qualified privilege in Minnesota

2019Maethner responds that the statements are not protected by a qualified privilege simply because "domestic abuse is a matter of 'public interest.' " According to Maethner: "Merely because it has a worthwhile mission, an organization is not entitled to say whatever it wants, without reasonable cause, or any cause at all, trampling over the rights and reputations of others." Our "doctrine of privileged communication rests upon public policy considerations." Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the U. S. , 389 N.W.2d 876 , 889 (Minn. 1986).

2016If a statement is protected by qualified privilege, recovery may be had only upon a showing of actual malice, which is “actual ill will, or a design causelessly and wantonly to injure plaintiff.” McBride v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 306 Minn. 93, 98 , 235 N.W.2d 371, 375 (1975); see also Lewis, 389 N.W.2d at 890 (“A qualified privilege is abused and therefore lost if the plaintiff demonstrates that the defendant acted with actual malice.”).

2019In order "to be protected by a qualified privilege, the statement must be made in good faith and 'must be made upon a proper occasion, from a proper motive, and must be based upon reasonable or probable cause.' " Bol v. Cole , 561 N.W.2d 143 , 149 (Minn. 1997) (quoting Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co. , 297 N.W.2d 252 , 256-57 (Minn. 1980) ).

2016B Introductory Note, at 242-43 (1977)). 3 For a defamatory statement to be protected by a qualified privilege, the statement must be made in good faith and “‘must be made upon a proper occasion, from a proper motive, and must be based upon reasonable or probable cause.’” Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252, 256-57 (Minn. 1980) (quoting Hebner v. Great N. Ry., 78 Minn. 289, 292 , 80 N.W. 1128, 1129 (1899)).

2019See Lewis , 389 N.W.2d at 889-90 ; see also Frankson v. Design Space Int'l , 394 N.W.2d 140 , 144 (Minn. 1986) (extending the employer's privilege to communicate the reason for discharge to communications between corporate employees who require the information to perform their job duties); Otto v. Charles T.

2016As is noted above, a statement is made with actual malice that defeats a qualified privilege if made “from ill will and improper motives, or causelessly and wantonly for the purpose of injuring the plaintiff.” Stuempges, 297 N.W.2d at 257 (quotation omitted). “‘Malice may be proved by extrinsic evidence of personal ill feeling, or by intrinsic evidence such as the exaggerated language of the libel, the character of the language used, the mode and extent of publication, and other matters in excess of the privilege.’” Buchanan, 573 N.W.2d at 738 (quoting Frankson v. Design Space Int’l, 394 N.W.2

2019See Bahr v. Boise Cascade Corp. , 766 N.W.2d 910 , 923 (Minn. 2009) (reasoning that a qualified privilege "extends to investigations of employee misconduct because 'the employer has an important interest in protecting itself and the public against dishonest or otherwise harmful employees' " (quoting McBride v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. , 306 Minn. 93 , 235 N.W.2d 371 , 374 (1975) )).

2019See Bahr v. Boise Cascade Corp. , 766 N.W.2d 910 , 923 (Minn. 2009) (reasoning that a qualified privilege "extends to investigations of employee misconduct because 'the employer has an important interest in protecting itself and the public against dishonest or otherwise harmful employees' " (quoting McBride v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. , 306 Minn. 93 , 235 N.W.2d 371 , 374 (1975) )).

2015We commonly use the phrase “prosecutorial immunity” when referring to the absolute immunity granted to prosecutors when they act within the scope of their duties by filing and maintaining criminal charges. 4 Because the court of appeals resolved the claim of prosecutorial immunity in Morton-Peters’ favor, see Stresemann v. Jesson, No. A13-1967, 2014 WL 3800289 , at *7 (Minn. App. Aug. 4, 2014), it did not reach her other immunity claims on appeal. 5 Qualified immunity, in contrast, provides that a recipient is shielded from civil liability so long as that recipient acted in “good faith.” See E

2015Qualified immunity, in contrast, provides that a recipient is shielded from civil liability so long as that recipient acted in "good faith.” See Elwood v. Cty. of Rice, 423 N.W.2d 671, 674 (Minn.1988). .

1996Although Lindstrom may have had a proper purpose in seeking to protect other employees and possibly had a proper occasion immediately after her tires were slashed, Lindstrom and Crown CoCo are not entitled to a qualified privilege unless they had “reasonable or probable grounds for believing in the validity of the statement, even though hindsight might show the statement to be false.” Wirig v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 461 N.W.2d 374, 380 (Minn.1990) (holding employer ineligible for qualified privilege, because it had taken no steps to investigate before publicly accusing employee, had not acted in r

1992"Qualified privilege rests, however, on more than having a proper occasion and purpose." Wirig, 461 N.W.2d at 380 .

