de novo hearing (Connecticut) · Go Syfert
← Connecticut issues

de novo hearing in Connecticut

89 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1941–2026 10 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (30)

CaseFollowedCited
Buckman v. People Express, Inc.green
conn · 1987 · cited in 2 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
2 sentences

2017See, e.g., Buckman v. People Express, Inc. , 205 Conn. 166 , 175, 176 n.10, 177, 530 A.2d 596 (1987) (stating that whether "amount of the verdict is 'exorbitant' and unjust in light of all of the evidence ... raises a question of law," and concluding, contrary to trial court and solely on basis of size of award, that verdict was "so grossly excessive as to shock the conscience of this court"); Peck v. Jacquemin , 196 Conn. 53 , 72, 491 A.2d 1043 (1985) ("[t]he trial court now makes its determination as a pure question of law"); see also Wichers v. Hatch , 252 Conn. 174 , 181-82, 745 A.2d 789 (

2017See, e.g., Buckman v. People Express, Inc. , 205 Conn. 166 , 175, 176 n.10, 177, 530 A.2d 596 (1987) (stating that whether "amount of the verdict is 'exorbitant' and unjust in light of all of the evidence ... raises a question of law," and concluding, contrary to trial court and solely on basis of size of award, that verdict was "so grossly excessive as to shock the conscience of this court"); Peck v. Jacquemin , 196 Conn. 53 , 72, 491 A.2d 1043 (1985) ("[t]he trial court now makes its determination as a pure question of law"); see also Wichers v. Hatch , 252 Conn. 174 , 181-82, 745 A.2d 789 (

22
Wichers v. Hatchgreen
conn · 2000 · cited in 2 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
2 sentences

2017See, e.g., Buckman v. People Express, Inc. , 205 Conn. 166 , 175, 176 n.10, 177, 530 A.2d 596 (1987) (stating that whether "amount of the verdict is 'exorbitant' and unjust in light of all of the evidence ... raises a question of law," and concluding, contrary to trial court and solely on basis of size of award, that verdict was "so grossly excessive as to shock the conscience of this court"); Peck v. Jacquemin , 196 Conn. 53 , 72, 491 A.2d 1043 (1985) ("[t]he trial court now makes its determination as a pure question of law"); see also Wichers v. Hatch , 252 Conn. 174 , 181-82, 745 A.2d 789 (

2017See, e.g., Buckman v. People Express, Inc. , 205 Conn. 166 , 175, 176 n.10, 177, 530 A.2d 596 (1987) (stating that whether "amount of the verdict is 'exorbitant' and unjust in light of all of the evidence ... raises a question of law," and concluding, contrary to trial court and solely on basis of size of award, that verdict was "so grossly excessive as to shock the conscience of this court"); Peck v. Jacquemin , 196 Conn. 53 , 72, 491 A.2d 1043 (1985) ("[t]he trial court now makes its determination as a pure question of law"); see also Wichers v. Hatch , 252 Conn. 174 , 181-82, 745 A.2d 789 (

22
State v. Kirbygreen
conn · 2006 · cited in 2 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2007–2013
2 sentences

2013See State v. Kirby, 280 Conn. 361, 394 , 908 A.2d 506 (2006).

2013See State v. Kirby, 280 Conn. 361, 394 , 908 A.2d 506 (2006).

22
Sherman v. Roncogreen
conn · 2010 · cited in 3 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2015–2017
2 sentences

2017Two years later, in Sherman , we observed that the relation back standard of review was "not at issue" in that case, but used dictum in a footnote "to clarify that the de novo standard of review is always the applicable standard of review for resolving whether subsequent amendments to a complaint relate back for purposes of the statute of limitations." (Emphasis in original.) Sherman v. Ronco , supra, 294 Conn. at 554 n.10, 985 A.2d 1042 .

2017Two years later, in Sherman , we observed that the relation back standard of review was "not at issue" in that case, but used dictum in a footnote "to clarify that the de novo standard of review is always the applicable standard of review for resolving whether subsequent amendments to a complaint relate back for purposes of the statute of limitations." (Emphasis in original.) Sherman v. Ronco , supra, 294 Conn. at 554 n.10, 985 A.2d 1042 .

