89 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1941–2026 10 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Buckman v. People Express, Inc.green2 sentences2017See, e.g., Buckman v. People Express, Inc. , 205 Conn. 166 , 175, 176 n.10, 177, 530 A.2d 596 (1987) (stating that whether "amount of the verdict is 'exorbitant' and unjust in light of all of the evidence ... raises a question of law," and concluding, contrary to trial court and solely on basis of size of award, that verdict was "so grossly excessive as to shock the conscience of this court"); Peck v. Jacquemin , 196 Conn. 53 , 72, 491 A.2d 1043 (1985) ("[t]he trial court now makes its determination as a pure question of law"); see also Wichers v. Hatch , 252 Conn. 174 , 181-82, 745 A.2d 789 ( 2017See, e.g., Buckman v. People Express, Inc. , 205 Conn. 166 , 175, 176 n.10, 177, 530 A.2d 596 (1987) (stating that whether "amount of the verdict is 'exorbitant' and unjust in light of all of the evidence ... raises a question of law," and concluding, contrary to trial court and solely on basis of size of award, that verdict was "so grossly excessive as to shock the conscience of this court"); Peck v. Jacquemin , 196 Conn. 53 , 72, 491 A.2d 1043 (1985) ("[t]he trial court now makes its determination as a pure question of law"); see also Wichers v. Hatch , 252 Conn. 174 , 181-82, 745 A.2d 789 ( | 2 | 2 |
Wichers v. Hatchgreen2 sentences2017See, e.g., Buckman v. People Express, Inc. , 205 Conn. 166 , 175, 176 n.10, 177, 530 A.2d 596 (1987) (stating that whether "amount of the verdict is 'exorbitant' and unjust in light of all of the evidence ... raises a question of law," and concluding, contrary to trial court and solely on basis of size of award, that verdict was "so grossly excessive as to shock the conscience of this court"); Peck v. Jacquemin , 196 Conn. 53 , 72, 491 A.2d 1043 (1985) ("[t]he trial court now makes its determination as a pure question of law"); see also Wichers v. Hatch , 252 Conn. 174 , 181-82, 745 A.2d 789 ( 2017See, e.g., Buckman v. People Express, Inc. , 205 Conn. 166 , 175, 176 n.10, 177, 530 A.2d 596 (1987) (stating that whether "amount of the verdict is 'exorbitant' and unjust in light of all of the evidence ... raises a question of law," and concluding, contrary to trial court and solely on basis of size of award, that verdict was "so grossly excessive as to shock the conscience of this court"); Peck v. Jacquemin , 196 Conn. 53 , 72, 491 A.2d 1043 (1985) ("[t]he trial court now makes its determination as a pure question of law"); see also Wichers v. Hatch , 252 Conn. 174 , 181-82, 745 A.2d 789 ( | 2 | 2 |
State v. Kirbygreen2 sentences2013See State v. Kirby, 280 Conn. 361, 394 , 908 A.2d 506 (2006). 2013See State v. Kirby, 280 Conn. 361, 394 , 908 A.2d 506 (2006). | 2 | 2 |
Sherman v. Roncogreen2 sentences2017Two years later, in Sherman , we observed that the relation back standard of review was "not at issue" in that case, but used dictum in a footnote "to clarify that the de novo standard of review is always the applicable standard of review for resolving whether subsequent amendments to a complaint relate back for purposes of the statute of limitations." (Emphasis in original.) Sherman v. Ronco , supra, 294 Conn. at 554 n.10, 985 A.2d 1042 . 2017Two years later, in Sherman , we observed that the relation back standard of review was "not at issue" in that case, but used dictum in a footnote "to clarify that the de novo standard of review is always the applicable standard of review for resolving whether subsequent amendments to a complaint relate back for purposes of the statute of limitations." (Emphasis in original.) Sherman v. Ronco , supra, 294 Conn. at 554 n.10, 985 A.2d 1042 . | 1 | 3 |
Dimartino v. Richensgreen2 sentences2025See DiMartino v. Richens, 263 Conn. 639 , 661–62, 822 A.2d 205 (2003). 2025See DiMartino v. Richens, 263 Conn. 639 , 661–62, 822 A.2d 205 (2003). | 1 | 2 |
