de novo standard in Texas

2026STANDARD OF REVIEW “We review a trial court’s ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction under a de novo standard.” County of Bexar v. Steward, 139 S.W.3d 354, 357 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2004, no pet.) (citing Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 928 (Tex. 1998)).

2025STANDARD OF REVIEW “We review a trial court’s ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction under a de novo standard of review.” County of Bexar v. Steward, 139 S.W.3d 354, 357 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2004, no pet.) (citing Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 928 (Tex. 1998)).

2025Standard of Review The Texas Supreme Court explained the de novo standard of review for pleas to the jurisdiction in Texas Dept. of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 225-27 (Tex. 2004).

2024In applying a de novo standard of review to a standing determination, reviewing courts “construe the pleadings in the plaintiff’s favor, but we also consider relevant evidence offered by the parties.” In re H.S., 550 S.W.3d 151, 155 (Tex. 2018) (citations omitted). “[I]f a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts, we consider relevant evidence submitted by the parties when 4 necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issues raised, as the trial court is required to do.” Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227 .

2025App. 2009) (recognizing that statutory construction involves questions of law that an appellate court reviews de novo); City of Fort Worth v. Rylie, 649 S.W.3d 246 , 249 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2022, pet. denied) (recognizing that the de novo standard of review applies to both constitutional and statutory interpretation (citing Patel v. Tex. Dep’t of Licensing & Regul., 469 S.W.3d 69, 87 (Tex. 2015); Fin.

2025App. 2009) (recognizing that statutory construction involves questions of law that an appellate court reviews de novo); City of Fort Worth v. Rylie, 649 S.W.3d 246 , 249 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2022, pet. denied) (recognizing that the de novo standard of review applies to both constitutional and statutory interpretation (citing Patel v. Tex. Dep’t of Licensing & Regul., 469 S.W.3d 69, 87 (Tex. 2015); Fin.

2025Comm’n of Tex. v. Norwood, 418 S.W.3d 566, 585 (Tex. 2013))).

2025Comm’n of Tex. v. Norwood, 418 S.W.3d 566, 585 (Tex. 2013))).

2026“In reviewing the trial court’s ruling on appellant’s federal constitutional speedy trial claim, we apply a bifurcated standard of review: an abuse of discretion standard for the factual components, and a de novo standard for the legal components.” Zamorano v. State, 84 S.W.3d 643, 648 (Tex. Crim.

2024In our review of a “speedy trial claim, ‘we apply a bifurcated standard of review: an abuse of discretion standard for the factual components, and a de novo standard for the legal components.’” Velasco, 678 S.W.3d at 263 (quoting Zamorano, 84 S.W.3d at 648 ).

2011Ctr. at Houston v. Gutierrez, 237 S.W.3d 869 , 871 n.1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied) (applying de novo standard of review in determining whether one of the parties was served in accordance with the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code); Buck v. Blum, 130 S.W.3d 285, 290 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (―[T]o the extent resolution of this issue requires interpretation of the statute itself, we review under a de novo standard.‖).

2009Ctr. at Houston v. Gutierrez, 237 S.W.3d 869, 871 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied); see also Buck v. Blum, 130 S.W.3d 285, 290 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (noting that to the extent that the resolution of an issue requires an interpretation of the health care liability statute, a de novo standard applies); Ponce v. El Paso Healthcare Sys., Ltd,., 55 S.W.3d 34, 36 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2001, pet. denied) (same). b.

2020However, we apply “a de novo standard of review to pure questions of law and mixed questions that do not depend on credibility determinations.” Id. (citing Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89 ). 6 Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 , 57–58 (1988). 7 Illinois v. Fisher, 540 U.S. 544, 547 (2004). 8 Youngblood, 481 U.S. at 57. 9 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 7 2.

2015“The appellate court must apply a bifurcated standard of review, giving almost total deference to a trial court's determination of historic facts and mixed questions of law and fact that rely upon the credibility of a witness, but applying a de novo standard of review to pure questions of law and mixed questions that do not depend on credibility determinations.” Martinez, 348 S.W.3d at 923 ; Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85 , 87–89 (Tex. Crim.

2023Standard of Review We apply a de novo standard to review rulings granting motions for summary judgment. 4 In no-evidence motions, the motion must allege that no evidence supports one or more of the essential elements of a party’s claim. 5 Thus, the motion must state “the elements as to which 4Valance Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005). 5Tex.