13
Dimartino v. Richensgreen
conn · 2003 · cited in 2 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2023–2025
2 sentences

2025See DiMartino v. Richens, 263 Conn. 639 , 661–62, 822 A.2d 205 (2003).

2025See DiMartino v. Richens, 263 Conn. 639 , 661–62, 822 A.2d 205 (2003).

12
Peck v. Jacquemingreen
conn · 1985 · cited in 2 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
2 sentences

2017See, e.g., Buckman v. People Express, Inc. , 205 Conn. 166 , 175, 176 n.10, 177, 530 A.2d 596 (1987) (stating that whether "amount of the verdict is 'exorbitant' and unjust in light of all of the evidence ... raises a question of law," and concluding, contrary to trial court and solely on basis of size of award, that verdict was "so grossly excessive as to shock the conscience of this court"); Peck v. Jacquemin , 196 Conn. 53 , 72, 491 A.2d 1043 (1985) ("[t]he trial court now makes its determination as a pure question of law"); see also Wichers v. Hatch , 252 Conn. 174 , 181-82, 745 A.2d 789 (

2017See, e.g., Buckman v. People Express, Inc. , 205 Conn. 166 , 175, 176 n.10, 177, 530 A.2d 596 (1987) (stating that whether "amount of the verdict is 'exorbitant' and unjust in light of all of the evidence ... raises a question of law," and concluding, contrary to trial court and solely on basis of size of award, that verdict was "so grossly excessive as to shock the conscience of this court"); Peck v. Jacquemin , 196 Conn. 53 , 72, 491 A.2d 1043 (1985) ("[t]he trial court now makes its determination as a pure question of law"); see also Wichers v. Hatch , 252 Conn. 174 , 181-82, 745 A.2d 789 (

12
Fredericks v. Reinckegreen
conn · 1965 · cited in 2 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1966–2007
2 sentences

2007See also State v. Pascucci, 161 Conn. 382 , 288 A.2d 408 (1971); Fredericks v. Reincke, 152 Conn. 501 , 208 A.2d 756 (1965).

2007See also State v. Pascucci, 161 Conn. 382 , 288 A.2d 408 (1971); Fredericks v. Reincke, 152 Conn. 501 , 208 A.2d 756 (1965).

12
Alam & Sarker, LLC v. United Statesgreen
ca1 · 2024 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2026–2026
2 sentences

2026See, e.g., id.; see also Alam & Sarker, LLC v. United States, 113 F.4th 153, 167 (1st Cir. 2024) (“assuming arguendo that a procedural due process violation existed at the administrative level, the de novo hearing in the [D]istrict [C]ourt cured the violation” (emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted), quoting Traficanti v. United States, 227 F.3d 170, 175 (4th Cir. 2000); Kim v. United States, 121 F.3d 1269, 1274 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[a] trial de novo, in which the existence of a violation is examined afresh, Daniels v. Commissioner of Revenue Services and the parties are not limited

2026See, e.g., id.; see also Alam & Sarker, LLC v. United States, 113 F.4th 153, 167 (1st Cir. 2024) (“assuming arguendo that a proce- dural due process violation existed at the administrative level, the de novo hearing in the [D]istrict [C]ourt cured the violation” (emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted)), quoting Traficanti v. United States, 227 F.3d 170, 175 (4th Cir. 2000); Kim v. United States, 121 F.3d 1269, 1274 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[a] trial de novo, in which the existence of a violation is examined afresh, Daniels v. Commissioner of Revenue Services and the parties are not limit

11
Leonard Traficanti, D/B/A Lt's Gas/snaks v. United Statesgreen
ca4 · 2000 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2026–2026
2 sentences

2026See, e.g., id.; see also Alam & Sarker, LLC v. United States, 113 F.4th 153, 167 (1st Cir. 2024) (“assuming arguendo that a procedural due process violation existed at the administrative level, the de novo hearing in the [D]istrict [C]ourt cured the violation” (emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted), quoting Traficanti v. United States, 227 F.3d 170, 175 (4th Cir. 2000); Kim v. United States, 121 F.3d 1269, 1274 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[a] trial de novo, in which the existence of a violation is examined afresh, Daniels v. Commissioner of Revenue Services and the parties are not limited

