qualified immunity in New Jersey

2025A-1774-24 17 The doctrine of qualified immunity "shield[s] 'government officials performing discretionary functions generally . . . from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'" Morillo v. Torres, 222 N.J. 104, 116 (2015) (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 ).

2025A-1774-24 17 The doctrine of qualified immunity "shield[s] 'government officials performing discretionary functions generally . . . from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'" Morillo v. Torres, 222 N.J. 104, 116 (2015) (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 ).

2025A-1774-24 17 The doctrine of qualified immunity "shield[s] 'government officials performing discretionary functions generally . . . from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'" Morillo v. Torres, 222 N.J. 104, 116 (2015) (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 ).

2025Our Supreme Court has also held "[t]he doctrine of qualified immunity 'shields law enforcement officers from personal liability for civil rights violations when the officers are acting under the color of law in the performance of official duties,' unless the officers' 'performance is not objectively reasonable.'" Harris v. City of Newark, 250 N.J. 294 , 299 (2022) (quoting Morillo v. Torres, 222 N.J. 104, 107-08 (2015)).

2024A trial judge and this court "should be permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of A-1259-22 14 the circumstances in the particular case at hand." Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).

2021In other words, "whether an official protected by qualified immunity may be held personally liable for an allegedly unlawful official action gener ally turns on the 'objective legal reasonableness' of the action, assessed in light of the legal rules that were 'clearly established' at the time it was taken." Id. at 639 (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819 and 818). "[T]he 'driving force' behind creation of the qualified immunity doctrine was a desire to ensure that "'insubstantial claims' against government officials [will] be resolved prior to discovery."" Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231 (quoting Anderso

2025Super. 406, 425 (App. Div. 2015), rev'd A-1774-24 15 on other grounds, 230 N.J. 84 (2017); see also Gormley v. Wood-El, 218 N.J. 72, 113-16 (2014) (discussing the qualified immunity doctrine).

2022Super. 406, 425 (App. Div. 2015), rev'd on other grounds, 230 N.J. 84 (2017); see also Gormley v. Wood-El, 218 N.J. 72, 113-16 (2014) (discussing the qualified immunity doctrine).

2013There, we held that defendants’ otherwise defamatory statements were protected by the qualified privilege recognized in Bainhauer, supra, 215 N.J.Super. at 36 , 520 A.2d 1154 , namely: [A] communication “made bona fide upon any subject-matter in which the party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has a duty, is privileged if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, although it contains criminatory matter which, without this privilege, would be slanderous and actionable.” [Ibid. (quoting Coleman v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 29 N.J. 357, 375 , 149 A.2d 19

2013There, we held that defendants’ otherwise defamatory statements were protected by the qualified privilege recognized in Bainhauer, supra, 215 N.J.Super. at 36 , 520 A.2d 1154 , namely: [A] communication “made bona fide upon any subject-matter in which the party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has a duty, is privileged if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, although it contains criminatory matter which, without this privilege, would be slanderous and actionable.” [Ibid. (quoting Coleman v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 29 N.J. 357, 375 , 149 A.2d 19

2021“Qualified immunity is ‘an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation’”; it is “an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 , 200 (2001) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)), overruled in part on other grounds by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236-43 (2009). “[Q]ualified immunity ordinarily is a question of law to be decided by the court.” Baskin, 243 N.J. at 128 (citing Brown, 230 N.J. at 98-99 ).

2018Qualified immunity "is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability. . . ." Wildoner v. Borough of Ramsey, 162 N.J. 375, 387 (2000) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)).

2020Qualified immunity attaches when law enforcement officers are able to prove they acted with probable cause or that "a reasonable police officer could have believed in its existence." Kirk v. City of Newark, 109 N.J. 173, 184 (1988).

2017"If officers of reasonable competence could disagree on the issue of probable cause, the doctrine of qualified immunity should be applied." Id. at 119 (quoting Connor, supra, 162 N.J. at 409 ).

2020Claims against the Detectives and Investigator "Qualified immunity protects all officers 'but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.'" Connor v. Powell, 162 N.J. 397, 409 (2000) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).

2020Claims against the Detectives and Investigator "Qualified immunity protects all officers 'but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.'" Connor v. Powell, 162 N.J. 397, 409 (2000) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).

2021A-4560-19 13 Qualified immunity "acknowledges an officer may make 'reasonable mistakes . . . as to the legal constraints on particular police conduct.'" Id. at 27 (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 , 205 (2001), overruled on other grounds by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009)).

2021“Qualified immunity is ‘an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation’”; it is “an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 , 200 (2001) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)), overruled in part on other grounds by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236-43 (2009). “[Q]ualified immunity ordinarily is a question of law to be decided by the court.” Baskin, 243 N.J. at 128 (citing Brown, 230 N.J. at 98-99 ).