2021Partner, Inc. v. Rubio, 185 S.W.3d 842, 846 (Tex. 2005). 5 reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor.”6 On appeal, “we consider all grounds presented to the trial court and preserved on appeal in the interest of judicial economy.”7 The ruling is reviewed under a de novo standard.8 Under that standard, a judgment without “a jury verdict is proper at any course of the proceedings only when the law does not allow reasonable jurors to decide otherwise.”9 A traditional motion requires the party filing the motion to prove the claims it relied on in its motion as a matter o

2009Ctr. at Houston v. Gutierrez , 237 S.W.3d 869, 871 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied); see also Buck v. Blum , 130 S.W.3d 285, 290 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (noting that to the extent that the resolution of an issue requires an interpretation of the health care liability statute, a de novo standard applies); Ponce v. El Paso Healthcare Sys., Ltd. , 55 S.W.3d 34, 36 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2001, pet. denied) (same). b.

2009Ctr. at Houston v. Gutierrez, 237 S.W.3d 869, 871 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied); see also Buck v. Blum, 130 S.W.3d 285, 290 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (noting that to the extent that the resolution of an issue requires an interpretation of the health care liability statute, a de novo standard applies); Ponce v. El Paso Healthcare Sys., Ltd,., 55 S.W.3d 34, 36 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2001, pet. denied) (same). b.

2025STANDARD OF REVIEW & APPLICABLE LAW “When reviewing a trial court’s decision to deny a motion to quash an indictment, we apply a de novo standard of review.” Lawrence v. State, 240 S.W.3d 912, 915 (Tex. Crim.

2025“When reviewing a trial court’s decision to deny a motion to quash an indictment, we apply a de novo standard of review.” Lawrence v. State, 240 S.W.3d 912, 915 (Tex. Crim.

2026Moncrief Oil Int’l, Inc. v. OAO Gazprom, 414 S.W.3d 142, 150 (Tex. 2013) (an appellate court reviews whether a court has personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant under a de novo standard of review) (citing Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569, 574 (Tex. 2007)); BMC Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 794 (Tex. 2002) (same); Caviness v. High Profile Promotions, Inc., No. 03-17-00553-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 2735 , at *13 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 5, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“We review the trial court’s 5 ruling on a special appearance, including any determin

2016If, in ruling on the special appearance, the trial court is required to resolve disputed questions of fact, the trial court’s factual findings are reviewed for legal and factual sufficiency, and its legal conclusions are reviewed .using a de novo standard, BMC Software, 83 S.W.3d at 794 .

2024“If, as here, resolution of the issue requires us to construe statutory language, we employ a de novo standard of review.” Bruington Eng’g, 403 S.W.3d at 526 (citing Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v. Summers, 282 S.W.3d 433, 437 (Tex. 2009)).

2015Likewise, matters of statutory construction are reviewed under a de novo standard. .City of San Antonio v. City of Boeme, 111 S.W.3d 22, 25 (Tex.2003); see Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v. Summers, 282 S.W.3d 433, 437 (Tex.2009).

2023We employ “a bifurcated standard of review, giving almost total deference to a trial court’s determination of historic facts and mixed questions of law and fact that rely upon the credibility of a witness,” but “applying a de novo standard of review to pure questions of law and mixed questions that do not depend on credibility determinations.” Id.

2022We approach our review with two standards, “giving almost total deference to a trial court’s determination of historic facts and mixed questions of law and fact that rely on the credibility of a witness, but applying a de novo standard of review to pure questions of law and mixed questions that do not depend on credibility determinations.” 4 In this context, we use the term interrogation and interview interchangeably. 7 Hutchison, 424 S.W.3d at 175 (quoting Martinez, 348 S.W.3d at 922–23); see State v. Johnston, 336 S.W.3d 649, 657 (Tex. Crim.

2012See Creditwatch, Inc. v. Jackson, 157 S.W.3d 814 , 816 n.7 (Tex. 2005) (citing Schneider Nat'l Carriers, Inc. v. Bates, 147 S.W.3d 264 , 290 n.137 (Tex. 2004)); see also Alaniz v. Hoyt, 105 S.W.3d 330, 345 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.).

2011See Creditwatch, Inc. v. Jackson, 157 S.W.3d 814 , 816 n.7 (Tex. 2005) (citing Schneider Nat'l Carriers, Inc. v. Bates, 147 S.W.3d 264 , 290 n.137 (Tex. 2004)); see also Alaniz v. Hoyt, 105 S.W.3d 330, 345 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.).

2024P. 166a(c). 18 When a party that moves for summary judgment provides summary-judgment proof with its motion sufficient to establish that no genuine issue of material fact exist on at least one element of the claim on which it is seeking to obtain a summary judgment, “the burden shifts to the nonmovant to raise a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment” on that claim. 25 Evidence raises a genuine issue of material fact when reasonable and fair-minded jurors could differ in their conclusions after considering the summary-judgment evidence properly considered in the hearing. 26

2021Under the Act, when someone sends a public entity a request for information that is covered by the Act and the entity fails to handle the 13See Johnson v. City of Fort Worth, 774 S.W.2d 653, 655-56 (Tex. 1989) (reflecting a de novo standard applies to reviewing a lower court’s interpretation of a statute). 14Id. 13 request in the manner set out in the Act, the person who asked for access to the information may file suit. 15 To do so, the Act provides that a person may enforce the entity’s obligations under the Act by applying for “a writ of mandamus compelling [the public entity] to make infor

2023See Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Needham, 82 S.W.3d 314, 318 (Tex. 2002).

