qualified immunity in Maine

2026Qualified immunity protects state officers except for those “plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).

2020"Qualified immunity protects all but the plainly 12 incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Id. (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).

2014Prot., 1998 ME 198, ¶ 5 , 716 A.2d 212 (reaching the merits of whether the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity if a fact-finder accepted the plaintiffs version of the facts, noting that the defendant would otherwise lose his immunity from suit if we were to grant a plaintiffs motion to dismiss an interlocutory appeal). [¶ 54] The qualified immunity doctrine establishes that “ ‘[government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights

2014Prot., 1998 ME 198, ¶ 5 , 716 A.2d 212 (reaching the merits of whether the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity if a fact-finder accepted the plaintiffs version of the facts, noting that the defendant would otherwise lose his immunity from suit if we were to grant a plaintiffs motion to dismiss an interlocutory appeal). [¶ 54] The qualified immunity doctrine establishes that “ ‘[government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights

2014See Jenness, 637 A.2d at 1154, 1159 (indicating our agreement that "the qualified immunity analysis under section 1983 also applies to the MCRA” and holding that, "[h]aving found [the defendant police officers] immune from the section 1983 claims, we also find them immune from claims under the MCRA” and affirming summary judgment to the officers on the MCRA claims); see also Hegarty v. Somerset Cnty., 53 F.3d 1367 , 1373 n. 3 (1st Cir.1995) (citing Jenness for the proposition that the qualified immunity analysis applicable to federal civil rights claims applies to claims brought under the MCRA

2001Maine Civil Rights Act In Jenness v. Nickerson, 637 A.2d 1152, 1153 (Me. 1994), the Law Court noted 14 that because the Maine Civil Rights Act is patterned after 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , the same qualified immunity analysis that is applicable to § 1983 actions is also applicable to claims under the Maine Civil Rights Act.

2014Prot., 1998 ME 198, ¶ 5 , 716 A.2d 212 (reaching the merits of whether the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity if a fact-finder accepted the plaintiffs version of the facts, noting that the defendant would otherwise lose his immunity from suit if we were to grant a plaintiffs motion to dismiss an interlocutory appeal). [¶ 54] The qualified immunity doctrine establishes that “ ‘[government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights

2014Prot., 1998 ME 198, ¶ 5 , 716 A.2d 212 (reaching the merits of whether the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity if a fact-finder accepted the plaintiffs version of the facts, noting that the defendant would otherwise lose his immunity from suit if we were to grant a plaintiffs motion to dismiss an interlocutory appeal). [¶ 54] The qualified immunity doctrine establishes that “ ‘[government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights

2018Me. 1996); Packard v. Central Maine Power Co., 477 A.2d 264, 267-68 (Me. 1984); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 598 (1976)). [¶28] Carey agreed to discipline based on the judges’ complaints and the physician’s complaint.

2018Me. 1996) ; Packard v. Central Maine Power Co. , 477 A.2d 264 , 267-68 (Me. 1984) ; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 598 (1976) ). [¶ 28] Carey agreed to discipline based on the judges' complaints and the physician's complaint.

2018Maine Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 2.15(B) requires that A judge having knowledge that a lawyer has committed a violation of the Maine Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial 13 question regarding that lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects shall inform the Board of Overseers of the Bar . . . . [¶27] We have held that “[a]ny person has a qualified privilege to make statements to law enforcement or regulatory agencies regarding the conduct of others, where the person making the statement believes in good faith that the statement is true and

2018Maine Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 2.15(B) requires that A judge having knowledge that a lawyer has committed a violation of the Maine Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question regarding that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects shall inform the Board of Overseers of the Bar .... [¶ 27] We have held that "[a]ny person has a qualified privilege to make statements to law enforcement or regulatory agencies regarding the conduct of others, where the person making the statement believes in good faith that the statement is true and indic

1995See Ryan v. City of Augusta, 622 A.2d 74, 75 (Me.1993) (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 524-26 , 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2814-15 , 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985)).