2026See, e.g., id.; see also Alam & Sarker, LLC v. United States, 113 F.4th 153, 167 (1st Cir. 2024) (“assuming arguendo that a proce- dural due process violation existed at the administrative level, the de novo hearing in the [D]istrict [C]ourt cured the violation” (emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted)), quoting Traficanti v. United States, 227 F.3d 170, 175 (4th Cir. 2000); Kim v. United States, 121 F.3d 1269, 1274 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[a] trial de novo, in which the existence of a violation is examined afresh, Daniels v. Commissioner of Revenue Services and the parties are not limit

11
Williams v. General Nutrition Centers, Inc.green
conn · 2017 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025
2 sentences

2025See, e.g., Williams v. General Nutrition Centers, Inc., 326 Conn. 651, 657 , 166 A.3d 625 (2017). ‘‘[B]ecause regulations have the same force and effect as statutes, we interpret both using the plain meaning rule.’’ Id.; see General Statutes § 1-2z.

2025See, e.g., Williams v. General Nutrition Centers, Inc., 326 Conn. 651, 657 , 166 A.3d 625 (2017). ‘‘[B]ecause regulations have the same force and effect as statutes, we interpret both using the plain meaning rule.’’ Id.; see General Statutes § 1-2z.

11
Town of Groton v. United Steelworkers of Americagreen
conn · 2000 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025
2 sentences

2025See, e.g., Groton v. United Steelworkers of America, 254 Conn. 35 , 51–52, 757 A.2d 501 (2000) (noting that ‘‘[o]ur legal system . . . ordinarily give[s] great deference . . . to both the factual and legal determinations of the arbitra- tors’’ and that, even when appellate review ‘‘requires a de novo determination by the court . . . we give defer- ence to the arbitrator’s factual determinations’’ (citation omitted)).

2025See, e.g., Groton v. United Steelworkers of America, 254 Conn. 35 , 51–52, 757 A.2d 501 (2000) (noting that ‘‘[o]ur legal system . . . ordinarily give[s] great deference . . . to both the factual and legal determinations of the arbitra- tors’’ and that, even when appellate review ‘‘requires a de novo determination by the court . . . we give defer- ence to the arbitrator’s factual determinations’’ (citation omitted)).

11
Kerin v. Stanglegreen
conn · 1988 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021
11
In Re Joseph W., Jr.green
conn · 2011 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
11
Zimmerman v. CADE ENTERPRISES, INC.green
fladistctapp · 2010 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
11
Tyler A. White v. State of Indianagreen
indctapp · 2012 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
11
State v. Kinggreen
wisctapp · 1997 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
11
State v. Lopezgreen
wisctapp · 1992 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
11
State v. Knybelgreen
conn · 2007 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2012–2012
11
State v. Popeleskigreen
conn · 2009 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011
11
Marroquin v. F. MONARCA MASONRYgreen
connappct · 2010 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2010–2010
11
Bielaska v. Town of Waterfordgreen
conn · 1985 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2008–2008
11
Gurliacci v. Mayergreen
conn · 1991 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2008–2008
11
Friezo v. Friezogreen
conn · 2007 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2008–2008
11
Slayton v. American Express Co.green
ca2 · 2006 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2008–2008
11
State v. Pascuccigreen
conn · 1971 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
11
Medvalusa Health Programs, Inc. v. Memberworks, Inc.green
conn · 2005 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
11
State v. Cobbgreen
conn · 1999 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2005–2005
11
Zimmerman v. Meloygreen
scotus · 2000 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2005–2005
11
Choice v. Goordgreen
scotus · 2000 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2005–2005
11
Gaye v. Kramergreen
scotus · 2000 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2005–2005
11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (1)

CaseNegativeCited
Kim v. United Statesgreen
ca9 · 1997 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2026–2026
2 sentences

2026See, e.g., id.; see also Alam & Sarker, LLC v. United States, 113 F.4th 153, 167 (1st Cir. 2024) (“assuming arguendo that a procedural due process violation existed at the administrative level, the de novo hearing in the [D]istrict [C]ourt cured the violation” (emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted), quoting Traficanti v. United States, 227 F.3d 170, 175 (4th Cir. 2000); Kim v. United States, 121 F.3d 1269, 1274 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[a] trial de novo, in which the existence of a violation is examined afresh, Daniels v. Commissioner of Revenue Services and the parties are not limited

