de novo standard in Nevada

2020See May, 121 Nev. at 672-73 , 119 P.3d at 1257 (Contract interpretation is subject to a de novo standard of review.

2020See May, 121 Nev. at 672-73 , 119 P.3d at 1257 (Contract interpretation is subject to a de novo standard of review.

2018See Schuck v. Signature Flight Support of Nev., Inc., 126 Nev. 434, 436 , 245 P.3d 542, 544 (2010) ("a de novo standard of review does not trump the general rule that `[a] point not urged in the trial court, unless it goes to the jurisdiction of that court, is deemed to have been waived and will not be considered on appeal").

2018See Schuck v. Signature Flight Support of Nev., Inc., 126 Nev. 434, 436 , 245 P.3d 542, 544 (2010) ("a de novo standard of review does not trump the general rule that `[a] point not urged in the trial court, unless it goes to the jurisdiction of that court, is deemed to have been waived and will not be considered on appeal").

2015Op. 84, 312 P.3d 479, 482 (2013) (stating that, while this court reviews an appeals officer's factual findings for substantial evidence, a de novo standard is applied to the appeals officer's legal question determinations).

2014"A de novo standard of review is applied when this court addresses a question of law, 'including the administrative construction of statutes." Id. (quoting Holiday Ret.

2020A deprivation of due process is of constitutional dimension, and "[t] his court applies a de novo standard of review to constitutional challenges." Callie v. Bowling, 123 Nev. 181, 183, 160 P.3d 878, 879 (2007). 3 "Due process is satisfied where interested parties are given an 'opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.'" J.D.

2020A deprivation of due process is of constitutional dimension, and "[t] his court applies a de novo standard of review to constitutional challenges." Callie v. Bowling, 123 Nev. 181, 183, 160 P.3d 878, 879 (2007). 3 "Due process is satisfied where interested parties are given an 'opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.'" J.D.

2017But Kokocinski is an outlier in that it rejects the de novo standard of review the First, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits deem appropriate in the SLC setting, Sarnacki v. Golden, 778 F.3d 217, 222 (1st Cir. 2015); Bach v. Nat'l W.

2017But Kokocinski is an outlier in that it rejects the de novo standard of review the First, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits deem appropriate in the SLC setting, Sarnacki v. Golden, 778 F.3d 217, 222 (1st Cir. 2015); Bach v. Nat'l W.

2019Wyeth v. Rowatt, 126 Nev. 446, 460 , 244 P.3d 765, 775 (2010).

2019Wyeth v. Rowatt, 126 Nev. 446, 460 , 244 P.3d 765, 775 (2010).

2016Grey v. State, 124 Nev. 110, 117 , 178 P.3d 154, 159 (2008) ("This court applies a de novo standard of review to constitutional challenges.").

2016Grey v. State, 124 Nev. 110, 117 , 178 P.3d 154, 159 (2008) ("This court applies a de novo standard of review to constitutional challenges.").

2015State v. Colosimo, 122 Nev. 950, 954 , 142 P.3d 352, 355 (2006).

2015State v. Colosimo, 122 Nev. 950, 954 , 142 P.3d 352, 355 (2006).

2013We accept the non-moving party's factual allegations as true, drawing every reasonable inference in his or her favor, id., but we apply a de novo standard of review to all questions of law, including decisions applying claim or issue preclusion principles, Bonnell v. Lawrence, 128 Nev. „ 282 P.3d 712, 716 (2012).

2013Id.; Bonnell v. Lawrence, 128 Nev. 394, 400-01 , 282 P.3d 712, 716 (2012).

2026Citizens for Cold Springs v. City of Reno , 125 Nev. 625, 629 , 218 P.3d 847, 850 (2009); Shoen v. SAC Holding Corp. , 122 Nev. 621, 634 , 137 P.3d 1171, 1180 (2006) (observing that when a plaintiff lacks standing, it is appropriate to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted), abrogated on other grounds by Guzman v. Johnson , 137 Nev. 126 , 483 P.3d 531 (2021). 11 Lorenzo has standing to pursue her claim for parentage The district court ruled that Lorenzo did not have standing to bring a complaint for parental rights for several reasons , including L

2026Citizens for Cold Springs v. City of Reno , 125 Nev. 625, 629 , 218 P.3d 847, 850 (2009); Shoen v. SAC Holding Corp. , 122 Nev. 621, 634 , 137 P.3d 1171, 1180 (2006) (observing that when a plaintiff lacks standing, it is appropriate to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted), abrogated on other grounds by Guzman v. Johnson , 137 Nev. 126 , 483 P.3d 531 (2021). 11 Lorenzo has standing to pursue her claim for parentage The district court ruled that Lorenzo did not have standing to bring a complaint for parental rights for several reasons , including L