1995“Under the qualified immunity doctrine, government officials performing discretionary functions are immune from suit in actions brought pursuant to § 1983 ‘insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’ ” Ryan, 622 A.2d at 75 -76 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 , 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738 , 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982).

2026The individual defendants are alternatively entitled to qualified immunity for the § 1983 claim because there was no clearly established right. [¶23] “Qualified immunity is meant to protect government officials where no . . . red flags are flying.” MacDonald v. Town of Eastham, 745 F.3d 8, 15 (1st Cir. 2014).

2026“To render a government official’s claim of qualified immunity inert, ‘existing precedent must have placed the statutory or 14 constitutional question beyond debate.’” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 , 741 (2011)). [¶24] “In order to determine that a right is clearly established . . . the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.

2017See Estate of Fortier v. City of Lewiston, 2010 ME 50, ¶ 1 , 997 A.2d 84 ; Knowlton v. Attorney General, 2009 ME 79, ¶ 10 , 976 A.2d 973 ; Wilcox v. City of Portland, 2009 ME 53, ¶ 11 , 970 A.2d 295 ; Hawkes v. Commercial Union Ins.

2017See Estate of Fortier v. City of Lewiston, 2010 ME 50, ¶ 1 , 997 A.2d 84 ; Knowlton v. Attorney General, 2009 ME 79, ¶ 10 , 976 A.2d 973 ; Wilcox v. City of Portland, 2009 ME 53, ¶ 11 , 970 A.2d 295 ; Hawkes v. Commercial Union Ins.

2014See Jenness, 637 A.2d at 1154, 1159 (indicating our agreement that "the qualified immunity analysis under section 1983 also applies to the MCRA” and holding that, "[h]aving found [the defendant police officers] immune from the section 1983 claims, we also find them immune from claims under the MCRA” and affirming summary judgment to the officers on the MCRA claims); see also Hegarty v. Somerset Cnty., 53 F.3d 1367 , 1373 n. 3 (1st Cir.1995) (citing Jenness for the proposition that the qualified immunity analysis applicable to federal civil rights claims applies to claims brought under the MCRA

2014See Jenness, 637 A.2d at 1154, 1159 (indicating our agreement that "the qualified immunity analysis under section 1983 also applies to the MCRA” and holding that, "[h]aving found [the defendant police officers] immune from the section 1983 claims, we also find them immune from claims under the MCRA” and affirming summary judgment to the officers on the MCRA claims); see also Hegarty v. Somerset Cnty., 53 F.3d 1367 , 1373 n. 3 (1st Cir.1995) (citing Jenness for the proposition that the qualified immunity analysis applicable to federal civil rights claims applies to claims brought under the MCRA

2014Prot., 1998 ME 198, ¶ 5 , 716 A.2d 212 (reaching the merits of whether the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity if a fact-finder accepted the plaintiffs version of the facts, noting that the defendant would otherwise lose his immunity from suit if we were to grant a plaintiffs motion to dismiss an interlocutory appeal). [¶ 54] The qualified immunity doctrine establishes that “ ‘[government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights

2014Prot., 1998 ME 198, ¶ 5 , 716 A.2d 212 (reaching the merits of whether the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity if a fact-finder accepted the plaintiffs version of the facts, noting that the defendant would otherwise lose his immunity from suit if we were to grant a plaintiffs motion to dismiss an interlocutory appeal). [¶ 54] The qualified immunity doctrine establishes that “ ‘[government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights

2000See Dineen, 381 A.2d at 664-665 (“just as a witness needs the freedom to be able to answer questions posed, free of any concern except the truth as he believes it to be, an attorney must be free to assert relevant statements to pursue fully the interests of his client”); see also Tanguay v. Asen, 722 A.2d 49, 50 (Me. 1998) (recognizing “at least a qualified privilege of counsel to inquire and develop evidence relevant to the proceeding”); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 586, comment a ("The privilege stated in this Section is based upon a public policy of securing to attorneys as officers of t

1998Cf. Dineen v. Daughan, 381 A.2d 663, 664 (Me.1978) (recognizing absolute privilege for statements made in a motion filed with this court).