2026See, e.g., id.; see also Alam & Sarker, LLC v. United States, 113 F.4th 153, 167 (1st Cir. 2024) (“assuming arguendo that a proce- dural due process violation existed at the administrative level, the de novo hearing in the [D]istrict [C]ourt cured the violation” (emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted)), quoting Traficanti v. United States, 227 F.3d 170, 175 (4th Cir. 2000); Kim v. United States, 121 F.3d 1269, 1274 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[a] trial de novo, in which the existence of a violation is examined afresh, Daniels v. Commissioner of Revenue Services and the parties are not limit

11

Also cited on this issue (49)

CaseCitedYears
Kolomiets v. Syncor International Corp. neutral
connappct · 1999
2 sentences

2005“The standard of review to be used by the board when reviewing a commissioner’s findings is set forth in Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies § 31-301-8. 1 That section directs the board not to retry the case before it, but to determine whether evidence supports the commissioner’s finding.” Dengler v. Special Attention Health Services, Inc., 62 Conn. App. 440, 447 , 774 A.2d 992 (2001). “[T]he review [board’s] hearing of an appeal from the commissioner is not a de novo hearing of the facts. . . . [I]t is obligated] to hear the appeal on the record and not retry the facts. . . . [T]he powe

2005“The standard of review to be used by the board when reviewing a commissioner’s findings is set forth in Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies § 31-301-8. 1 That section directs the board not to retry the case before it, but to determine whether evidence supports the commissioner’s finding.” Dengler v. Special Attention Health Services, Inc., 62 Conn. App. 440, 447 , 774 A.2d 992 (2001). “[T]he review [board’s] hearing of an appeal from the commissioner is not a de novo hearing of the facts. . . . [I]t is obligated] to hear the appeal on the record and not retry the facts. . . . [T]he powe

71999–2005
Caserta v. Zoning Board of Appeals green
conn · 1993
2 sentences

1994Prior to the briefing by the plaintiff of the issues on this appeal, he filed an "Objection to Record on Appeal" (File item 105), in which he sought to exclude certain documents in the record relating to the zoning enforcement officer's investigation on the ground that the board "had an obligation to review the actions of the Zoning Enforcement Officer at the time he issued the cease and desist order [and that any] subsequent actions are not relevant to the Appeal at hand." The plaintiff's objection was overruled by the court based on the standard of review stated in Caserta v. Zoning Board of

1994Prior to the briefing by the plaintiff of the issues on this appeal, he filed an "Objection to Record on Appeal" (File item 105) in which he sought to exclude certain documents in the record relating to the zoning enforcement officer's investigation on the ground that the board "had an obligation to review the actions of the Zoning Enforcement Officer at the time he issued the cease and desist order [and that any] subsequent actions are not relevant to the Appeal at hand." The plaintiff's objection was overruled by the court based on the standard of review stated in Caserta v. Zoning Board of

61994–1998
Fair v. People's Savings Bank green
conn · 1988
2 sentences

2001“The review [board’s] hearing of an appeal from the commissioner is not a de novo hearing of the facts. . . . [I]t is [obligated] to hear the appeal on the record and not retry the facts.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mulroy v. Becton Dickinson Co., 48 Conn. App. 774, 776 , 712 A.2d 436 (1998), quoting Fair v. People’s Savings Bank, 207 Conn. 535, 538-39 , 542 A.2d 1118 (1988).

2001“The review [board’s] hearing of an appeal from the commissioner is not a de novo hearing of the facts. . . . [I]t is [obligated] to hear the appeal on the record and not retry the facts.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mulroy v. Becton Dickinson Co., 48 Conn. App. 774, 776 , 712 A.2d 436 (1998), quoting Fair v. People’s Savings Bank, 207 Conn. 535, 538-39 , 542 A.2d 1118 (1988).

