de novo standard in California

2026You have somebody agitated, cussing him out, hand on a knife and says, one stab, you are done, that would put any reasonable person in fear.” Standard of Review “The trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on the essential elements of the offense.” (People v. Merritt (2017) 2 Cal.5th 819, 824 .) “When the jury is ‘misinstructed on an element of the offense … reversal … is required unless we are able to conclude that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (People v. Wilkins (2013) 56 Cal.4th 333, 348 .) “The independent or de novo standard of review is applicable in

2026“The independent or de novo standard of review is applicable in assessing whether [jury] instructions correctly state the law.” (People v. Posey (2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 218 ).

2026Among the circumstances that may be relevant for this purpose, for example, are the transactions preceding the offense, the suspect’s response to the inducements of the officer, the gravity of the crime, and the difficulty of detecting instances of its commission.” (Barraza, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 690 .) “On appeal, we apply a de novo standard of review.” (People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 581 ; see People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 733 [“Whether or not to give any particular instruction in any particular case entails the resolution of a mixed question of law and fact that, we b

2024It should decide as to each jury question whether further explanation is desirable, or whether it should merely warrant the instructions already given.” (Ibid.) “A violation of section 1138 does not warrant reversal unless prejudice is shown.” (Ibid.) “An appellate court applies the abuse of discretion standard of review to any decision by a trial court to instruct, or not to instruct, in its exercise of its supervision over a deliberating jury.” (People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690 , 745–746 (Waidla).) “The independent or de novo standard of review is applicable in assessing whether instru

2026DISCUSSION A. Standard of Review “ ‘A motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication is properly granted only when “all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” ’ ” (Campbell v. FPI Management, Inc. (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 1151 , 1161; see Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (c) & (f); Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 607, 618 .) “ ‘We apply a de novo standard of review to an order granting summary judgment when, on undisputed facts, the order is

2019(Powerline Oil Co., Inc. v. Superior Court (2005) 37 Cal.4th 377, 390 (Powerline).) An “ ‘insurer is entitled to summary adjudication that no potential for indemnity exists . . . if the evidence establishes as a matter of law that there is no coverage.’ ” (Ibid.) Stated another way, “ ‘[w]e apply a de novo standard of review to an order granting summary judgment when, on undisputed facts, the order is based on the interpretation or application of the terms of an insurance policy.’ ” (Ibid.) Settled rules govern the interpretation of insurance contracts.

2026(Id. at p. 304; see also People v. Albarran (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 214, 224, fn. 7 [concluding that the trial court’s denial of a new trial motion should be reviewed independently because it implicated the defendant’s “federal 9 constitutional rights to due process and concerns the fundamental fairness of his trial”].) McCauley does not, however, cite a decision applying the de novo standard of review to a trial court’s ruling that implicates the right set forth in Payne, supra, 17 Cal.3d 908.

2026He also contends the court should review this issue under a de novo standard and not for abuse of discretion, given his allegations of Constitutional errors, citing People v. Albarran (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 214 , 224 and People v. Seijas (2005) 36 Cal.4th 291, 304 .

2020“We apply a de novo standard of review . . . because federal preemption presents a pure question of law [citation].” (Farm Raised Salmon Cases (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1077, 1089, fn. 10 .) However, “when conflicting inferences may be drawn from undisputed facts, the reviewing court must accept the inference drawn by the trier of fact so long as it is reasonable.” (Boling v. Public Employment Relations Board (2018) 5 Cal.5th 898, 913 .) “The party who claims that a state statute is preempted by federal law bears the burden of demonstrating preemption.” (Bronco Wine Co. v. Jolly (2004) 33 Cal.4th 943,

2019(Town of Atherton v. California High-Speed Rail Authority (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 314, 331 .) “We apply a de novo standard of review . . . because federal preemption presents a pure question of law [citation].” (Farm Raised Salmon Cases (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1077, 1089, fn. 10 .) A. General Preemption Principles. “‘“The supremacy clause of the United States Constitution . . . vests Congress with the power to preempt state law.” [Citations.] Similarly, federal agencies, acting pursuant to authorization from Congress, can issue regulations that override state requirements. [Citations.] Preemption is

