de novo standard in California

2026You have somebody agitated, cussing him out, hand on a knife and says, one stab, you are done, that would put any reasonable person in fear.” Standard of Review “The trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on the essential elements of the offense.” (People v. Merritt (2017) 2 Cal.5th 819, 824 .) “When the jury is ‘misinstructed on an element of the offense … reversal … is required unless we are able to conclude that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (People v. Wilkins (2013) 56 Cal.4th 333, 348 .) “The independent or de novo standard of review is applicable in

2026“The independent or de novo standard of review is applicable in assessing whether [jury] instructions correctly state the law.” (People v. Posey (2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 218 ).

2024It should decide as to each jury question whether further explanation is desirable, or whether it should merely warrant the instructions already given.” (Ibid.) “A violation of section 1138 does not warrant reversal unless prejudice is shown.” (Ibid.) “An appellate court applies the abuse of discretion standard of review to any decision by a trial court to instruct, or not to instruct, in its exercise of its supervision over a deliberating jury.” (People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690 , 745–746 (Waidla).) “The independent or de novo standard of review is applicable in assessing whether instru

2024We will apply the abuse of discretion standard in reviewing the trial court’s response to the jury’s question, and the de novo standard of review in assessing whether the trial court’s instructions correctly state the law. ( Waidla, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 745–746; Posey, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 218 .) In closing arguments, the parties presented different theories of the act or acts that were at issue in count 1.

2019(Powerline Oil Co., Inc. v. Superior Court (2005) 37 Cal.4th 377, 390 (Powerline).) An “ ‘insurer is entitled to summary adjudication that no potential for indemnity exists . . . if the evidence establishes as a matter of law that there is no coverage.’ ” (Ibid.) Stated another way, “ ‘[w]e apply a de novo standard of review to an order granting summary judgment when, on undisputed facts, the order is based on the interpretation or application of the terms of an insurance policy.’ ” (Ibid.) Settled rules govern the interpretation of insurance contracts.

2015Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)” (Committee to Save the Beverly Highlands Homes Assn. v. Beverly Highlands Homes Assn. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1247, 1261 .) On appeal, we conduct a de novo review of the record: “We examine the evidence and independently determine its effect. [Citation.] We must uphold the judgment if it is correct on any ground, regardless of the reasons the trial court gave. [Citation.]” (Committee to Save the Beverly Highlands Homes Assn. v. Beverly Highlands Homes Assn., supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at p. 1261 .) 8 The same principles apply in the insurance context if the evidence establ

2020“We apply a de novo standard of review . . . because federal preemption presents a pure question of law [citation].” (Farm Raised Salmon Cases (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1077, 1089, fn. 10 .) However, “when conflicting inferences may be drawn from undisputed facts, the reviewing court must accept the inference drawn by the trier of fact so long as it is reasonable.” (Boling v. Public Employment Relations Board (2018) 5 Cal.5th 898, 913 .) “The party who claims that a state statute is preempted by federal law bears the burden of demonstrating preemption.” (Bronco Wine Co. v. Jolly (2004) 33 Cal.4th 943,

2019(Town of Atherton v. California High-Speed Rail Authority (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 314, 331 .) “We apply a de novo standard of review . . . because federal preemption presents a pure question of law [citation].” (Farm Raised Salmon Cases (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1077, 1089, fn. 10 .) A. General Preemption Principles. “‘“The supremacy clause of the United States Constitution . . . vests Congress with the power to preempt state law.” [Citations.] Similarly, federal agencies, acting pursuant to authorization from Congress, can issue regulations that override state requirements. [Citations.] Preemption is

2018If doubts can reasonably be resolved in favor of the use of this reserve power, courts will preserve it." ' ( Associated Home Builders etc., Inc. v. City of Livermore (1976) 18 Cal.3d 582 , 591 [ 135 Cal.Rptr. 41 , 557 P.2d 473 ], fn. omitted; see also Brosnahan v. Brown (1982) 32 Cal.3d 236 , 241 [ 186 Cal.Rptr. 30 , 651 P.2d 274 ].)" ( Rossi, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 695 , 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 363 , 889 P.2d 557 .) In conducting our review of the constitutional issue in this case, we apply the de novo standard of review because the facts are not in dispute and the issue is one of law. ( Ghirardo v.