Peck v. Jacquemingreen2 sentences2017See, e.g., Buckman v. People Express, Inc. , 205 Conn. 166 , 175, 176 n.10, 177, 530 A.2d 596 (1987) (stating that whether "amount of the verdict is 'exorbitant' and unjust in light of all of the evidence ... raises a question of law," and concluding, contrary to trial court and solely on basis of size of award, that verdict was "so grossly excessive as to shock the conscience of this court"); Peck v. Jacquemin , 196 Conn. 53 , 72, 491 A.2d 1043 (1985) ("[t]he trial court now makes its determination as a pure question of law"); see also Wichers v. Hatch , 252 Conn. 174 , 181-82, 745 A.2d 789 ( 2017See, e.g., Buckman v. People Express, Inc. , 205 Conn. 166 , 175, 176 n.10, 177, 530 A.2d 596 (1987) (stating that whether "amount of the verdict is 'exorbitant' and unjust in light of all of the evidence ... raises a question of law," and concluding, contrary to trial court and solely on basis of size of award, that verdict was "so grossly excessive as to shock the conscience of this court"); Peck v. Jacquemin , 196 Conn. 53 , 72, 491 A.2d 1043 (1985) ("[t]he trial court now makes its determination as a pure question of law"); see also Wichers v. Hatch , 252 Conn. 174 , 181-82, 745 A.2d 789 ( | 1 | 2 |
Fredericks v. Reinckegreen2 sentences2007See also State v. Pascucci, 161 Conn. 382 , 288 A.2d 408 (1971); Fredericks v. Reincke, 152 Conn. 501 , 208 A.2d 756 (1965). 2007See also State v. Pascucci, 161 Conn. 382 , 288 A.2d 408 (1971); Fredericks v. Reincke, 152 Conn. 501 , 208 A.2d 756 (1965). | 1 | 2 |
Alam & Sarker, LLC v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2026See, e.g., id.; see also Alam & Sarker, LLC v. United States, 113 F.4th 153, 167 (1st Cir. 2024) (“assuming arguendo that a procedural due process violation existed at the administrative level, the de novo hearing in the [D]istrict [C]ourt cured the violation” (emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted), quoting Traficanti v. United States, 227 F.3d 170, 175 (4th Cir. 2000); Kim v. United States, 121 F.3d 1269, 1274 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[a] trial de novo, in which the existence of a violation is examined afresh, Daniels v. Commissioner of Revenue Services and the parties are not limited 2026See, e.g., id.; see also Alam & Sarker, LLC v. United States, 113 F.4th 153, 167 (1st Cir. 2024) (“assuming arguendo that a proce- dural due process violation existed at the administrative level, the de novo hearing in the [D]istrict [C]ourt cured the violation” (emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted)), quoting Traficanti v. United States, 227 F.3d 170, 175 (4th Cir. 2000); Kim v. United States, 121 F.3d 1269, 1274 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[a] trial de novo, in which the existence of a violation is examined afresh, Daniels v. Commissioner of Revenue Services and the parties are not limit | 1 | 1 |
Leonard Traficanti, D/B/A Lt's Gas/snaks v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2026See, e.g., id.; see also Alam & Sarker, LLC v. United States, 113 F.4th 153, 167 (1st Cir. 2024) (“assuming arguendo that a procedural due process violation existed at the administrative level, the de novo hearing in the [D]istrict [C]ourt cured the violation” (emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted), quoting Traficanti v. United States, 227 F.3d 170, 175 (4th Cir. 2000); Kim v. United States, 121 F.3d 1269, 1274 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[a] trial de novo, in which the existence of a violation is examined afresh, Daniels v. Commissioner of Revenue Services and the parties are not limited 2026See, e.g., id.; see also Alam & Sarker, LLC v. United States, 113 F.4th 153, 167 (1st Cir. 2024) (“assuming arguendo that a proce- dural due process violation existed at the administrative level, the de novo hearing in the [D]istrict [C]ourt cured the violation” (emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted)), quoting Traficanti v. United States, 227 F.3d 170, 175 (4th Cir. 2000); Kim v. United States, 121 F.3d 1269, 1274 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[a] trial de novo, in which the existence of a violation is examined afresh, Daniels v. Commissioner of Revenue Services and the parties are not limit | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. General Nutrition Centers, Inc.green2 sentences2025See, e.g., Williams v. General Nutrition Centers, Inc., 326 Conn. 651, 657 , 166 A.3d 625 (2017). ‘‘[B]ecause regulations have the same force and effect as statutes, we interpret both using the plain meaning rule.’’ Id.; see General Statutes § 1-2z. 2025See, e.g., Williams v. General Nutrition Centers, Inc., 326 Conn. 651, 657 , 166 A.3d 625 (2017). ‘‘[B]ecause regulations have the same force and effect as statutes, we interpret both using the plain meaning rule.’’ Id.; see General Statutes § 1-2z. | 1 | 1 |
