de novo standard in Illinois

2022Citimortgage, Inc. v. Sharlow, 2014 IL App (3d) 130107, ¶ 14 (“The appellate court applies a de novo standard of review in cases in which the trial court either dismissed a section 2–1401 petition or ruled on the petition based on the pleadings alone, without an evidentiary hearing.” (citing People v. Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d 1, 18 (2007))). 5 1-21-1636 ¶ 15 In their reply brief, Mechele and Monte argue that Tracy’s response brief should be stricken for his failure to comply with the Illinois Supreme Court Rules governing appellate briefs.

2021Walters, 2015 IL 117783, ¶ 47 (addressing the use of the de novo standard in People v. Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d 1, 5 (2007)).

2025The Illinois Supreme Court has yet to resolve the long-standing conflict on this issue, created by its holdings in People v. Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d 92 (2007), wherein, without much explanation, it applied a de novo standard to the review of prosecutorial comments, and People v. Blue, 189 Ill. 2d 99 (2000), wherein it followed countless decisions in applying the traditional abuse of discretion standard of review.

2025In People v. Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d 92, 121 (2007), the de novo standard of review was applied to whether a prosecutor’s remarks were so egregious as to require a new trial.

2025The State, citing both Wheeler and People v. Blue, 189 Ill. 2d 99, 128 (2000), observes that our supreme court has applied both a de novo standard and an abuse of discretion standard to claims of improper closing arguments.

2025The Illinois Supreme Court has yet to resolve the long-standing conflict on this issue, created by its holdings in People v. Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d 92 (2007), wherein, without much explanation, it applied a de novo standard to the review of prosecutorial comments, and People v. Blue, 189 Ill. 2d 99 (2000), wherein it followed countless decisions in applying the traditional abuse of discretion standard of review.

2023This standard of review is “between the manifest weight of the evidence standard and a de novo standard, so as to provide ‘some deference’ to the agency’s decision.” AFM Messenger, 198 Ill. 2d at 392 (quoting City of Belvidere v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 181 Ill. 2d 191, 205 (1998)).

2022See also City of Belvidere v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 181 Ill. 2d 191, 205 (1998) (noting the “clearly erroneous” standard is “between a manifest weight of the evidence standard and a de novo standard”).

2021See Love, 377 Ill.

2018Compare People v. Love, 377 Ill.

2023“Under the de novo standard of review, this court owes no deference to the trial court.” People v. Williams, 2013 IL App (1st) 111116, ¶ 75 (citing Townsend v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 227 Ill. 2d 147, 154 (2007)). ¶ 23 In ruling on a section 2-619 motion to dismiss, a court must interpret the pleadings and supporting materials in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.

2022“Under the de novo standard of review, this court owes no deference to the trial court.” People v. Williams, 2013 IL App (1st) 111116, ¶ 75 (citing Townsend v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 227 Ill. 2d 147, 154 (2007)).

2021A decision is clearly erroneous “where the reviewing court, on the entire record, is ‘left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’ ” AFM Messenger Service, Inc. v. Department of Employment Security, 198 Ill. 2d 380, 395 (2001) (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)).

2021A decision is clearly erroneous “where the reviewing court, on the entire record, is ‘left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’ ” AFM Messenger Service, Inc. v. Department of Employment Security, 198 Ill. 2d 380, 395 (2001) (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)).

2007Most recently, however, this court has applied the de novo standard of review to the ultimate ruling on a motion to suppress, relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 , 134 L.

2007Most recently, however, this court has applied the de novo standard of review to the ultimate ruling on a motion to suppress, relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 , 134 L.

2024Simmons v. Homatas, 236 Ill. 2d 459, 466 (2010).

2017Simmons v. Homatas, 236 Ill. 2d 459, 466 (2010).

2026We only apply a de novo standard of review “[i]f no such determinations are necessary at third stage, i.e., no new evidence is presented and the issues presented are pure questions of law.” Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d at 473 ; see also People v. McCoy, 2026 IL 131565, ¶ 51 ; People v. Harris, 2025 IL 130351, ¶ 44 ; People v. Newlin, 2026 IL App (5th) 220764-U, ¶ 85 ; People v. Jones, 2025 IL App (1st) 240709-U, ¶ 41 .

