qualified immunity in Massachusetts

2012The standard for qualified immunity is well settled. “[Gjovernment officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Rod-riques v. Furtado, 410 Mass. 878, 882 (1991), quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

2009Qualified Immunity Blake has sued all of the Defendants in both their official and individual capacities, except for Michael Thomas, who is sued only his individual capacity. 21 The doctrine of qualified immunity shields from liability government officials who perform discretionary tasks, Duarte v. Healy, 405 Mass. 43, 47 (1989), “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Shedlock v. Department of Correction, 442 Mass. 844, 859 (2004), quoting Barlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

2005Qualified immunity is intended to shield public officials “from civil damages liability as long as their actions could reasonably have been thought consistent with the rights they are alleged to have violated.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987).

2003A right is “clearly established” when “[t]he contours of the right [are] sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). “[T]he ‘clearly established [right]’ prong of the qualified immunity inquiry is satisfied when (1) the subordinate’s actions violated a clearly established constitutional right, and (2) it was clearly established that a supervisor would be liable for constitutional violations perpetrated by his subordinates in that context. ...

2018The doctrine of qualified immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012), applies equally to MCRA claims, Duarte v. Healy , 405 Mass. 43 , 46-47 (1989), shielding government officials performing nonministerial, discretionary functions from civil damages if their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

2018The doctrine of qualified immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012), applies equally to MCRA claims, Duarte v. Healy , 405 Mass. 43 , 46-47 (1989), shielding government officials performing nonministerial, discretionary functions from civil damages if their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

1997The Court (Fremont-Smith, J.) denied Tesson’s motion on the ground that a government official, such as the Commissioner, enj oys a qualified immunity from suit for civil damages when he or she is performing a discretionary function and when, “at the time of the challenged action, the statutory or constitutional right allegedly violated was not ‘clearly established.’ ” Breault v. Chairman of the Bd. of Fire Commissioners of Springfield, 401 Mass. 26, 32 (1987) (citations omitted).

1989Under Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982), the doctrine of qualified immunity applies only to “discretionary functions.” For this portion of our discussion, we shall assume that the supervisory defendants’ acts were discretionary acts. 6 Contrast Breault v. Chairman of the Bd. of Fire Comm’rs of Springfield, 401 Mass. 26 , 33 (1987) (where acts are ministerial, no valid claim of qualified immunity can be raised), cert. denied sub nom.

2003“Even defendants who violate constitutional rights enjoy a qualified immunity that protects them from liability for damages unless it is further demonstrated that their conduct was unreasonable under the applicable standard.” Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 190 (1984).

1996Since “[e]ven defendants who violate constitutional rights enjoy a qualified immunity that protects them from liability for damages unless it is further demonstrated that their conduct was unreasonable under the applicable standard,” Davis v Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 190 (1984), and since resolution of the constitutional question under current law presents difficult questions unnecessary to our decision, we proceed directly to the questions raised by the qualified immunity defense, without deciding what notice or hearing is constitutionally required under current law.

2002The Court emphasized the importance of deciding the qualified immunity defense “at the earliest possible stage in [the] litigation.” Id. at 201, quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (per curiam), because qualified immunity is “an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation,” Saucier v. Katz, supra at 200, quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985), and the benefit is “effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.” Saucier v. Katz, supra at 201.

2002The Court emphasized the importance of deciding the qualified immunity defense “at the earliest possible stage in [the] litigation.” Id. at 201, quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (per curiam), because qualified immunity is “an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation,” Saucier v. Katz, supra at 200, quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985), and the benefit is “effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.” Saucier v. Katz, supra at 201.

2005In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, supra, the Supreme Court removed the subjective aspect, i.e., the actor’s intent, from the qualified immunity standard it had articulated in Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308,322 (1975).

2004In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, supra, the Supreme Court removed the subjective aspect, i.e., the actor’s intent, from the qualified immunity standard it had articulated in Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975). 15 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, supra at 815-818 .

2020Cristo v. Evangelidis, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 585, 590 (2016). "[T]he relevant inquiry on summary judgment as to the defense of qualified immunity is whether a reasonable official could have believed his actions were lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information possessed by the official at the time he acted." Clancy v. McCabe, 441 Mass. 311, 322 (2004).

2005The doctrine of qualified immunity generally shields public officials from liability for civil damages for the performance of discretionary functions, “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Clancy v. McCabe, 441 Mass. 311, 317 (2004), quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

2017See Mulgrew, supra at 635 ; Vigoda, supra at 484 .