2019See Bahr v. Boise Cascade Corp. , 766 N.W.2d 910 , 923 (Minn. 2009) (reasoning that a qualified privilege "extends to investigations of employee misconduct because 'the employer has an important interest in protecting itself and the public against dishonest or otherwise harmful employees' " (quoting McBride v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. , 306 Minn. 93 , 235 N.W.2d 371 , 374 (1975) )).

2016A statement falls within the qualified privilege if it is “made upon a proper occasion, from a proper motive, and . . . based upon reasonable or probable cause.” Lewis, 389 N.W.2d at 889 (quotation omitted). “[S]tatements made in the course of an employer’s investigation into employee misconduct are protected by the qualified privilege.” Bahr v. Boise Cascade Corp., 766 N.W.2d 910, 923 (Minn. 2009).

2016B Introductory Note, at 242-43 (1977)). 3 For a defamatory statement to be protected by a qualified privilege, the statement must be made in good faith and “‘must be made upon a proper occasion, from a proper motive, and must be based upon reasonable or probable cause.’” Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252, 256-57 (Minn. 1980) (quoting Hebner v. Great N. Ry., 78 Minn. 289, 292 , 80 N.W. 1128, 1129 (1899)).

2016B Introductory Note, at 242-43 (1977)). 3 For a defamatory statement to be protected by a qualified privilege, the statement must be made in good faith and “‘must be made upon a proper occasion, from a proper motive, and must be based upon reasonable or probable cause.’” Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252, 256-57 (Minn. 1980) (quoting Hebner v. Great N. Ry., 78 Minn. 289, 292 , 80 N.W. 1128, 1129 (1899)).

2019In order "to be protected by a qualified privilege, the statement must be made in good faith and 'must be made upon a proper occasion, from a proper motive, and must be based upon reasonable or probable cause.' " Bol v. Cole , 561 N.W.2d 143 , 149 (Minn. 1997) (quoting Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co. , 297 N.W.2d 252 , 256-57 (Minn. 1980) ).

2019In each of these cases, a qualified privilege applied because we determined that the "statements ... should be encouraged despite the risk that the statements might be defamatory." Id. at 149 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2014The doctrine of qualified immunity protects “government officials performing discretionary functions . . . from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 , 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2738 (1982).

2014The doctrine of qualified immunity protects “government officials performing discretionary functions . . . from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 , 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2738 (1982).

1984A. Federal Civil Rights Cases The trial court discussed Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 , 95 S.Ct. 992 , 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975), Hostrop v. Board of Junior College District No. 515, 523 F.2d 569 (7th Cir.1975), and Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 , 96 S.Ct. 984 , 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976), as authority for the proposition that appellants are entitled only to a qualified privilege.

1984A. Federal Civil Rights Cases The trial court discussed Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 , 95 S.Ct. 992 , 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975), Hostrop v. Board of Junior College District No. 515, 523 F.2d 569 (7th Cir.1975), and Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 , 96 S.Ct. 984 , 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976), as authority for the proposition that appellants are entitled only to a qualified privilege.

2015Nor does Hurd’s reference to “unethical actions” display the “actual malice” needed to defeat the qualified privilege accorded to statements “made upon a proper occasion, from a proper motive, and based upon reasonable or probable cause.” Bauer v. State, 511 N.W.2d 447, 449 (Minn. 1994). 2 After his deposition, Hansen produced an affidavit saying he had disclosed the suspension to Hurd, but, as the district court noted, “[a] self-serving affidavit that contradicts earlier damaging deposition testimony is not sufficient to create a general issue of material fact,” Banbury v. Omnitriton Int’l, I

1995In Bauer , the court concluded that statements documenting an employee’s behavior in connection with her job performance appeared to be entitled to a qualified privilege. 511 N.W.2d at 450 .

1994Qualified immunity “is intended to provide government officials with the ability ‘reasonably [to] anticipate when their conduct may give rise to liability for damages.’ ” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 , 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3042 , 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987) (quoting Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 195 , 104 S.Ct. 3012, 3019 , 82 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984)).

1994Qualified immunity “is intended to provide government officials with the ability ‘reasonably [to] anticipate when their conduct may give rise to liability for damages.’ ” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 , 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3042 , 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987) (quoting Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 195 , 104 S.Ct. 3012, 3019 , 82 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984)).