2015Tex. Dep't of consulting health care provider and being licensed, certified, Transp. v. Needham, 82 S.W.3d 314, 318 (Tex.2002).

2016See Carroll, 342 S.W.3d at 696 (“[T]o the extent that our analysis requires us to construe chapter 74—a question of law—we apply a de novo standard.” (citing City of San Antonio v. City of Boerne, 111 S.W.3d 22, 25 (Tex. 2003))).

2015Likewise, matters of statutory construction are reviewed under a de novo standard. .City of San Antonio v. City of Boeme, 111 S.W.3d 22, 25 (Tex.2003); see Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v. Summers, 282 S.W.3d 433, 437 (Tex.2009).

2010App. 1999), but when the trial court's rulings do not turn on the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses, we apply a de novo standard of review, Estrada v. State , 154 S.W.3d 604, 607 (Tex. Crim.

2010App. 1999), but when the trial court’s rulings do not turn on the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses, we apply a de novo standard of review, Estrada v. State, 154 S.W.3d 604, 607 (Tex. Crim.

2022App. 2001); and (3) violated the de novo standard of review articulated by the Texas Supreme Court in Quick v. City of Austin, 7 S.W.3d 109 (Tex. 1999) because the charge included that the administrative 4 “Retrograde extrapolation is the computation back in time of the blood-alcohol level . . . .” Mata v. State, 46 S.W.3d 902 , 908–09 (Tex. Crim.

2015See Quick, 7 S.W.3d at 116 (describing the de novo standard of review).

2021“A de novo hearing ‘is a new and independent action on those issues raised’ in the request for a hearing.” In re R.R., 537 S.W.3d 621 , 622–23 (Tex. App.—Austin 2017, no pet.) (quoting Attorney Gen. v. Orr, 989 S.W.2d 464, 467-68 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, no pet.)).

2017This Court cited to that language to describe a de novo hearing under .the family code in Attorney General of Texas v. Orr, 989 S.W.2d 464, 467 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, no pet.), and several other courts of appeals have cited Orr and its reliance on Key Western in their cases involving de novo hearings under the family code.

2026See State v. Moff, 154 S.W.3d 599, 601 (Tex. Crim.

2020However, we apply “a de novo standard of review to pure questions of law and mixed questions that do not depend on credibility determinations.” Id. (citing Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89 ). 6 Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 , 57–58 (1988). 7 Illinois v. Fisher, 540 U.S. 544, 547 (2004). 8 Youngblood, 481 U.S. at 57. 9 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 7 2.

2022“The construction of an unambiguous contract is a question of law for the court, which we may consider under a de novo standard of review.” Tawes v. Barnes, 340 S.W.3d 419, 425 (Tex. 2011).

2017“The construction of an unambiguous contract is a question of law for the court, which we may consider under a de novo standard of review.” Tawes, 340 S.W.3d at 425 (citing Chrysler Ins.

2024“In reviewing the trial court’s ruling on [an accused’s] federal constitutional speedy trial claim, we apply a bifurcated standard of review: an abuse of discretion standard for the factual components, and a de novo standard for the legal components.” Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 282 (quoting Zamorano v. State, 84 S.W.3d 643, 648 (Tex. Crim.

2023We review whether there has been a speedy trial violation under a bifurcated standard of review: “an abuse of discretion standard for the factual components, and a de novo standard for the legal components.” Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 282 .

2015Ross, 32 S.W.3d at 856 . original interrogation. • [E]ven if the defendant had not been Mirandized Issues that present purely legal questions are considered prior to his original interrogation, there was no under a de novo standard.

2015Ross, 32 S.W.3d at 856 . original interrogation. • [E]ven if the defendant had not been Mirandized Issues that present purely legal questions are considered prior to his original interrogation, there was no under a de novo standard.

2024However, “[w]e apply a de novo standard of review to determine whether an identification procedure was so impermissibly suggestive that it gave rise to a very substantial likelihood of misidentification.” Sierra v. State, 266 S.W.3d 72, 75 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, pet. ref’d); see Loserth v. State, 963 S.W.2d 770 , 773–74 (Tex. Crim.

2016See Martinez v. State, 348 S.W.3d 919, 923 (Tex.Crim.App.2011) (holding that a de novo standard of review applied to “mixed questions that do not depend on credibility determinations”); see also Loserth v. State, 963 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998) (holding that whether an in-court *597 identification has been tainted.is a mixed question of law and fact that does not'turn on an evaluation of credibility and therefore is subject to de. novo review).