de novo standard in Rhode Island

2016But when the application raises issues of fact or mixed issues of law and fact relating to an applicant’s constitutional rights, “we review those issues de novo.” Merida, 93 A.3d at. 549 (quoting Neufville, 13 A.3d at 610 ); see also Thornton v. State, 948 A.2d 312, 316 (R.I.2008), At the same time, however, it is well established that “[f]ind-ings of historical fact, and inferences drawn from those facts, will still be accorded great deference by this Court, even when a de novo standard is applied to the issues of constitutional dimension.” Merida, 93 A.3d at 549 (quoting Hazard v. State, 968

2015Nevertheless, “[e]ven when the de novo standard is applied to issues of constitutional dimension, we still accord a hearing justice’s findings of historical fact, and inferences drawn from those facts, great deference in conducting our review.” State v. Eddy, 68 A.3d 1089, 1098 (R.I.2013) (quoting Thornton v. State, 948 A.2d 312, 316 (R.I.2008)).

2016But when the application raises issues of fact or mixed issues of law and fact relating to an applicant’s constitutional rights, “we review those issues de novo.” Merida, 93 A.3d at. 549 (quoting Neufville, 13 A.3d at 610 ); see also Thornton v. State, 948 A.2d 312, 316 (R.I.2008), At the same time, however, it is well established that “[f]ind-ings of historical fact, and inferences drawn from those facts, will still be accorded great deference by this Court, even when a de novo standard is applied to the issues of constitutional dimension.” Merida, 93 A.3d at 549 (quoting Hazard v. State, 968

2015Yet, “[w]hen a postconviction relief decision involves ‘questions of fact or mixed questions of law and fact pertaining to an alleged violation of an applicant’s constitutional rights[,]’ we review those issues de novo.” Neufville, 13 A.3d at 610 (quoting Hazard v. State, 968 A.2d 886, 891 (R.I.2009)). “[Findings of historical fact, and inferences drawn from those facts, will still be accorded great deference by this Court, even when a de novo standard is applied to the issues of constitutional dimension.” Hazard, 968 A.2d at 891 (quoting Gonder v. State, 935 A.2d 82, 85 (R.I.2007)).

2017Nevertheless, “[e]ven when the de novo standard is applied to issues of constitutional dimension, we still accord a hearing justice’s findings of historical fact, and inferences drawn from those facts, great deference in conducting our review.” Id. (quoting Rice v. State, 38 A.3d 9, 16 (R.I. 2012)).

2017Nevertheless, “[e]ven when the de novo standard is applied to issues of constitutional dimension, we still accord a hearing justice’s findings of historical fact, and inferences drawn from those facts, great deference in conducting our review.” Id. (quoting Rice v. State, 38 A.3d 9, 16 (R.I. 2012)).

2021II Standard of Review “When interpreting statutes and court rules, we apply a de novo standard of review.” State v. Morais, 203 A.3d 1150, 1154 (R.I. 2019) (quoting State v. Goncalves, 941 A.2d 842, 847 (R.I. 2008)).

2019“When faced with the interpretation of statutes and court rules upon review of a Rule 35 motion, however,” this Court applies “a de novo standard.” State v. Bouffard, 35 A.3d 909, 916 (R.I. 2012) (quoting State v. Goncalves, 941 A.2d 842, 847 (R.I. 2008)).

2023“We do not weigh the evidence on certiorari, but only conduct our review to examine questions of law raised in the petition.” Malachowski v. State, 877 A.2d 649, 653 (R.I. 2005) (quoting Jeff Anthony Properties v. Zoning Board of Review of North Providence, 853 A.2d 1226, 1229 (R.I. 2004)). “[W]ith respect to determining the scope of Rule 26, we have repeatedly employed a de novo standard of review.” DeCurtis v. Visconti, Boren & Campbell, Ltd., 152 A.3d 413, 421 (R.I. 2017) (quoting Cashman Equipment Corp., Inc. v. Cardi Corp., Inc., 139 A.3d 379, 381 (R.I. 2016)).

