17 North Dakota opinions name it 2 courts 1991–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Dakota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Soentgen v. Quain & Ramstad Clinic, P.C.green2 sentences2013MeritCare also argues it is immune from liability under N.D.C.C. § 34-02-18(2) and has a qualified privilege for its responses to the questionnaire under N.D.C.C. § 14-02-05(3) and Soentgen v. Quain & Ramstad Clinic, P.C., 467 N.W.2d 73, 77-80 (N.D.1991). [¶ 11] Under N.D. 2013Because of our resolution of this issue, we need not address MeritCare’s arguments about the validity of Dr. Schmitt’s authorization for MeritCare to respond to the questionnaire, or the application of either the immunity provisions of N.D.C.C. § 34-02-18(2) or the qualified privilege provisions of N.D.C.C. § 14-02-05(3) and Soentgen, 467 N.W.2d at 77-80 , to Dr. Schmitt’s defamation claim. | 5 | 7 |
Livingood v. Meecegreen2 sentences1996As we explained in Livingood v. Meece, 477 N.W.2d 183, 192 (N.D.1991), this doctrine recognizes the need for government officials to be free from harassing lawsuits and from apprehension of personal liability when they reasonably exercise authority and discretion while performing their duties in the public interest. 1994In Livingood v. Meece, 477 N.W.2d at 192, the North Dakota Supreme Court explained the requirements of “qualified immunity”: “The doctrine of qualified immunity recognizes the need of government officials to be free from harassing lawsuits and apprehension of personal liability when they exercise authority and discretion while performing their jobs in the public interest. | 2 | 2 |
Morris v. Cliffordgreen2 sentences1994See Morris v. Clifford, 903 F.2d 574, 579 (8th Cir.1990), and cases cited therein.” We consider the individual state defendants’ alleged conduct in the context of whether it violated clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. 1991See Morris v. Clifford, 903 F.2d 574, 579 (8th Cir.1990), and cases cited therein. | 2 | 2 |
Richmond v. Nodlandgreen2 sentences2023“A qualified privilege is abused ‘if statements are made with actual malice, without reasonable grounds for believing them to be true, and on a subject matter irrelevant to the common interest or duty.’” Richmond, 552 N.W.2d at 589 . 2022However, a qualified privilege “may be abused and does not provide absolute immunity from liability for defamation.” Id. (quoting Richmond, 552 N.W.2d at 588 ). | 1 | 4 |
Carradine v. Stategreen2 sentences2010Id. at 149-51. [¶ 15] In Carradine , the Minnesota Supreme Court considered an arrestee’s defamation claim against an arresting officer for statements made in a police report and for statements made to the news media. 511 N.W.2d at 734 . 2010Id. at 735-37 . | 1 | 2 |
Wishnatsky v. Bergquistgreen2 sentences2025The exercise of this Court’s supervisory jurisdiction is warranted “if a district court’s decision contradicts North Dakota statutes and precedent,” or when “matters of important public interest are presented.” City of Mandan v. Strata Corp., 2012 ND 173, ¶ 10 , 819 N.W.2d 557 ; Sauvageau v. Bailey, 2022 ND 86, ¶ 7 , 973 N.W.2d 207 (quoting Wilkinson v. Bd. of Univ., 2020 ND 179, ¶ 17 , 947 N.W.2d 910 ). [¶15] Qualified immunity is “immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability.” Wishnatsky v. Bergquist, 550 N.W.2d 394, 400 (N.D. 1996) (cleaned up). 2025It is “an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation, and it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.” Id. at 401 . | 1 | 1 |
Krile v. Lawyergreen2 sentences2022Krile, 2020 ND 176, ¶ 38 . 2022N.D.C.C. § 14-02-05. 6 [¶21] “The analysis of a qualified privilege requires a two-step process to determine: (1) if a communication’s attending circumstances necessitate a qualified privilege; and (2) if so, whether the privilege was abused.” Krile, 2020 ND 176, ¶ 36 (quoting Khokha v. Shahin, 2009 ND 110, ¶ 26 , 767 N.W.2d 159 ). | 1 | 1 |
Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc.green1 sentence2022See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 510 (1991) (explaining “Actual malice under the New York Times standard should not be confused with the concept of malice as an evil intent or a motive arising from spite or ill will.”). | 1 | 1 |
Riemers v. Mahargreen2 sentences2022See Riemers v. Mahar, 2008 ND 95, ¶ 19 , 748 N.W.2d 714 . 2022See Riemers v. Mahar, 2008 ND 95, ¶ 19 , 748 N.W.2d 714 . | 1 | 1 |
Habiger v. City of Fargogreen2 sentences1996Elder, 510 U.S. at 513-14 , 114 S.Ct. at 1022 ; see also Habiger v. City of Fargo, 80 F.3d 289 , 295 (8th Cir.1996) (“The qualified immunity doctrine allows officers to make reasonable errors so that they do not always ‘err on the side of caution,’ ” citing Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229 , 112 S.Ct. 534, 537 , 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991)). 1996As summarized by the court in Sanders v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 984 F.2d 972, 976 (8th Cir.1993): “What matters in a qualified immunity inquiry is whether a reasonable officer could have believed the arrest to be lawful.” See also Habiger v. City of Fargo, 80 F.3d at 295 (“ ‘[t]he issue for immunity purposes is not probable cause in fact but arguable probable cause,’ ... that is, whether the officer should have known that the arrest violated plaintiffs clearly established right, (citations omitted)). | 1 | 1 |