Town of Groton v. United Steelworkers of Americagreen2 sentences2025See, e.g., Groton v. United Steelworkers of America, 254 Conn. 35 , 51–52, 757 A.2d 501 (2000) (noting that ‘‘[o]ur legal system . . . ordinarily give[s] great deference . . . to both the factual and legal determinations of the arbitra- tors’’ and that, even when appellate review ‘‘requires a de novo determination by the court . . . we give defer- ence to the arbitrator’s factual determinations’’ (citation omitted)). 2025See, e.g., Groton v. United Steelworkers of America, 254 Conn. 35 , 51–52, 757 A.2d 501 (2000) (noting that ‘‘[o]ur legal system . . . ordinarily give[s] great deference . . . to both the factual and legal determinations of the arbitra- tors’’ and that, even when appellate review ‘‘requires a de novo determination by the court . . . we give defer- ence to the arbitrator’s factual determinations’’ (citation omitted)). | 1 | 1 |
| Kerin v. Stanglegreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Joseph W., Jr.green | 1 | 1 |
| Zimmerman v. CADE ENTERPRISES, INC.green | 1 | 1 |
| Tyler A. White v. State of Indianagreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Kinggreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Lopezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Knybelgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Popeleskigreen | 1 | 1 |
| Marroquin v. F. MONARCA MASONRYgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bielaska v. Town of Waterfordgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gurliacci v. Mayergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Friezo v. Friezogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Slayton v. American Express Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Pascuccigreen | 1 | 1 |
| Medvalusa Health Programs, Inc. v. Memberworks, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Cobbgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Zimmerman v. Meloygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Choice v. Goordgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gaye v. Kramergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Kim v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2026See, e.g., id.; see also Alam & Sarker, LLC v. United States, 113 F.4th 153, 167 (1st Cir. 2024) (“assuming arguendo that a procedural due process violation existed at the administrative level, the de novo hearing in the [D]istrict [C]ourt cured the violation” (emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted), quoting Traficanti v. United States, 227 F.3d 170, 175 (4th Cir. 2000); Kim v. United States, 121 F.3d 1269, 1274 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[a] trial de novo, in which the existence of a violation is examined afresh, Daniels v. Commissioner of Revenue Services and the parties are not limited 2026See, e.g., id.; see also Alam & Sarker, LLC v. United States, 113 F.4th 153, 167 (1st Cir. 2024) (“assuming arguendo that a proce- dural due process violation existed at the administrative level, the de novo hearing in the [D]istrict [C]ourt cured the violation” (emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted)), quoting Traficanti v. United States, 227 F.3d 170, 175 (4th Cir. 2000); Kim v. United States, 121 F.3d 1269, 1274 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[a] trial de novo, in which the existence of a violation is examined afresh, Daniels v. Commissioner of Revenue Services and the parties are not limit | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Kolomiets v. Syncor International Corp.
