 2005 MT 288, ¶ 10 , 329 Mont. 273 , 124 P.3d 164 (voluntariness of plea); Stop Over Spending Mont. v. State, 2006 MT 178, ¶ 10 , 333 Mont. 42 , 139 P.3d 788 (issues surrounding ballot statements approved by the Attorney General).

2021"Mixed questions of law and fact are presented to this Court when the historical facts of a case are admitted or established, the applicable law is undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the statutory standard." Stop Over Spending Mont., ¶ 10 (citing State v. Warclub, 2005 MT 149, ¶ 21 , 327 Mont. 352 , 114 P.3d 254 (citing Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 965 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273 , 289 n. 19, 102 S. Ct. 1781, 1790 (1982)))).

2021"Mixed questions of law and fact are presented to this Court when the historical facts of a case are admitted or established, the applicable law is undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the statutory standard." Stop Over Spending Mont., ¶ 10 (citing State v. Warclub, 2005 MT 149, ¶ 21 , 327 Mont. 352 , 114 P.3d 254 (citing Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 965 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273 , 289 n. 19, 102 S. Ct. 1781, 1790 (1982)))).

2021"We have, with minor exceptions not important here, applied the de novo standard in criminal cases where we consider mixed questions of law and fact . . ." Holt, ¶ 67 (Nelson, J., concurring); see State v. Grixti, 2005 MT 296,¶ 15 , 329 Mont. 330 , 124 P.3d 177 (ineffective assistance of counsel); State v. Favi, 2005 MT 288, ¶ 10 , 329 Mont. 273 , 124 P.3d 164 (voluntariness of plea); Stop Over Spending Mont. v. State, 2006 MT 178, ¶ 10 , 333 Mont. 42 , 139 P.3d 788 (issues surrounding ballot statements approved by the Attorney General).

2021"We have, with minor exceptions not important here, applied the de novo standard in criminal cases where we consider mixed questions of law and fact . . ." Holt, ¶ 67 (Nelson, J., concurring); see State v. Grixti, 2005 MT 296,¶ 15 , 329 Mont. 330 , 124 P.3d 177 (ineffective assistance of counsel); State v. Favi, 2005 MT 288, ¶ 10 , 329 Mont. 273 , 124 P.3d 164 (voluntariness of plea); Stop Over Spending Mont. v. State, 2006 MT 178, ¶ 10 , 333 Mont. 42 , 139 P.3d 788 (issues surrounding ballot statements approved by the Attorney General).

2021Gordon v. Kuzara, 2012 MT 206, ¶ 13 , 366 Mont. 243 , 286 P.3d 895 (citation omitted).

2021Gordon v. Kuzara, 2012 MT 206, ¶ 13 , 366 Mont. 243 , 286 P.3d 895 (citation omitted).

2016According to Davis, this creates the possibility that “a defendant now may be sentenced to imprisonment when a lay judge makes a mistake of law that, because of the standard of review, will evade appellate review by a lawyer-judge.” Davis argues that even if a trial court’s error can be remedied on appeal, the defendant already will have gone through substantial “burden, expense, and delay,” and even may have served his or her entire term of imprisonment before the appeal system can provide relief. ¶16 The State argues that the use of non-lawyer judges to “expeditiously try minor criminal offe

2016According to Davis, this creates the possibility that “a defendant now may be sentenced to imprisonment when a lay judge makes a mistake of law that, because of the standard of review, will evade appellate review by a lawyer-judge.” Davis argues that even if a trial court’s error can be remedied on appeal, the defendant already will have gone through substantial “burden, expense, and delay,” and even may have served his or her entire term of imprisonment before the appeal system can provide relief. ¶16 The State argues that the use of non-lawyer judges to “expeditiously try minor criminal offe

2016According to Davis, this creates the possibility that “a defendant now may be sentenced to imprisonment when a lay judge makes a mistake of law that, because of the standard of review, will evade appellate review by a lawyer-judge.” Davis argues that even if a trial court’s error can be remedied on appeal, the defendant already will have gone through substantial “burden, expense, and delay,” and even may have served his or her entire term of imprisonment before the appeal system can provide relief. ¶16 The State argues that the use of non-lawyer judges to “expeditiously try minor criminal offe

2016According to Davis, this creates the possibility that “a defendant now may be sentenced to imprisonment when a lay judge makes a mistake of law that, because of the standard of review, will evade appellate review by a lawyer-judge.” Davis argues that even if a trial court’s error can be remedied on appeal, the defendant already will have gone through substantial “burden, expense, and delay,” and even may have served his or her entire term of imprisonment before the appeal system can provide relief. ¶16 The State argues that the use of non-lawyer judges to “expeditiously try minor criminal offe

2016According to Davis, this creates the possibility that “a defendant now may be sentenced to imprisonment when a lay judge makes a mistake of law that, because of the standard of review, will evade appellate review by a lawyer-judge.” Davis argues that even if a trial court’s error can be remedied on appeal, the defendant already will have gone through substantial “burden, expense, and delay,” and even may have served his or her entire term of imprisonment before the appeal system can provide relief. ¶16 The State argues that the use of non-lawyer judges to “expeditiously try minor criminal offe