2017“In addition to examining the record for judicial error, ‘we inspect the record to discern if there is any legally competent evidence to support the findings of the hearing justice below.’ ” Id. (quoting Brown v. State, 841 A.2d 1116, 1121 (R.I. 2004)). “[Wjith respect to determining the scope of Rule 26, we have repeatedly employed a de novo standard of review.” Cashman Equipment Corp., Inc. v. Cardi Corp., Inc., 139 A.3d 379, 381 (R.I. 2016) (citing State v. Lead Industries Association, Inc., 64 A.3d 1183, 1191 (R.I. 2013)).

2020Waterman v. Caprio, 983 A.2d 841, 844 (R.I. 2009) (“This Court * * * uses a de novo standard to review a trial justice’s rulings on questions of law.”).

2014See In re Volkswagen and Audi Warranty Extension Litigation, 692 F.3d 4, 13 (1st Cir. 2012) (“We * * * review choice of law issues de novo.”); Robidoux v. Muholland, 642 F.3d 20, 22 (1st Cir.2011) (“Choice of law determinations are questions of law, which we * * * review de novo.”); Torre v. Brickey, 278 F.3d 917, 919 (9th Cir.2002) (“Whether state or federal law applies to a particular issue in a diversity action is a question of law which we * * * review de novo.”); see also Waterman v. Caprio, 983 A.2d 841, 844 (R.I.2009) (“This Court *483 * * * uses a de novo standard to review a trial jus

2019Nevertheless, "even when the de novo standard is applied to issues of constitutional dimension, we still accord a hearing justice's findings of historical fact, and inferences drawn from those facts, great deference in conducting our review." Rice , 38 A.3d at 16 (brackets omitted).

2017Nevertheless, “[e]ven when the de novo standard is applied to issues of constitutional dimension, we still accord a hearing justice’s findings of historical fact, and inferences drawn from those facts, great deference in conducting our review.” Id. (quoting Rice v. State, 38 A.3d 9, 16 (R.I. 2012)).

2009“However, this Court ‘will review de novo any post-conviction relief decision involving questions of fact or mixed questions of law and fact pertaining to an alleged violation of an applicant’s constitutional rights.’ ” Id. (quoting Bleau v. Wall, 808 A.2d 637, 641-42 (R.I.2002)). “[Findings of historical fact, and inferences drawn from those facts, will still be accorded great deference by this Court, even when a de novo standard is applied to the issues of constitutional dimension.” Gonder v. State, 935 A.2d 82, 85 (R.I.2007) (quoting State v. Thomas, 794 A.2d 990, 993 (R.I.2002)).

2009“Finally, findings of historical fact, and inferences drawn from those facts, will still be accorded great deference by this Court, even when a de novo standard is applied to the issues of constitutional dimension.” Gonder, 935 A.2d at 85 (quoting Thomas, 794 A.2d at 993 ); see also Sosa v. State, 949 A.2d 1014, 1016 (R.I.2008); Ouimette v. State, 785 A.2d 1132, 1135 (R.I.2001).

2021“We apply a de novo standard of review, however, to questions of law,” Wiggins, 919 A.2d at 989 , and “[i]n passing on a trial justice’s ruling on statutory interpretation, we do so on a de novo basis.” State v. Marsich, 10 A.3d 435, 440 (R.I. 2010).

2013In contrast, “[t]his Court will ‘apply a de novo standard of review * * * to mixed questions of fact and law that purportedly implicate a constitutional right.’ ” Richards v. Fiore, 57 A.3d 254, 257 (R.I.2012) (quoting State v. Wiggins, 919 A.2d 987, 989 (R.I.2007)).

2019II Standard of Review "When interpreting statutes and court rules, we apply a de novo standard of review." State v. Goncalves , 941 A.2d 842 , 847 (R.I. 2008) (quoting State v. Brown , 898 A.2d 69 , 76 (R.I. 2006) ).

2019II Standard of Review “When interpreting statutes and court rules, we apply a de novo standard of review.” State v. Goncalves, 941 A.2d 842, 847 (R.I. 2008) (quoting State v. Brown, 898 A.2d 69, 76 (R.I. 2006)).

2023“However, ‘[i]n granting or denying discovery motions, a Superior Court justice has broad discretion,’ which -5- ‘this Court will not disturb * * * save for an abuse of that discretion.’” State v. Lead Industries Association, Inc., 64 A.3d 1183, 1191 (R.I. 2013) (quoting Colvin v. Lekas, 731 A.2d 718, 720 (R.I. 1999)).