51996–2001
Crochiere v. Board of Education of Town of Enfield green
conn · 1993
2 sentences

1997The appropriate standard applicable to the review board when reviewing a decision of a commissioner is well established. “[T]he review [board’s] hearing of an appeal from the commissioner is not a de novo hearing of the facts. . . . [I]t is obligated] to hear the appeal on the record and not retry the facts. . . . [T]he power and duty of determining the facts rests on the commissioner, the trier of facts. . . . [T]he conclusions drawn by him from the facts found must stand unless they result from an incorrect application of the law to the subordinate facts or from an inference illegally or unr

1997The appropriate standard applicable to the review board when reviewing a decision of a commissioner is well established. “[T]he review [board’s] hearing of an appeal from the commissioner is not a de novo hearing of the facts. . . . [I]t is obligated] to hear the appeal on the record and not retry the facts. . . . [T]he power and duty of determining the facts rests on the commissioner, the trier of facts. . . . [T]he conclusions drawn by him from the facts found must stand unless they result from an incorrect application of the law to the subordinate facts or from an inference illegally or unr

51994–1998
Kolomiets v. Syncor International Corp. green
conn · 2000
2 sentences

2005“The standard of review to be used by the board when reviewing a commissioner’s findings is set forth in Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies § 31-301-8. 1 That section directs the board not to retry the case before it, but to determine whether evidence supports the commissioner’s finding.” Dengler v. Special Attention Health Services, Inc., 62 Conn. App. 440, 447 , 774 A.2d 992 (2001). “[T]he review [board’s] hearing of an appeal from the commissioner is not a de novo hearing of the facts. . . . [I]t is obligated] to hear the appeal on the record and not retry the facts. . . . [T]he powe

2005“The standard of review to be used by the board when reviewing a commissioner’s findings is set forth in Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies § 31-301-8. 1 That section directs the board not to retry the case before it, but to determine whether evidence supports the commissioner’s finding.” Dengler v. Special Attention Health Services, Inc., 62 Conn. App. 440, 447 , 774 A.2d 992 (2001). “[T]he review [board’s] hearing of an appeal from the commissioner is not a de novo hearing of the facts. . . . [I]t is obligated] to hear the appeal on the record and not retry the facts. . . . [T]he powe

42001–2005
Muldoon v. Homestead Insulation Co. green
conn · 1994
2 sentences

1997The appropriate standard applicable to the review board when reviewing a decision of a commissioner is well established. “[T]he review [board’s] hearing of an appeal from the commissioner is not a de novo hearing of the facts. . . . [I]t is obligated] to hear the appeal on the record and not retry the facts. . . . [T]he power and duty of determining the facts rests on the commissioner, the trier of facts. . . . [T]he conclusions drawn by him from the facts found must stand unless they result from an incorrect application of the law to the subordinate facts or from an inference illegally or unr

1997The appropriate standard applicable to the review board when reviewing a decision of a commissioner is well established. “[T]he review [board’s] hearing of an appeal from the commissioner is not a de novo hearing of the facts. . . . [I]t is obligated] to hear the appeal on the record and not retry the facts. . . . [T]he power and duty of determining the facts rests on the commissioner, the trier of facts. . . . [T]he conclusions drawn by him from the facts found must stand unless they result from an incorrect application of the law to the subordinate facts or from an inference illegally or unr

41996–1998
Sellers v. Sellers Garage, Inc. green
connappct · 2005
2 sentences

2020The board’s ‘‘hearing of an appeal from the commissioner is not a de novo hearing of the facts. . . . [I]t is oblig[ated] to hear the appeal on the record and not retry the facts.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sellers v. Sellers Garage, Inc., 92 Conn. App. 650, 651 , 887 A.2d 382 (2005). ‘‘[T]he power and duty of determining the facts [rest] on the commis- sioner, the trier of facts. . . .

2020The board’s ‘‘hearing of an appeal from the commissioner is not a de novo hearing of the facts. . . . [I]t is oblig[ated] to hear the appeal on the record and not retry the facts.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sellers v. Sellers Garage, Inc., 92 Conn. App. 650, 651 , 887 A.2d 382 (2005). ‘‘[T]he power and duty of determining the facts [rest] on the commis- sioner, the trier of facts. . . .

22019–2020
In Re Stephen M. green
connappct · 2008
2 sentences

2020In such circumstances, an appellate court employs the de novo standard of review.’’ In re Stephen M., 109 Conn. App. 644, 658 , 953 A.2d 668 (2008).

