de novo standard in Alaska

2017See Storrs v. Lutheran Hosps. & Homes Soc'y of Am., Inc., 609 P.2d 24, 28 (Alaska 1980) (holding quasi-public hospitals cannot violate due process standards in denying staff privileges). 7 .

2016Ctr., 33 F.3d 1318 , 1332 & n.24 (11th Cir. 1994); see also Maness v. Daily, 307 P.3d 894, 900 (Alaska 2013) (articulating the de novo standard of review in the federal qualified immunity context). 6 See Storrs v. Lutheran Hosps. & Homes Soc’y of Am., Inc., 609 P.2d 24, 28 (Alaska 1980) (holding quasi-public hospitals cannot violate due process standards in denying staff privileges). -10- 7135 is afforded.7 We previously have held that a waiver of constitutional rights must be knowing and voluntary, and even in civil cases “courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against their waiver.

2017Ctr., 33 F.3d 1318 , 1332 & n.24 (11th Cir. 1994); see also Maness v. Daily, 307 P.3d 894, 900 (Alaska 2013) (articulating the de novo standard of review in the federal qualified immunity context). 6 .

2016Ctr., 33 F.3d 1318 , 1332 & n.24 (11th Cir. 1994); see also Maness v. Daily, 307 P.3d 894, 900 (Alaska 2013) (articulating the de novo standard of review in the federal qualified immunity context). 6 .

1998For example, in R.J.M. v. State, 946 P.2d 855, 861 (Alaska 1997), we stated that we would apply the clearly erroneous standard to the trial court’s factual findings, but “in determining whether the trial court’s findings comport with the requirements of the CINA statutes and rules, we deal with questions of law, and so apply the de novo standard of review.” See also R.R. v. State, 919 P.2d 754 , 755 n. 1 (1996).

1998For example, in R.J.M. v. State, 946 P.2d 855, 861 (Alaska 1997), we stated that we would apply *176 the clearly erroneous standard to the trial court's factual findings, but "in determining whether the trial court's findings comport with the requirements of the CINA statutes and rules, we deal with questions of law, and so apply the de novo standard of review." See also R.R. v. State, 919 P.2d 754 , 755 n. 1 (1996).

2024STANDARD OF REVIEW We review factual findings in involuntary commitment proceedings for clear error, and reverse those findings only if we have a “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.”8 “[T]he ultimate legal conclusion [regarding] whether those facts meet the ‘gravely disabled’ criteria is reviewed de novo.”9 “On appeal under a de novo standard of review, it is [our] task to ascertain whether the evidence relied on by the superior court satisfie[s] the requisite legal standards . . . [and] evidentiary burden[s].”10 8 In re Hospitalization of Jacob S., 384 P.3d 758, 763-64

2020P. 53(d)(2)(B) (requiring court to “consider under a de novo standard of review all objections to findings of fact made or recommended in the [magistrate judge’s] report”). 6 In re Hospitalization of Naomi B., 435 P.3d 918, 923 (Alaska 2019) (continued...) -5- 1786 meet the involuntary commitment and medication statutory requirements is a question of law we review de novo.”7 We “review de novo the superior court’s decisions and use our independent judgment to determine whether, based on the underlying factual findings made by the superior court, there was clear and convincing evidence” that in

2024STANDARD OF REVIEW We review factual findings in involuntary commitment proceedings for clear error, and reverse those findings only if we have a “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.”8 “[T]he ultimate legal conclusion [regarding] whether those facts meet the ‘gravely disabled’ criteria is reviewed de novo.”9 “On appeal under a de novo standard of review, it is [our] task to ascertain whether the evidence relied on by the superior court satisfie[s] the requisite legal standards . . . [and] evidentiary burden[s].”10 8 In re Hospitalization of Jacob S., 384 P.3d 758, 763-64

2021In re Hospitalization of Naomi B., 435 P.3d 918 , 930 n.60 (Alaska 2019) (“[R]egardless of the type of involuntary admission or medication proceeding being challenged or the legal basis for appeal, the public interest exception authorizes us to consider any such appeal on the merits.”). 11 In re Hospitalization of Jacob S., 384 P.3d 758, 763-64 (Alaska 2016) (quoting Wetherhorn v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 156 P.3d 371, 375 (Alaska 2007), overruled on other grounds by In re Naomi B., 435 P.3d at 936 ). -4- 1838 with the requirements of [the involuntary commitment statute],’ is a question of la

2024STANDARD OF REVIEW We review factual findings in involuntary commitment proceedings for clear error, and reverse those findings only if we have a “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.”8 “[T]he ultimate legal conclusion [regarding] whether those facts meet the ‘gravely disabled’ criteria is reviewed de novo.”9 “On appeal under a de novo standard of review, it is [our] task to ascertain whether the evidence relied on by the superior court satisfie[s] the requisite legal standards . . . [and] evidentiary burden[s].”10 8 In re Hospitalization of Jacob S., 384 P.3d 758, 763-64

