de novo hearing in Massachusetts

1988“The task of the Superior Court was to determine whether this applicant for a special permit was able to demonstrate at a de novo hearing (Josephs v. Board of Appeals of Brookline, 362 Mass. 290, 295 [1972]) that ‘the board has based its decision ón a “legally untenable ground, or is unreasonable, whimsical, capricious or arbitrary.” ’ Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Board of Appeals of Amherst, 360 Mass. 604, 605 (1971), quoting from MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals of Duxbury, 356 Mass. 635, 639 (1970), and citing Gulf Oil Corp. v. Board of Appeals of Framingham, 355 Mass. 275, 277 (1969).” S. Vol

1988“The task of the Superior Court was to determine whether this applicant for a special permit was able to demonstrate at a de novo hearing (Josephs v. Board of Appeals of Brookline, 362 Mass. 290, 295 [1972]) that ‘the board has based its decision on a “legally untenable ground, or is unreasonable, whimsical, capricious or arbitrary.” ’ Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Board of Appeals of Amherst, 360 Mass. 604, 605 (1971), quoting from MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals of Duxbury, 356 Mass. 635, 639 (1970), and citing Gulf Oil Corp. v. Board of Appeals of Framingham, 355 Mass. 275, 277 (1969).” S. Vol

1988“The task of the Superior Court was to determine whether this applicant for a special permit was able to demonstrate at a de novo hearing (Josephs v. Board of Appeals of Brookline, 362 Mass. 290, 295 [1972]) that ‘the board has based its decision ón a “legally untenable ground, or is unreasonable, whimsical, capricious or arbitrary.” ’ Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Board of Appeals of Amherst, 360 Mass. 604, 605 (1971), quoting from MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals of Duxbury, 356 Mass. 635, 639 (1970), and citing Gulf Oil Corp. v. Board of Appeals of Framingham, 355 Mass. 275, 277 (1969).” S. Vol

1988“The task of the Superior Court was to determine whether this applicant for a special permit was able to demonstrate at a de novo hearing (Josephs v. Board of Appeals of Brookline, 362 Mass. 290, 295 [1972]) that ‘the board has based its decision on a “legally untenable ground, or is unreasonable, whimsical, capricious or arbitrary.” ’ Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Board of Appeals of Amherst, 360 Mass. 604, 605 (1971), quoting from MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals of Duxbury, 356 Mass. 635, 639 (1970), and citing Gulf Oil Corp. v. Board of Appeals of Framingham, 355 Mass. 275, 277 (1969).” S. Vol

1990“The task of the [Land] Court was to determine whether this applicant for a special permit was able to demonstrate at a de novo hearing (Josephs v. Board of Appeals of Brookline, 362 Mass. 290, 295 [1972]) that ‘the board has based its decision on a “legally untenable ground, or is unreasonable, whimsical, capricious or arbitrary.”1 Humble Oil & Ref.

1988“The task of the Superior Court was to determine whether this applicant for a special permit was able to demonstrate at a de novo hearing (Josephs v. Board of Appeals of Brookline, 362 Mass. 290, 295 [1972]) that ‘the board has based its decision ón a “legally untenable ground, or is unreasonable, whimsical, capricious or arbitrary.” ’ Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Board of Appeals of Amherst, 360 Mass. 604, 605 (1971), quoting from MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals of Duxbury, 356 Mass. 635, 639 (1970), and citing Gulf Oil Corp. v. Board of Appeals of Framingham, 355 Mass. 275, 277 (1969).” S. Vol

1988“The task of the Superior Court was to determine whether this applicant for a special permit was able to demonstrate at a de novo hearing (Josephs v. Board of Appeals of Brookline, 362 Mass. 290, 295 [1972]) that ‘the board has based its decision ón a “legally untenable ground, or is unreasonable, whimsical, capricious or arbitrary.” ’ Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Board of Appeals of Amherst, 360 Mass. 604, 605 (1971), quoting from MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals of Duxbury, 356 Mass. 635, 639 (1970), and citing Gulf Oil Corp. v. Board of Appeals of Framingham, 355 Mass. 275, 277 (1969).” S. Vol