2024If no fact-finding or credibility determinations are necessary at the third stage, “i.e., no new evidence is presented and the issues are pure questions of law, we will apply a de novo standard of review, unless the presiding judge has some ‘special expertise or familiarity’ with the trial or sentencing of the defendant and that ‘familiarity’ has some bearing on disposition of the postconviction petition.” Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d at 473 (citing People v. Caballero, 206 Ill. 2d 65, 87-88 (2002)).

1993Appellate courts apply a de novo standard when reviewing summary judgment rulings. ( Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. (1992), 154 Ill.2d 90, 102 , 180 Ill.Dec. 691 , 607 N.E.2d 1204 ); ( Neimiec v. Roels (1993), 224 Ill.App.3d 275 , 277, 185 Ill.Dec. 222 , 614 N.E.2d 356 ).

1993Appellate courts apply a de novo standard when reviewing summary judgment rulings. ( Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. (1992), 154 Ill.2d 90, 102 , 180 Ill.Dec. 691 , 607 N.E.2d 1204 ); ( Neimiec v. Roels (1993), 224 Ill.App.3d 275 , 277, 185 Ill.Dec. 222 , 614 N.E.2d 356 ).

2020McClure v. Owens Corning Fiberglass Corp., 188 Ill. 2d 102, 132 , 720 N.E.2d 242, 257 (1999).

2020McClure v. Owens Corning Fiberglass Corp., 188 Ill. 2d 102, 132 , 720 N.E.2d 242, 257 (1999).

2023This standard of review is “between the manifest weight of the evidence standard and a de novo standard, so as to provide ‘some deference’ to the agency’s decision.” AFM Messenger, 198 Ill. 2d at 392 (quoting City of Belvidere v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 181 Ill. 2d 191, 205 (1998)).

2022As this case involves a mixed question, the clearly erroneous standard applies. ¶ 42 A clearly erroneous standard of review is “between the manifest weight of the evidence standard and a de novo standard, so as to provide ‘some deference’ to the agency’s decision.” AFM Messenger Service, Inc. v. Department of Employment Security, 198 Ill. 2d 380, 392 (2001) (quoting City of Belvidere, 181 Ill. 2d at 205 ).

2020Edwards, 2012 IL 111711, ¶ 22 (citing People v. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d 444, 459 (2002)). ¶ 107 “The denial of a defendant’s motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition is reviewed de novo.” People v. Bailey, 2017 IL 121450, ¶ 13 ; People v. Wrice, 2012 IL 111860, ¶ 50 (applying a de novo standard of review to the State’s argument concerning lack of prejudice to the defendant, since these “arguments raise purely legal issues”).

2020In addition, the denial of a motion for leave to file a successive petition alleging cause and prejudice is reviewed de novo (People v. Wrice, 2012 IL 111860, ¶¶ 49-50 ), as is a similar ruling premised on statutory construction (People v. Bailey, 2017 IL 121450, ¶¶ 12-13 ). ¶ 40 In light of these governing principles, this court recognized in Edwards, 2012 IL 111711, ¶ 30 , that the assessment of whether, as a matter of law, a colorable - 11 - claim of actual innocence has been asserted suggests the de novo standard of review.

2024If no fact-finding or credibility determinations are necessary at the third stage, “i.e., no new evidence is presented and the issues are pure questions of law, we will apply a de novo standard of review, unless the presiding judge has some ‘special expertise or familiarity’ with the trial or sentencing of the defendant and that ‘familiarity’ has some bearing on disposition of the postconviction petition.” Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d at 473 (citing People v. Caballero, 206 Ill. 2d 65, 87-88 (2002)).

2008However, “[i]f no such determinations are necessary at the third stage, i.e., no new evidence is presented and the issues presented are pure questions of law, we will apply a de novo standard of review, unless the judge presiding over postconviction proceedings has some ‘special expertise or familiarity’ with the trial or sentencing of the defendant and that ‘familiarity’ has some bearing upon disposition of the postconviction petition.” Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d at 473 , citing People v. Caballero, 206 Ill. 2d 65, 87-88 (2002).

2015People v. Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d 425, 431 (2001); see also Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996).

2015People v. Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d 425, 431 (2001); see also Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996).

2011Millennium Park Joint Venture, LLC v. Houlihan, 241 Ill.2d at 309 , 349 Ill.Dec. 898 , 948 N.E.2d 1 . ¶ 23 The de novo standard of review is also dictated by the fact that the issue before us involves the construction of a statute.

