de novo standard in New Hampshire

2015By its plain language, RSA 231:65 does not provide for either a pre-termination hearing before the Board or a de novo hearing in superior court to review the Board’s termination decisions. See Appeal of Doherty, 123 N.H. 508, 509 (1983) (“[I]f the legislature desires a full de novo hearing on appeal, it knows how to require it by using those words.”) (quotation omitted).

2008See Town of Hudson v. Baker, 133 N.H. 750, 752 (1990) (“If the legislature desires a full de novo hearing on appeal, it knows how to require it by using those words.” (quotation omitted)); Appeal of Doherty, 123 N.H. 508, 509 (1983) (holding same in memorandum opinion); Allard v. Power, 122 N.H. 27, 28 (1982) (holding same in memorandum opinion).

2008See Town of Hudson v. Baker, 133 N.H. 750, 752 (1990) (“If the legislature desires a full de novo hearing on appeal, it knows how to require it by using those words.” (quotation omitted)); Appeal of Doherty, 123 N.H. 508, 509 (1983) (holding same in memorandum opinion); Allard v. Power, 122 N.H. 27, 28 (1982) (holding same in memorandum opinion).

1990“If the legislature desires a full de novo hearing on appeal, it knows how to require it by using those words.” Allard v. Power, 122 N.H. 27, 28 , 440 A.2d 450, 451 (1982), quoted in Appeal of Doherty, 123 N.H. 508, 509 , 464 A.2d 1113, 1113 (1983).

2021See Kay, 162 N.H. at 243-45 ; Benner, 172 N.H. at 202 ; see also Smith, 163 N.H. at 18 ; Gibbs, 157 N.H. at 540, 542 . 2 In Kay, we distinguished our review of whether the evidence was sufficient to establish that a violation occurred, which we review under a de novo standard, from our review of the trial court’s decision regarding the appropriate sanction to be imposed after a violation has been found, which we review for an unsustainable exercise of discretion.

2021See Kay, 162 N.H. at 243-45 ; Benner, 172 N.H. at 202 ; see also Smith, 163 N.H. at 18 ; Gibbs, 157 N.H. at 540, 542 . 2 In Kay, we distinguished our review of whether the evidence was sufficient to establish that a violation occurred, which we review under a de novo standard, from our review of the trial court’s decision regarding the appropriate sanction to be imposed after a violation has been found, which we review for an unsustainable exercise of discretion.

2021See Kay, 162 N.H. at 243-45 ; Benner, 172 N.H. at 202 ; see also Smith, 163 N.H. at 18 ; Gibbs, 157 N.H. at 540, 542 . 2 In Kay, we distinguished our review of whether the evidence was sufficient to establish that a violation occurred, which we review under a de novo standard, from our review of the trial court’s decision regarding the appropriate sanction to be imposed after a violation has been found, which we review for an unsustainable exercise of discretion.

2021See Kay, 162 N.H. at 243-45 ; Benner, 172 N.H. at 202 ; see also Smith, 163 N.H. at 18 ; Gibbs, 157 N.H. at 540, 542 . 2 In Kay, we distinguished our review of whether the evidence was sufficient to establish that a violation occurred, which we review under a de novo standard, from our review of the trial court’s decision regarding the appropriate sanction to be imposed after a violation has been found, which we review for an unsustainable exercise of discretion.

2021See Kay, 162 N.H. at 243-45 ; Benner, 172 N.H. at 202 ; see also Smith, 163 N.H. at 18 ; Gibbs, 157 N.H. at 540, 542 . 2 In Kay, we distinguished our review of whether the evidence was sufficient to establish that a violation occurred, which we review under a de novo standard, from our review of the trial court’s decision regarding the appropriate sanction to be imposed after a violation has been found, which we review for an unsustainable exercise of discretion.

2021See Kay, 162 N.H. at 243-45 ; Benner, 172 N.H. at 202 ; see also Smith, 163 N.H. at 18 ; Gibbs, 157 N.H. at 540, 542 . 2 In Kay, we distinguished our review of whether the evidence was sufficient to establish that a violation occurred, which we review under a de novo standard, from our review of the trial court’s decision regarding the appropriate sanction to be imposed after a violation has been found, which we review for an unsustainable exercise of discretion.

2025See id.

2025See McMinn, 141 N.H. at 644 - 47. [¶11] In Chen, we departed from our customary de novo standard without explanation or clarification and applied our unsustainable exercise of discretion standard when reviewing a defendant’s request for a jury instruction on his theory of defense.

2021See Bordalo, 164 N.H. at 314 .

2020Accordingly, because a standard of review “affects only the process of enforcing litigants’ rights and not the rights themselves,” and “does not in itself create any substantive right,” Freund v. Nycomed Amersham, 347 F.3d 752, 761-62 (9th Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted), we conclude that the application of a de novo standard of review under RSA chapter 498-A does not impermissibly enlarge the Beatties’ substantive rights in contravention of RSA 498-A:1.

2019See Appeal of Rainville, 143 N.H. 624, 629 (1999) (stating CAB hearing is de novo).

2018Owners Assoc., 146 N.H. at 452 (quotation omitted).

2017See Attorney General, Dir. of Charitable Trusts v. Loreto Publ’ns, 169 N.H. 68, 71 (2016) (noting that we review de novo whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction); Univ.

2016See Town of Hinsdale v. Town of Chesterfield, 153 N.H. 70, 73 (2005) (“De novo review means that the reviewing [authority] decides the matter anew, neither restricted by nor deferring to decisions made below.”).

2015“When the language of a statute is clear on its face, its meaning is not subject to modification.” Correia v. Town of Alton, 157 N.H. 716, 718 (2008).

2014Petition of Carrier, 165 N.H. 719, 720-21 (2013).

2014Petition of Carrier, 165 N.H. 719, 720-21 (2013).

2013Wetlands Council, 154 N.H. 529, 544-45 (2006) (alleged error “that the wetlands council applied a deferential rather than de novo standard of review to the wetlands bureau’s legal conclusion” regarding DES’s scope of authority-under RSA chapter 482-A “would have been corrected . . . when the superior court correctly applied the de novo standard of review to the wetlands council’s legal determinations”).

2012However, we apply a de novo standard of review both to the constitutionality of a statute, Appeal of Blizzard, 163 N.H. 326, 331 (2012), and to the trial court’s application of the law to the facts, State v. Michelson, 160 N.H. 270, 272 (2010).

2012However, we apply a de novo standard of review both to the constitutionality of a statute, Appeal of Blizzard, 163 N.H. 326, 331 (2012), and to the trial court’s application of the law to the facts, State v. Michelson, 160 N.H. 270, 272 (2010).

2009It did,'however, conclude that the improper refund alone constituted the type of misconduct warranting denial of benefits under Appeal of New Hampshire Sweepstakes Commission, 130 N.H. 659, 664 (1988) (holding that single instance of misconduct is sufficient to deny benefits if it is “a deliberate violation of a company rule reasonably designed to protect the legitimate interests of the employer”).

2008See Town of Hudson v. Baker, 133 N.H. 750, 752 (1990) (“If the legislature desires a full de novo hearing on appeal, it knows how to require it by using those words.” (quotation omitted)); Appeal of Doherty, 123 N.H. 508, 509 (1983) (holding same in memorandum opinion); Allard v. Power, 122 N.H. 27, 28 (1982) (holding same in memorandum opinion).

2006United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245, 260-62 (2005).

2006See Andrews, 447 F.3d at 809-10 (recognizing, in post-Booker decision, that defendant suffered no ex post facto violation by application of former de novo standard of sentence review).