de novo standard in Colorado

2016Even if the statute were ambiguous, we would reject reliance upon this rule of construction because, as discussed later in this opinion, a statutory Scheme in which de novo review of an arbitration award is discretionary does not violate father's due process rights. {17 Finally, father's reliance on In re Marriage of Popack, 998 P.2d 464, 468-69 (Colo. App. 2000), to support his assertion that a de novo hearing is mandatory is misplaced for two reasons.

2016Even if the statute were ambiguous, we would reject reliance upon this rule of construction because, as discussed later in this opinion, a statutory scheme in which de novo review of an arbitration award is discretionary does not violate father’s due process rights. ¶17 Finally, father’s reliance on In re Marriage of Popack , 998 P.2d 464, 468-69 (Colo. App. 2000), to support his assertion that a de novo hearing is mandatory is misplaced for two reasons.

2016See §§ 14-10-102(2)(a)-(b), 14-10-104.5, C.R.S8. 2015; see also In re Marriage of Barker, 251 P.3d 591, 592-98 (Colo. App. 2010). $22 Second, father's right to challenge the arbitration award under the CUAA and his right to request (but not necessarily receive) a de novo hearing under section 14-10-128.5 sufficiently protect his rights to procedural due process, In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Broadnax, 827 P.2d 531, 537 (Colo. 1992), the supreme court held that mandatory arbitration does not violate due' process so long as fair procedures are provided and" ultimate Jud1c1a1 r

2016See §§ 14-10-102(2)(a)-(b), 14-10-104.5, C.R.S. 2015; see also In re Marriage of Barker , 251 P.3d 591 , 592 93 (Colo. App. 2010). ¶22 Second, father’s right to challenge the arbitration award under the CUAA and his right to request (but not necessarily receive) a de novo hearing under section 14-10-128.5 sufficiently protect his rights to procedural due process.

2024Under the mixed standard, “[f]indings of fact are generally reviewed under a clear error or abuse of discretion standard, whereas conclusions of law are generally reviewed under a de novo standard.” E-470 Pub. 10 Highway Auth. v. 455 Co., 3 P.3d 18, 22 (Colo. 2000).

2014Id. 128 We will review the trial court's findings of historical fact under the clear error standard, and we will review its legal conclusions and findings of ultimate fact under the de novo standard.

2016Wolf Ranch, LLC. v. City of Colorado Springs, 220 P.3d 559, 568 (Colo.2009).

2016Wolf Ranch, LLC. v. City of Colorado Springs , 220 P.3d 559, 563 (Colo. 2009).

2016Then, if those pleadings persuaded the court to grant a de novo hearing, it will consider the pleadings .and the arguments and evidence presented at that hearing on the ultimate question of whether the motion to modify the arbitrator's award should be granted or denied, 116 Father also argues that because denial of a right to a de novo hearing would violate his rights to due process, we should apply the rule of construction that requires a court to choose the interpretation of a statute that meets constitutional requirements, See State, Dep't of Labor & Employment v. Esser, 30 P.3d 189, 194 (C

2016See State, Dep’t of Labor & Employment v. Esser , 30 P.3d 189, 194 (Colo. 2001).

2016See id.; see also In re Marriage of Rivera, 2018 COA 21, ¶ 15 , 300 P.3d 994 .

2016See id. ; see also In re Marriage of Rivera , 2013 COA 21, ¶15 .

2016See §§ 14-10-102(2)(a)-(b), 14-10-104.5, C.R.S8. 2015; see also In re Marriage of Barker, 251 P.3d 591, 592-98 (Colo. App. 2010). $22 Second, father's right to challenge the arbitration award under the CUAA and his right to request (but not necessarily receive) a de novo hearing under section 14-10-128.5 sufficiently protect his rights to procedural due process, In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Broadnax, 827 P.2d 531, 537 (Colo. 1992), the supreme court held that mandatory arbitration does not violate due' process so long as fair procedures are provided and" ultimate Jud1c1a1 r

2016In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Broadnax , 827 P.2d 531, 537 (Colo. 1992), the supreme court held that mandatory arbitration does not violate due process so long as fair procedures are provided and ultimate judicial review is available.

