qualified immunity in Colorado

2012See Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 319-20 , 115 S.Ct. 2151 , 132 L.Ed.2d 238 (1995) ("[Al defendant, entitled to invoke a qualified immunity defense, may not appeal a district court's summary judgment order insofar as that order determines whether or not the pretrial record sets forth a 'genuine' issue of fact for trial."); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 528 , 105 S.Ct. 2806 , 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985) ("[aln appellate court reviewing the denial of the defendant's claim of immunity need not consider the correctness of the plaintiff's version of the facts").

2012See Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 319-20 , 115 S.Ct. 2151 , 132 L.Ed.2d 238 (1995) ("[Al defendant, entitled to invoke a qualified immunity defense, may not appeal a district court's summary judgment order insofar as that order determines whether or not the pretrial record sets forth a 'genuine' issue of fact for trial."); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 528 , 105 S.Ct. 2806 , 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985) ("[aln appellate court reviewing the denial of the defendant's claim of immunity need not consider the correctness of the plaintiff's version of the facts").

2024Qualified immunity “protects government officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson v. Callaha n , 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald , 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).

2024Qualified immunity “protects government officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson v. Callaha n , 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald , 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).

2008Qualified "Common Interest" Privilege "A qualified privilege exists for communications by a party with a legitimate interest or duty to persons having a corresponding interest or duty in communications promoting legitimate individual, group, or public interests." Wiliams v. Boyle, 72 P.3d at 400 ; accord Dominguez v. Babcock, 727 P.2d 362, 365 (Colo.1986) (a privilege exists in matters of "common interest" to the maker of the statement and the one to whom it is communicated), aff'g 696 P.2d 338 (Colo.App.1984).

1990In the face of a defendant’s qualified privilege, we held that a plaintiff could recover on a defamation claim only by showing that the defendant *1302 “publishe[d] the material with malice, that is, knowing the matter to be false, or act[ed] in reckless disregard as to its veracity.” Churchey, 759 P.2d at 1346 (quoting Dominguez v. Babcock, 727 P.2d 362, 366 (Colo.1986)).

2016Qualified immunity, we stated, "is not immunity from suit, but rather a defense that can be raised by the public employee who is named in his or her individual capacity." Id.

2014See City of Lakewood v. Brace, 919 P.2d 231, 245-46 (Colo.1996) (an employee's qualified immunity under the governmental immunity act is an affirmative defense rather than a jurisdictional issue because it is immunity from liability, not immunity from suit). 19 Here, the DMSA contains no explicit limitation of jurisdiction.

2026See Lawson, ¶ 21. ¶ 18 “A qualified privilege creates a presumption that the alleged defamatory communication was made in good faith and without malice.” Williams v. Boyle, 72 P.3d 392, 401 (Colo. App. 2003).

2026See Lawson, ¶¶ 23-24. ¶ 22 “A qualified privilege creates a presumption that the alleged defamatory communication was made in good faith and without malice.” Williams v. Boyle, 72 P.3d 392, 401 (Colo. App. 2003); see also § 19-3-309, C.R.S. 2025 (good faith by any person reporting child abuse “shall be presumed”).

2003Cf. Dominguez v. Babcock, 727 P.2d 8362 (Colo.1986)(supervisors have interest in comments concerning employee); Coopersmith v. Williams, 171 Colo. 511 , 468 P2d 739 (1970)(letter from boy scout father to boy seout committee regarding trip leader subject to qualified privilege); Wigger v. McKee, supra (social worker's statements to therapist privileged); Barakat v. Matz, 271 IIl.

2003Cf. Dominguez v. Babcock, 727 P.2d 8362 (Colo.1986)(supervisors have interest in comments concerning employee); Coopersmith v. Williams, 171 Colo. 511 , 468 P2d 739 (1970)(letter from boy scout father to boy seout committee regarding trip leader subject to qualified privilege); Wigger v. McKee, supra (social worker's statements to therapist privileged); Barakat v. Matz, 271 IIl.

2013See Richardson v. Starks, 36 P.3d 168 , 171 (Colo.App.2001) (ruling on CGIA qualified immunity not immediately appealable because CGIA "qualified immunity is not a jurisdictional issue of sovereign immunity, but rather, an affirmative defense" that provides immunity from liability); see also Furlong, 956 P.2d at 551 (distinguishing CGIA qualified immunity from qualified immunity in a § 1983 case and concluding that "qualified immunity under the CGIA does not apply to the qualified immunity doctrine under § 1983"). ¶ 35 Thus, because act of state protection is not immunity from suit but, instea

2013See Furlong, 956 P.2d at 551 . b.