1990See LaRouche v. National Broadcasting Co., 780 F.2d 1134, 1139 (4th Cir,), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 818 , 107 S.Ct. 79 , 93 L.Ed.2d 34 (1986); United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70, 77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 816 , 104 S.Ct. 72 , 78 L.Ed.2d 85 (1983); Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705 (D.C.Cir.1981); Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041 , 101 S.Ct. 1759 , 68 L.Ed.2d 238 (1981); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433, 438 (10th Cir.1977); Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986 (8th Cir.1972), cert, denied, 409 U.S. 1125 , 93 S.Ct. 9

1988See e.g., Larouche v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc., 780 F.2d 1134 (4th Cir.1986); United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70 (2d Cir.1983); Tribune v. Huffstetler, 489 So.2d 722 (Fla.1986); Sinnott v. Boston Retirement Board, 402 Mass. 581 , 524 N.E.2d 100 (1988); State v. Siel, 122 N.H. 254 , 444 A.2d 499 (1982); People v. Korkala, 99 A.D.2d 161 , 472 N.Y.S.2d 310 (1984); Brown v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 755 , 204 S.E.2d 429 (1974); State v. Rinaldo, 102 Wash.2d 749 , 689 P.2d 392 (1984).

1990See LaRouche v. National Broadcasting Co., 780 F.2d 1134, 1139 (4th Cir,), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 818 , 107 S.Ct. 79 , 93 L.Ed.2d 34 (1986); United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70, 77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 816 , 104 S.Ct. 72 , 78 L.Ed.2d 85 (1983); Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705 (D.C.Cir.1981); Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041 , 101 S.Ct. 1759 , 68 L.Ed.2d 238 (1981); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433, 438 (10th Cir.1977); Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986 (8th Cir.1972), cert, denied, 409 U.S. 1125 , 93 S.Ct. 9

1988See e.g., Larouche v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc., 780 F.2d 1134 (4th Cir.1986); United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70 (2d Cir.1983); Tribune v. Huffstetler, 489 So.2d 722 (Fla.1986); Sinnott v. Boston Retirement Board, 402 Mass. 581 , 524 N.E.2d 100 (1988); State v. Siel, 122 N.H. 254 , 444 A.2d 499 (1982); People v. Korkala, 99 A.D.2d 161 , 472 N.Y.S.2d 310 (1984); Brown v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 755 , 204 S.E.2d 429 (1974); State v. Rinaldo, 102 Wash.2d 749 , 689 P.2d 392 (1984).

2022In a Maine case directly on point, we have said that “[a]ny person has a qualified privilege to make statements to law enforcement or regulatory agencies regarding the conduct of others, where the person making the statement believes in good faith that the statement is true and indicates that a statutory standard administered by the agency may have been violated.” Truman v. Browne, 2001 ME 182, ¶ 15 , 788 A.2d 168 . [¶48] Here, Narowetz made complaints to various regulatory agencies.

2022In a Maine case directly on point, we have said that “[a]ny person has a qualified privilege to make statements to law enforcement or regulatory agencies regarding the conduct of others, where the person making the statement believes in good faith that the statement is true and indicates that a statutory standard administered by the agency may have been violated.” Truman v. Browne, 2001 ME 182, ¶ 15 , 788 A.2d 168 . [¶48] Here, Narowetz made complaints to various regulatory agencies.

2020"Qualified immunity protects all but the plainly 12 incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Id. (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).

1993See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 , 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3038 , 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987) (citing Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819 , 102 S.Ct. at 2738-39 ).

2018The Court cited numerous cases3 to support its conclusion that the "clearly established" prong of the qualified immunity test had been met in the circumstances presented that case, namely the arrest of a woman for a nonviolent offense who was not a threat to the officers' safety with the use of force sufficient to knock her down and then handcuff and handle her so as to cause "severe pain;" and that this constituted conduct that was "excessive and unreasonable." Richards, 2001 ME 132, 127 , 780 A.2d 281 .

