de novo standard in Tennessee

2020This court will review the post-conviction court’s findings of fact “under a de novo standard, accompanied with a presumption that those findings are correct unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise.” Fields v. State, 40 S.W.3d 450, 458 (Tenn. 2001) (citing Tenn. R.

2019This court will review the post-conviction court’s findings of fact “under a de novo standard, accompanied with a presumption that those findings are correct unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise.” Fields v. State, 40 S.W.3d 450, 458 (Tenn. 2001) (citing Tenn. R.

2020Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddleston, 854 S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tenn. 1993) (citing Estate of Adkins v. White Consol.

2017We review a trial court‟s conclusions of law under a de novo standard with no presumption of correctness. -3- Campbell v. Florida Steel Corp., 919 S.W.2d 26, 35 (Tenn. 1996); Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddleston, 854 S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tenn. 1993).

2020App. P. 13(d); Henley, 960 S.W.2d at 578 ).

2004Burns, 6 S.W.3d at 461 . “[A] trial court’s findings of fact underlying a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel are reviewed on appeal under a de novo standard, accompanied with a presumption that those findings are correct unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise.” Fields v. State, 40 S.W.3d 450, 458 (Tenn. 2001) (citing Tenn. R. -2- App. P. 13(d); Henley v. State, 960 S.W.2d 572, 578 (Tenn. 1997)).

2017State v. Harkins, 811 S.W.2d 79, 82 (Tenn. 1991).

2015State v. Harkins, 811 S.W.2d 79, 82 (Tenn. 1991).

2025This court reviews “a trial court’s application of law to the facts under a de novo standard of review with no presumption of correctness.” McKinney, 669 S.W.3d at 764 (citing State v. Echols, 382 S.W.3d 266, 277 (Tenn. 2012); State v. Walton, 41 S.W.3d 75, 81 (Tenn. 2001)). 3.

2025This Court reviews “a trial court’s application of law to the facts under a de novo standard of review with no presumption of correctness.” McKinney, 669 S.W.3d at 764 (citing State v. Echols, 382 S.W.3d 266, 277 (Tenn. 2012); State v. Walton, 41 S.W.3d 75, 81 (Tenn. 2001)).

2018For example, citing Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-401(d), the Defendant states that our review is “de novo . . . with a presumption that the trial court’s determinations are correct if the record shows the trial judge considered the sentencing principles and all relevant facts and circumstances.” However, our supreme court in Bise specifically stated, “[A]lthough the statutory language continues to describe appellate review as de novo with a presumption of correctness,” the 2005 revisions to the Sentencing Act “effectively abrogated the de novo standard of appellate review.” 380 S.W.3

2018Standard of Review The Defendant first argues that this court should utilize a de novo standard to review the trial court’s decision ordering him to register as a sex offender, rather than the abuse of discretion with a presumption of reasonableness standard enunciated in State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682, 707 (Tenn. 2012) (adopting “an abuse of discretion standard of review, granting a presumption of reasonableness to within-range sentencing decisions that reflect a proper application of the purposes and principles of our Sentencing Act”).

2014“Our review of a trial court’s application of law to the facts, however, is conducted under a de novo standard of review.” Walton, 41 S.W.3d at 81 (citing State v. Crutcher, 989 S.W.2d 295, 299 (Tenn. 1999)); Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d at 629 .

2014“Our review of a trial court’s application of law to the facts, however, is conducted under a de novo standard of review.” Walton, 41 S.W.3d at 81 (citing State v. Crutcher, 989 S.W.2d 295, 299 (Tenn. 1999); Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d at 629 .

2012State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d 453, 461 (Tenn. 1999). “[A] trial court’s findings of fact underlying a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel are reviewed on appeal under a de novo standard, accompanied with a presumption that those findings are correct unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise.” Fields v. State, 40 S.W.3d 450, 458 (Tenn. 2001) (citing Tenn. R.

2011Burns, 6 S.W.3d at 461 . “[A] trial court’s findings of fact underlying a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel are reviewed on appeal under a de novo standard, accompanied with a presumption that those findings are correct unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise.” Fields v. State, 40 S.W.3d 450, 458 (Tenn. 2001) (citing Tenn. R.

2023See id. at 791 (“Because the application of Ferguson . . . presents a constitutional issue, we will apply a de novo standard of review to the trial court’s decision concerning the fundamental fairness of the trial.”).

2021Id. at 791 (“Because the application of Ferguson . . . presents a constitutional issue, we will apply a de novo standard of review to the trial court’s decision concerning the fundamental fairness of the trial.”).

2020See Melton v. City of Lakeland, No. W2018-01237-COA- R3-CV, 2019 WL 2375431 , at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 5, 2019) (citing Campbell v. Florida Steel Corp., 919 S.W.2d 26, 35 (Tenn. 1996)); State ex rel.