2018If doubts can reasonably be resolved in favor of the use of this reserve power, courts will preserve it." ' ( Associated Home Builders etc., Inc. v. City of Livermore (1976) 18 Cal.3d 582 , 591 [ 135 Cal.Rptr. 41 , 557 P.2d 473 ], fn. omitted; see also Brosnahan v. Brown (1982) 32 Cal.3d 236 , 241 [ 186 Cal.Rptr. 30 , 651 P.2d 274 ].)" ( Rossi, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 695 , 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 363 , 889 P.2d 557 .) In conducting our review of the constitutional issue in this case, we apply the de novo standard of review because the facts are not in dispute and the issue is one of law. ( Ghirardo v.

2026Applicable law and standard of review “We determine whether a jury instruction correctly states the law under the independent or de novo standard of review.” (People v. Ramos (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1082, 1088 .) When we review a purportedly erroneous instruction, we consider “ ‘ “ ‘whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way’ that violates the Constitution.” [Citation.]’ ” (People v. Richardson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 959, 1028 (Richardson).) We consider the instructions as a whole and “ ‘assume that jurors are intelligent persons and capabl

2026Rather . . . he or she need only intend the commission of the perpetrator’s act, the natural and probable consequences of which are dangerous to human life, intentionally aid in the commission of that act and do so with conscious disregard for human life.” ’ [Citations.] “The requisite intent is a subjective one—the defendant must have “ ‘actually appreciated the risk involved.’ ” ’ [Citation.] ‘ “In short, implied malice [murder] requires a defendant’s awareness of engaging in conduct that endangers the life of another.” ’ [Citations.]” (People v. Werntz, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 1116.) “W

2026(Braverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 162 .) The lesser included offense instruction should be given only “where there is substantial evidence to support it.” (People v. Burns (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1251, 1256 , citing People v. DePriest (2007) 42 Cal.4th 1, 50 .) Thus, “the trial court need not instruct on a lesser included offense whenever any evidence, no matter how weak, is presented to support an instruction, but only when the evidence is substantial enough to merit consideration by the jury.” (People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 195, fn. 4 (Barton).) Instruction is not required “when t

2023To satisfy the subjective element, the defendant must have acted under the actual influence of the provocation. “ ‘ “However, if sufficient time has elapsed between the provocation and the fatal blow for passion to subside and reason to return, the killing is not voluntary manslaughter.” ’ ” (People v. Moye (2009) 47 Cal.4th 537 , 549–550 (Moye).) “[O]n appeal we employ a de novo standard of review and independently determine whether an instruction on the lesser included offense of [attempted voluntary manslaughter based on the heat of passion theory] should have been given.” (People v. Manriq

2026He also contends the court should review this issue under a de novo standard and not for abuse of discretion, given his allegations of Constitutional errors, citing People v. Albarran (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 214 , 224 and People v. Seijas (2005) 36 Cal.4th 291, 304 .

2020(People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 203 .) “A trial court abuses its discretion when its ruling ‘fall[s] “outside the bounds of reason.” ’ [Citations.]” (People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 714 .) If the erroneous admission “implicates defendant’s federal constitutional rights to due process and concerns the fundamental fairness of his trial, we will apply the de novo standard of review.” (People v. Albarran (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 214, 225, fn. 7 .) 2.