2017“In addition to examining the record for judicial error, ‘we inspect the record to discern if there is any legally competent evidence to support the findings of the hearing justice below.’ ” Id. (quoting Brown v. State, 841 A.2d 1116, 1121 (R.I. 2004)). “[Wjith respect to determining the scope of Rule 26, we have repeatedly employed a de novo standard of review.” Cashman Equipment Corp., Inc. v. Cardi Corp., Inc., 139 A.3d 379, 381 (R.I. 2016) (citing State v. Lead Industries Association, Inc., 64 A.3d 1183, 1191 (R.I. 2013)).

2019III Review on Certiorari of the Plan Administrator's Decision Pursuant to what we indicated at oral argument, we now reinstate and grant plaintiff's original petition for a writ of certiorari-originally denied without prejudice by this Court on June 12, 2015-and proceed to review the plan administrator's decision denying plaintiff pension benefits. 5 A Standard of Review This Court "review[s] a pension administrator's interpretation of a pension plan that is governed by federal law under an arbitrary-and-capricious standard-provided the plan accords the administrator discretionary authority to

2009Jur. 2d, Pensions , § 1255 (2003) ("If the questions are ones of law, not fact . . . it is proper for the court to apply a de novo standard when reviewing the board's decisions.); Canario , 752 A.2d at 479 ("[I]n respect to the standard of review exercised by the Superior Court over a determination made by the superintendent, we would apply a standard applicable to decisions by the Superior Court on questions of law and would, therefore, review such a determination de novo.") V Conclusion After due consideration of the arguments advanced by counsel at oral argument and in their memoranda, the

2020We “apply a de novo standard of review to questions of law that may implicate a constitutional right.” Cranston, 208 A.3d at 571 (quoting Goetz v. LUVRAJ, LLC, 986 A.2d 1012, 1016 (R.I. 2010)).

2020We “apply a de novo standard of review to questions of law that may implicate a constitutional right.” Cranston, 208 A.3d at 571 (quoting Goetz v. LUVRAJ, LLC, 986 A.2d 1012, 1016 (R.I. 2010)).

2018“We similarly employ a de novo standard ‘[w]hen reviewing an appeal based on an alleged error of law.’ ” Warwick Sewer Authority v. Carlone, 45 A.3d 493, 498 (R.I. 2012) (quoting N & M Properties, LLC v. Town of West Warwick, 964 A.2d 1141, 1144 (R.I. 2009)).

2015Accordingly, we shall apply a de novo standard of review, as we customarily do “[w]hen reviewing an appeal based on an alleged error of law.” Warwick Sewer Authority v. Carlone, 45 A.3d 493, 498 (R.I. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Medeiros v. Bankers Trust Co., 38 A.3d 1112, 1117 (R.I. 2012); see also Ashley v. Kehew, 992 A.2d 983, 987 (R.I. 2010).

2018“We similarly employ a de novo standard ‘[w]hen reviewing an appeal based on an alleged error of law.’ ” Warwick Sewer Authority v. Carlone, 45 A.3d 493, 498 (R.I. 2012) (quoting N & M Properties, LLC v. Town of West Warwick, 964 A.2d 1141, 1144 (R.I. 2009)).

2013II Standard of Review This Court employs “a de novo standard ‘[w]hen reviewing an appeal based on an alleged error of law.’ ” Warwick Sewer Authority v. Carlone, 45 A.3d 498, 498 (R.I.2012) (quoting N & M Properties, LLC v. Town of West Warwick, 964 A.2d 1141, 1144 (R.I.2009)).

2016But when the application raises issues of fact or mixed issues of law and fact relating to an applicant’s constitutional rights, “we review those issues de novo.” Merida, 93 A.3d at. 549 (quoting Neufville, 13 A.3d at 610 ); see also Thornton v. State, 948 A.2d 312, 316 (R.I.2008), At the same time, however, it is well established that “[f]ind-ings of historical fact, and inferences drawn from those facts, will still be accorded great deference by this Court, even when a de novo standard is applied to the issues of constitutional dimension.” Merida, 93 A.3d at 549 (quoting Hazard v. State, 968

2015Yet, “[w]hen a postconviction relief decision involves ‘questions of fact or mixed questions of law and fact pertaining to an alleged violation of an applicant’s constitutional rights[,]’ we review those issues de novo.” Neufville, 13 A.3d at 610 (quoting Hazard v. State, 968 A.2d 886, 891 (R.I.2009)). “[Findings of historical fact, and inferences drawn from those facts, will still be accorded great deference by this Court, even when a de novo standard is applied to the issues of constitutional dimension.” Hazard, 968 A.2d at 891 (quoting Gonder v. State, 935 A.2d 82, 85 (R.I.2007)).