Hunter v. Bryantgreen2 sentences1996Elder, 510 U.S. at 513-14 , 114 S.Ct. at 1022 ; see also Habiger v. City of Fargo, 80 F.3d 289 , 295 (8th Cir.1996) (“The qualified immunity doctrine allows officers to make reasonable errors so that they do not always ‘err on the side of caution,’ ” citing Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229 , 112 S.Ct. 534, 537 , 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991)). 1996Elder, 510 U.S. at 513-14 , 114 S.Ct. at 1022 ; see also Habiger v. City of Fargo, 80 F.3d 289 , 295 (8th Cir.1996) (“The qualified immunity doctrine allows officers to make reasonable errors so that they do not always ‘err on the side of caution,’ ” citing Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229 , 112 S.Ct. 534, 537 , 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991)). | 1 | 1 |
Ronny J. Sanders v. Sears, Roebuck & Company, a New York Corporation Daniel J. Geigergreen2 sentences1996As summarized by the court in Sanders v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 984 F.2d 972, 976 (8th Cir.1993): “What matters in a qualified immunity inquiry is whether a reasonable officer could have believed the arrest to be lawful.” See also Habiger v. City of Fargo, 80 F.3d at 295 (“ ‘[t]he issue for immunity purposes is not probable cause in fact but arguable probable cause,’ ... that is, whether the officer should have known that the arrest violated plaintiffs clearly established right, (citations omitted)). 1996As summarized by the court in Sanders v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., *402 984 F.2d 972, 976 (8th Cir.1993): "What matters in a qualified immunity inquiry is whether a reasonable officer could have believed the arrest to be lawful." See also Habiger v. City of Fargo, 80 F.3d at 295 ("`[t]he issue for immunity purposes is not probable cause in fact but arguable probable cause,' ... that is, whether the officer should have known that the arrest violated plaintiff's clearly established right, ...'" (citations omitted)). | 1 | 1 |
Ennis v. Dasovickgreen2 sentences1996Ennis v. Dasovick, 506 N.W.2d 386, 393 (N.D.1993); Livingood, 477 N.W.2d at 194. 1996Ennis v. Dasovick, 506 N.W.2d 386, 393 (N.D.1993); Livingood, 477 N.W.2d at 194 . | 1 | 1 |
Malley v. Briggsgreen2 sentences1996The qualified immunity standard “gives ample room for mistaken judgments” by protecting “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Malley, supra, 475 U.S., at 343, 341 , 106 S.Ct., at 1097, 1096 . 1996The qualified immunity standard “gives ample room for mistaken judgments” by protecting “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Malley, supra, 475 U.S., at 343, 341 , 106 S.Ct., at 1097, 1096 . | 1 | 1 |
| Pierson v. Raygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Sibley v. Lutheran Hospital of Maryland, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Giacalone v. Abramsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Sibley v. Lutheran Hospital Of Marylandgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Dakota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Fish v. Dockter
green
2 sentences2022“A qualified privilege is abused if statements are made with actual malice, without reasonable grounds for believing them to be true, on a subject matter irrelevant to the common interest or duty.” Krile, at ¶ 37 (quoting Fish v. Dockter, 2003 ND 185, ¶ 13 , 671 N.W.2d 819 ). 2022“A qualified privilege is abused if statements are made with actual malice, without reasonable grounds for believing them to be true, on a subject matter irrelevant to the common interest or duty.” Krile, at ¶ 37 (quoting Fish v. Dockter, 2003 ND 185, ¶ 13 , 671 N.W.2d 819 ). | 2 | 2004–2022 |
Butz v. Economou
green
2 sentences1994Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506-507 , 98 S.Ct. 2894, 2911 , 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978). 1994Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506-507 , 98 S.Ct. 2894, 2911 , 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978). | 2 | 1991–1994 |
Mitchell v. Forsyth
green
2 sentences1994Although the applicability of the qualified immunity defense is ordinarily a question of law [Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 528 , 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2816 , 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985) ], under some circumstances, resolution of the issue may require that a factfinder determine the reasonableness of the official’s actions. 1994Although the applicability of the qualified immunity defense is ordinarily a question of law [Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 528 , 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2816 , 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985) ], under some circumstances, resolution of the issue may require that a factfinder determine the reasonableness of the official’s actions. | 2 | 1991–1994 |
Wilkinson v. Board of University and School Lands of the State of N.D.