2016According to Davis, this creates the possibility that “a defendant now may be sentenced to imprisonment when a lay judge makes a mistake of law that, because of the standard of review, will evade appellate review by a lawyer-judge.” Davis argues that even if a trial court’s error can be remedied on appeal, the defendant already will have gone through substantial “burden, expense, and delay,” and even may have served his or her entire term of imprisonment before the appeal system can provide relief. ¶16 The State argues that the use of non-lawyer judges to “expeditiously try minor criminal offe

2016According to Davis, this creates the possibility that “a defendant now may be sentenced to imprisonment when a lay judge makes a mistake of law that, because of the standard of review, will evade appellate review by a lawyer-judge.” Davis argues that even if a trial court’s error can be remedied on appeal, the defendant already will have gone through substantial “burden, expense, and delay,” and even may have served his or her entire term of imprisonment before the appeal system can provide relief. ¶16 The State argues that the use of non-lawyer judges to “expeditiously try minor criminal offe

2016According to Davis, this creates the possibility that “a defendant now may be sentenced to imprisonment when a lay judge makes a mistake of law that, because of the standard of review, will evade appellate review by a lawyer-judge.” Davis argues that even if a trial court’s error can be remedied on appeal, the defendant already will have gone through substantial “burden, expense, and delay,” and even may have served his or her entire term of imprisonment before the appeal system can provide relief. ¶16 The State argues that the use of non-lawyer judges to “expeditiously try minor criminal offe

2015Seltzer v. Morton, 2007 MT 62, ¶ 152 , 336 Mont. 225 , 154 P.3d 561 (We must conduct de novo review of the District Court’s application of the Gore guideposts to the jury’s punitive damages verdict.”). ¶21 We review a district court’s evidentiary ruling for an abuse of discretion.

2015Seltzer v. Morton, 2007 MT 62, ¶ 152 , 336 Mont. 225 , 154 P.3d 561 (We must conduct de novo review of the District Court’s application of the Gore guideposts to the jury’s punitive damages verdict.”). ¶21 We review a district court’s evidentiary ruling for an abuse of discretion.

2011Fish v. Harris, 2008 MT 302, ¶ 8 , 345 Mont. 527 , 192 P.3d 238 ; Giambra v. Kelsey, 2007 MT 158, ¶ 27 , 338 Mont. 19 , 162 P.3d 134 (announcing the de novo standard and overruling a host of cases that stated the standard of review for a ruling on a motion for a new trial based on insufficiency of the evidence was for a manifest abuse of discretion).

2011Fish v. Harris, 2008 MT 302, ¶ 8 , 345 Mont. 527 , 192 P.3d 238 ; Giambra v. Kelsey, 2007 MT 158, ¶ 27 , 338 Mont. 19 , 162 P.3d 134 (announcing the de novo standard and overruling a host of cases that stated the standard of review for a ruling on a motion for a new trial based on insufficiency of the evidence was for a manifest abuse of discretion).

2011Fish v. Harris, 2008 MT 302, ¶ 8 , 345 Mont. 527 , 192 P.3d 238 ; Giambra v. Kelsey, 2007 MT 158, ¶ 27 , 338 Mont. 19 , 162 P.3d 134 (announcing the de novo standard and overruling a host of cases that stated the standard of review for a ruling on a motion for a new trial based on insufficiency of the evidence was for a manifest abuse of discretion).

2011Fish v. Harris, 2008 MT 302, ¶ 8 , 345 Mont. 527 , 192 P.3d 238 ; Giambra v. Kelsey, 2007 MT 158, ¶ 27 , 338 Mont. 19 , 162 P.3d 134 (announcing the de novo standard and overruling a host of cases that stated the standard of review for a ruling on a motion for a new trial based on insufficiency of the evidence was for a manifest abuse of discretion).

2010In applying the ‘arbitrary, capricious or unlawful’ standard of review, the Camp Court unanimously held that “the focal point for judicial review should be the administrative record already in existence, not some new record made initially in the reviewing court.” Further, the Court explained that, in the event the administrative record was so incomplete “as to frustrate effective judicial review, the remedy was not to hold a de novo hearing but, as contemplated by Overton Park, to obtain from the agency, either through affidavits or testimony, such additional explanation of the reasons for the

2010In applying the ‘arbitrary, capricious or unlawful’ standard of review, the Camp Court unanimously held that “the focal point for judicial review should be the administrative record already in existence, not some new record made initially in the reviewing court.” Further, the Court explained that, in the event the administrative record was so incomplete “as to frustrate effective judicial review, the remedy was not to hold a de novo hearing but, as contemplated by Overton Park, to obtain from the agency, either through affidavits or testimony, such additional explanation of the reasons for the