2020In such circumstances, an appellate court employs the de novo standard of review.’’ In re Stephen M., 109 Conn. App. 644, 658 , 953 A.2d 668 (2008).

22010–2020
Dimmock v. Lawrence & Memorial Hospital, Inc. green
conn · 2008
2 sentences

2017We then posited that, "[o]n the other hand, a de novo standard would be more consistent with the oft stated rule that [t]he interpretation of pleadings is always a question of law for the court and that our interpretation of the pleadings therefore is plenary." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 799-800 , 945 A.2d 955 .

2017We then posited that, "[o]n the other hand, a de novo standard would be more consistent with the oft stated rule that [t]he interpretation of pleadings is always a question of law for the court and that our interpretation of the pleadings therefore is plenary." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 799-800 , 945 A.2d 955 .

22010–2017
O'Reilly v. General Dynamics Corp. green
connappct · 1999
2 sentences

2000“The appropriate standard applicable to the board when reviewing a decision of a commissioner is well established. [T]he review [board’s] hearing of an appeal from the commissioner is not a de novo hearing of the facts. . . . [I]t is obligated to hear the appeal on the record and not retry the facts. . . . [T]he power and duty of determining the facts rests on the commissioner, the trier of facts.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) O’Reilly v. General Dynamics Corp., 52 Conn. App. 813, 815-16 , 728 A.2d 527 (1999).

2000“The appropriate standard applicable to the board when reviewing a decision of a commissioner is well established. [T]he review [board’s] hearing of an appeal from the commissioner is not a de novo hearing of the facts. . . . [I]t is obligated to hear the appeal on the record and not retry the facts. . . . [T]he power and duty of determining the facts rests on the commissioner, the trier of facts.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) O’Reilly v. General Dynamics Corp., 52 Conn. App. 813, 815-16 , 728 A.2d 527 (1999).

22000–2009
Autotote Enterprises, Inc. v. State green
conn · 2006
2 sentences

2006“As in ah matters of statutory interpretation, we apply a de novo standard of review on appeal because the issue is one of law.” Autotote Enterprises, Inc. v. State, 278 Conn. 150, 160 , 898 A.2d 141 (2006).

2006“As in ah matters of statutory interpretation, we apply a de novo standard of review on appeal because the issue is one of law.” Autotote Enterprises, Inc. v. State, 278 Conn. 150, 160 , 898 A.2d 141 (2006).

22006–2006
Rogers v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc. neutral
connappct · 1997
2 sentences

2005We note that “[t]he review [board’s] hearing of an appeal from the commissioner is not a de novo hearing of the facts. . . . [I]t is obligated] to hear the appeal on the record and not retry the facts. [T]he power and duty of determining the facts rests on the commissioner, the trier of facts. . . . [T]he conclusions drawn by him from the facts found must stand unless they result from an incorrect application of the law to the subordinate facts or from an inference illegally or unreasonably drawn from them.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rogers v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc., 45 Conn. App. 204

2005We note that “[t]he review [board’s] hearing of an appeal from the commissioner is not a de novo hearing of the facts. . . . [I]t is obligated] to hear the appeal on the record and not retry the facts. [T]he power and duty of determining the facts rests on the commissioner, the trier of facts. . . . [T]he conclusions drawn by him from the facts found must stand unless they result from an incorrect application of the law to the subordinate facts or from an inference illegally or unreasonably drawn from them.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rogers v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc., 45 Conn. App. 204

22001–2005
Dengler v. Special Attention Health Services, Inc. green
connappct · 2001
2 sentences

2005“The standard of review to be used by the board when reviewing a commissioner’s findings is set forth in Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies § 31-301-8. 1 That section directs the board not to retry the case before it, but to determine whether evidence supports the commissioner’s finding.” Dengler v. Special Attention Health Services, Inc., 62 Conn. App. 440, 447 , 774 A.2d 992 (2001). “[T]he review [board’s] hearing of an appeal from the commissioner is not a de novo hearing of the facts. . . . [I]t is obligated] to hear the appeal on the record and not retry the facts. . . . [T]he powe