green
1 sentence2025The exercise of this Court’s supervisory jurisdiction is warranted “if a district court’s decision contradicts North Dakota statutes and precedent,” or when “matters of important public interest are presented.” City of Mandan v. Strata Corp., 2012 ND 173, ¶ 10 , 819 N.W.2d 557 ; Sauvageau v. Bailey, 2022 ND 86, ¶ 7 , 973 N.W.2d 207 (quoting Wilkinson v. Bd. of Univ., 2020 ND 179, ¶ 17 , 947 N.W.2d 910 ). [¶15] Qualified immunity is “immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability.” Wishnatsky v. Bergquist, 550 N.W.2d 394, 400 (N.D. 1996) (cleaned up). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Perry Center, Inc. v. Heitkamp
green
2 sentences2025Perry Ctr., Inc. v. Heitkamp, 1998 ND 78, ¶ 39 , 576 N.W.2d 505 ; State v. Thesing, 2024 ND 219, ¶ 6 , 14 N.W.3d 574 . 6 [¶19] In counts II and III of the complaint, Wagendorf and Nelson are alleged to have deprived the Park of its property interest in an operating license without the substantive and procedural due process afforded under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . 2025Perry Ctr., Inc. v. Heitkamp, 1998 ND 78, ¶ 39 , 576 N.W.2d 505 ; State v. Thesing, 2024 ND 219, ¶ 6 , 14 N.W.3d 574 . 6 [¶19] In counts II and III of the complaint, Wagendorf and Nelson are alleged to have deprived the Park of its property interest in an operating license without the substantive and procedural due process afforded under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
City of Mandan v. Strata Corp.
green
1 sentence2025The exercise of this Court’s supervisory jurisdiction is warranted “if a district court’s decision contradicts North Dakota statutes and precedent,” or when “matters of important public interest are presented.” City of Mandan v. Strata Corp., 2012 ND 173, ¶ 10 , 819 N.W.2d 557 ; Sauvageau v. Bailey, 2022 ND 86, ¶ 7 , 973 N.W.2d 207 (quoting Wilkinson v. Bd. of Univ., 2020 ND 179, ¶ 17 , 947 N.W.2d 910 ). [¶15] Qualified immunity is “immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability.” Wishnatsky v. Bergquist, 550 N.W.2d 394, 400 (N.D. 1996) (cleaned up). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
City of Mandan v. Strata Corp.