2026Co. v. Superior Court (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1485, 1493 .) Likewise, “[w]here the ‘likelihood of prevailing on the merits’ factor depends upon a question of law rather than upon evidence to be introduced at a subsequent full trial, the standard of review is not abuse of discretion but whether the superior court correctly interpreted and applied statutory law, which we review de novo.” (Efstratis v. First Northern Bank (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 667 , 671–672; Doe v. Brown (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 408, 417 [“We apply the de novo standard of review to this claim, since the claim raises an issue of stat

2025(Doe v. Brown (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 408, 417 [“We apply the de novo standard of review to this claim, since the claim raises an 2 Further unspecified regulatory references are to the “General Institution Regulations” related to “Incarcerated Person Discipline” found in title 15, division 3, chapter 1, subchapter 4, article 5 of the California Code of Regulations (Regulations).

2025(See Manriquez, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 581 ; see also ([People v. ]Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th [690,] 733 [‘An appellate court applies the independent or de novo standard of review to the failure by a trial court to instruct on an uncharged offense that was assertedly lesser than, and included, in a charged offense.’].)” (Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 133 .) C Analysis As discussed, Whitaker contends the court erred by denying his request for instructions on imperfect self-defense and provocation after he initially rested his case because there was sufficient evidence at that time to support the

2023To satisfy the subjective element, the defendant must have acted under the actual influence of the provocation. “ ‘ “However, if sufficient time has elapsed between the provocation and the fatal blow for passion to subside and reason to return, the killing is not voluntary manslaughter.” ’ ” (People v. Moye (2009) 47 Cal.4th 537 , 549–550 (Moye).) “[O]n appeal we employ a de novo standard of review and independently determine whether an instruction on the lesser included offense of [attempted voluntary manslaughter based on the heat of passion theory] should have been given.” (People v. Manriq

2025“There is no uniform standard of review for evaluating an order denying a motion to compel arbitration. [Citation.] If the court’s order is based on a decision of fact, then we adopt a substantial evidence standard. [Citations.] Alternatively, if the court’s denial rests solely on a decision of law, then a de novo standard of review is employed.” (Robertson v. Health Net of California, Inc. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1419, 1425 .) Here, the trial court’s denial was based on its interpretation of the EFAA.

2025“There is no uniform standard of review for evaluating an order denying a motion to compel arbitration.” (Robertson v. Health Net of California, Inc. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1419, 1425 .) “[I]f the court’s denial rests solely on a decision of law, then a de novo standard of review is employed.” (Ibid.) “If the court’s order is based on a decision of fact, then we adopt a substantial evidence standard.” (Ibid.) But if the order “is based on the court’s finding that petitioner failed to carry its burden of proof, the question for the reviewing court is whether that finding is erroneous as a matte

2023(Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1060 .) At the first step, we ask whether the defendant has shown that “the challenged allegations or claims” arise from the defendant’s “protected activity.” (Ibid.) If and only if the defendant meets its burden at the first step, we move to the second step, which asks whether the plaintiff has demonstrated that its challenged “claims have at least ‘minimal merit.’” (Id. at p. 1061.) 8 We apply the de novo standard of review to determine if the trial court properly granted an anti-SLAPP motion.

2019Proc., § 425.16, subd. (e)(1)-(2).) An appellate court reviews the grant or denial of an anti-SLAPP motion under the de novo standard. ( Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057 , 1067, 217 Cal.Rptr.3d 130 , 393 P.3d 905 ( Park ).) 2.

2026(Braverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 162 .) The lesser included offense instruction should be given only “where there is substantial evidence to support it.” (People v. Burns (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1251, 1256 , citing People v. DePriest (2007) 42 Cal.4th 1, 50 .) Thus, “the trial court need not instruct on a lesser included offense whenever any evidence, no matter how weak, is presented to support an instruction, but only when the evidence is substantial enough to merit consideration by the jury.” (People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 195, fn. 4 (Barton).) Instruction is not required “when t

2025(Ibid.) The lesser included offense instruction should be given only “where there is substantial evidence to support it.” (People v. Burns (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1251, 1256 , citing People v. DePriest (2007) 42 Cal.4th 1, 50 .) Thus, “the trial court need not instruct on a lesser included 7 offense whenever any evidence, no matter how weak, is presented to support an instruction, but only when the evidence is substantial enough to merit consideration by the jury.” (People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 195, fn. 4 (Barton).) Instruction is not required “when the evidence is ‘minimal and insub

2026He also contends the court should review this issue under a de novo standard and not for abuse of discretion, given his allegations of Constitutional errors, citing People v. Albarran (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 214 , 224 and People v. Seijas (2005) 36 Cal.4th 291, 304 .