2021In re Hospitalization of Naomi B., 435 P.3d 918 , 930 n.60 (Alaska 2019) (“[R]egardless of the type of involuntary admission or medication proceeding being challenged or the legal basis for appeal, the public interest exception authorizes us to consider any such appeal on the merits.”). 11 In re Hospitalization of Jacob S., 384 P.3d 758, 763-64 (Alaska 2016) (quoting Wetherhorn v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 156 P.3d 371, 375 (Alaska 2007), overruled on other grounds by In re Naomi B., 435 P.3d at 936 ). -4- 1838 with the requirements of [the involuntary commitment statute],’ is a question of la

2024Cos., 262 P.3d 602, 607 (Alaska 2011). 13 Ball v. Birch, Horton, Bittner & Cherot, 58 P.3d 481, 485 (Alaska 2002). 14 ConocoPhillips Alaska, Inc. v. Williams Alaska Petroleum, Inc., 322 P.3d 114, 122 (Alaska 2014) (quoting Kalenka v. Jadon, Inc., 305 P.3d 346, 349 (Alaska 2013)). 15 Id. (quoting Russell ex rel.

2021DISCUSSION Alaska’s Little Miller Act requires prime contractors on public works projects to maintain a payment bond.9 If “a person having direct contractual relationships with a subcontractor” is not paid in full, that person “has a right of action on the payment bond.”10 That right is conditioned on a requirement to “giv[e] written 7 ConocoPhillips Alaska, Inc. v. Williams Alaska Petroleum, Inc., 322 P.3d 114, 122 (Alaska 2014) (footnotes omitted). 8 Id. (quoting Russell ex rel.

2011Because Congress intended states to have primary responsibility of formulating each individual child's education, we must defer to their "specialized knowledge and experience" by giving "due weight" to the decisions of the state's administrative bodies." (quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206-08 , 102 S.Ct. 3034 )); P.N. v. Greco, 282 F.Supp.2d 221, 235 (D.N.J.2003) ("In reviewing administrative decisions in IDEA cases, a district court applies a de novo standard to questions of law.

2011April 13, 2006) (finding that the trial court "must review the administrative findings of fact for clear error and the conclusions of law de novo" under the IDEA); P.N. v. Greco, 282 F.Supp.2d 221, 235 (D.N.J.2003) ("In reviewing administrative decisions in IDEA cases, a district court applies a de novo standard to questions of law....

2005Alaska Ctr. for the Env’t v. Rue, 95 P.3d 924, 926 (Alaska 2004); see also Greenpeace, 96 P.3d at 1061 n. 10 (de novo standard applies if the case concerns "statutory interpretation or other analysis of legal relationships about which courts have specialized knowledge and experience”) (quoting Kelly v. Zamarello, 486 P.2d 906, 916 (Alaska 1971)). 4 .Morton also argues that the 75% rule cannot be applied to him because (1) it was unconstitutional to apply the 75% policy to him where that policy had not been enacted as 'a regulation until after he was hired and (2) application of the policy cons

2004We apply the de novo standard if the administrative agency’s expertise provides little guidance to the court, or if the case concerns "statutory interpretation or other analysis of legal relationships about which courts have specialized knowledge and experience.” Kelly v. Zamarello, 486 P.2d 906, 916 (Alaska 1971); see also Tulkisarmute Native Cmty. Council v. Heinze, 898 P.2d 935, 940 (Alaska 1995) ("Additionally, interpreting the applicable statutory requirements for granting a permit extension does not involve agency expertise.

2000See State v. Arbuckle, 941 P.2d 181, 184 (Alaska 1997) (stating that attorney's fees award is reviewed under the de novo standard because it involves contract interpretation); Palmer G.

1999See State v. Arbuckle, 941 P.2d 181, 184 (Alaska 1997).

1998For example, in R.J.M. v. State, 946 P.2d 855, 861 (Alaska 1997), we stated that we would apply the clearly erroneous standard to the trial court’s factual findings, but “in determining whether the trial court’s findings comport with the requirements of the CINA statutes and rules, we deal with questions of law, and so apply the de novo standard of review.” See also R.R. v. State, 919 P.2d 754 , 755 n. 1 (1996).

1998For example, in R.J.M. v. State, 946 P.2d 855, 861 (Alaska 1997), we stated that we would apply *176 the clearly erroneous standard to the trial court's factual findings, but "in determining whether the trial court's findings comport with the requirements of the CINA statutes and rules, we deal with questions of law, and so apply the de novo standard of review." See also R.R. v. State, 919 P.2d 754 , 755 n. 1 (1996).