neutral
2 sentences2005“The standard of review to be used by the board when reviewing a commissioner’s findings is set forth in Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies § 31-301-8. 1 That section directs the board not to retry the case before it, but to determine whether evidence supports the commissioner’s finding.” Dengler v. Special Attention Health Services, Inc., 62 Conn. App. 440, 447 , 774 A.2d 992 (2001). “[T]he review [board’s] hearing of an appeal from the commissioner is not a de novo hearing of the facts. . . . [I]t is obligated] to hear the appeal on the record and not retry the facts. . . . [T]he powe 2005“The standard of review to be used by the board when reviewing a commissioner’s findings is set forth in Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies § 31-301-8. 1 That section directs the board not to retry the case before it, but to determine whether evidence supports the commissioner’s finding.” Dengler v. Special Attention Health Services, Inc., 62 Conn. App. 440, 447 , 774 A.2d 992 (2001). “[T]he review [board’s] hearing of an appeal from the commissioner is not a de novo hearing of the facts. . . . [I]t is obligated] to hear the appeal on the record and not retry the facts. . . . [T]he powe | 7 | 1999–2005 |
Caserta v. Zoning Board of Appeals
green
2 sentences1994Prior to the briefing by the plaintiff of the issues on this appeal, he filed an "Objection to Record on Appeal" (File item 105), in which he sought to exclude certain documents in the record relating to the zoning enforcement officer's investigation on the ground that the board "had an obligation to review the actions of the Zoning Enforcement Officer at the time he issued the cease and desist order [and that any] subsequent actions are not relevant to the Appeal at hand." The plaintiff's objection was overruled by the court based on the standard of review stated in Caserta v. Zoning Board of 1994Prior to the briefing by the plaintiff of the issues on this appeal, he filed an "Objection to Record on Appeal" (File item 105) in which he sought to exclude certain documents in the record relating to the zoning enforcement officer's investigation on the ground that the board "had an obligation to review the actions of the Zoning Enforcement Officer at the time he issued the cease and desist order [and that any] subsequent actions are not relevant to the Appeal at hand." The plaintiff's objection was overruled by the court based on the standard of review stated in Caserta v. Zoning Board of | 6 | 1994–1998 |
Fair v. People's Savings Bank
green
2 sentences2001“The review [board’s] hearing of an appeal from the commissioner is not a de novo hearing of the facts. . . . [I]t is [obligated] to hear the appeal on the record and not retry the facts.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mulroy v. Becton Dickinson Co., 48 Conn. App. 774, 776 , 712 A.2d 436 (1998), quoting Fair v. People’s Savings Bank, 207 Conn. 535, 538-39 , 542 A.2d 1118 (1988). 2001“The review [board’s] hearing of an appeal from the commissioner is not a de novo hearing of the facts. . . . [I]t is [obligated] to hear the appeal on the record and not retry the facts.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mulroy v. Becton Dickinson Co., 48 Conn. App. 774, 776 , 712 A.2d 436 (1998), quoting Fair v. People’s Savings Bank, 207 Conn. 535, 538-39 , 542 A.2d 1118 (1988). | 5 | 1996–2001 |
Crochiere v. Board of Education of Town of Enfield
green
2 sentences1997The appropriate standard applicable to the review board when reviewing a decision of a commissioner is well established. “[T]he review [board’s] hearing of an appeal from the commissioner is not a de novo hearing of the facts. . . . [I]t is obligated] to hear the appeal on the record and not retry the facts. . . . [T]he power and duty of determining the facts rests on the commissioner, the trier of facts. . . . [T]he conclusions drawn by him from the facts found must stand unless they result from an incorrect application of the law to the subordinate facts or from an inference illegally or unr 1997The appropriate standard applicable to the review board when reviewing a decision of a commissioner is well established. “[T]he review [board’s] hearing of an appeal from the commissioner is not a de novo hearing of the facts. . . . [I]t is obligated] to hear the appeal on the record and not retry the facts. . . . [T]he power and duty of determining the facts rests on the commissioner, the trier of facts. . . . [T]he conclusions drawn by him from the facts found must stand unless they result from an incorrect application of the law to the subordinate facts or from an inference illegally or unr | 5 | 1994–1998 |
Kolomiets v. Syncor International Corp.
green
2 sentences2005“The standard of review to be used by the board when reviewing a commissioner’s findings is set forth in Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies § 31-301-8. 1 That section directs the board not to retry the case before it, but to determine whether evidence supports the commissioner’s finding.” Dengler v. Special Attention Health Services, Inc., 62 Conn. App. 440, 447 , 774 A.2d 992 (2001). “[T]he review [board’s] hearing of an appeal from the commissioner is not a de novo hearing of the facts. . . . [I]t is obligated] to hear the appeal on the record and not retry the facts. . . . [T]he powe 2005“The standard of review to be used by the board when reviewing a commissioner’s findings is set forth in Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies § 31-301-8. 1 That section directs the board not to retry the case before it, but to determine whether evidence supports the commissioner’s finding.” Dengler v. Special Attention Health Services, Inc., 62 Conn. App. 440, 447 , 774 A.2d 992 (2001). “[T]he review [board’s] hearing of an appeal from the commissioner is not a de novo hearing of the facts. . . . [I]t is obligated] to hear the appeal on the record and not retry the facts. . . . [T]he powe | 4 | 2001–2005 |
Muldoon v. Homestead Insulation Co.