2017We review a trial court‟s conclusions of law under a de novo standard with no presumption of correctness. -3- Campbell v. Florida Steel Corp., 919 S.W.2d 26, 35 (Tenn. 1996); Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddleston, 854 S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tenn. 1993).

2025Id. (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1 - 107(d) (2022)). -6- not free to alter, amend, or depart from the words of the statute” (citing Gleaves v. Checker Cab Transit Corp., 15 S.W.3d 799, 803 (Tenn. 2000))).

2002Because “issues of statutory construction are questions of law,” Stewart v. State, 33 S.W.3d 785, 791 (Tenn.2000); see also State v. Williams, 38 S.W.3d 532, 535 (Tenn.2001); Gleaves v. Checker Cab Transit Corp., 15 S.W.3d 799, 802 (Tenn.2000), we review the issues in this case under a de novo standard of review, according no presumption of correctness to the conclusions reached by the trial court, see Walker v. Board of Prof'l Responsibility, 38 S.W.3d 540, 544 (Tenn.2001); Reeves v. Granite State Ins.

2018Bd. of Educ., 58 S.W.3d 706, 710 (Tenn. 2001).

2012Kendrick v. Shoemake, 90 S.W.3d 566, 569-70 (Tenn. 2002); Southern Constructors, Inc. v. Loudon County Bd. of Educ., 58 S.W.3d 706, 710 (Tenn. 2001).

2022A hearing under the section is not an “appeal.” Rather, the section requires “a traditional de novo hearing.” Kelly v. Evans, 43 S.W. 3d 514, 515 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).

2019However, this Court has held under the applicable version of the statute, as well as prior versions, that the rehearing of a magistrate’s decision before a juvenile court judge “contemplates a traditional de novo hearing.” See Kelly v. Evans, 43 S.W.3d 514, 515 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Mar. 30, 2001); see also In re Zamorah B., 2013 WL 614449 , at *4 (“The de novo hearing is not a review of the record presented to the magistrate, but is a full evidentiary hearing akin to a new trial, as in an appeal from a general sessions court to a circuit court.” (citing Kelly, 43 S.W

2018In re Estate of Tanner, 295 S.W.3d 610, 613 (Tenn. 2009) (citing Gleaves v. Checker Cab Transit Corp., 15 S.W.3d 799, 802 (Tenn. 2000); Myint v. Allstate Ins.

2018In re Estate of Tanner, 295 S.W.3d 610, 613 (Tenn. 2009) (citing Gleaves v. Checker Cab Transit Corp., 15 S.W.3d 799, 802 (Tenn. 2000)); Myint v. Allstate Ins.

2024In applying the de novo standard, “we are mindful that ‘[t]rial courts are vested with wide discretion in matters of child custody’ and that ‘the appellate courts will not interfere except upon a showing of erroneous exercise of that discretion.’” Johnson v. Johnson, 165 S.W.3d 640, 645 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (quoting Koch v. Koch, 874 S.W.2d 571, 575 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993)).

2012In applying the de novo standard, we acknowledge that “[t]rial courts are vested with wide discretion in matters of child custody” and that “appellate courts will not interfere -4- except upon a showing of erroneous exercise of that discretion.” Koch v. Koch, 874 S.W.2d 571, 575 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993).

2012“Because ‘[c]ustody and visitation determinations often hinge on subtle factors, including the parents’ demeanor and credibility during . . . proceedings themselves,’ appellate courts are ‘reluctant to second-guess a trial court’s decisions.’” Johnson v. Johnson, 165 S.W.3d 640, 645 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (quoting Gaskill v. Gaskill, 936 S.W.2d 626, 631 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996)).

2008In applying the de novo standard, “we are mindful that ‘[t]rial courts are vested with wide discretion in matters of child custody’ and that ‘the appellate courts will not interfere except upon a showing of erroneous exercise of that discretion.’” Johnson v. Johnson, 169 S.W.3d 640, 645 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (quoting Koch v. Koch, 874 S.W.2d 571, 575 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993)). -4- “Because ‘[c]ustody and visitation determinations often hinge on subtle factors, including the parents’ demeanor and credibility during...proceedings themselves,’ appellate courts ‘are reluctant to second-guess a trial

2010App. P. 13(d); Kendrick, 90 S.W.3d at 570 . -4- In applying the de novo standard, "we are mindful that ‘[t]rial courts are vested with wide discretion in matters of child custody’ and that ‘the appellate courts will not interfere except upon a showing of erroneous exercise of that discretion.'" Johnson v. Johnson, 169 S.W.3d 640, 645 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (quoting Koch v. Koch, 874 S.W.2d 571, 575 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993)).