2017See Mulgrew v. Taunton, 410 Mass. 631, 635 (1991); Vigoda v. Barton, 348 Mass. 478, 484 (1965). 10 Edwards also claims that inconsistencies between Patrick’s September 22, 2014, statement and his January 2, 2015, statement demonstrate that he lied about her removal.

2002See Foley, 400 Mass. at 95 (qualified privilege exists “where the publisher and the recipient have a common interest, and the communication is of a kind reasonably calculated to protect or further it”) (quoting Sheehan v. Tobin, 326 Mass. 185, 190-91 (1950)).

2002See Foley, 400 Mass. at 95 (quoting Sheehan v. Tobin, 326 Mass. 185, 190-91 (1950)); see also Mullen v. Ludlow Hospital Society, 32 Mass.App.Ct. 968, 970 (1992) (summary judgment affirmed when the defendant employer had a privilege to publish information about the plaintiff in evaluating his work within the hospital and he did not publish the information excessively).

2002Humphrey v. National Semiconductor Corp., 18 Mass.App.Ct. 132, 134 (1984).

1999Humphrey v. National Semiconductor Corp., 18 Mass.App.Ct. 132, 134 (1984), citing Bander v. Metropolitan Life Ins.

2023Evid. § 801(a) (2023); Madsen v. Erwin, 395 Mass. 715, 721 (1985) ("Hearsay in an affidavit is unacceptable to defeat summary judgment"); Whirty v. Lynch, 27 Mass. App. Ct. 498 , 499- 500 (1989) (assertions "based on hearsay or supposition" properly disregarded on summary judgment). 8 effect), and terminating his employment, the town manager enjoyed a qualified privilege to do so, and to share that information with those with a need to know. 3 See Foley v. Polaroid Corp., 400 Mass. 82, 94-95 (1987).

2023For purposes of the defamation claim, the issue is not whether the town was correct in its assessment of the plaintiff's performance, but whether it acted within the scope of its qualified privilege. 4 Id.

2009Qualified Immunity Blake has sued all of the Defendants in both their official and individual capacities, except for Michael Thomas, who is sued only his individual capacity. 21 The doctrine of qualified immunity shields from liability government officials who perform discretionary tasks, Duarte v. Healy, 405 Mass. 43, 47 (1989), “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Shedlock v. Department of Correction, 442 Mass. 844, 859 (2004), quoting Barlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

2006The doctrine of qualified immunity shields government officials, performing discretionary tasks, from liability for civil damages under both Federal and State law, Duarte v. Healy, 405 Mass. 43, 47 (1989), “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Shedlock v. Department of Correction, 442 Mass. 844, 859 (2004), quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

2005See Febus-Rodriguez v. Betancourt-Lebron, 14 F.3d 87, 89 (1st Cir. 1994) (“[w]hen a defendant moves for summary judgment based on the doctrine of qualified immunity, the court must review the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff”).

2005See Febus-Rodriguez v. Betancourt-Lebron, 14 F.3d 87, 89 (1st Cir. 1994) (“[w]hen a defendant moves for summary judgment based on the doctrine of qualified immunity, the court must review the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff”).

2005That right is complemented by an accompanying “entitlement not to be forced to litigate the consequences of official conduct.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 527 (1985).

2002The Court emphasized the importance of deciding the qualified immunity defense “at the earliest possible stage in [the] litigation.” Id. at 201, quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (per curiam), because qualified immunity is “an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation,” Saucier v. Katz, supra at 200, quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985), and the benefit is “effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.” Saucier v. Katz, supra at 201.

2000See id.

1987Ezekiel v. Jones Motor Co., 374 Mass. 382, 386 (1978).

2005The “driving force” behind this reformulation of the doctrine was the Court’s desire “that ‘insubstantial claims’ against government officials be resolved prior to discovery and on summary judgment if possible.” In short, “[immunity ordinarily should be decided by the court long before trial.” Clancy v. McCabe, 441 Mass. 311, 322-23 (2004) (citations omitted), quoting Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640 n.2; Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818-19 ; and Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 (1991).

2002The Court emphasized the importance of deciding the qualified immunity defense “at the earliest possible stage in [the] litigation.” Id. at 201, quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (per curiam), because qualified immunity is “an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation,” Saucier v. Katz, supra at 200, quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985), and the benefit is “effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.” Saucier v. Katz, supra at 201.