2018If doubts can reasonably be resolved in favor of the use of this reserve power, courts will preserve it." ' ( Associated Home Builders etc., Inc. v. City of Livermore (1976) 18 Cal.3d 582 , 591 [ 135 Cal.Rptr. 41 , 557 P.2d 473 ], fn. omitted; see also Brosnahan v. Brown (1982) 32 Cal.3d 236 , 241 [ 186 Cal.Rptr. 30 , 651 P.2d 274 ].)" ( Rossi, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 695 , 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 363 , 889 P.2d 557 .) In conducting our review of the constitutional issue in this case, we apply the de novo standard of review because the facts are not in dispute and the issue is one of law. ( Ghirardo v.

2018If doubts can reasonably be resolved in favor of the use of this reserve power, courts will preserve it." ' ( Associated Home Builders etc., Inc. v. City of Livermore (1976) 18 Cal.3d 582 , 591 [ 135 Cal.Rptr. 41 , 557 P.2d 473 ], fn. omitted; see also Brosnahan v. Brown (1982) 32 Cal.3d 236 , 241 [ 186 Cal.Rptr. 30 , 651 P.2d 274 ].)" ( Rossi, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 695 , 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 363 , 889 P.2d 557 .) In conducting our review of the constitutional issue in this case, we apply the de novo standard of review because the facts are not in dispute and the issue is one of law. ( Ghirardo v.

2026(Braverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 162 .) The lesser included offense instruction should be given only “where there is substantial evidence to support it.” (People v. Burns (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1251, 1256 , citing People v. DePriest (2007) 42 Cal.4th 1, 50 .) Thus, “the trial court need not instruct on a lesser included offense whenever any evidence, no matter how weak, is presented to support an instruction, but only when the evidence is substantial enough to merit consideration by the jury.” (People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 195, fn. 4 (Barton).) Instruction is not required “when t

2023To satisfy the subjective element, the defendant must have acted under the actual influence of the provocation. “ ‘ “However, if sufficient time has elapsed between the provocation and the fatal blow for passion to subside and reason to return, the killing is not voluntary manslaughter.” ’ ” (People v. Moye (2009) 47 Cal.4th 537 , 549-550 (Moye).) “[O]n appeal we employ a de novo standard of review and independently determine whether an instruction on the lesser included offense of [attempted voluntary manslaughter based on the heat of passion theory] should have been given.” (People v. Manriq

2026Co. v. Superior Court (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1485, 1493 .) Likewise, “[w]here the ‘likelihood of prevailing on the merits’ factor depends upon a question of law rather than upon evidence to be introduced at a subsequent full trial, the standard of review is not abuse of discretion but whether the superior court correctly interpreted and applied statutory law, which we review de novo.” (Efstratis v. First Northern Bank (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 667 , 671-672; Doe v. Brown (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 408, 417 [“We apply the de novo standard of review to this claim, since the claim raises an issue of stat

2025(Doe v. Brown (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 408, 417 [“We apply the de novo standard of review to this claim, since the claim raises an 3 issue of statutory interpretation”].) “ ‘Rules governing the interpretation of statutes also apply to interpretation of regulations.’ ” (In re Villa (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 954, 964 .) “ ‘ “In interpreting regulations, the court seeks to ascertain the intent of the agency issuing the regulation by giving effect to the usual meaning of the language used so as to effectuate the purpose of the law, and by avoiding an interpretation which renders any language mere surpl

2026You may consider this evidence only in deciding whether or not 19 [the victims’] conduct was consistent with the conduct of someone who has been molested in evaluating the believability of the alleged victims.” “We determine whether a jury instruction correctly states the law under the independent or de novo standard of review.” (People v. Ramos (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1082, 1088 .) When we review a purportedly erroneous instruction, we consider “ ‘ “ ‘whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way’ that violates the Constitution.” ’ ” (Pe

2026Applicable Law and Standard of Review “We determine whether a jury instruction correctly states the law under the independent or de novo standard of review.” (People v. Ramos (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1082, 1088 .) When we review a purportedly erroneous instruction, we consider “ ‘ “ ‘whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged 19 instruction in a way’ that violates the Constitution.” ’ ” (People v. Richardson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 959, 1028 .) We consider the instructions as a whole and “ ‘assume that jurors are intelligent persons and capable of understanding a

