qualified privilege in Illinois

2026(Though, of course, a question of fact could preclude that legal determination at summary judgment.) ¶ 38 There is no fixed formula for determining the existence of a qualified privilege. “[A] court looks only to the occasion itself for the communication and determines as a matter of law and general policy whether the occasion created some recognized duty or interest to make the communication so as to make it privileged.” Kuwik, 156 Ill. 2d at 27 .

2026Dent, 2022 IL 126795, ¶ 31 ; Kuwik, 156 Ill. 2d at 28-29 . ¶ 39 For example, workplace harassment allegations were protected by a qualified privilege.

2026Dent, 2022 IL 126795, ¶ 31 ; Kuwik, 156 Ill. 2d at 28-29 . ¶ 39 For example, workplace harassment allegations were protected by a qualified privilege.

2025“This privilege is based on the policy of protecting honest communications of misinformation in certain favored circumstances in order to facilitate the availability of correct information.” Id. ¶ 137 However, a defendant may abuse a qualified privilege.

2017Id. at 1121 . ¶ 31 The court in Knight found that a qualified privilege existed for the disclosure of a surveillance location at trial, but held that “the surveillance privilege should be treated differently when raised at a suppression hearing as opposed to when it is raised at a trial.” Id. at 1126 .

2017Id. at 1121 . ¶ 31 The court in Knight found that a qualified privilege existed for the disclosure of a surveillance location at trial, but held that “the surveillance privilege should be treated differently when raised at a suppression hearing as opposed to when it is raised at a trial.” Id. at 1126 .

2022App. 3d 966, 969 (1991)), if shielded under the innocent construction rule (Kolegas v. Heftel Broadcasting Corp., 154 Ill. 2d 1, 11 (1992)), if safeguarded as an expression of opinion (Mittelman v. Witous, 135 Ill. 2d 220, 239 (1989)), or if protected by a qualified privilege (Kuwik v. Starmark Star Marketing and Administration, Inc., 156 Ill. 2d 16 (1993)).

2011“This qualified privilege does not apply where officers act solely for their own gain or solely for the purpose of harming plaintiff since such conduct is not undertaken to further the corporation’s interest. [Citation.] To be tortious, a corporate officer’s action must be done without justification or maliciously.” (Emphasis omitted.) Mittelman v. Witous, 135 Ill. 2d 220, 249 (1989), abrogated by Kuwik v. Starmark Star Marketing & Administration, Inc., 156 Ill. 2d 16 (1993). ¶ 53 Counts VII and VIII–Interference by Olson and DeVault ¶ 54 Appellant made identical claims against Olson and DeVau

2026Id. at 669 .

1998“In Illinois, the issue of whether a qualified privilege exists has been a question of law for the court, and the issue of whether the privilege was abused has been a question of fact for the jury.” Kuwik v. Starmark Star Marketing & Administration, Inc., 156 Ill. 2d 16, 25 (1993); Barakat, 271 Ill.

2018"A qualified privilege exists where a communication that might be defamatory is not actionable because of the occasion on which or the circumstances under which it was made." (Emphasis added.) Cianci v. Pettibone Corp. , 298 Ill.

2018"An abuse of the privilege may consist of 'any reckless act which shows a disregard for the defamed party's rights, including the failure to properly investigate the truth of the matter, limit the scope of the material, or send the material to only the proper parties.' " Id. (quoting Kuwik v. Starmark Star Marketing & Administration, Inc. , 156 Ill. 2d 16 , 30, 188 Ill.Dec. 765 , 619 N.E.2d 129 (1993) ); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 599, cmt. a (1977) (noting a qualified privilege "may be abused *** because the publication is made to some person not reasonably believed to be necess

2017People v. Enis, 139 Ill. 2d 264, 295 (1990). ¶ 18 Illinois recognizes a qualified privilege from disclosing secret surveillance locations in a criminal proceeding against the target of the surveillance.

2017People v. Enis, 139 Ill. 2d 264, 295 (1990). ¶ 17 Illinois recognizes a qualified privilege from disclosing secret surveillance locations in a criminal proceeding against the target of the surveillance.

2018Id. ¶ 26 As discussed above, Illinois courts recognize a qualified privilege regarding the disclosure of surveillance locations.

2017Id. ¶ 26 As discussed above, Illinois courts recognize a qualified privilege regarding the disclosure of surveillance locations.

2025Quinn v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc., 276 Ill.

1999Quinn v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc. , 276 Ill.

2024See, e.g., Popko v. Continental Casualty Co., 355 Ill.

2013“A corporation has an unquestionable interest in investigating and correcting a situation where one of its employees may be engaged in suspicious conduct within the company. [Citation.] Thus, a qualified privilege exists for communication made concerning such investigation.” Id.