2022(People v. Sweeney (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 210, 221 [appellate courts should generally apply the de novo standard to confrontation clause claims], citing People v. Seijas (2005) 36 Cal.4th 291, 304 .) To the extent there are mixed questions of law and facts, “we defer to the trial court’s determination of ‘the historical facts’— which ‘will rarely be in dispute’—but not the court’s ‘application of [the] 14Jones asserts that, if we conclude that he did not sufficiently raise his appellate claim below, he received ineffective assistance of counsel.

2026Legal Principles “We apply the independent or de novo standard of review to the failure by the trial court to instruct on an assertedly lesser included offense.” (People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1218 .) Involuntary manslaughter is an unlawful killing caused by a defendant who committed an act that endangered human life 17 without realizing the risk or danger involved, i.e., with criminal negligence.

2025(People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 194-195 .) A duty to instruct does not arise “unless there is some evidence, not merely minimal or insubstantial evidence but evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude, that the offense was less than that charged.” (People v. Jones (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 867, 870 .) “We apply the independent or de novo standard of review to the failure by the trial court to instruct on an assertedly lesser included offense.” (People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1218 .) 17 An attempt to commit a crime can constitute a lesser included offense of a completed cr

2024(Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 849 .) “In the context of summary judgment, the Privette doctrine gives rise to a rebuttable presumption that affects the burden of producing evidence.” (Degala, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 166.) If the moving party establishes that it hired an independent contractor to perform certain work, and that the injured plaintiff is an employee of that independent contractor, the “burden shifts to the opposing party to come forward with evidence raising a triable issue of fact as to whether an exception to the Privette doctrine applies.” (Ibid.) “Nevertheless, the bur

2022On this point, this case is indistinguishable from Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826 , in which the Supreme Court held the de novo standard of review applies when a trial court grants a motion for new trial based on an error of law in granting a summary judgment motion.

2020PRECEDENT Hudack contends, “Never in the history of published California jurisprudence has any court ruled an anti-SLAPP motion, a derivative tort defense, defeats [a] collateral attack on judgments void on their face.” We apply the de novo standard of review. ( Flatley, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 325- 326.) In Church of Scientology, the Church brought a “complaint attack[ing] the judgment Wollersheim had obtained against the Church in a prior action.” (Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 628, 636 (Church of Scientology) (disapproved on other grounds in Equilon Enterprises

2020LACK OF AUTHORITY Hudack contends the trial court lacked “authority to consider and rule on an anti- SLAPP motion.” 27 We apply the de novo standard of review. ( Flatley, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 325- 326.) An anti-SLAPP motion is an option for responding to a collateral attack.

2022Standard of review “We review the trial court’s rulings on a SLAPP motion independently under a de novo standard of review. [Citation.]” 5 (Kajima Engineering & Construction, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 921, 929 .) II.

2022Relevant Law and Standard of Review A. Standard of review “We review the trial court’s rulings on a SLAPP motion independently under a de novo standard of review. [Citation.]” (Kajima Engineering & Construction, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 921, 929 .) B.