green
2 sentences1997The appropriate standard applicable to the review board when reviewing a decision of a commissioner is well established. “[T]he review [board’s] hearing of an appeal from the commissioner is not a de novo hearing of the facts. . . . [I]t is obligated] to hear the appeal on the record and not retry the facts. . . . [T]he power and duty of determining the facts rests on the commissioner, the trier of facts. . . . [T]he conclusions drawn by him from the facts found must stand unless they result from an incorrect application of the law to the subordinate facts or from an inference illegally or unr 1997The appropriate standard applicable to the review board when reviewing a decision of a commissioner is well established. “[T]he review [board’s] hearing of an appeal from the commissioner is not a de novo hearing of the facts. . . . [I]t is obligated] to hear the appeal on the record and not retry the facts. . . . [T]he power and duty of determining the facts rests on the commissioner, the trier of facts. . . . [T]he conclusions drawn by him from the facts found must stand unless they result from an incorrect application of the law to the subordinate facts or from an inference illegally or unr | 4 | 1996–1998 |
Sellers v. Sellers Garage, Inc.
green
2 sentences2020The board’s ‘‘hearing of an appeal from the commissioner is not a de novo hearing of the facts. . . . [I]t is oblig[ated] to hear the appeal on the record and not retry the facts.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sellers v. Sellers Garage, Inc., 92 Conn. App. 650, 651 , 887 A.2d 382 (2005). ‘‘[T]he power and duty of determining the facts [rest] on the commis- sioner, the trier of facts. . . . 2020The board’s ‘‘hearing of an appeal from the commissioner is not a de novo hearing of the facts. . . . [I]t is oblig[ated] to hear the appeal on the record and not retry the facts.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sellers v. Sellers Garage, Inc., 92 Conn. App. 650, 651 , 887 A.2d 382 (2005). ‘‘[T]he power and duty of determining the facts [rest] on the commis- sioner, the trier of facts. . . . | 2 | 2019–2020 |
In Re Stephen M.
green
2 sentences2020In such circumstances, an appellate court employs the de novo standard of review.’’ In re Stephen M., 109 Conn. App. 644, 658 , 953 A.2d 668 (2008). 2020In such circumstances, an appellate court employs the de novo standard of review.’’ In re Stephen M., 109 Conn. App. 644, 658 , 953 A.2d 668 (2008). | 2 | 2010–2020 |
Dimmock v. Lawrence & Memorial Hospital, Inc.
green
2 sentences2017We then posited that, "[o]n the other hand, a de novo standard would be more consistent with the oft stated rule that [t]he interpretation of pleadings is always a question of law for the court and that our interpretation of the pleadings therefore is plenary." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 799-800 , 945 A.2d 955 . 2017We then posited that, "[o]n the other hand, a de novo standard would be more consistent with the oft stated rule that [t]he interpretation of pleadings is always a question of law for the court and that our interpretation of the pleadings therefore is plenary." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 799-800 , 945 A.2d 955 . | 2 | 2010–2017 |
O'Reilly v. General Dynamics Corp.