2005“The standard of review to be used by the board when reviewing a commissioner’s findings is set forth in Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies § 31-301-8. 1 That section directs the board not to retry the case before it, but to determine whether evidence supports the commissioner’s finding.” Dengler v. Special Attention Health Services, Inc., 62 Conn. App. 440, 447 , 774 A.2d 992 (2001). “[T]he review [board’s] hearing of an appeal from the commissioner is not a de novo hearing of the facts. . . . [I]t is obligated] to hear the appeal on the record and not retry the facts. . . . [T]he powe

22001–2005
Bryan v. Sheraton-Hartford Hotel green
connappct · 2001
2 sentences

2005“On appeal, the board must determine whether there is any evidence in the record to support the commissioner’s findings and award.” Bryan v. Sheraton-Hartford Hotel, 62 Conn. App. 733, 739 , 774 A.2d 1009 (2001).

2005“On appeal, the board must determine whether there is any evidence in the record to support the commissioner’s findings and award.” Bryan v. Sheraton-Hartford Hotel, 62 Conn. App. 733, 739 , 774 A.2d 1009 (2001).

22001–2005
Aurora v. Miami Plumbing & Heating, Inc. green
connappct · 1986
2 sentences

1999“Our role is to determine whether the review [board’s] decision results from an incorrect application of the law to the subordinate facts or from an inference illegally or unreasonably drawn from them.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Aurora v. Miami Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 6 Conn. App. 45, 47 , 502 A.2d 952 (1986).

1999“Our role is to determine whether the review [board’s] decision results from an incorrect application of the law to the subordinate facts or from an inference illegally or unreasonably drawn from them.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Aurora v. Miami Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 6 Conn. App. 45, 47 , 502 A.2d 952 (1986).

21999–1999
Dinan v. Board of Zoning Appeals green
conn · 1991
2 sentences

1994The plaintiff's initial brief attacked the zoning regulation on various constitutional grounds including that of "impermissible vagueness" and devoted one section of his argument (pp. 20-22) to the claim that the definition of "boarding house" in the zoning ordinance is "unconstitutional in that there is no rational basis to exclude it from a RAR 40/MF Zone." At the time of the hearing on the plaintiff's objection to the record on appeal, the court directed counsel's attention to the cases of Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas , 416 U.S. 1 (1974) and Elliott v. City of Athens, Georgia , 960 F.2d

1994The plaintiff's initial brief attacked the zoning regulation on various constitutional grounds including that of "impermissible vagueness" and devoted one section of his argument (pp. 20-22) to the claim that the definition of "boarding house" in the zoning ordinance is "unconstitutional in that there is no rational basis to exclude it from a PAR 40/MF Zone." At the time of the hearing on the plaintiff's objection to the record on appeal, the court directed counsel's attention to the cases of Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) and Elliott v. City of Athens Georgia, 960 F.2d 97

21994–1994
Elliott v. City of Athens, Georgia green
ca11 · 1992
2 sentences

1994The plaintiff's initial brief attacked the zoning regulation on various constitutional grounds including that of "impermissible vagueness" and devoted one section of his argument (pp. 20-22) to the claim that the definition of "boarding house" in the zoning ordinance is "unconstitutional in that there is no rational basis to exclude it from a RAR 40/MF Zone." At the time of the hearing on the plaintiff's objection to the record on appeal, the court directed counsel's attention to the cases of Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas , 416 U.S. 1 (1974) and Elliott v. City of Athens, Georgia , 960 F.2d

1994The plaintiff's initial brief attacked the zoning regulation on various constitutional grounds including that of "impermissible vagueness" and devoted one section of his argument (pp. 20-22) to the claim that the definition of "boarding house" in the zoning ordinance is "unconstitutional in that there is no rational basis to exclude it from a PAR 40/MF Zone." At the time of the hearing on the plaintiff's objection to the record on appeal, the court directed counsel's attention to the cases of Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) and Elliott v. City of Athens Georgia, 960 F.2d 97

21994–1994
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas green
· 1974
2 sentences

1994The plaintiff's initial brief attacked the zoning regulation on various constitutional grounds including that of "impermissible vagueness" and devoted one section of his argument (pp. 20-22) to the claim that the definition of "boarding house" in the zoning ordinance is "unconstitutional in that there is no rational basis to exclude it from a RAR 40/MF Zone." At the time of the hearing on the plaintiff's objection to the record on appeal, the court directed counsel's attention to the cases of Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas , 416 U.S. 1 (1974) and Elliott v. City of Athens, Georgia , 960 F.2d