1988“The task of the Superior Court was to determine whether this applicant for a special permit was able to demonstrate at a de novo hearing (Josephs v. Board of Appeals of Brookline, 362 Mass. 290, 295 [1972]) that ‘the board has based its decision on a “legally untenable ground, or is unreasonable, whimsical, capricious or arbitrary.” ’ Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Board of Appeals of Amherst, 360 Mass. 604, 605 (1971), quoting from MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals of Duxbury, 356 Mass. 635, 639 (1970), and citing Gulf Oil Corp. v. Board of Appeals of Framingham, 355 Mass. 275, 277 (1969).” S. Vol

2001Some judges, as Moughalian and now a majority of this panel reflect, view that absence as requiring a finding of “not responsible.” Others, likely focusing on the non-criminal character of motor vehicle appeals and the statutorily-created prima facie effect of the citation, have asked the appellant what he or she has to say about the circumstances that resulted in the issuance of the complaint Town of Reading v. Murray, 405 Mass. 415 (1989), cited here and in Moughalian , says only that the Town of Reading and the Commonwealth (as intervener) “concede that, if no representative of the citation

2001Some judges, as Moughalian and now a majority of this panel reflect, view that absence as requiring a finding of “not responsible.” Others, likely focusing on the non-criminal character of motor vehicle appeals and the statutorily-created prima facie effect of the citation, have asked the appellant what he or she has to say about the circumstances that resulted in the issuance of the complaint Town of Reading v. Murray, 405 Mass. 415 (1989), cited here and in Moughalian , says only that the Town of Reading and the Commonwealth (as intervener) “concede that, if no representative of the citation

1988“The task of the Superior Court was to determine whether this applicant for a special permit was able to demonstrate at a de novo hearing (Josephs v. Board of Appeals of Brookline, 362 Mass. 290, 295 [1972]) that ‘the board has based its decision ón a “legally untenable ground, or is unreasonable, whimsical, capricious or arbitrary.” ’ Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Board of Appeals of Amherst, 360 Mass. 604, 605 (1971), quoting from MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals of Duxbury, 356 Mass. 635, 639 (1970), and citing Gulf Oil Corp. v. Board of Appeals of Framingham, 355 Mass. 275, 277 (1969).” S. Vol

1988“The task of the Superior Court was to determine whether this applicant for a special permit was able to demonstrate at a de novo hearing (Josephs v. Board of Appeals of Brookline, 362 Mass. 290, 295 [1972]) that ‘the board has based its decision on a “legally untenable ground, or is unreasonable, whimsical, capricious or arbitrary.” ’ Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Board of Appeals of Amherst, 360 Mass. 604, 605 (1971), quoting from MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals of Duxbury, 356 Mass. 635, 639 (1970), and citing Gulf Oil Corp. v. Board of Appeals of Framingham, 355 Mass. 275, 277 (1969).” S. Vol

2021See Crittenton Hastings House of the Florence Crittenton League v. Board of Appeal of Boston, 25 Mass. App. Ct. 704, 713 (1988).

1988Also see Crittenton Hastings House of the Florence Crittenton League v. Board of Appeal of Boston, 25 Mass. App. Ct. 704, 711-712 (1988).

2026See Commonwealth v. Balukonis, 357 Mass. 721, 725 (1970) ("The best evidence rule is applicable to only those situations where the contents of a writing are sought to be proved"). 3 We also reject El-Bayeh's argument that Trial Court Rule VII(d)(2) required the de novo judge to review a copy of the citation to find probable cause.

2025Because Doe was still incarcerated, the hearing examiner put Doe on "provisional status" and a subsequent hearing was held on July 26, 2022 -- a date closer to Doe's release from incarceration. 3 constitutional provisions, is based on an error of law, or is not supported by substantial evidence." Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 496501 v. Sex Offender Registry Board, 482 Mass. 643, 649 (2019), citing G.