2014Standard of Review “When interpreting statutes and court rules, we apply a de novo standard of review.” State v. Brown, 898 A.2d 69, 76 (R.I.2006) (citing Jacksonbay Builders, Inc. v. Azarmi, 869 A.2d 580, 583 (R.I.2005)).

2008“When interpreting statutes and court rules, we apply a de novo standard of review.” State v. Brown, 898 A.2d 69, 76 (R.I.2006) (citing Jacksonbay Builders, Inc. v. Azarmi, 869 A.2d 580, 583 (R.I.2005)).

2007"Despite this de novo standard . . . `a reviewing court should take care . . . to review findings of historical fact only for clear error and . . . give due weight to inferences drawn from those facts. . . .'" Id. at 514 (emphasis added) (quoting Ornelas v. United States , 517 U.S. 690 , 699 (1996); citing Broccoli v. Moran , 698 A.2d 720 , 725 (R.I. 1997); Mastracchio , 698 A.2d at 710 ; and LaChappelle v. State , 686 A.2d 924 , 926 (R.I. 1996)).

2005“Despite this de novo standard regarding ultimate determinations, however, the Supreme Court has warned ‘that a reviewing court should take care * * * to review findings of historical fact only for clear error and to give due weight to inferences drawn from those facts * * *.’ ” Powers, 734 A.2d at 514 (quoting Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 699 , 116 S.Ct. 1657 ).

1992General Laws 1956 (1986 Reenactment) § 28-35-28 mandates that the appellate division shall “review the decree upon the record of the case and shall file a decision pursuant to the law and the fair preponderance of the evidence^]” thereby “giving the [division] a de novo standard of review.” Davol, Inc. v. Aguiar, 463 A.2d 170, 173 (R.I.1983).

1990In opposition to the Appellate Commission’s final decree, employer argues that the commission did not comply with Davol, Inc. v. Aguiar, 463 A.2d 170 (R.I.1983), which requires that when the commission reviews findings based upon determinations of credibility, it must first find the trial commissioner clearly wrong before applying the de novo standard of review suggested in Moretti v. Turin, Inc., 112 R.I. 220 , 308 A.2d 500 (1973).

2009“Finally, findings of historical fact, and inferences drawn from those facts, will still be accorded great deference by this Court, even when a de novo standard is applied to the issues of constitutional dimension.” Gonder, 935 A.2d at 85 (quoting Thomas, 794 A.2d at 993 ); see also Sosa v. State, 949 A.2d 1014, 1016 (R.I.2008); Ouimette v. State, 785 A.2d 1132, 1135 (R.I.2001).

2002However, “[findings of historical fact, and inferences drawn from those facts, will still be accorded great deference by this Court, even when a de novo standard is applied to the issues of constitutional dimension.” Id. (quoting Ouimette, 785 A.2d at 1135 ).

2005“Despite this de novo standard regarding ultimate determinations, however, the Supreme Court has warned ‘that a reviewing court should take care * * * to review findings of historical fact only for clear error and to give due weight to inferences drawn from those facts * * *.’ ” Powers, 734 A.2d at 514 (quoting Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 699 , 116 S.Ct. 1657 ).

2002Finally, “[f|indings of historical fact, and inferences drawn from those facts, will still be accorded great deference by this Court, even when a de novo standard is applied to the issues of constitutional dimension.” Id. (citing Powers, 734 A.2d at 514 ).

2021However, “‘[w]hen faced with the interpretation of statutes and court rules upon review of a Rule 35 motion, * * *’ this Court applies ‘a de novo standard.’” Mattatall, 219 A.3d at 1293 (quoting State v. Bouffard, 35 A.3d 909, 916 (R.I. 2012)).