green
2 sentences2000“The appropriate standard applicable to the board when reviewing a decision of a commissioner is well established. [T]he review [board’s] hearing of an appeal from the commissioner is not a de novo hearing of the facts. . . . [I]t is obligated to hear the appeal on the record and not retry the facts. . . . [T]he power and duty of determining the facts rests on the commissioner, the trier of facts.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) O’Reilly v. General Dynamics Corp., 52 Conn. App. 813, 815-16 , 728 A.2d 527 (1999). 2000“The appropriate standard applicable to the board when reviewing a decision of a commissioner is well established. [T]he review [board’s] hearing of an appeal from the commissioner is not a de novo hearing of the facts. . . . [I]t is obligated to hear the appeal on the record and not retry the facts. . . . [T]he power and duty of determining the facts rests on the commissioner, the trier of facts.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) O’Reilly v. General Dynamics Corp., 52 Conn. App. 813, 815-16 , 728 A.2d 527 (1999). | 2 | 2000–2009 |
Autotote Enterprises, Inc. v. State
green
2 sentences2006“As in ah matters of statutory interpretation, we apply a de novo standard of review on appeal because the issue is one of law.” Autotote Enterprises, Inc. v. State, 278 Conn. 150, 160 , 898 A.2d 141 (2006). 2006“As in ah matters of statutory interpretation, we apply a de novo standard of review on appeal because the issue is one of law.” Autotote Enterprises, Inc. v. State, 278 Conn. 150, 160 , 898 A.2d 141 (2006). | 2 | 2006–2006 |
Rogers v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc.
neutral
2 sentences2005We note that “[t]he review [board’s] hearing of an appeal from the commissioner is not a de novo hearing of the facts. . . . [I]t is obligated] to hear the appeal on the record and not retry the facts. [T]he power and duty of determining the facts rests on the commissioner, the trier of facts. . . . [T]he conclusions drawn by him from the facts found must stand unless they result from an incorrect application of the law to the subordinate facts or from an inference illegally or unreasonably drawn from them.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rogers v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc., 45 Conn. App. 204 2005We note that “[t]he review [board’s] hearing of an appeal from the commissioner is not a de novo hearing of the facts. . . . [I]t is obligated] to hear the appeal on the record and not retry the facts. [T]he power and duty of determining the facts rests on the commissioner, the trier of facts. . . . [T]he conclusions drawn by him from the facts found must stand unless they result from an incorrect application of the law to the subordinate facts or from an inference illegally or unreasonably drawn from them.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rogers v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc., 45 Conn. App. 204 | 2 | 2001–2005 |
Dengler v. Special Attention Health Services, Inc.
green
2 sentences2005“The standard of review to be used by the board when reviewing a commissioner’s findings is set forth in Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies § 31-301-8. 1 That section directs the board not to retry the case before it, but to determine whether evidence supports the commissioner’s finding.” Dengler v. Special Attention Health Services, Inc., 62 Conn. App. 440, 447 , 774 A.2d 992 (2001). “[T]he review [board’s] hearing of an appeal from the commissioner is not a de novo hearing of the facts. . . . [I]t is obligated] to hear the appeal on the record and not retry the facts. . . . [T]he powe 2005“The standard of review to be used by the board when reviewing a commissioner’s findings is set forth in Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies § 31-301-8. 1 That section directs the board not to retry the case before it, but to determine whether evidence supports the commissioner’s finding.” Dengler v. Special Attention Health Services, Inc., 62 Conn. App. 440, 447 , 774 A.2d 992 (2001). “[T]he review [board’s] hearing of an appeal from the commissioner is not a de novo hearing of the facts. . . . [I]t is obligated] to hear the appeal on the record and not retry the facts. . . . [T]he powe | 2 | 2001–2005 |
Bryan v. Sheraton-Hartford Hotel
green
2 sentences2005“On appeal, the board must determine whether there is any evidence in the record to support the commissioner’s findings and award.” Bryan v. Sheraton-Hartford Hotel, 62 Conn. App. 733, 739 , 774 A.2d 1009 (2001). 2005“On appeal, the board must determine whether there is any evidence in the record to support the commissioner’s findings and award.” Bryan v. Sheraton-Hartford Hotel, 62 Conn. App. 733, 739 , 774 A.2d 1009 (2001). | 2 | 2001–2005 |
Aurora v. Miami Plumbing & Heating, Inc.