2018The Court cited numerous cases3 to support its conclusion that the "clearly established" prong of the qualified immunity test had been met in the circumstances presented that case, namely the arrest of a woman for a nonviolent offense who was not a threat to the officers' safety with the use of force sufficient to knock her down and then handcuff and handle her so as to cause "severe pain;" and that this constituted conduct that was "excessive and unreasonable." Richards, 2001 ME 132, 127 , 780 A.2d 281 .

2014Prot., 1998 ME 198, ¶ 5 , 716 A.2d 212 (reaching the merits of whether the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity if a fact-finder accepted the plaintiffs version of the facts, noting that the defendant would otherwise lose his immunity from suit if we were to grant a plaintiffs motion to dismiss an interlocutory appeal). [¶ 54] The qualified immunity doctrine establishes that “ ‘[government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights

2014Prot., 1998 ME 198, ¶ 5 , 716 A.2d 212 (reaching the merits of whether the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity if a fact-finder accepted the plaintiffs version of the facts, noting that the defendant would otherwise lose his immunity from suit if we were to grant a plaintiffs motion to dismiss an interlocutory appeal). [¶ 54] The qualified immunity doctrine establishes that “ ‘[government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights

1990See LaRouche v. National Broadcasting Co., 780 F.2d 1134, 1139 (4th Cir,), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 818 , 107 S.Ct. 79 , 93 L.Ed.2d 34 (1986); United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70, 77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 816 , 104 S.Ct. 72 , 78 L.Ed.2d 85 (1983); Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705 (D.C.Cir.1981); Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041 , 101 S.Ct. 1759 , 68 L.Ed.2d 238 (1981); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433, 438 (10th Cir.1977); Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986 (8th Cir.1972), cert, denied, 409 U.S. 1125 , 93 S.Ct. 9

1988See e.g., United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70 (2d Cir.1983); United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139 (3d Cir.1980) (privilege grounded in federal common law, as well as first amendment); State v. Siel, 122 N.H. 254 , 444 A.2d 499 (1982) (state constitution provides for conditional privilege); but see State v. Rinaldo, 102 Wash.2d 749 , 689 P.2d 392 (1984) (qualified privilege derives from common law).

2023Swartz v, Sylvester, 53 F.4th 693, 698 (1st Cir. 2022).

2023“Qualified immunity protects ‘all but the plamly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Id. (quoting City of Tahlequah yv.

2020See Kelly Oil Co. v. Svetlik, 975 S.W.2d 762, 764 (Tex. App. 1998) ("[I]t is well-settled ... that Texas courts have no power or jurisdiction to adjudicate title to interests in real property located in another state.") The court later qualified that rule: "Texas courts may, however, compel a party over whom it has jurisdiction to execute a conveyance of a real property interest situated in another state." Id.

2020See Kelly Oil Co. v. Svetlik, 975 S.W.2d 762, 764 (Tex. App. 1998) ("[I]t is well-settled ... that Texas courts have no power or jurisdiction to adjudicate title to interests in real property located in another state.") The court later qualified that rule: "Texas courts may, however, compel a party over whom it has jurisdiction to execute a conveyance of a real property interest situated in another state." Id.

2017Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,231 (2009) (quotation omitted); see also Pratt v. Ottum, 2000 ME 203 , 11 16-17, 761 A.2d SIS. "[Q]ualified immunity protects 'all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law."' MacDonald v. Town cfEastham, 745 F.3d 8, 11 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).

2017According to the majority, "Even if pl'epared by lawyers and reflecting legal thinking, materials assembled in the ordinary coUl'se of business, or pursuant to public requirements unrelated to litigation, or for other nonlitigation purposes are not under the qualified immunity ... '' Id. at 30 (internal quotations, alterations, and citation omitted).

2017Thus, "work product protection does not extend to documents that are prepared in the ordinary course of pusiness or that would have been created in essentially similar form irrespective of the 15 · litigation." Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted).

2017Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,231 (2009) (quotation omitted); see also Pratt v. Ottum, 2000 ME 203 , 11 16-17, 761 A.2d SIS. "[Q]ualified immunity protects 'all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law."' MacDonald v. Town cfEastham, 745 F.3d 8, 11 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).