2019“When faced with the interpretation of statutes and court rules upon review of a Rule 35 motion, however,” this Court applies “a de novo standard.” State v. Bouffard, 35 A.3d 909, 916 (R.I. 2012) (quoting State v. Goncalves, 941 A.2d 842, 847 (R.I. 2008)).

2021It is well settled that “[i]n construing statutes or court rules, * * * ‘when the language * * * is clear and unambiguous, this Court must give the words * * * their plain and ordinary meanings.’” Cashman Equipment Corporation, Inc. v. Cardi Corporation, Inc., 139 A.3d 379, 382 (R.I. 2016) (brackets omitted) (quoting State v. Brown, 88 A.3d 1101, 1110 (R.I. 2014)).

2019"In construing statutes or court rules, it is a fundamental principle of our jurisprudence that 'when the language of a rule is clear and unambiguous, this Court must give the words of the rule their plain and ordinary meanings.' " Cashman Equipment Corporation, Inc. v. Cardi Corporation, Inc. , 139 A.3d 379 , 382 (R.I. 2016) (brackets omitted) (quoting State v. Brown , 88 A.3d 1101 , 1110 (R.I. 2014) ).

2020This Court “will not disturb the factual findings made by a trial justice sitting without a jury ‘unless such findings are clearly erroneous or unless the trial justice misconceived or overlooked material evidence.’” Id. (quoting Gregoire v. Baird Properties, LLC, 138 A.3d 182, 191 (R.I. 2016)). “[W]e accord great weight to [the] trial justice’s determinations of credibility, which, inherently, are the functions of the trial court and not the functions of the appellate court.” Gregoire, 138 A.3d at 191 (quoting South County Post & Beam, Inc. v. McMahon, 116 A.3d 204, 210 (R.I. 2015)).

2020This Court “will not disturb the factual findings made by a trial justice sitting without a jury ‘unless such findings are clearly erroneous or unless the trial justice misconceived or overlooked material evidence.’” Id. (quoting Gregoire v. Baird Properties, LLC, 138 A.3d 182, 191 (R.I. 2016)). “[W]e accord great weight to [the] trial justice’s determinations of credibility, which, inherently, are the functions of the trial court and not the functions of the appellate court.” Gregoire, 138 A.3d at 191 (quoting South County Post & Beam, Inc. v. McMahon, 116 A.3d 204, 210 (R.I. 2015)).

2020This Court “will not disturb the factual findings made by a trial justice sitting without a jury ‘unless such findings are clearly erroneous or unless the trial justice misconceived or overlooked material evidence.’” Id. (quoting Gregoire v. Baird Properties, LLC, 138 A.3d 182, 191 (R.I. 2016)). “[W]e accord great weight to [the] trial justice’s determinations of credibility, which, inherently, are the functions of the trial court and not the functions of the appellate court.” Gregoire, 138 A.3d at 191 (quoting South County Post & Beam, Inc. v. McMahon, 116 A.3d 204, 210 (R.I. 2015)).

2020This Court “will not disturb the factual findings made by a trial justice sitting without a jury ‘unless such findings are clearly erroneous or unless the trial justice misconceived or overlooked material evidence.’” Id. (quoting Gregoire v. Baird Properties, LLC, 138 A.3d 182, 191 (R.I. 2016)). “[W]e accord great weight to [the] trial justice’s determinations of credibility, which, inherently, are the functions of the trial court and not the functions of the appellate court.” Gregoire, 138 A.3d at 191 (quoting South County Post & Beam, Inc. v. McMahon, 116 A.3d 204, 210 (R.I. 2015)).

1982This court has repeatedly stated that “§ 16-39-2, in requiring that appeals from school committee actions to the Commissioner of Education are heard ‘after notice to the parties interested of the time and place of hearing * * * ’ contemplates a de novo hearing by the commissioner.” Slattery v. Cranston School Committee, 116 R.I. 252, 263 , 354 A.2d 741, 747 (1976).

1982This court has repeatedly stated that “§ 16-39-2, in requiring that appeals from school committee actions to the Commissioner of Education are heard ‘after notice to the parties interested of the time and place of hearing * * * ’ contemplates a de novo hearing by the commissioner.” Slattery v. Cranston School Committee, 116 R.I. 252, 263 , 354 A.2d 741, 747 (1976).