1997Civ.App. 103.03, “without regard to whether it must be followed.” Anderson v. City of Hopkins, 393 N.W.2d 363, 364 (Minn.1986).

1991Although the Anderson court found Harlow immunity “analogous” to the claim reviewed in Mitchell, see Anderson, 393 N.W.2d at 364 , common law official immunity provides only a qualified privilege in defamation cases, and thus is dissimilar.

2019See Froslee v. Lund's State Bank of Vining , 131 Minn. 435 , 155 N.W. 619 , 620 (1915).

2019See Froslee v. Lund's State Bank of Vining , 131 Minn. 435 , 155 N.W. 619 , 620 (1915).

2009Johnson v. Morris, 453 N.W.2d 31, 38-39 (Minn.1990). “[Qualified immunity questions should be resolved at the earliest possible stage to shield officers from disruptive effects of broad-ranging discovery and effects of litigation.” Elwood v. Rice County, 423 N.W.2d 671, 675 (Minn.1988).

2009Johnson v. Morris, 453 N.W.2d 31, 38-39 (Minn.1990). “[Qualified immunity questions should be resolved at the earliest possible stage to shield officers from disruptive effects of broad-ranging discovery and effects of litigation.” Elwood v. Rice County, 423 N.W.2d 671, 675 (Minn.1988).

1992McIntire v. State, 419 N.W.2d 799, 802 (Minn.App.1988), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 20, 1988).

1992McIntire v. State, 419 N.W.2d 799, 802 (Minn.App.1988), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 20, 1988).

1992Phipps v. Clark Oil & Refining Corp., 408 N.W.2d 569, 574 (Minn. 1987); Karnes v. Milo Beauty & Barber Supply, 441 N.W.2d 565, 568 (Minn.App. 1989), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 15, 1989).

1992E.g., Frankson v. Design Space Int'l, 394 N.W.2d 140, 145 (Minn.1986); McBride, 306 Minn. at 98 , 235 N.W.2d at 374 ; Karnes v. Milo Beauty & Barber Supply Co., 441 N.W.2d 565, 568 (Minn. App.1989), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 15, 1989).

1995See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 , 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2815 , 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985).

1995See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 , 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2815 , 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985).

1994Qualified immunity “is intended to provide government officials with the ability ‘reasonably [to] anticipate when their conduct may give rise to liability for damages.’ ” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 , 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3042 , 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987) (quoting Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 195 , 104 S.Ct. 3012, 3019 , 82 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984)).

1994Qualified immunity “is intended to provide government officials with the ability ‘reasonably [to] anticipate when their conduct may give rise to liability for damages.’ ” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 , 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3042 , 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987) (quoting Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 195 , 104 S.Ct. 3012, 3019 , 82 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984)).

2019A "qualified privilege bars liability only if the 'defamatory statements are publicized in good faith and without malice.' " Minke v. City of Minneapolis , 845 N.W.2d 179 , 182 (Minn. 2014) (quoting Matthis v. Kennedy , 243 Minn. 219 , 67 N.W.2d 413 , 416 (1954) ).

2019A "qualified privilege bars liability only if the 'defamatory statements are publicized in good faith and without malice.' " Minke v. City of Minneapolis , 845 N.W.2d 179 , 182 (Minn. 2014) (quoting Matthis v. Kennedy , 243 Minn. 219 , 67 N.W.2d 413 , 416 (1954) ).

2000See Jadwin, 367 N.W.2d at 481 .

1999In Jadwin , the Minnesota Supreme Court referred to a qualified privilege associated with “reports of official proceedings or public meetings.” 367 N.W.2d at 481 (citing Nixon v. Dispatch Printing Co., 101 Minn. 309 , 112 N.W. 258 (1907)).

1999On remand, this court in Jadwin stated that “[n]ewspapers have a qualified privilege when making a fair and accurate report of public records.” Jadwin v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 390 N.W.2d 437, 441 (Minn.App.1986) (citing Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 455-57 , 96 S.Ct. 958, 965-66 , 47 L.Ed.2d 154 (1976); Nixon, 101 Minn. 309 , 112 N.W. 258 ).

1999On remand, this court in Jadwin stated that “[n]ewspapers have a qualified privilege when making a fair and accurate report of public records.” Jadwin v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 390 N.W.2d 437, 441 (Minn.App.1986) (citing Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 455-57 , 96 S.Ct. 958, 965-66 , 47 L.Ed.2d 154 (1976); Nixon, 101 Minn. 309 , 112 N.W. 258 ).

1989Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1453 (8th Cir.1987), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 97 , 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987).

1988Myers, 810 F.2d at 1455 .