2012Court, 713 P.2d 840 , 852 (Colo.1985) ("Qualified immunity, in contrast [to absolute immunity], represents the norm, especially for executive officials.").

1996Harlow, 457 U.S. at 807 , 102 S.Ct. at 2732 ; Higgs, 713 P.2d at 852.

1996An individual defendant may still be liable under section 1983 regardless of whether his or her actions were “willful and wanton." In contrast, for purposes of state law claims, an individual defendant will be shielded by the qualified immunity defense for actions taken within the scope of employment unless his or her actions were "willful and wanton.” Trimble v. City & County of Denver, 697 P.2d 716, 729 (Colo.1985) (adopting the "willful and wanton" standard to overcome the "type of immunity an official ... performing discretionary acts within the scope of his office, enjoys under Colorado l

1989Under the doctrine of official immunity a public official enjoys a qualified immunity for discretionary actions — i.e., those involving a judgment on a matter of policy — performed within the scope of his authority, insofar as such actions are "not willful, malicious or intended to cause harm.” Trimble v. City and County of Denver, 697 P.2d 716, 729 (Colo.1985).

2024Qualified immunity “protects government officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson v. Callaha n , 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald , 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).

2024Qualified immunity “protects government officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson v. Callaha n , 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald , 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).

2024Robbins v. Oklahoma , 519 F.3d 1242, 1250 (10th Cir. 2008).

2024Robbins v. Oklahoma , 519 F.3d 1242, 1250 (10th Cir. 2008).

2024Will v. Mich. Dep ’ t of State Police , 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). i. Personal Capacity ¶ 32 In their motion to dismiss, the State Patrol Defendants asserted a qualified immunity defense as to p laintiffs’ claims of violations of federal constitutional provisions.

2024Will v. Mich. Dep ’ t of State Police , 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). i. Personal Capacity ¶ 32 In their motion to dismiss, the State Patrol Defendants asserted a qualified immunity defense as to p laintiffs’ claims of violations of federal constitutional provisions.

2001See Berryman v. Rieger, 150 F.3d 561 (6th Cir.1998) (defendant must be prepared to overlook any factual dispute and to concede an interpretation of the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff's case); see also Zuchel v. Spinharney, 890 F.2d 273 (10th Cir.1989) (denying summary judgment because record contained evidence that, if believed by fact finder, could support a finding that defendant's conduct was not objectively reasonable, and noting that although defendant's version of events was supported by majority of summary judgment evidence, court was not entitled to weigh evidence o

1990See Hannula v. City of Lakewood, supra and Zuchel v. Spinharney, 890 F.2d 273 (10th Cir.1989).

1994Hannula v. City of Lakewood, 907 F.2d 129, 130 (10th Cir.1990). “[Qualified immunity] is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a ease is erroneously permitted to go to trial.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 , 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2815 , 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985).

1990In Hannula v. City of Lakewood, 907 F.2d 129, 130 (10th Cir.1990), the court explained: “[W]e have emphasized that once a defendant raises a qualified immunity defense, the plaintiff bears a heavy burden ....

1988Warehouse Co. v. Holloway, 34 Colo. 432 , 83 P. 131 (1905), and the qualified privilege of an employer to explain the reasons for an employee’s discharge to other employees, Patane v. Broadmoor Hotel, Inc., 708 P.2d 473 (Colo.Ct.App.1985).

1988Warehouse Co. v. Holloway, 34 Colo. 432 , 83 P. 131 (1905), and the qualified privilege of an employer to explain the reasons for an employee's discharge to other employees, Patane v. Broadmoor Hotel, Inc., 708 P.2d 473 (Colo. Ct.App.1985).

2012See Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 319-20 , 115 S.Ct. 2151 , 132 L.Ed.2d 238 (1995) ("[Al defendant, entitled to invoke a qualified immunity defense, may not appeal a district court's summary judgment order insofar as that order determines whether or not the pretrial record sets forth a 'genuine' issue of fact for trial."); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 528 , 105 S.Ct. 2806 , 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985) ("[aln appellate court reviewing the denial of the defendant's claim of immunity need not consider the correctness of the plaintiff's version of the facts").

2012See Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 319-20 , 115 S.Ct. 2151 , 132 L.Ed.2d 238 (1995) ("[Al defendant, entitled to invoke a qualified immunity defense, may not appeal a district court's summary judgment order insofar as that order determines whether or not the pretrial record sets forth a 'genuine' issue of fact for trial."); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 528 , 105 S.Ct. 2806 , 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985) ("[aln appellate court reviewing the denial of the defendant's claim of immunity need not consider the correctness of the plaintiff's version of the facts").