2016We reject this argument and instead conclude that the plain language of the statute gives the court discretion to grant or deny a party's motion for a de novo hearing. 115 The purpose of a de novo hearing is for the court to hear the relevant evidence and base 'its decision whether to "substantially uphold[ ]" the arbitrator's decision on the evidence, not just the "pleadings." See B.C., Ltd. v. Krinhop, 815 P.2d 1016, 1018 (Colo. App. 1991).

2016We reject this argument and instead conclude that the plain language of the statute gives the court discretion to grant or deny a party’s motion for a de novo hearing. ¶15 The purpose of a de novo hearing is for the court to hear the relevant evidence and base its decision whether to “substantially uphold” the arbitrator’s decision on the evidence, not just the “pleadings.” See B.C., Ltd. v. Krinhop , 815 P.2d 1016, 1018 (Colo. App. 1991).

2014The Attorney General responds that we should review for an abuse of discretion, citing United States v. Throneburg, 921 F.2d 654, 657 (6th Cir.1990), and other federal cireuit court cases. 17 Whether an indictment is multi-plicitous and, if so, whether double jeopardy concerns warrant reversal are questions of law reviewed de novo.

2014The Attorney General responds that we should review for an abuse of discretion, citing United States v. Throneburg, 921 F.2d 654, 657 (6th Cir.1990), and other federal circuit court cases. ¶ 7 Whether an indictment is multiplicitous and, if so, whether double jeopardy concerns warrant reversal are questions of law reviewed de novo.

2014See People v. Gennings, 808 P.2d 839 , 844 (Colo.1991).

2014See, e.g., People v. Gennings, 808 P.2d 839 , 844 (Colo.1991) ; see also Thomas v. Fed.

2010People v. Clayton, 207 P.3d 831, 835 (Colo. 2009) (citing People v. Matheny, 46 P.3d 453, 462 (Colo.2002)).

2009People v. Matheny, 46 P.3d 453, 462 (Colo.2002) (citing People v. Owens, 969 P.2d 704 (Colo.1999), and People v. Valdez, 969 P.2d 208 (Colo.1998)).

2019Valdez, 966 P.2d at 590 .

2001Valdez v. People, 966 P.2d 587, 590 (Colo.1998).

2025Id.; see also People v. Ortega, 34 P.3d 986, 990 (Colo. 2001) (“In reviewing a court’s conclusions of law, however, we apply a de novo standard of review to ascertain whether its legal conclusions are supported by sufficient evidence and whether it has applied the correct standard.”). ¶ 11 “The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures.” People v. Vaughn, 2014 CO 71, ¶ 10 .

2002People v. Ortega, 34 P.3d 986, 990 (Colo.2001) (citation omitted; quoting People v. Quezada, 731 P.2d 730, 732 (Colo.1987)).

2024Applying that standard, we conclude that the evidence presented at the restitution hearing was sufficient to support the court’s restitution order. ¶ 11 When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a restitution award de novo, we evaluate “whether the evidence, both direct and circumstantial, when viewed as a whole and in the light most favorable to the prosecution, establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant caused that amount of loss.” Barbre, ¶ 25; see also People v. Stone, 2020 COA 24, ¶ 7 . ¶ 12 At the restitution hearing, CIRSA’s restitution specialist

2024Applying that standard, we conclude that the evidence presented at the restitution hearing was sufficient to support the court’s restitution order. ¶ 11 When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a restitution award de novo, we evaluate “whether the evidence, both direct and circumstantial, when viewed as a whole and in the light most favorable to the prosecution, establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant caused that amount of loss.” Barbre, ¶ 25; see also People v. Stone, 2020 COA 24, ¶ 7 . ¶ 12 At the restitution hearing, CIRSA’s restitution specialist

2020Id. at 705 (referring to a de novo hearing).