2021In other words, "whether an official protected by qualified immunity may be held personally liable for an allegedly unlawful official action gener ally turns on the 'objective legal reasonableness' of the action, assessed in light of the legal rules that were 'clearly established' at the time it was taken." Id. at 639 (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819 and 818). "[T]he 'driving force' behind creation of the qualified immunity doctrine was a desire to ensure that "'insubstantial claims' against government officials [will] be resolved prior to discovery."" Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231 (quoting Anderso

2021In other words, "whether an official protected by qualified immunity may be held personally liable for an allegedly unlawful official action gener ally turns on the 'objective legal reasonableness' of the action, assessed in light of the legal rules that were 'clearly established' at the time it was taken." Id. at 639 (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819 and 818). "[T]he 'driving force' behind creation of the qualified immunity doctrine was a desire to ensure that "'insubstantial claims' against government officials [will] be resolved prior to discovery."" Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231 (quoting Anderso

2025Co., 104 N.J. 125, 137 (1986) (explaining that "citizens have a qualified privilege to make statements to authorities for the prevention and detection of crime").

2000To overcome a qualified privilege on this ground, "a plaintiff must establish that the publisher knew the statement to be false or acted in reckless disregard of its truth or falsity." Dairy Stores, Inc. v. Sentinel Publ'g Co., 104 N.J. 125, 151 , 516 *729 A. 2d 220 (1986), citing Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 600 (1977).

2013There, we held that defendants’ otherwise defamatory statements were protected by the qualified privilege recognized in Bainhauer, supra, 215 N.J.Super. at 36 , 520 A.2d 1154 , namely: [A] communication “made bona fide upon any subject-matter in which the party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has a duty, is privileged if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, although it contains criminatory matter which, without this privilege, would be slanderous and actionable.” [Ibid. (quoting Coleman v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 29 N.J. 357, 375 , 149 A.2d 19

2013There, we held that defendants’ otherwise defamatory statements were protected by the qualified privilege recognized in Bainhauer, supra, 215 N.J.Super. at 36 , 520 A.2d 1154 , namely: [A] communication “made bona fide upon any subject-matter in which the party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has a duty, is privileged if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, although it contains criminatory matter which, without this privilege, would be slanderous and actionable.” [Ibid. (quoting Coleman v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 29 N.J. 357, 375 , 149 A.2d 19

2022However, "[i]f officers of reasonable competence could disagree on the issue of probable cause, the doctrine of qualified immunity should be applied." Connor, 162 N.J. at 409 .

2022However, "[i]f officers of reasonable competence could disagree on the issue of probable cause, the doctrine of qualified immunity should be applied." Connor, 162 N.J. at 409 .

2025However, even absent probable cause, a defendant may still be entitled to a qualified immunity defense if he or she A-2578-23 20 "reasonably believed that probable cause existed." Wildoner v. Borough of Ramsey, 162 N.J. 375, 385 (2000).

2018Qualified immunity "is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability. . . ." Wildoner v. Borough of Ramsey, 162 N.J. 375, 387 (2000) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)).

2010Though plaintiff frames his argument within the context of the purportedly suggestive showup, the standard for qualified immunity is one of "objective reasonableness, which is a lesser standard than required for probable cause." Schneider, supra, 163 N.J. at 365 , 749 A. 2d 336 .

2010Though plaintiff frames his argument within the context of the purportedly suggestive showup, the standard for qualified immunity is one of "objective reasonableness, which is a lesser standard than required for probable cause." Schneider, supra, 163 N.J. at 365 , 749 A. 2d 336 .

2020Indeed, “the clearly established law must be ‘particularized’ to the facts of the case.” Ibid. (quoting Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640 ); see Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. at 1776 (“Qualified immunity is no immunity at all if ‘clearly established’ law can simply be defined as the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.”).

2018Instead, it identifies "the specific constitutional right at issue [as] the Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force." Ante at 12. 13 A-5553-15T2 The United States Supreme Court, however, has repeatedly admonished that "'clearly established law' should not be defined 'at a high level of generality'" but "must instead be 'particularized' to the facts of the case." White, 137 S. Ct. at 552 (quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742 and Creighton, 483 U.S. at 640 ); see also City & County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. __ , 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1776 (2015) ("Qualified immunity is no immun

1993Although, as the Appellate Division pointed out, we said in Erickson that we had previously declared that “malice in the context of a qualified privilege must be established by clear and convincing evidence,” 117 N.J. at 565 , 569 A.2d 793 (citing Burke v. Deiner, 97 N.J. 465, 481 , 479 A.2d 393 (1984); Maressa v. New Jersey *123 Monthly, 89 N.J. 176 , 197 n. 10, 445 A.2d 376 (1982)), nevertheless Erickson was the first case to apply the clear-and-convincing standard to private defamation plaintiffs.