green
2 sentences1999“Our role is to determine whether the review [board’s] decision results from an incorrect application of the law to the subordinate facts or from an inference illegally or unreasonably drawn from them.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Aurora v. Miami Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 6 Conn. App. 45, 47 , 502 A.2d 952 (1986). 1999“Our role is to determine whether the review [board’s] decision results from an incorrect application of the law to the subordinate facts or from an inference illegally or unreasonably drawn from them.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Aurora v. Miami Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 6 Conn. App. 45, 47 , 502 A.2d 952 (1986). | 2 | 1999–1999 |
Dinan v. Board of Zoning Appeals
green
2 sentences1994The plaintiff's initial brief attacked the zoning regulation on various constitutional grounds including that of "impermissible vagueness" and devoted one section of his argument (pp. 20-22) to the claim that the definition of "boarding house" in the zoning ordinance is "unconstitutional in that there is no rational basis to exclude it from a RAR 40/MF Zone." At the time of the hearing on the plaintiff's objection to the record on appeal, the court directed counsel's attention to the cases of Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas , 416 U.S. 1 (1974) and Elliott v. City of Athens, Georgia , 960 F.2d 1994The plaintiff's initial brief attacked the zoning regulation on various constitutional grounds including that of "impermissible vagueness" and devoted one section of his argument (pp. 20-22) to the claim that the definition of "boarding house" in the zoning ordinance is "unconstitutional in that there is no rational basis to exclude it from a PAR 40/MF Zone." At the time of the hearing on the plaintiff's objection to the record on appeal, the court directed counsel's attention to the cases of Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) and Elliott v. City of Athens Georgia, 960 F.2d 97 | 2 | 1994–1994 |
Elliott v. City of Athens, Georgia
green
2 sentences1994The plaintiff's initial brief attacked the zoning regulation on various constitutional grounds including that of "impermissible vagueness" and devoted one section of his argument (pp. 20-22) to the claim that the definition of "boarding house" in the zoning ordinance is "unconstitutional in that there is no rational basis to exclude it from a RAR 40/MF Zone." At the time of the hearing on the plaintiff's objection to the record on appeal, the court directed counsel's attention to the cases of Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas , 416 U.S. 1 (1974) and Elliott v. City of Athens, Georgia , 960 F.2d 1994The plaintiff's initial brief attacked the zoning regulation on various constitutional grounds including that of "impermissible vagueness" and devoted one section of his argument (pp. 20-22) to the claim that the definition of "boarding house" in the zoning ordinance is "unconstitutional in that there is no rational basis to exclude it from a PAR 40/MF Zone." At the time of the hearing on the plaintiff's objection to the record on appeal, the court directed counsel's attention to the cases of Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) and Elliott v. City of Athens Georgia, 960 F.2d 97 | 2 | 1994–1994 |
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas
green
2 sentences1994The plaintiff's initial brief attacked the zoning regulation on various constitutional grounds including that of "impermissible vagueness" and devoted one section of his argument (pp. 20-22) to the claim that the definition of "boarding house" in the zoning ordinance is "unconstitutional in that there is no rational basis to exclude it from a RAR 40/MF Zone." At the time of the hearing on the plaintiff's objection to the record on appeal, the court directed counsel's attention to the cases of Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas , 416 U.S. 1 (1974) and Elliott v. City of Athens, Georgia , 960 F.2d 1994The plaintiff's initial brief attacked the zoning regulation on various constitutional grounds including that of "impermissible vagueness" and devoted one section of his argument (pp. 20-22) to the claim that the definition of "boarding house" in the zoning ordinance is "unconstitutional in that there is no rational basis to exclude it from a PAR 40/MF Zone." At the time of the hearing on the plaintiff's objection to the record on appeal, the court directed counsel's attention to the cases of Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) and Elliott v. City of Athens Georgia, 960 F.2d 97 | 2 | 1994–1994 |
| State v. Golding green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Burnham v. Karl & Gelb, P.C. green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Mensah v. Mensah green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| State v. Porter green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Labissoniere v. Gaylord Hospital, Inc. green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Fitzgerald Council v. Com'r of Correction green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Guzman v. Yeroz green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Vitti v. City of Milford green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Fagan v. City of Stamford neutral | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Mathews v. Eldridge green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Duperry v. Solnit green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| DuPerry v. Kirk green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Driscoll v. Norwich Savings Society green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp. green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Quigley-Dodd v. General Accident Insurance Co. of America neutral | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Sosin v. Sosin neutral | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Duffy v. Flagg green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Security Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York v. Kings West Ltd. Partnership green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Paternostro v. Arborio Corp. green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Keenan v. Union Camp Corp. green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Turner v. Croman green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Paternostro v. Arborio Corp. green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.