1998See State v. Jones, 706 P.2d 317, 323 (Alaska 1985) (explaining that “a magistrate’s initial determination of probable cause is given considerable deference”) (citing Johnson v. State, 617 P.2d 1117, 1122 (Alaska 1980) (noting that “the decision of the judicial officer who has issued the warrant is to be given ‘great deference’ ”) (citation omitted)); Lockwood v. State, 591 P.2d 969, 970-71 (Alaska 1979) (same)). 4 The court relies on Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 , 116 S.Ct. 1657 , 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996), which imposed a de novo standard of review for probable cause determinations wh

1998See State v. Jones, 706 P.2d 317, 323 (Alaska 1985) (explaining that "a magistrate's initial determination of probable cause is given considerable deference") (citing Johnson v. State, 617 P.2d 1117, 1122 (Alaska 1980) (noting that "the decision of the judicial officer who has issued the warrant is to be given `great deference'") (citation omitted)); Lockwood v. State, 591 P.2d 969, 970-71 (Alaska 1979) (same)). [4] *186 The court relies on Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 , 116 S.Ct. 1657 , 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996), which imposed a de novo standard of review for probable cause determinati

1998See State v. Jones, 706 P.2d 317, 323 (Alaska 1985) (explaining that “a magistrate’s initial determination of probable cause is given considerable deference”) (citing Johnson v. State, 617 P.2d 1117, 1122 (Alaska 1980) (noting that “the decision of the judicial officer who has issued the warrant is to be given ‘great deference’ ”) (citation omitted)); Lockwood v. State, 591 P.2d 969, 970-71 (Alaska 1979) (same)). 4 The court relies on Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 , 116 S.Ct. 1657 , 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996), which imposed a de novo standard of review for probable cause determinations wh

1998See State v. Jones, 706 P.2d 317, 323 (Alaska 1985) (explaining that "a magistrate's initial determination of probable cause is given considerable deference") (citing Johnson v. State, 617 P.2d 1117, 1122 (Alaska 1980) (noting that "the decision of the judicial officer who has issued the warrant is to be given `great deference'") (citation omitted)); Lockwood v. State, 591 P.2d 969, 970-71 (Alaska 1979) (same)). [4] *186 The court relies on Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 , 116 S.Ct. 1657 , 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996), which imposed a de novo standard of review for probable cause determinati

1998See State v. Jones, 706 P.2d 317, 323 (Alaska 1985) (explaining that “a magistrate’s initial determination of probable cause is given considerable deference”) (citing Johnson v. State, 617 P.2d 1117, 1122 (Alaska 1980) (noting that “the decision of the judicial officer who has issued the warrant is to be given ‘great deference’ ”) (citation omitted)); Lockwood v. State, 591 P.2d 969, 970-71 (Alaska 1979) (same)). 4 The court relies on Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 , 116 S.Ct. 1657 , 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996), which imposed a de novo standard of review for probable cause determinations wh

1998See State v. Jones, 706 P.2d 317, 323 (Alaska 1985) (explaining that "a magistrate's initial determination of probable cause is given considerable deference") (citing Johnson v. State, 617 P.2d 1117, 1122 (Alaska 1980) (noting that "the decision of the judicial officer who has issued the warrant is to be given `great deference'") (citation omitted)); Lockwood v. State, 591 P.2d 969, 970-71 (Alaska 1979) (same)). [4] *186 The court relies on Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 , 116 S.Ct. 1657 , 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996), which imposed a de novo standard of review for probable cause determinati

1997In re S.A., 912 P.2d 1235, 1237 (Alaska 1996). 6 However, in determining whether the trial court’s findings comport with the requirements of the CINA statutes and rules, we deal with questions of law, and so apply the de novo standard of review.

1997In re S.A., 912 P.2d 1235, 1237 (Alaska 1996). [6] However, in determining whether the trial court's findings comport with the requirements of the CINA statutes and rules, we deal with questions of law, and so apply the de novo standard of review.

2026Servs., Off. of Child.’s Servs., 272 P.3d 1014, 1019-20 (Alaska 2012). 12 State, Dep’t of Health & Soc.