1993Although, as the Appellate Division pointed out, we said in Erickson that we had previously declared that “malice in the context of a qualified privilege must be established by clear and convincing evidence,” 117 N.J. at 565 , 569 A.2d 793 (citing Burke v. Deiner, 97 N.J. 465, 481 , 479 A.2d 393 (1984); Maressa v. New Jersey *123 Monthly, 89 N.J. 176 , 197 n. 10, 445 A.2d 376 (1982)), nevertheless Erickson was the first case to apply the clear-and-convincing standard to private defamation plaintiffs.

1995A qualified privilege, sometimes referred to as a conditional privilege, see Swede v. Passaic Daily News, 30 N.J. 320, 332 , 153 A. 2d 36 (1959), may be recognized for the protection of the publisher's "own interest, the interest of the recipient or other third person, or an interest common to the publisher and the recipient." Bainhauer v. Manoukian, 215 N.J.

1995A qualified privilege, sometimes referred to as a conditional privilege, see Swede v. Passaic Daily News, 30 N.J. 320, 332 , 153 A. 2d 36 (1959), may be recognized for the protection of the publisher's "own interest, the interest of the recipient or other third person, or an interest common to the publisher and the recipient." Bainhauer v. Manoukian, 215 N.J.

2025Super. 406, 425 (App. Div. 2015), rev'd A-1774-24 15 on other grounds, 230 N.J. 84 (2017); see also Gormley v. Wood-El, 218 N.J. 72, 113-16 (2014) (discussing the qualified immunity doctrine).

2022Super. 406, 425 (App. Div. 2015), rev'd on other grounds, 230 N.J. 84 (2017); see also Gormley v. Wood-El, 218 N.J. 72, 113-16 (2014) (discussing the qualified immunity doctrine).

2021Co. of Am., 245 N.J.

1996Super. 480, 499 , 586 A. 2d 278 (1991) (holding that a showing of ill will defeats a qualified privilege if it is the "primary motivating force" behind a defamatory statement) (quoting Coleman, supra, 29 N.J. at 375 , 149 A. 2d 193 ).

2020Indeed, “the clearly established law must be ‘particularized’ to the facts of the case.” Ibid. (quoting Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640 ); see Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. at 1776 (“Qualified immunity is no immunity at all if ‘clearly established’ law can simply be defined as the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.”).

2018Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil liability unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing: "(1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was 'clearly established' at the time of the challenged conduct." Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 , 735 (2011).

2011At common law, such a qualified privilege could be overcome only by a showing of “ill motive or malice in fact.” Id. at 565 , 569 A.2d 793 (quoting Rainier’s Dairies v. Raritan Valley Farms, 19 N.J. 552, 558 , 117 A.2d 889 (1955)).

2011At common law, such a qualified privilege could be overcome only by a showing of “ill motive or malice in fact.” Id. at 565 , 569 A.2d 793 (quoting Rainier’s Dairies v. Raritan Valley Farms, 19 N.J. 552, 558 , 117 A.2d 889 (1955)).

1996Although, generally, questions of motive are not decided on summary judgment, the Supreme Court has created an exception to the rule: "Because a qualified privilege is favored with a presumption that there was no express malice, plaintiff carries the burden of establishing that the statements complained of were made `from an indirect or improper motive, and not for a reason which would otherwise render them privileged.'" Fees v. Trow, supra, 105 N.J. at 342 , 521 A. 2d 824 (citation omitted); Lutz v. Royal Ins.

1996Although, generally, questions of motive are not decided on summary judgment, the Supreme Court has created an exception to the rule: "Because a qualified privilege is favored with a presumption that there was no express malice, plaintiff carries the burden of establishing that the statements complained of were made `from an indirect or improper motive, and not for a reason which would otherwise render them privileged.'" Fees v. Trow, supra, 105 N.J. at 342 , 521 A. 2d 824 (citation omitted); Lutz v. Royal Ins.

2024Super. at 248 (citing Canico, 144 N.J. at 366 ).

2020Summary judgment, however, is appropriate when the employee demonstrates that his/her actions "were objectively reasonable or that [he] performed them with subjective good faith." This test recognizes that even a person who acted negligently is entitled to a qualified immunity, if he acted in an objectively reasonable manner. [Ibid. (citation omitted) (quoting Canico v. Hurtado, 144 N.J. 361, 365 (1996)).] N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-13 contains an additional "disclaimer for 'willful or wanton' actions" that does not appear in N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-13.1.