green
1 sentence2025The exercise of this Court’s supervisory jurisdiction is warranted “if a district court’s decision contradicts North Dakota statutes and precedent,” or when “matters of important public interest are presented.” City of Mandan v. Strata Corp., 2012 ND 173, ¶ 10 , 819 N.W.2d 557 ; Sauvageau v. Bailey, 2022 ND 86, ¶ 7 , 973 N.W.2d 207 (quoting Wilkinson v. Bd. of Univ., 2020 ND 179, ¶ 17 , 947 N.W.2d 910 ). [¶15] Qualified immunity is “immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability.” Wishnatsky v. Bergquist, 550 N.W.2d 394, 400 (N.D. 1996) (cleaned up). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Eckroth v. Eckroth
green
1 sentence2025The exercise of this Court’s supervisory jurisdiction is warranted “if a district court’s decision contradicts North Dakota statutes and precedent,” or when “matters of important public interest are presented.” City of Mandan v. Strata Corp., 2012 ND 173, ¶ 10 , 819 N.W.2d 557 ; Sauvageau v. Bailey, 2022 ND 86, ¶ 7 , 973 N.W.2d 207 (quoting Wilkinson v. Bd. of Univ., 2020 ND 179, ¶ 17 , 947 N.W.2d 910 ). [¶15] Qualified immunity is “immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability.” Wishnatsky v. Bergquist, 550 N.W.2d 394, 400 (N.D. 1996) (cleaned up). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Sauvageau v. Bailey
green
1 sentence2025The exercise of this Court’s supervisory jurisdiction is warranted “if a district court’s decision contradicts North Dakota statutes and precedent,” or when “matters of important public interest are presented.” City of Mandan v. Strata Corp., 2012 ND 173, ¶ 10 , 819 N.W.2d 557 ; Sauvageau v. Bailey, 2022 ND 86, ¶ 7 , 973 N.W.2d 207 (quoting Wilkinson v. Bd. of Univ., 2020 ND 179, ¶ 17 , 947 N.W.2d 910 ). [¶15] Qualified immunity is “immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability.” Wishnatsky v. Bergquist, 550 N.W.2d 394, 400 (N.D. 1996) (cleaned up). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Thesing
neutral
1 sentence2025Perry Ctr., Inc. v. Heitkamp, 1998 ND 78, ¶ 39 , 576 N.W.2d 505 ; State v. Thesing, 2024 ND 219, ¶ 6 , 14 N.W.3d 574 . 6 [¶19] In counts II and III of the complaint, Wagendorf and Nelson are alleged to have deprived the Park of its property interest in an operating license without the substantive and procedural due process afforded under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Krile v. Lawyer
green
2 sentences2023Id. [¶17] The defendants claim that any statements they made to law enforcement during the investigation of Kluver’s criminal activity are qualifiedly privileged. 2023Actual malice in this context “is not the same as the constitutional standard of actual malice that a plaintiff must prove when the person is a public figure bringing a defamation claim.” Krile, 2022 ND 28, ¶ 22 . | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Khokha v. Shahin
neutral
2 sentences2022N.D.C.C. § 14-02-05. 6 [¶21] “The analysis of a qualified privilege requires a two-step process to determine: (1) if a communication’s attending circumstances necessitate a qualified privilege; and (2) if so, whether the privilege was abused.” Krile, 2020 ND 176, ¶ 36 (quoting Khokha v. Shahin, 2009 ND 110, ¶ 26 , 767 N.W.2d 159 ). 2022N.D.C.C. § 14-02-05. 6 [¶21] “The analysis of a qualified privilege requires a two-step process to determine: (1) if a communication’s attending circumstances necessitate a qualified privilege; and (2) if so, whether the privilege was abused.” Krile, 2020 ND 176, ¶ 36 (quoting Khokha v. Shahin, 2009 ND 110, ¶ 26 , 767 N.W.2d 159 ). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Jose v. Norwest Bank North Dakota, N.A.
green
2 sentences2003Jose v. Norwest Bank North Dakota, 1999 ND 175, ¶ 23 , 599 N.W.2d 293 . 2003Jose v. Norwest Bank North Dakota, 1999 ND 175, ¶ 23 , 599 N.W.2d 293 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
W. Eugene Bridgewater v. Ron Caples
green
2 sentences1996E.g., Bridgewater, 23 F.3d at 1449 ; Arnott, 995 F.2d at 123 . 1996E.g., Bridgewater, 23 F.3d at 1449 ; Arnott, 995 F.2d at 123 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Elder v. Holloway
green
2 sentences1996Elder, 510 U.S. at 513-14 , 114 S.Ct. at 1022 ; see also Habiger v. City of Fargo, 80 F.3d 289 , 295 (8th Cir.1996) (“The qualified immunity doctrine allows officers to make reasonable errors so that they do not always ‘err on the side of caution,’ ” citing Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229 , 112 S.Ct. 534, 537 , 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991)). 1996Elder, 510 U.S. at 513-14 , 114 S.Ct. at 1022 ; see also Habiger v. City of Fargo, 80 F.3d 289 , 295 (8th Cir.1996) (“The qualified immunity doctrine allows officers to make reasonable errors so that they do not always ‘err on the side of caution,’ ” citing Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229 , 112 S.Ct. 534, 537 , 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991)). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
George R. Arnott, Sr. v. John Mataya, Greg Connolly
green
2 sentences1996E.g., Bridgewater, 23 F.3d at 1449 ; Arnott, 995 F.2d at 123 . 1996E.g., Bridgewater, 23 F.3d at 1449 ; Arnott, 995 F.2d at 123 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Haldeman v. Total Petroleum, Inc. green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Scheuer v. Rhodes red | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Frankson v. Design Space International green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Anderson v. Creighton green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.