2024We disagree. “‘[A] trial court must instruct a criminal jury on any lesser offense “necessarily included” in the charged offense, if there is substantial evidence that only the lesser crime was committed.’” (People v. Smith (2013) 57 Cal.4th 232, 239 .) “‘Substantial evidence in this context is evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the defendant committed the lesser, but not the greater, offense.’” (People v. Landry (2016) 2 Cal.5th 52, 96 .) “‘We apply the independent or de novo standard of review to the failure by the trial court to instruct on an assertedly lesser includ

2016The Accusatory Pleadings Test “‘We apply the independent or de novo standard of review to the failure by the trial court to instruct on an assertedly lesser included offense. [Citation.]’” (People v. Licas (2007) 41 Cal.4th 362, 366 .) “‘“[A] lesser offense is necessarily included in a greater offense if either the statutory elements of the greater offense, or the facts actually alleged in the accusatory pleading, include all the elements of the lesser offense, such that the greater cannot be committed without also committing the lesser. [Citations.]” [Citation.]’” (Ibid.) Section 288.5, subdi

2022(Sierra Club v. City of Orange (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 523, 536 [“An appellate court employs a de novo standard of review when determining whether the exhaustion of remedies doctrine applies”]; Farahani v. San Diego Community College Dist. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1486, 1491 [“The interpretation of a statute is a legal issue subject to de novo review”].) In reviewing questions of law, we are not bound by the trial court’s stated reasons or rationales.

2021(See Sierra Club v. City of Orange (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 523, 536 [appellate court uses a de novo standard of review when determining whether exhaustion requirement applies].) A. Statutory Provisions CEQA explicitly addresses the exhaustion of administrative remedies, containing both an issue exhaustion requirement and a party exhaustion requirement.

2025Standard of Review “Because the function of a demurrer is to test the sufficiency of a pleading as a matter of law, we apply the de novo standard of review in an appeal following the sustaining of a demurrer without leave to amend.” (California Logistics, Inc. v. State of California (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 242, 247 .) “‘We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. [Citation.] We also consider matters which may be judicially noticed.’ [Citation.] Further, we give the complaint a reasonable 6 interpretation,

2025Standard of Review “Because the function of a demurrer is to test the sufficiency of a pleading as a matter of law, we apply the de novo standard of review in an appeal following the sustaining of a demurrer without leave to amend.” (California Logistics, Inc. v. State of California (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 242, 247 .) “‘We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. [Citation.] We also consider matters which may be judicially noticed.’ [Citation.] Further, we give the complaint a reasonable 6 interpretation,

2015Co. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 667, 672 [ 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 358 ] [a de novo standard of review applies when an appellate court reviews a judgment on the pleadings].) We examine the issues below.

2015Co. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 667, 672 [ 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 358 ] [a de novo standard of review applies when an appellate court reviews a judgment on the pleadings].) We examine the issues below.

2026We reject appellants’ argument that the standard for reviewing evidentiary objections on summary judgment is de novo, “consistent with the general standard of review applicable to summary judgment rulings.” (Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 535 .) In Reid, the Supreme Court applied the de novo standard of review to evidentiary objections on which the trial court had failed to rule, reasoning that “because there was no exercise of trial court discretion, the Court of Appeal had no occasion to determine whether the trial court abused it.” (Ibid.) That reasoning does not apply here, wh

2025Co. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 45, 52 ; but see Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 535 [declining to decide governing standard for review of evidentiary objections in summary judgment proceedings].) Even under a de novo standard of review, we find no error in the trial court’s ruling.

2026“We review an order granting or denying an anti-SLAPP motion under the de novo standard and, in so doing, conduct the same two-step process to determine whether as a matter of law the defendant met its burden of showing the challenged claim arose out of protected activity and, if so, whether the plaintiff met its burden of showing probability of success.” (Newport Harbor Offices & Marina, LLC v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 28, 42 .) The usual rules of appellate review apply: A trial court’s judgment is presumed correct, and the appellant bears the burden to demonstrat

2026“We review an order granting or denying an anti-SLAPP motion under the de novo standard and, in so doing, conduct the same two-step process to determine whether as a matter of law the defendant met its burden of showing the challenged claim arose out of protected activity and, if so, whether the plaintiff met its burden of showing probability of success.” (Newport Harbor Offices & Marina, LLC v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 28, 42 .) The usual rules of appellate review apply: A trial court’s judgment is presumed correct, and the appellant bears the burden to demonstrat