2026Citizens for Cold Springs v. City of Reno , 125 Nev. 625, 629 , 218 P.3d 847, 850 (2009); Shoen v. SAC Holding Corp. , 122 Nev. 621, 634 , 137 P.3d 1171, 1180 (2006) (observing that when a plaintiff lacks standing, it is appropriate to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted), abrogated on other grounds by Guzman v. Johnson , 137 Nev. 126 , 483 P.3d 531 (2021). 11 Lorenzo has standing to pursue her claim for parentage The district court ruled that Lorenzo did not have standing to bring a complaint for parental rights for several reasons , including L

2026Citizens for Cold Springs v. City of Reno , 125 Nev. 625, 629 , 218 P.3d 847, 850 (2009); Shoen v. SAC Holding Corp. , 122 Nev. 621, 634 , 137 P.3d 1171, 1180 (2006) (observing that when a plaintiff lacks standing, it is appropriate to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted), abrogated on other grounds by Guzman v. Johnson , 137 Nev. 126 , 483 P.3d 531 (2021). 11 Lorenzo has standing to pursue her claim for parentage The district court ruled that Lorenzo did not have standing to bring a complaint for parental rights for several reasons , including L

2024State v. Beckman, 129 Nev. 481, 486 , 305 P.3d 912, 916 (2013) (reviewing de novo the issue of reasonableness in the Fourth Amendment context).

2024State v. Beckman, 129 Nev. 481, 486 , 305 P.3d 912, 916 (2013) (reviewing de novo the issue of reasonableness in the Fourth Amendment context).

2022In particular, the district court denied appellant's motion for summary judgment against respondent after this court's remand, which indicates the district court still found respondent's claims against appellant to be potentially meritorious.3 2We also are not persuaded by appellant's argument that a de novo standard of review should apply. 3The district court also denied appellant's motion for reconsideration, clarifying that the claims remained potentially meritorious because 2 Moreover, while we question whether accepting appellant's offer of judgment would have had preclusive effect on res

2022In particular, the district court denied appellant's motion for summary judgment against respondent after this court's remand, which indicates the district court still found respondent's claims against appellant to be potentially meritorious.3 2We also are not persuaded by appellant's argument that a de novo standard of review should apply. 3The district court also denied appellant's motion for reconsideration, clarifying that the claims remained potentially meritorious because 2 Moreover, while we question whether accepting appellant's offer of judgment would have had preclusive effect on res

2022See 134 Nev. at 759, 431 P.3d at 356 .

2022State Bar of Nev. v. Claiborne, 104 Nev. 115, 213 , 756 P.2d 464, 527-28 (1988) (stating that the purpose of attorney discipline is to protect the public, the courts, and the legal system).

2022State Bar of Nev. v. Claiborne, 104 Nev. 115, 213 , 756 P.2d 464, 527-28 (1988) (stating that the purpose of attorney discipline is to protect the public, the courts, and the legal system).

2022SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 2 (0) 1947A ogigto or emotional problems2; remorse; timely good faith effort to rectify the consequences of the misconduct; and the remoteness of Jimmerson's prior discipline offense, which occurred in 1994) compared to the two aggravating circumstances (substantial experience in the practice of law and prior disciplinary offense), we conclude that a public reprimand is sufficient.3 SCR 105(3)(b) (providing that a de novo standard of review applies to legal conclusions and recommended discipline and a deferential standard applies to findings of fact); In re Discipline o

2022SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 2 (0) 1947A ogigto or emotional problems2; remorse; timely good faith effort to rectify the consequences of the misconduct; and the remoteness of Jimmerson's prior discipline offense, which occurred in 1994) compared to the two aggravating circumstances (substantial experience in the practice of law and prior disciplinary offense), we conclude that a public reprimand is sufficient.3 SCR 105(3)(b) (providing that a de novo standard of review applies to legal conclusions and recommended discipline and a deferential standard applies to findings of fact); In re Discipline o

2021Simply put, then, given the procedural protections laid out above and as applied, the district judges review "serve[d] to enhance reliability and benefit [Tahja]." Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 684 (Blackmun, J., concurring).

2021Simply put, then, given the procedural protections laid out above and as applied, the district judges review "serve[d] to enhance reliability and benefit [Tahja]." Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 684 (Blackmun, J., concurring).

2020Constr., Inc. v. IBEX Ina Grp., LLC, 126 Nev. 366, 377, 240 P.3d 1033, 1041 (2010) (quoting Mathezvs v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)).

