qualified privilege in North Carolina

2004Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, “government officials per *645 forming discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 , 73 L.

2004Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, “government officials per *645 forming discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 , 73 L.

2022LEVEL FOUR ORTHOTICS & PROSTHETICS, INC. 2022-NCSC-19 Opinion of the Court permitted to infer a personal interest upon which Penta Fund and Level Four Holdings acted from the allegations in the complaint. ¶ 33 Further, this Court has concluded that a stockholder’s financial interest in a corporation allows for “a qualified privilege to interfere with contractual relations between the corporation and a third party.” Wilson v. McClenny, 262 N.C. 121, 133 , 136 S.E.2d 569, 578 (1964).

2022LEVEL FOUR ORTHOTICS & PROSTHETICS, INC. 2022-NCSC-19 Opinion of the Court permitted to infer a personal interest upon which Penta Fund and Level Four Holdings acted from the allegations in the complaint. ¶ 33 Further, this Court has concluded that a stockholder’s financial interest in a corporation allows for “a qualified privilege to interfere with contractual relations between the corporation and a third party.” Wilson v. McClenny, 262 N.C. 121, 133 , 136 S.E.2d 569, 578 (1964).

2024The matter is remanded to that court with instructions to further remand to the trial 10 Although not at issue in this case, we observe that statements concerning matters of public concern generally enjoy the protection of the “qualified privilege.” See generally Stewart v. Nation-Wide Check Corp., 279 N.C. 278, 285 , 182 S.E.2d 410, 415 (1971) (“The essential elements [for the qualified privilege to exist as a defense to defamation claims] are . . . [1] good faith, [2] an interest to be upheld, [3] a statement limited in its scope to this purpose, [4] a proper occasion, and [5] publication in

2024The matter is remanded to that court with instructions to further remand to the trial 10 Although not at issue in this case, we observe that statements concerning matters of public concern generally enjoy the protection of the “qualified privilege.” See generally Stewart v. Nation-Wide Check Corp., 279 N.C. 278, 285 , 182 S.E.2d 410, 415 (1971) (“The essential elements [for the qualified privilege to exist as a defense to defamation claims] are . . . [1] good faith, [2] an interest to be upheld, [3] a statement limited in its scope to this purpose, [4] a proper occasion, and [5] publication in

2022Plaintiff’s conclusory allegation does little to comply with the specific pleading requirements of a tortious interference claim that prohibit general allegations of malice, Spartan, 263 N.C. at 559 , 140 S.E.2d at 11 , and fails to rebut the qualified privilege afforded to Penta Fund and Level Four Holdings as non- outsiders, Embree, 330 N.C. at 500 , 411 S.E.2d at 926 , and stockholders.

2022Plaintiff’s conclusory allegation does little to comply with the specific pleading requirements of a tortious interference claim that prohibit general allegations of malice, Spartan, 263 N.C. at 559 , 140 S.E.2d at 11 , and fails to rebut the qualified privilege afforded to Penta Fund and Level Four Holdings as non- outsiders, Embree, 330 N.C. at 500 , 411 S.E.2d at 926 , and stockholders.

2004“The essential elements for the qualified privilege to exist are good faith, an interest to be unheld, a statement limited in its scope to this purpose, a proper occasion and publication in a proper manner and the proper parties only.” Id. at 602 , 439 S.E.2d at 800 .

2004“The essential elements for the qualified privilege to exist are good faith, an interest to be unheld, a statement limited in its scope to this purpose, a proper occasion and publication in a proper manner and the proper parties only.” Id. at 602 , 439 S.E.2d at 800 .

2022GALLION [do not modify this line] Opinion of the Court 293 N.C. 105, 126 , 235 S.E.2d 828, 841 (stating a qualified privilege can be waived).

2022GALLION [do not modify this line] Opinion of the Court 293 N.C. 105, 126 , 235 S.E.2d 828, 841 (stating a qualified privilege can be waived).

2025“Plaintiff’s forecast of evidence raises precisely the issue of wrongful purpose, which purpose would defeat a non-outsider’s qualified privilege to interfere.” Lenzer, 106 N.C.

2020App. at 513 , 418 S.E.2d at 286 (“[The p]laintiff’s forecast of evidence raises precisely the issue of wrongful purpose, which purpose would defeat a non- outsider’s qualified privilege to interfere”); see also You v. Roe, 97 N.C.

2026Qualified privilege arises where "(1) a communication is made in good faith, (2) the subject and scope of the communication is one in which the party uttering it has a valid interest to uphold, or in reference to which he has a legal right or duty, and (3) the communication is made to a person or persons having a corresponding interest, right, or duty." Presnell v. Pell, 298 N.C. 715, 720 (1979) (original citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

1988Moreover, because the principal’s report to the Assistant Superintendent of Personnel related to plaintiffs conduct as a substitute teacher, the report would be at a minimum protected by a qualified privilege, see Presnell v. Pell, 298 N.C. 715 , 260 S.E. 2d 611 (1979).

2022Qualified Privilege ¶ 13 “Qualified privilege is a defense for a defamatory publication[.]” Clark v. Brown, 99 N.C.

2022Qualified Privilege ¶ 13 “Qualified privilege is a defense for a defamatory publication[.]” Clark v. Brown, 99 N.C.

2025Corum, 330 N.C. at 773 ; see id. (“Qualified immunity, if available, provides ‘an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.’ ” (emphasis omitted) (quoting Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526 )).