1989See generally Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 , 77 S.Ct. 623 , 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957); People v. District Court, 767 P.2d 1208 (Colo.1989); People v. Vigil, 729 P.2d 360 (Colo.1986); People v. Roy, 723 P.2d 1345 (Colo.1986); People v. McLean, 661 P.2d 1157 (Colo. 1983); People v. Bueno, 646 P.2d 931 (Colo. 1982).

1989See generally Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 , 77 S.Ct. 623 , 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957); People v. District Court, 767 P.2d 1208 (Colo.1989); People v. Vigil, 729 P.2d 360 (Colo.1986); People v. Roy, 723 P.2d 1345 (Colo.1986); People v. McLean, 661 P.2d 1157 (Colo. 1983); People v. Bueno, 646 P.2d 931 (Colo. 1982).

2014Burke v. Greene, 963 P.2d 1119, 1122 (Colo.App.1998); see also, e.g., Gallo v. Barile, 284 Conn. 459 , 935 A.2d 103, 111-12 (2007); Fridovich v. Fridovich, 598 So.2d 65, 67-69 (Fla.1992); Kelley v. Tanoos, 865 N.E.2d 593, 599-600 (Ind.2007); Jalou II, Inc. v. Liner, 43 So.3d 1023, 1037 (La.Ct.App.2010); Caldor, Inc. v. Bowden, 330 Md. 632 , 625 A.2d 959, 968-69 (1993); Writt v. Shell Oil Co., 409 S.W.3d 59, 68-73 (Tex.App.2013).

2000Burke v. Greene, 963 P.2d 1119 (Colo.App.1998).

2014Burke v. Greene, 963 P.2d 1119, 1122 (Colo.App.1998); see also, e.g., Gallo v. Barile, 284 Conn. 459 , 935 A.2d 103, 111-12 (2007); Fridovich v. Fridovich, 598 So.2d 65, 67-69 (Fla.1992); Kelley v. Tanoos, 865 N.E.2d 593, 599-600 (Ind.2007); Jalou II, Inc. v. Liner, 43 So.3d 1023, 1037 (La.Ct.App.2010); Caldor, Inc. v. Bowden, 330 Md. 632 , 625 A.2d 959, 968-69 (1993); Writt v. Shell Oil Co., 409 S.W.3d 59, 68-73 (Tex.App.2013).

1998As the Florida Supreme Court pointed out in Fridovich v. Fridovich, supra, 598 So.2d at 69 , a qualified privilege “is sufficiently protective of [those] wishing to report events concerning crime and balances society’s interest in detecting and prosecuting crime with a defendant’s interest not to be falsely accused.” We agree with that analysis and with the conclusion that communications to law enforcement officers are only conditionally privileged.

2012Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 , 112 S.Ct. 584 , 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991) ("Immunity ordinarily should be decided by the court long before trial."); Air Wisconsin Airlines Corp. v. Hoeper, 2012 CO 19, ¶ 21 , 320 P.3d 830 ; Conde v. Colorado State Dep't of Personnel, 872 P.2d 1381, 1388 (Colo.App.1994)("[Blecause qualified immunity means immunity from suit as well as from liability, the issue should be decided as early as possible in the litigation process."); see Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Romer, 921 P.2d 84, 91 (Colo.App.1996) (affirming trial court's dismissal of claims bas

2012Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 , 112 S.Ct. 584 , 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991) ("Immunity ordinarily should be decided by the court long before trial."); Air Wisconsin Airlines Corp. v. Hoeper, 2012 CO 19, ¶ 21 , 320 P.3d 830 ; Conde v. Colorado State Dep't of Personnel, 872 P.2d 1381, 1388 (Colo.App.1994)("[Blecause qualified immunity means immunity from suit as well as from liability, the issue should be decided as early as possible in the litigation process."); see Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Romer, 921 P.2d 84, 91 (Colo.App.1996) (affirming trial court's dismissal of claims bas

2008Qualified "Common Interest" Privilege "A qualified privilege exists for communications by a party with a legitimate interest or duty to persons having a corresponding interest or duty in communications promoting legitimate individual, group, or public interests." Wiliams v. Boyle, 72 P.3d at 400 ; accord Dominguez v. Babcock, 727 P.2d 362, 365 (Colo.1986) (a privilege exists in matters of "common interest" to the maker of the statement and the one to whom it is communicated), aff'g 696 P.2d 338 (Colo.App.1984).

1996Dominguez v. Babcock, 696 P.2d 338 (Colo.App.1984), affd, 727 P.2d 362 (Colo.1986) (mere negligent failure of employer to investigate cannot constitute actual malice for defamation claim).