2024STANDARD OF REVIEW “We review questions of law, including questions of subject matter jurisdiction, de novo.”2 De novo review also “applies to constitutional issues.” 3 When 1 See AS 22.10.020(d); AS 22.15.240(a). 2 Hawkins v. Attatayuk, 322 P.3d 891, 894 (Alaska 2014); see also Sherrill v. Sherrill, 373 P.3d 486, 489 (Alaska 2016). 3 Bodkin v. Cook Inlet Region, Inc., 182 P.3d 1072, 1076 (Alaska 2008). -3- 2047 applying the de novo standard of review, we exercise our independent judgment and “adopt the rule of law that is most persuasive in light of precedent, reason, and policy.” 4 DISCUSSIO

2024STANDARD OF REVIEW We review factual findings in involuntary commitment proceedings for clear error, and reverse those findings only if we have a “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.”8 “[T]he ultimate legal conclusion [regarding] whether those facts meet the ‘gravely disabled’ criteria is reviewed de novo.”9 “On appeal under a de novo standard of review, it is [our] task to ascertain whether the evidence relied on by the superior court satisfie[s] the requisite legal standards . . . [and] evidentiary burden[s].”10 8 In re Hospitalization of Jacob S., 384 P.3d 758, 763-64

2024STANDARD OF REVIEW We review factual findings in involuntary commitment proceedings for clear error, and reverse those findings only if we have a “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.”8 “[T]he ultimate legal conclusion [regarding] whether those facts meet the ‘gravely disabled’ criteria is reviewed de novo.”9 “On appeal under a de novo standard of review, it is [our] task to ascertain whether the evidence relied on by the superior court satisfie[s] the requisite legal standards . . . [and] evidentiary burden[s].”10 8 In re Hospitalization of Jacob S., 384 P.3d 758, 763-64

2024Co. v. Ogden Env’t Servs., Inc., 852 P.2d 1146, 1149 (Alaska 1993). -5- 7713 review, we apply our independent judgment, ‘adopting the rule of law most persuasive in light of precedent, reason, and policy.’ ”3 The decision to award specific performance of a contract is “within the discretion of the trial court and will be reversed on appeal only where it is against the clear weight of the evidence.”4 “We will disturb a superior court’s refusal to find unclean hands only if it is clearly erroneous,” meaning that “we are ‘left with a definite and firm conviction on the entire record that a mistak

2024The Midwifery cross-appeals, arguing that the superior court erred in construing the wrongful death statute and in declining to estop the Goodwins’ arguments related to that statute. 11 STANDARD OF REVIEW “We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying our independent judgment.” 12 “We affirm a grant of summary judgment if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 13 “Whether the evidence presented a genuine issue of material fact is a question of law that we independently review.”14 “When applying the de novo standard of

2024The Midwifery cross-appeals, arguing that the superior court erred in construing the wrongful death statute and in declining to estop the Goodwins’ arguments related to that statute. 11 STANDARD OF REVIEW “We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying our independent judgment.” 12 “We affirm a grant of summary judgment if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 13 “Whether the evidence presented a genuine issue of material fact is a question of law that we independently review.”14 “When applying the de novo standard of

2024Cos., 262 P.3d 602, 607 (Alaska 2011). 13 Ball v. Birch, Horton, Bittner & Cherot, 58 P.3d 481, 485 (Alaska 2002). 14 ConocoPhillips Alaska, Inc. v. Williams Alaska Petroleum, Inc., 322 P.3d 114, 122 (Alaska 2014) (quoting Kalenka v. Jadon, Inc., 305 P.3d 346, 349 (Alaska 2013)). 15 Id. (quoting Russell ex rel.

2024Cos., 262 P.3d 602, 607 (Alaska 2011). 13 Ball v. Birch, Horton, Bittner & Cherot, 58 P.3d 481, 485 (Alaska 2002). 14 ConocoPhillips Alaska, Inc. v. Williams Alaska Petroleum, Inc., 322 P.3d 114, 122 (Alaska 2014) (quoting Kalenka v. Jadon, Inc., 305 P.3d 346, 349 (Alaska 2013)). 15 Id. (quoting Russell ex rel.

2024Cos., 262 P.3d 602, 607 (Alaska 2011). 13 Ball v. Birch, Horton, Bittner & Cherot, 58 P.3d 481, 485 (Alaska 2002). 14 ConocoPhillips Alaska, Inc. v. Williams Alaska Petroleum, Inc., 322 P.3d 114, 122 (Alaska 2014) (quoting Kalenka v. Jadon, Inc., 305 P.3d 346, 349 (Alaska 2013)). 15 Id. (quoting Russell ex rel.

2024STANDARD OF REVIEW “We review questions of law, including questions of subject matter jurisdiction, de novo.”2 De novo review also “applies to constitutional issues.” 3 When 1 See AS 22.10.020(d); AS 22.15.240(a). 2 Hawkins v. Attatayuk, 322 P.3d 891, 894 (Alaska 2014); see also Sherrill v. Sherrill, 373 P.3d 486, 489 (Alaska 2016). 3 Bodkin v. Cook Inlet Region, Inc., 182 P.3d 1072, 1076 (Alaska 2008). -3- 2047 applying the de novo standard of review, we exercise our independent judgment and “adopt the rule of law that is most persuasive in light of precedent, reason, and policy.” 4 DISCUSSIO