1994The plaintiff's initial brief attacked the zoning regulation on various constitutional grounds including that of "impermissible vagueness" and devoted one section of his argument (pp. 20-22) to the claim that the definition of "boarding house" in the zoning ordinance is "unconstitutional in that there is no rational basis to exclude it from a PAR 40/MF Zone." At the time of the hearing on the plaintiff's objection to the record on appeal, the court directed counsel's attention to the cases of Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) and Elliott v. City of Athens Georgia, 960 F.2d 97

21994–1994
State v. Golding green
conn · 1989
12022–2022
Burnham v. Karl & Gelb, P.C. green
conn · 2000
12021–2021
Mensah v. Mensah green
conn · 2016
12021–2021
State v. Porter green
conn · 2016
12021–2021
Labissoniere v. Gaylord Hospital, Inc. green
connappct · 2018
12021–2021
Fitzgerald Council v. Com'r of Correction green
conn · 2008
12021–2021
Guzman v. Yeroz green
connappct · 2016
12021–2021
Vitti v. City of Milford green
connappct · 2019
12021–2021
Fagan v. City of Stamford neutral
connappct · 2018
12020–2020
Mathews v. Eldridge green
scotus · 1976
12017–2017
Duperry v. Solnit green
conn · 2002
12016–2016
DuPerry v. Kirk green
ctd · 2008
12016–2016
Driscoll v. Norwich Savings Society green
conn · 1952
12015–2015
Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp. green
conn · 2009
12012–2012
Quigley-Dodd v. General Accident Insurance Co. of America neutral
conn · 2001
12012–2012
Sosin v. Sosin neutral
conn · 2008
12011–2011
Duffy v. Flagg green
conn · 2006
12011–2011
Security Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York v. Kings West Ltd. Partnership green
conn · 2000
12010–2010
Paternostro v. Arborio Corp. green
conn · 2000
12010–2010
Keenan v. Union Camp Corp. green
connappct · 1998
12010–2010
Turner v. Croman green
connappct · 1999
12010–2010
Paternostro v. Arborio Corp. green
connappct · 1999
12010–2010

Statutes the citing opinions construe

CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-199 (15) CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-275 (12) CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 1-2z (6) CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-301 (6) CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-418 (5) CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-584 (5) CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-284 (4) CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-129 (4) CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-470 (4) CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-298 (3) CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4-5 (3) CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-120 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

OH 2702 (1948–2026) IL 2388 (1962–2026) TX 2382 (1960–2026) CA 2096 (1926–2026) MS 1710 (1969–2026) PA 1548 (1953–2026) TN 1479 (1962–2026) WV 1195 (1991–2026) FL 1102 (1978–2026) LA 773 (1991–2026) GA 674 (1934–2026) SD 546 (1975–2026) IN 526 (1989–2026) NM 477 (1961–2026) KS 467 (1972–2026) NC 447 (1943–2026) NJ 408 (1958–2026) OK 405 (1951–2026) MD 389 (1971–2026) ND 280 (1981–2026) MN 279 (1969–2026) AL 266 (1974–2026) WA 256 (1968–2026) VA 240 (1988–2026) KY 229 (1954–2026) WI 209 (1980–2026) MI 174 (1951–2026) NY 165 (1968–2026) RI 159 (1975–2026) SC 106 (1983–2026) VT 96 (1969–2026) CO 95 (1973–2026) CT 89 (1941–2026) WY 87 (1982–2026) MO 78 (1968–2025) AR 78 (1960–2026) HI 77 (1980–2026) AZ 73 (1948–2025) ME 64 (1987–2025) NV 57 (1998–2026) AK 42 (1993–2026) DC 41 (1969–2025) ID 41 (1978–2025) MA 37 (1976–2026) IA 35 (1974–2026) MT 35 (1989–2026) DE 31 (1969–2026) NH 30 (1978–2025) UT 25 (1981–2022) NE 24 (1997–2026) OR 22 (1944–2025) VI 8 (2010–2024) GU 2 (2022–2023)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

← Caselaw search · G Cite Topics · Brief Check