2011Millennium Park Joint Venture, LLC v. Houlihan, 241 Ill.2d at 309 , 349 Ill.Dec. 898 , 948 N.E.2d 1 . ¶ 23 The de novo standard of review is also dictated by the fact that the issue before us involves the construction of a statute.

2025See, e.g., Tillman v. Pritzker, 2021 IL 126387, ¶ 17 (statutory interpretation is a question of law, subject to de novo review); Dowling v. Chicago Options Associates, Inc., 226 Ill. 2d 277, 285 (2007) (the interpretation of a contract involves a question of law, which we review de novo); General Motors Corp. v. Pappas, 242 Ill. 2d 163, 172-73 (2011) (de novo standard of review concerns the application of law to undisputed facts).

2020Townsend v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 227 Ill. 2d 147, 154 (2007) (“Where the circuit court does not hear testimony and bases its decision on documentary evidence, the rationale underlying a deferential standard of review is inapplicable and review is de novo.”); Dowling v. Chicago Options Associates, Inc., 226 Ill. 2d 277, 285 (2007) (where the trial court did not conduct an evidentiary hearing or make any findings of fact and relied on the parties’ oral argument and the record, “we review the court’s ruling on this issue de novo”). - 11 - ¶ 61 Thus, we apply a de novo review to defendant’s claim

2021See People v. Hommerson, 2014 IL 115638, ¶ 6 (first-stage summary dismissal); People v. Tyler, 2015 IL App (1st) 123470, ¶ 151 (second-stage dismissal (citing People v. Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d 458, 473 (2006))).

2021Dupree, 2018 IL 122307, ¶ 29 (review of a second-stage dismissal is de novo); People v. Hommerson, 2014 IL 115638, ¶ 6 (review of a first-stage dismissal is also de novo).

2025See People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 388-89 (1998) (holding a de novo standard applies to the review of a first-stage dismissal of a postconviction petition).

2004The trial court characterized the incident as ‘a drug transaction that goes bad,’ but did not find mitigating factors reducing the crime to second-degree murder. *** In fact, the court expressly noted at the time of the shooting, the victim dove out a glass window in an effort to save himself.” Applying a de novo standard of review, as we are required to do when resolving an appeal of a petition dismissed at the first stage of the postconviction process (Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d at 389 ), we find the record positively rebuts the defendant’s allegation that he suffered a constitutional deprivation

2002In In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d 37, 49-50 (2000), our supreme court adopted a de novo standard of review for the ultimate question of whether a confession is voluntary, but again affirmed that a reviewing court will accord great deference to the trial court’s factual findings, and we will reverse those findings only if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence.

2002In In re G.O. , 191 Ill. 2d 37, 49-50 (2000), our supreme court adopted a de novo standard of review for the ultimate question of whether a confession is voluntary, but again affirmed that a reviewing court will accord great deference to the trial court's factual findings, and we will reverse those findings only if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence.

2026Id. ¶ 19 Brown asserts that the facts are undisputed and the issue on appeal is a question of law, and thus a de novo standard of review should be applied, “or at least a heightened level of the ‘clearly erroneous’ standard.” Souders maintains that the appeal raises a mixed question of fact and law and the clearly erroneous standard should be employed.

2026Id. ¶ 18 Brown asserts that the facts are undisputed and the issue on appeal is a question of law, and thus a de novo standard of review should be applied, “or at least a heightened level of the ‘clearly erroneous’ standard.” Souders maintains that the appeal raises a mixed question of fact and law and the clearly erroneous standard should be employed.

2026See People v. Tyler, 2015 IL App (1st) 123470, ¶ 151 (“Under the de novo standard of review, the reviewing court does not need to defer to the trial court’s judgment or reasoning.”); People v. Anderson, 401 Ill.

2019“At the second-stage proceedings, we review the trial court’s decision under a de novo standard of review. [Citation.] Under the de novo standard of review, the reviewing court does not need to defer to the trial court’s judgment or reasoning. [Citation.] De novo review is completely independent of the trial court’s decision. [Citation.] De novo consideration means that the reviewing court performs the same analysis that a trial judge would perform.” People v. Tyler, 2015 IL App (1st) 123470, ¶ 151 .