2020Id. ¶36 Kinchen’s description of the nature of the hearing held by or on behalf of the Board as a de novo hearing is not surprising considering that a certified employee may introduce evidence and the Board or the ALJ is required to make written findings of fact.

2008Medina, 35 P.3d at 452 ; see Trinity Broad., Inc. v. City of Westminster, 848 P.2d 916, 924 (Colo.1998).

1998See Swieckowski, 934 P.2d at 1384 ; Trinity Broad v. City of Westminster, 848 P.2d 916, 924-25 (Colo.1993). 9 If the plaintiffs factual allegations are undisputed, the issue is one of law and an appellate court is not bound by the trial court’s determination.

2001Here, in ruling that Huizar was entitled to such fees, the trial court also relied on Huizar v. Allstate Insurance, supra, 952 P.2d at 348-49 , in which the supreme court stated that: [W]hen an insurer invokes the trial de novo clause, the amount that the insured victim ultimately recovers is necessarily reduced.

2001That provision states that when, as here, a party invokes the right to trial de novo with respect to uninsured motorist benefits: "Costs, including attorney fees, are to be paid by the party incurring them." Although the supreme court, in Huizar v. Allstate Insurance Co., 952 P.2d 342 (Colo. 1998), held the trial de novo clause itself unenforceable, its decision could not nullify the quoted language as an explicit and authoritative expression of the parties' intent with respect to attorneys fees.

2025Comm’rs, 813 P.2d 766, 767 (Colo. App. 1990).

1993See Snyder Family Trust v. Adams County Board of Equalization, 835 P.2d 579 (Colo.App.1992); Arapahoe Partnership v. Board of County Commissioners, 813 P.2d 766 (Colo.App.1990); see also BAA Rule 14, 8 Code Colo.Reg. 1301-1 (1990); § 24-4-105(7), C.R.S. (1988 Repl.Vol. 10A).

2016Kruse v. Town of Castle Rock , 192 P.3d 591, 601 (Colo. App. 2008). ¶ 11 On questions of law, however — such as the interpretation of the agency’s rules and regulations — we apply a de novo standard of review.

2016Kruse v. Town of Castle Rock, 192 P.3d 591 , 601 (Colo.App. 2008). ¶ 11 On questions of law, however-such as the interpretation of the agency's *656 rules and regulations-we apply a de novo standard of review.

2009People v. Matheny, 46 P.3d 453, 462 (Colo.2002) (citing People v. Owens, 969 P.2d 704 (Colo.1999), and People v. Valdez, 969 P.2d 208 (Colo.1998)).

2001People v. Owens, 969 P.2d 704, 707 (Colo.1999).

2005It is true that some courts have expressed that the burden of proof is to rebut the presumption of correctness: “[I]n a de novo hearing before the BAA, the burden of proof is on the taxpayer to rebut [the presumption that the valuation made by a county assessor is correct].” Snyder Family Trust, 835 P.2d at 580 ; see also Gyurman, 851 P.2d at 310 ; 117th Assoc., 811 P.2d at 463 ; County Bd. of Equalization, 743 P.2d at 446 .

1993See Snyder Family Trust v. Adams County Board of Equalization, 835 P.2d 579 (Colo.App.1992); Arapahoe Partnership v. Board of County Commissioners, 813 P.2d 766 (Colo.App.1990); see also BAA Rule 14, 8 Code Colo.Reg. 1301-1 (1990); § 24-4-105(7), C.R.S. (1988 Repl.Vol. 10A).

2026People v. Castaneda , 249 P.3d 1119, 1122 ( Colo. 2011 ) .

2026People v. Castaneda , 249 P.3d 1119, 1122 (Colo. 2011). 9 B.

2025Craig v. People, 986 P.2d 951, 960 (Colo. 1999) (citing St.

2025See City of Colorado Springs v. Conners, 993 P.2d 1167, 1171 (Colo. 2000).

2025Bd. of Comm’rs, 2017 COA 30, ¶ 10 (declining to review the assessor’s classification determination when the BAA held a de novo hearing). 7 ¶ 16 The district court held a two-day de novo trial.