2020Constr., Inc. v. IBEX Ina Grp., LLC, 126 Nev. 366, 377, 240 P.3d 1033, 1041 (2010) (quoting Mathezvs v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)).

2020Constr., Inc. v. IBEX Ina Grp., LLC, 126 Nev. 366, 377 , 240 P.3d 1033, 1041 (2010) (quoting Mathezvs v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)).

2020Constr., Inc. v. IBEX Ina Grp., LLC, 126 Nev. 366, 377, 240 P.3d 1033, 1041 (2010) (quoting Mathezvs v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)).

2019See Leven v. Frey, 123 Nev. 399, 402 , 168 P.3d 712, 714 (2007) (applying a de novo standard of review in resolving issues of statutory construction).

2019See Leven v. Frey, 123 Nev. 399, 402 , 168 P.3d 712, 714 (2007) (applying a de novo standard of review in resolving issues of statutory construction).

2019See NRS 533.450; Revert, 95 Nev. at 786 , 603 P.2d at 264 (stating that an aggrieved party is not entitled to a de novo hearing in the district court).

2019See NRS 533.450; Revert, 95 Nev. at 786 , 603 P.2d at 264 (stating that an aggrieved party is not entitled to a de novo hearing in the district court).

2016A defendant has a constitutional right to "a venire selected from a fair cross section of the community" Williams v. State, 121 Nev. 934, 939 , 125 P.3d 627, 631 (2005).

2016A defendant has a constitutional right to "a venire selected from a fair cross section of the community" Williams v. State, 121 Nev. 934, 939 , 125 P.3d 627, 631 (2005).

2016Dist., 125 Nev. 746, 753 , 219 P.3d 1276, 1281 (2009) (applying a de novo standard of review to an order granting a special motion to dismiss because such motions are to be treated as motions for summary judgment).

2016Dist., 125 Nev. 746, 753 , 219 P.3d 1276, 1281 (2009) (applying a de novo standard of review to an order granting a special motion to dismiss because such motions are to be treated as motions for summary judgment).

2014Dep't, 105 Nev. 22, 25, 769 P.2d 66, 68 (1989) (stating that noncompliance with statutory requirements for judicial review of an administrative decision divests a court of jurisdiction and is grounds for dismissal). 4 Having made this determination, we now consider whether judicial estoppel barred the district court from dismissing appellants' action despite their failure to file a petition for judicial review. 3Appellants' contention that Edison cannot be applied to their de novo action because the underlying case was active at the time this court decided Edison lacks merit.

2014Dep't, 105 Nev. 22, 25, 769 P.2d 66, 68 (1989) (stating that noncompliance with statutory requirements for judicial review of an administrative decision divests a court of jurisdiction and is grounds for dismissal). 4 Having made this determination, we now consider whether judicial estoppel barred the district court from dismissing appellants' action despite their failure to file a petition for judicial review. 3Appellants' contention that Edison cannot be applied to their de novo action because the underlying case was active at the time this court decided Edison lacks merit.

2014Kerala Props., Inc. v. Familian, 122 Nev. 601, 604, 137 P.3d 1146, 1149 (2006).

2014Kerala Props., Inc. v. Familian, 122 Nev. 601, 604, 137 P.3d 1146, 1149 (2006).

2014Based on this determination, we conclude that the district court did not err by determining that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the de novo challenge below because NRS 368A.290 required appellants to file a petition for judicial review. 3 See Edison, 127 Nev. at , 255 P.3d at 233, 237; see also Kame v. Emp't Sec.

2014Based on this determination, we conclude that the district court did not err by determining that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the de novo challenge below because NRS 368A.290 required appellants to file a petition for judicial review. 3 See Edison, 127 Nev. at , 255 P.3d at 233, 237 ; see also Kame v. Emp't Sec.

2013“A basic rule of contract interpretation is that ‘[e]very word must be given effect if at all possible.’ ” Musser v. Bank of Am., 114 Nev. 945, 949 , 964 P.2d 51, 54 (1998) (alteration in original) (quoting Royal Indem.

2013“A basic rule of contract interpretation is that ‘[e]very word must be given effect if at all possible.’ ” Musser v. Bank of Am., 114 Nev. 945, 949 , 964 P.2d 51, 54 (1998) (alteration in original) (quoting Royal Indem.

2010U.S. v. Iverson, 162 F.3d 1015, 1019 (9th Cir. 1998); Asphalt Specialt. v. City of Commerce City, 218 P.3d 741, 745 (Colo. App. 2009).