1993Qualified Privilege We begin our analysis by discussing the qualified privilege as it currently exists in Illinois defamation law. “ ‘A privileged communication is one which, except for the occasion on which or the circumstances under which it is made, might be defamatory and actionable ***.’ ” (Zeinfeld v. Hayes Freight Lines, Inc. (1968), 41 Ill. 2d 345, 349 , quoting Judge v. Rockford Memorial Hospital (1958), 17 Ill.

1993App. 3d 626, 631 ; see also Zeinfeld, 41 Ill. 2d at 350 (where this court found a qualified privilege to exist as a matter of law and remanded for a jury determination as to whether the privilege was abused).) A condi- ■ tional privilege has been found to exist as a matter of law where the following elements are present: (1) good faith by the defendant in making the statement; (2) an interest or duty to uphold; (3) a statement limited in its scope to that purpose; (4) a proper occasion; and (5) publication in a proper manner and to proper parties only.

2022In re Manuel M., 2017 IL App (1st) 162381, ¶ 18 ; People v. Palmer, 2017 IL App (1st) 151253, ¶ 22 .

2019In re Manuel M., 2017 IL App (1st) 162381, ¶ 18 ; Jackson, 2017 IL App (1st) 151779, ¶ 23 .

2020Gibson v. Philip Morris, Inc., 292 Ill.

2005App. 3d at 543 (“we will leave the question open for a future decision of whether defamatory statements or opinions made among an investigatory group should be considered a publication”))) and that the discussion of publication in Beauvoir arose in the context of a qualified privilege (Gibson, 292 Ill.

2013See Colson v. Stieg, 89 Ill. 2d 205, 209 (1982) (holding that statements made by a university department chairman about a former assistant professor to a university personnel committee, that he had information that reflected adversely on the professor’s performance as a teacher, were protected only by qualified privilege; noting “[t]he circumstances surrounding the making of the statements in question are not such as to require the protection of an absolute privilege, but instead, come within the accepted areas to which a qualified privilege has been extended”). -22- discipline and even separa

1990(Citations) ( Colson, 89 Ill.2d at 217 , 60 Ill.Dec. 449 , 433 N.E.2d 246 .) Justice Clark further stated that there is no Federal constitutional reason why a plaintiff cannot recover actual damages in a defamation action upon a showing of defendant's negligence, as the private defamation plaintiff's right to recover would still be limited by the common law doctrine of qualified privilege.

2001Although “[a]n otherwise defamatory statement is not actionable if made under a qualified privilege” (Larson v. Decatur Memorial Hospital, 236 Ill.

2001Although "an otherwise defamatory statement is not actionable if made under a qualified privilege" ( Larson v. Decatur Memorial Hospital , 236 Ill.

2022See Stone, 2011 IL App (1st) 093386, ¶ 26 ; see also Imperial Apparel, Ltd. v. Cosmo’s Designer Direct, Inc., 227 Ill. 2d 381, 398 (2008) (explaining that “[t]he test for determining whether a statement is protected from defamation claims under the first amendment is whether it can reasonably be interpreted as stating actual fact” and noting that the courts consider “(1) whether the statement has a precise and readily understood meaning, (2) whether the statement is verifiable, and (3) whether the statement’s literary or social context signals that it has factual content”). ¶ 61 By contrast, t

2018Imperial Apparel , 227 Ill. 2d at 402 , 317 Ill.Dec. 855 , 882 N.E.2d 1011 ("a determination that language is not actionable under the first amendment not only is fatal to plaintiffs' defamation claims, it precludes [plaintiffs] from obtaining recovery under any of the other common law and statutory claims they asserted in their complaint"). 5 ¶ 33 Because we hold that the alleged statements at issue in this appeal are constitutionally protected expressions of opinion, we need not address BBB's alternative argument that its ratings and communications to the public were protected by a qualified

2026Edwards by Phillips v. University of Chicago Hospitals & Clinics, 137 Ill.

1994Edwards v. University of Chicago Hospitals & Clinics (1985), 137 Ill.

2004The qualified privilege is abused if (1) the defendant acted with actual malice by making the statement with knowledge of its falsity or acting in reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity of the statement; or (2) the defendant committed "`any reckless act which shows a disregard for the defamed party's rights, including the failure to properly investigate the truth of the matter, limit the scope of the material, or send the material to only the proper parties.'" Gist, 284 Ill.App.3d at 374 , 219 Ill.Dec. 701 , 671 N.E.2d 1154 ; quoting Kuwik, 156 Ill.2d at 30 , 188 Ill.Dec. 765 , 619 N.E.

2004The qualified privilege is abused if (1) the defendant acted with actual malice by making the statement with knowledge of its falsity or acting in reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity of the statement; or (2) the defendant committed “ ‘any reckless act which shows a disregard for the defamed party’s rights, including the failure to properly investigate the truth of the matter, limit the scope of the material, or send the material to only the proper parties.’ ” Gist, 284 Ill.