2026Among the circumstances that may be relevant for this purpose, for example, are the transactions preceding the offense, the suspect’s response to the inducements of the officer, the gravity of the crime, and the difficulty of detecting instances of its commission.” (Barraza, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 690 .) “On appeal, we apply a de novo standard of review.” (People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 581 ; see People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 733 [“Whether or not to give any particular instruction in any particular case entails the resolution of a mixed question of law and fact that, we b

2025(See Manriquez, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 581 ; see also ([People v. ]Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th [690,] 733 [‘An appellate court applies the independent or de novo standard of review to the failure by a trial court to instruct on an uncharged offense that was assertedly lesser than, and included, in a charged offense.’].)” (Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 133 .) C Analysis As discussed, Whitaker contends the court erred by denying his request for instructions on imperfect self-defense and provocation after he initially rested his case because there was sufficient evidence at that time to support the

2025“There is no uniform standard of review for evaluating an order denying a motion to compel arbitration.” (Robertson v. Health Net of California, Inc. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1419, 1425 .) “[I]f the court’s denial rests solely on a decision of law, then a de novo standard of review is employed.” (Ibid.) “If the court’s order is based on a decision of fact, then we adopt a substantial evidence standard.” (Ibid.) But if the order “is based on the court’s finding that petitioner failed to carry its burden of proof, the question for the reviewing court is whether that finding is erroneous as a matte

2025“There is no uniform standard of review for evaluating an order denying a motion to compel arbitration. [Citation.] If the court’s order is based on a decision of fact, then we adopt a substantial evidence standard. [Citations.] Alternatively, if the court’s denial rests solely on a decision of law, then a de novo standard of review is employed.” (Robertson v. Health Net of California, Inc. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1419, 1425 .) Here, the trial court’s denial was based on its interpretation of the EFAA.

2026(People v. Wickersham (1982) 32 Cal.3d 307 , 323-324, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186 , 200-201.) “[T]he first prerequisite to receiving instructions on lesser related offenses must be the existence of some basis, other than an unexplainable rejection of prosecution evidence, on which the jury could find the 8 offense to be less than that charged.” (People v. Geiger (1984) 35 Cal.3d 510, 531 , reversed on other grounds by People v. Birks, supra, 19 Cal.4th 108 , 112-113, 136.) The independent or de novo standard of review is applicable in assessing whethe

2026(Braverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 162 .) The lesser included offense instruction should be given only “where there is substantial evidence to support it.” (People v. Burns (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1251, 1256 , citing People v. DePriest (2007) 42 Cal.4th 1, 50 .) Thus, “the trial court need not instruct on a lesser included offense whenever any evidence, no matter how weak, is presented to support an instruction, but only when the evidence is substantial enough to merit consideration by the jury.” (People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 195, fn. 4 (Barton).) Instruction is not required “when t

2023(Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1060 .) At the first step, we ask whether the defendant has shown that “the challenged allegations or claims” arise from the defendant’s “protected activity.” (Ibid.) If and only if the defendant meets its burden at the first step, we move to the second step, which asks whether the plaintiff has demonstrated that its challenged “claims have at least ‘minimal merit.’” (Id. at p. 1061.) 8 We apply the de novo standard of review to determine if the trial court properly granted an anti-SLAPP motion.

2018The first step is examining the causes of action to determine if they arise from any act in furtherance of the defendant's "right of petition or free speech *529 under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue." ( § 425.16, subd. (b).) The second step is determining whether the plaintiff has a probability of prevailing on her claims. ( § 425.16, subd. (b).) If a cause of action arises from an act in furtherance of the defendant's right of petition or free speech and the plaintiff does not have a probability of prevailing, then the cause of

2026He also contends the court should review this issue under a de novo standard and not for abuse of discretion, given his allegations of Constitutional errors, citing People v. Albarran (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 214 , 224 and People v. Seijas (2005) 36 Cal.4th 291, 304 .