2010App. P. 13(d); Kendrick, 90 S.W.3d at 570 . -4- In applying the de novo standard, "we are mindful that ‘[t]rial courts are vested with wide discretion in matters of child custody’ and that ‘the appellate courts will not interfere except upon a showing of erroneous exercise of that discretion.'" Johnson v. Johnson, 169 S.W.3d 640, 645 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (quoting Koch v. Koch, 874 S.W.2d 571, 575 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993)).

2014“Our review of a trial court’s application of law to the facts, however, is conducted under a de novo standard of review.” Walton, 41 S.W.3d at 81 (citing State v. Crutcher, 989 S.W.2d 295, 299 (Tenn. 1999)); Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d at 629 .

2014“Our review of a trial court’s application of law to the facts, however, is conducted under a de novo standard of review.” Walton, 41 S.W.3d at 81 (citing State v. Crutcher, 989 S.W.2d 295, 299 (Tenn. 1999); Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d at 629 .

2022Duke v. Duke, 398 S.W.3d 665, 668 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012). “[W]e review the denial of a motion for recusal under a de novo standard of review.” Id. (citing Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B, § 2.06).

2022Duke v. Duke, 398 S.W.3d 665, 668 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012). “[W]e review the denial of a motion for recusal under a de novo standard of review.” Id. (citing Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B, § 2.06).

2018See Duke v. Duke, 398 S.W.3d at 668 n.2 (citing State v. Hester, 324 S.W.3d 1, 73 (Tenn. 2010)). 2 An appeal that is “de novo” is distinguishable from “the de novo standard of review” pursuant to which the “appellate courts review factual findings de novo on the record and accord these findings a presumption of correctness unless the evidence preponderates otherwise.” See In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d 507, 524 (Tenn. 2016); see also Tenn. R.

2014See State v. Hester, 324 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2010).

2013See generally State v. Robert Fusco, No. M2012-01068-CCA-RM-CD, 2012 WL 6062856, at *38-39 (Tenn. Crim.

2013See generally State v. Robert Fusco, No. M2012-01068-CCA-RM-CD, 2012 WL 6062856, at *38-39 (Tenn. Crim.

2012T.C.A. § 40-35-401(d) (2006); State v. Johnson, 968 S.W.2d 883, 884 (Tenn. Crim.

2012T.C.A. § 40-35-401(d); State v. Johnson, 968 S.W.2d 883, 884 (Tenn. Crim.

2016Moore argues that this court should review his case under the de novo standard applied in State v. Binette, 33 S.W.3d 215, 217 (Tenn. 2000), because the trial court‟s ruling “involves a question of law and credibility is really not an issue.” Significantly however, Binette applies only “when a trial court‟s findings of fact on a motion to suppress are based solely on evidence that does not involve issues of witness credibility.” Id.

2016Moore argues that this court should review his case under the de novo standard applied in State v. Binette, 33 S.W.3d 215, 217 (Tenn. 2000), because the trial court‟s ruling “involves a question of law and credibility is really not an issue.” Significantly however, Binette applies only “when a trial court‟s findings of fact on a motion to suppress are based solely on evidence that does not involve issues of witness credibility.” Id.

2019Smith v. State, 357 S.W.3d 322, 336 (Tenn. 2011).

2019Smith v. State, 357 S.W.3d 322, 336 (Tenn. 2011).

2024In applying the de novo standard, “we are mindful that ‘[t]rial courts are vested with wide discretion in matters of child custody’ and that ‘the appellate courts will not interfere except upon a showing of erroneous exercise of that discretion.’” Johnson v. Johnson, 165 S.W.3d 640, 645 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (quoting Koch v. Koch, 874 S.W.2d 571, 575 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993)).

2012Oct. 12, 2010) (citing Johnson v. Johnson, 165 S.W.3d 640, 645 (Tenn.Ct.App.2004)).

2025However, this court reviews a trial court’s application of law to the facts under a de novo standard of review with no presumption of correctness. - 20 - Id.

2015Odom, 928 S.W.2d at 23 . “[I]n evaluating the correctness of a trial court‟s ruling on a pretrial motion to suppress, appellate courts may consider the proof adduced both at the suppression hearing and at trial.” State v. Henning, 975 S.W.2d 290, 299 (Tenn. 1998). “[O]ur review of a trial court‟s application of law to the facts is conducted under a de novo standard of review.” R.D.S., 245 S.W.3d at 362 .

2023Tenn. Dep’t of Corr. v. Pressley, 528 S.W.3d 506, 512 (Tenn. 2017); Arden v. Kozawa, 466 S.W.3d 758, 764 (Tenn. 2015).

2019Tenn. Dep’t of Corr. v. Pressley, 528 S.W.3d 506, 512 (Tenn. 2017); Arden v. Kozawa, 466 S.W.3d 758, 764 (Tenn. 2015).