2025Corum, 330 N.C. at 773 ; see id. (“Qualified immunity, if available, provides ‘an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.’ ” (emphasis omitted) (quoting Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526 )).

2003App. 274, 278 , 450 S.E.2d 753, 756 (1994)). {26} “The essential elements for the qualified privilege to exist are good faith, an interest to be upheld, a statement limited in its scope to this purpose, a proper occasion and publication in a manner and [to] the proper parties only." Id. (quoting Long v. Vertical Technologies, Inc. , 113 N.C.

2003App. 274, 278 , 450 S.E.2d 753, 756 (1994)). {26} “The essential elements for the qualified privilege to exist are good faith, an interest to be upheld, a statement limited in its scope to this purpose, a proper occasion and publication in a manner and [to] the proper parties only." Id. (quoting Long v. Vertical Technologies, Inc. , 113 N.C.

2022App. 329, 331, 401 S.E.2d 849, 850 (1991) (“Even though a qualified privilege may provide a defense to a defamation action, if this privilege is found to be abused, it ceases to exist.”).

2022App. 329, 331, 401 S.E.2d 849, 850 (1991) (“Even though a qualified privilege may provide a defense to a defamation action, if this privilege is found to be abused, it ceases to exist.”).

2022App. at 219 , 458 S.E.2d at 29 (“If the plaintiff cannot show actual malice, the qualified privilege becomes an absolute privilege, and there can be no recovery even though the statement was false.”).

2022App. at 219 , 458 S.E.2d at 29 (“If the plaintiff cannot show actual malice, the qualified privilege becomes an absolute privilege, and there can be no recovery even though the statement was false.”).

2024Bouligny, 270 N.C. at 172 , 154 S.E.2d at 355 (citing Ponder, 257 N.C. at 281 , 126 S.E.2d at 67 ). -26- BOUVIER V.

2024Bouligny, 270 N.C. at 172 , 154 S.E.2d at 355 (citing Ponder, 257 N.C. at 281 , 126 S.E.2d at 67 ). -26- BOUVIER V.

2006A qualified privilege allows a plaintiff to recover “if he can prove that the words were not used bona fide, but that the defendant used the privileged occasion artfully and knowingly to falsely defame the plaintiff.” Id.

1985In North Carolina, an absolute privilege has been limited to “words used in debate in Congress and the State Legislatures, reports of military or other officers to their superiors in the line of their duty, everything said by a judge on the bench, by a witness in the box, and the like.” Ramsey v. Cheek, 109 N.C. 270, 273-74 , 13 S.E. 775, 775 (1891).

1986What constitutes a privileged occasion is defined [as] “. . . when for the public good and in the interests of society one is freed from liability that would otherwise be imposed on him by reason of the publication of defamatory matter. . . . [Qualified privilege] relates more particularly to private interests; and comprehends communications made in good faith, without actual malice, with reasonable or probable grounds for believing them to be true, on a subject matter in which the author of the communication has an interest, or in respect to which he has a duty, public, personal, or private,

1986What constitutes a privileged occasion is defined [as] “. . . when for the public good and in the interests of society one is freed from liability that would otherwise be imposed on him by reason of the publication of defamatory matter. . . . [Qualified privilege] relates more particularly to private interests; and comprehends communications made in good faith, without actual malice, with reasonable or probable grounds for believing them to be true, on a subject matter in which the author of the communication has an interest, or in respect to which he has a duty, public, personal, or private,

2010App. 455, 463 , 524 S.E.2d 821, 826-27 (2000) (reversing summary judgment and holding the plaintiff’s evidence was sufficient to defeat a non-outsider’s qualified privilege on the basis that her managers: (1) “out of personal hostility and ill-will toward the [pjlaintiff, schemed to come up with false and defamatory accusations against the [p]laintiff with the intent to bring about the termination of her employment^]” (2) one defendant had a “hit list” with names of employees he intended to “get rid of’ and the plaintiff’s name was on the list; and (3) when the plaintiff confronted the defenda

2006Id. at 461 , 524 S.E.2d at 825 . {77} A qualified privilege may exist on these facts.

1967Qualified privilege is likewise extended to statements in a newspaper, published in good faith and without malice, concerning alleged waste of public funds, Yancey v. Gillespie, 242 N.C. 227 , 87 S.E. 2d 210 , and to statements made in good faith by the president of a corporation in a notice calling a meeting of its stockholders to consider evidence of misuse of corporate funds.

1967Qualified privilege is likewise extended to statements in a newspaper, published in good faith and without malice, concerning alleged waste of public funds, Yancey v. Gillespie, 242 N.C. 227 , 87 S.E. 2d 210 , and to statements made in good faith by the president of a corporation in a notice calling a meeting of its stockholders to consider evidence of misuse of corporate funds.

2024In such cases, “[b]ecause malice encompasses intent, . . . if a party alleges an intentional tort claim, the doctrine of qualified immunity does not immunize public officials . . . from suit in their individual capacities.” Hawkins v. State, 117 N.C.

1999App. 615 , 453 S.E.2d 233 , review dismissed as improvidently granted, 342 N.C. 188 , 463 S.E.2d 79 (1995) (plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a violation of a clearly established right under doctrine of qualified immunity).

2023It does not, however, protect a tortfeasor from personal liability for gross negligence and intentional torts.”). 187 N.C.

2009See id., and Wilkins, 185 N.C.