2022(People v. Sweeney (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 210, 221 [appellate courts should generally apply the de novo standard to confrontation clause claims], citing People v. Seijas (2005) 36 Cal.4th 291, 304 .) To the extent there are mixed questions of law and facts, “we defer to the trial court’s determination of ‘the historical facts’— which ‘will rarely be in dispute’—but not the court’s ‘application of [the] 14Jones asserts that, if we conclude that he did not sufficiently raise his appellate claim below, he received ineffective assistance of counsel.

2026Legal Principles “We apply the independent or de novo standard of review to the failure by the trial court to instruct on an assertedly lesser included offense.” (People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1218 .) Involuntary manslaughter is an unlawful killing caused by a defendant who committed an act that endangered human life 17 without realizing the risk or danger involved, i.e., with criminal negligence.

2025(People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 194-195 .) A duty to instruct does not arise “unless there is some evidence, not merely minimal or insubstantial evidence but evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude, that the offense was less than that charged.” (People v. Jones (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 867, 870 .) “We apply the independent or de novo standard of review to the failure by the trial court to instruct on an assertedly lesser included offense.” (People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1218 .) 17 An attempt to commit a crime can constitute a lesser included offense of a completed cr

2024We disagree. “‘[A] trial court must instruct a criminal jury on any lesser offense “necessarily included” in the charged offense, if there is substantial evidence that only the lesser crime was committed.’” (People v. Smith (2013) 57 Cal.4th 232, 239 .) “‘Substantial evidence in this context is evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the defendant committed the lesser, but not the greater, offense.’” (People v. Landry (2016) 2 Cal.5th 52, 96 .) “‘We apply the independent or de novo standard of review to the failure by the trial court to instruct on an assertedly lesser includ

2020See footnote, ante, page 1. 9 Burroughs was overruled on other grounds by People v. Blakely, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 89 . 16 unintentional killing during the course of a felonious assault committed with criminal negligence.” “‘We apply the independent or de novo standard of review to the failure by the trial court to instruct on an assertedly lesser included offense.’” (People v. Licas (2007) 41 Cal.4th 362, 366 ; People v. Campbell (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 148, 158 [same]; People v. Brothers (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 24, 30 (Brothers) [“We review the trial court’s failure to instruct on a lesser i

2024(Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 849 .) “In the context of summary judgment, the Privette doctrine gives rise to a rebuttable presumption that affects the burden of producing evidence.” (Degala, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 166.) If the moving party establishes that it hired an independent contractor to perform certain work, and that the injured plaintiff is an employee of that independent contractor, the “burden shifts to the opposing party to come forward with evidence raising a triable issue of fact as to whether an exception to the Privette doctrine applies.” (Ibid.) “Nevertheless, the bur

2022On this point, this case is indistinguishable from Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826 , in which the Supreme Court held the de novo standard of review applies when a trial court grants a motion for new trial based on an error of law in granting a summary judgment motion.

2020LACK OF AUTHORITY Hudack contends the trial court lacked “authority to consider and rule on an anti- SLAPP motion.” 27 We apply the de novo standard of review. ( Flatley, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 325- 326.) An anti-SLAPP motion is an option for responding to a collateral attack.

2020PRECEDENT Hudack contends, “Never in the history of published California jurisprudence has any court ruled an anti-SLAPP motion, a derivative tort defense, defeats [a] collateral attack on judgments void on their face.” We apply the de novo standard of review. ( Flatley, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 325- 326.) In Church of Scientology, the Church brought a “complaint attack[ing] the judgment Wollersheim had obtained against the Church in a prior action.” (Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 628, 636 (Church of Scientology) (disapproved on other grounds in Equilon Enterprises

2022Standard of review “We review the trial court’s rulings on a SLAPP motion independently under a de novo standard of review. [Citation.]” 5 (Kajima Engineering & Construction, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 921, 929 .) II.

2022Relevant Law and Standard of Review A. Standard of review “We review the trial court’s rulings on a SLAPP motion independently under a de novo standard of review. [Citation.]” (Kajima Engineering & Construction, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 921, 929 .) B.