2002The Supreme Court has accordingly adopted a doctrine of qualified immunity, that "government officials performing discretionary functions[ ] generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 , 102 S.Ct. at 2738 , 73 L.Ed.2d at 410 ; Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 197 , 104 S.Ct. 3012, 3020-21 , 82 L.Ed.2d 139, 151 (1984).

2002The Supreme Court has accordingly adopted a doctrine of qualified immunity, that "government officials performing discretionary functions[ ] generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 , 102 S.Ct. at 2738 , 73 L.Ed.2d at 410 ; Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 197 , 104 S.Ct. 3012, 3020-21 , 82 L.Ed.2d 139, 151 (1984).

2024“It is insufficient for a plaintiff to show that the defendant -19- 1-22-1524 merely succeeded by ending the business relationship or interfering with the expectancy; rather, ‘purposeful interference’ – a showing that defendant has committed some impropriety—is needed.” Id. ¶ 89 This court has recognized a qualified privilege under which “[g]enerally, a corporate officer cannot interfere with the continued employment of an employee because the officer acts on behalf of the corporation.” Harrison v. Addington, 2011 IL App (3d) 100810, ¶ 52 (citing Vickers v. Abbot Laboratories, 308 Ill.

2010Vickers, 308 Ill.

2019Lawlor v. North American Corp. of Illinois , 2012 IL 112530 , ¶ 37, 368 Ill.Dec. 1 , 983 N.E.2d 414 . ¶ 33 Where a qualified privilege exists, a statement that might otherwise be considered defamatory is protected due to the circumstances under or occasion on which it was made.

2019Lawlor v. North American Corp. of Illinois, 2012 IL 112530, ¶ 37 . ¶ 33 Where a qualified privilege exists, a statement that might otherwise be considered defamatory is protected due to the circumstances under or occasion on which it was made.

2013Id. -6- ¶ 27 “A qualified privilege protects communications that would normally be defamatory and actionable, in order to effect the policy of protecting honest communication of misinformation in certain favored circumstances and thus facilitate the availability of correct information.” Id.

2013Id. -6- ¶ 27 “A qualified privilege protects communications that would normally be defamatory and actionable, in order to effect the policy of protecting honest communication of misinformation in certain favored circumstances and thus facilitate the availability of correct information.” Id.

1989App. 3d at 632 , 435 N.E.2d at 1302 .) These bare allegations of actual malice are not sufficient to negate the good faith of the defendant who is protected by a qualified privilege.

1989App. 3d at 634 , 435 N.E.2d at 1303 .) Similarly, in a commercial disparagement claim, the qualified privilege also applies where the remarks are in furtherance of a public or legal interest such that the publisher is encouraged to speak honestly and candidly.

1978As the court stated in that case, “[o]ur holding in the present case is, of course, not intended to remove any of the absolute or qualified privileges which have heretofore been recognized in this State to the extent that the facts may warrant their application.” ( 62 Ill. 2d 184, 198 , 340 N.E.2d 292, 299 .) In Lulay v. Peoria Journal-Star, Inc. (1966), 34 Ill. 2d 112 , 214 N.E.2d 746 , our supreme court recognized the qualified privilege which attaches to any publication which is an accurate and complete report, or a fair abridgment, of governmental proceedings even though it may repeat matt

1978As the court stated in that case, “[o]ur holding in the present case is, of course, not intended to remove any of the absolute or qualified privileges which have heretofore been recognized in this State to the extent that the facts may warrant their application.” ( 62 Ill. 2d 184, 198 , 340 N.E.2d 292, 299 .) In Lulay v. Peoria Journal-Star, Inc. (1966), 34 Ill. 2d 112 , 214 N.E.2d 746 , our supreme court recognized the qualified privilege which attaches to any publication which is an accurate and complete report, or a fair abridgment, of governmental proceedings even though it may repeat matt

2019Cf. Mauvais-Jarvis, 2013 IL App (1st) 120070, ¶¶ 72, 76-80 (finding only a qualified privilege applied to allegedly defamatory statements made in the context of a private university’s research misconduct proceeding, where federal regulations and university policy required reporting on basis of “good faith,” thus injecting one of the elements of qualified privilege into the proceeding itself and where duty to report was not mandatory).

2018Cf. Mauvais-Jarvis , 2013 IL App (1st) 120070 , ¶¶ 72, 76-80, 370 Ill.Dec. 98 , 987 N.E.2d 864 (finding only a qualified privilege applied to allegedly defamatory statements made in the context of a private university's research misconduct proceeding, where federal regulations and university policy required reporting on basis of "good faith," thus injecting one of the elements of qualified privilege into the proceeding itself and where duty to report was not mandatory).