2025Fraud involves "a misrepresentation of an existing fact made with knowledge of the falsity of the misrepresentation or with reckless disregard of the actual facts." Christian v. Mooney, 400 Mass. 753, 764 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1053 (1988).

2025P. 12 (c) is "akin" to a rule 12 (b) (6) motion, Jarosz v. Palmer, 436 Mass. 526, 530 (2002), and the same de novo standard of review applies.

2025Doe challenged that decision and received a de novo hearing in December 2022, resulting in the level two classification. 4 Offender Registry Bd. No. 10800 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 459 Mass. 603, 632 (2019), quoting G.

2025See Luu v. Fallon Serv., Inc., 105 Mass. App. Ct. 236 , 239 (2025); Ridgeley Mgmt.

2025We review the issue whether Ford made fraudulent and material misrepresentations in the revival application under the de novo standard. "[T]o ensure that the ultimate findings and conclusions are consistent with the law, we scrutinize without deference the legal standard which the judge applied to the facts." Kendall v. Selvaggio, 413 Mass. 619, 621 (1992).

2024See Okoli v. Okoli 81 Mass. App. Ct. 381 (2012).

2023See 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.31. 15 deprived of an appellate proceeding due to the incompetency of counsel, given the passage of time and the purpose of a classification hearing, to assess a sex offender's present risk, Doe's rights can be fully restored only by vacating his original classification and granting him a de novo hearing.9 See Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 7083 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 472 Mass. 475, 483 (2015) ("the registration statute requires [the board] to base its classification determinations on a sex offender's 'current' risk to the community, in order to protect

2023See Marabello v. Boston Bark Corp., 463 Mass. 394, 397 (2012); Cadle Co. v. Schlichtmann, 448 Mass. 242, 250 (2007).

2023See Wenger, 451 Mass. at 7 .

2023See Marabello v. Boston Bark Corp., 463 Mass. 394, 397 (2012); Cadle Co. v. Schlichtmann, 448 Mass. 242, 250 (2007).

2022Applying a de novo standard of review, see Poulos v. Poulos, 100 Mass. App. Ct. 40, 43 (2021), we conclude that the trust is ambiguous as to whether removal under § 706 (b) (4) would constitute a "for cause" or "without cause" reason for removal, and that it was therefore error to dismiss Emily's petition for failure to state a claim.

2021Cf. Vaspourakan, Ltd., 401 Mass. at 354 ("by the time of the de novo hearing . . . , any defect which might have existed in the notice was cured, because the licensee had detailed notice of all the facts supporting the charges . . ."); LaPointe, 389 Mass. at 458 (although notice was deficient, "[t]hat deficiency . . . was cured at the first meeting with the board . . . when [licensee], with his counsel present, received precise notice of the subject matter of the proceedings").

2021Cf. Vaspourakan, Ltd., 401 Mass. at 354 ("by the time of the de novo hearing . . . , any defect which might have existed in the notice was cured, because the licensee had detailed notice of all the facts supporting the charges . . ."); LaPointe, 389 Mass. at 458 (although notice was deficient, "[t]hat deficiency . . . was cured at the first meeting with the board . . . when [licensee], with his counsel present, received precise notice of the subject matter of the proceedings").

2018See Williams , 477 Mass. at 444 , 78 N.E.3d 66 .

2018See Williams , 477 Mass. at 444 , 78 N.E.3d 66 .

2016Grady v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Peabody, 465 Mass. 725, 729 (2013).

2013In Guzman v. Commonwealth, 458 Mass. 354, 362 (2010) {Guzman), and Drumgold, supra at 370 , both appeals from decisions on the Commonwealth’s motions for summary judgment, we employed, without discussion, essentially a de novo standard of review, citing Mass. R.