2026Standards of Review “The function of a demurrer is to test the sufficiency of the complaint as a matter of law, and it raises only a question of law. [Citations.] On a question of law, we apply a de novo standard of review on appeal.” (Holiday Matinee, Inc. v. Rambus, Inc. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1413, 1420 .) “ ‘We review the trial court’s decision not to grant leave to amend for abuse of discretion. [Citation.] “ ‘[W]e must decide whether there is a reasonable possibility the plaintiff could cure the defect with an amendment. [Citation.] If we find that an amendment could cure the defect, we

2024Standard of review “The function of a demurrer is to test the sufficiency of the complaint as a matter of law, and it raises only a question of law.” (Holiday Matinee, Inc. v. Rambus, Inc. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1413, 1420 .) Therefore, we apply a de novo standard of review.

2026Demurrer “Because the function of a demurrer is to test the sufficiency of a pleading as a matter of law, we apply the de novo standard of review in an appeal following the sustaining of a demurrer without leave to amend. [Citation.] We assume the truth of the allegations in the complaint, but do not assume the truth of contentions, deductions, or conclusions of law. [Citation.] It is error for the trial court to sustain a demurrer if the plaintiff has stated a cause of action under any possible legal theory, and it is an abuse of discretion for the court to sustain a demurrer without leave to

2026Standard of Review “Because the function of a demurrer is to test the sufficiency of a pleading as a matter of law, we apply the de novo standard of review in an appeal following the sustaining of a demurrer without leave to amend. [Citation.] We assume the truth of the allegations in the complaint, but do not assume the truth of contentions, deductions, or conclusions of law. [Citation.] It is error for the trial court to sustain a demurrer if the plaintiff has stated a cause of action under any possible legal theory . . . .” (California Logistics, Inc. v. State of California (2008) 161 Cal.A

2015Co. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 667, 672 [ 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 358 ] [a de novo standard of review applies when an appellate court reviews a judgment on the pleadings].) We examine the issues below.

2015Co. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 667, 672 [ 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 358 ] [a de novo standard of review applies when an appellate court reviews a judgment on the pleadings].) We examine the issues below.

2025Standard of Review “Because the function of a demurrer is to test the sufficiency of a pleading as a matter of law, we apply the de novo standard of review in an appeal following the sustaining of a demurrer without leave to amend.” (California Logistics, Inc. v. State of California (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 242, 247 .) “‘We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. [Citation.] We also consider matters which may be judicially noticed.’ [Citation.] Further, we give the complaint a reasonable 6 interpretation,

2025Standard of Review “Because the function of a demurrer is to test the sufficiency of a pleading as a matter of law, we apply the de novo standard of review in an appeal following the sustaining of a demurrer without leave to amend.” (California Logistics, Inc. v. State of California (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 242, 247 .) “‘We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. [Citation.] We also consider matters which may be judicially noticed.’ [Citation.] Further, we give the complaint a reasonable 6 interpretation,

2025Co. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 45, 52 ; but see Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 535 [declining to decide governing standard for review of evidentiary objections in summary judgment proceedings].) Even under a de novo standard of review, we find no error in the trial court’s ruling.

2014(Gordon v. Nissan Motor Co., Ltd. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1103, 1111 ; but see Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 535 [suggesting that a trial court’s rulings on evidentiary objections based on papers alone in summary judgment proceedings may be reviewed under the de novo standard of review rather than abuse of discretion.)8 Ultimately, the purpose of summary judgment is to “provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p

2026“We review an order granting or denying an anti-SLAPP motion under the de novo standard and, in so doing, conduct the same two-step process to determine whether as a matter of law the defendant met its burden of showing the challenged claim arose out of protected activity and, if so, whether the plaintiff met its burden of showing probability of success.” (Newport Harbor Offices & Marina, LLC v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 28, 42 .) The usual rules of appellate review apply: A trial court’s judgment is presumed correct, and the appellant bears the burden to demonstrat

2026“We review an order granting or denying an anti-SLAPP motion under the de novo standard and, in so doing, conduct the same two-step process to determine whether as a matter of law the defendant met its burden of showing the challenged claim arose out of protected activity and, if so, whether the plaintiff met its burden of showing probability of success.” (Newport Harbor Offices & Marina, LLC v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 28, 42 .) The usual rules of appellate review apply: A trial court’s judgment is presumed correct, and the appellant bears the burden to demonstrat