2004Qualified immunity insulates reasonable errors of judgment, protecting “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).

1991Even if we were to assume, without deciding, that the affidavit failed the “basis of knowledge” test of AguilarSpinelli, we cannot conclude that the affidavit was “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence unreasonable.” Malley v. Briggs, supra at 345 . 10 The fact that an affidavit fails the “basis of knowledge” test is not sufficient to overcome a qualified immunity defense.

2025See Town Taxi, Inc. v. Police Comm'r of Boston, 377 Mass. 576, 586-88 (1979); Driscoll v. McCann, No. 19-CV-12302-ADB, 2020 WL 5983272 , at *4 (D.

2008See Town Taxi, Inc. v. Police Comm’r of Boston, 377 Mass. 576, 586-88 (1979).

2025Longval v. Commissioner of Correction, 448 Mass. 412, 419 (2007).

2012A right is only clearly established if, at the time of the alleged violation, “the contours of the right allegedly violated [were] sufficiently definite so that a reasonable official would appreciate that the conduct in question was unlawful.” Longval v. Commissioner of Correction, 448 Mass. 412, 419 (2007).

2024Auth., 437 Mass. 396, 403 (2002), quoting Medeiros v. Dracut, 21 F. Supp. 2d. 82, 85 (D.

2007Auth., 437 Mass. 396, 403-404 (2002), quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 , 201, 202 (2001).

2021"The doctrine of qualified immunity shields government officials, performing discretionary tasks, from liability for civil damages . . . insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Earielo, 98 Mass. App. Ct. at 115, quoting Ahmad v. Department of Correction, 446 Mass. 479, 484 (2006).

2016See Baker v. Gray, 57 Mass. App. Ct. 618, 622 (2003); Ahmad v. Department of Correction, 446 Mass. 479, 484 (2006).

2021See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).

1985See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-357 (1978) (judge immune from damages liability unless he acted in “clear absence of all jurisdiction”); Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 639 (1980) (“public officers are entitled to a qualified immunity from damages liability under § 1983); O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (superintendent of State hospital has qualified immunity); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) (Governor and other State executive officials have *130 qualified immunity); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-555 (1967) (§ 1983 did not abolish the “settled principle of law” o

2017See Mulgrew, supra at 635 ; Vigoda, supra at 484 .

2017See Mulgrew v. Taunton, 410 Mass. 631, 635 (1991); Vigoda v. Barton, 348 Mass. 478, 484 (1965). 10 Edwards also claims that inconsistencies between Patrick’s September 22, 2014, statement and his January 2, 2015, statement demonstrate that he lied about her removal.

2012The standard for qualified immunity is well settled. “[Gjovernment officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Rod-riques v. Furtado, 410 Mass. 878, 882 (1991), quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

1992For recent decisions describing the qualified immunity of public officials in actions brought under the State Civil Rights Act, see Duarte v. Healy, 405 Mass. at 46-48 , and Rodrigues v. Furtado, 410 Mass. 878, 881-882 (1991).

2005“On a motion for summary judgment, ‘the relevant question is whether a reasonable official could have believed his actions were lawful in light of clearly established law and the information the official possessed at the time of his allegedly unlawful conduct.’ Febus-Rodriguez v. Betancourt-Lebron, [supra at] 91, quoting McBride v. Taylor, 924 F.2d 386, 389 (1st Cir. 1991).” Clancy v. McCabe, 441 Mass. 311, 317 (2004).

2005“On a motion for summary judgment, ‘the relevant question is whether a reasonable official could have believed his actions were lawful in light of clearly established law and the information the official possessed at the time of his allegedly unlawful conduct.’ Febus-Rodriguez v. Betancourt-Lebron, [supra at] 91, quoting McBride v. Taylor, 924 F.2d 386, 389 (1st Cir. 1991).” Clancy v. McCabe, 441 Mass. 311, 317 (2004).

2004When so inquiring, we think it important to bear in mind the policy that informs the qualified immunity doctrine, namely “the need to protect officials who are required to exercise their discretion and the related public interest in encouraging the vigorous exercise of official authority.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982), quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506 (1978).

1997See Barrett v. United States, 798 F.2d 565, 571 (2d Cir. 1986), citing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506 (1978).

2003See Breault v. Chairman of the Bd. of Fire Commrs. of Springfield, 401 Mass. 26, 31-32 (1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 906 (1988).

1996Breault v. Chairman of theBd. of Fire Commrs. of Springfield, 401 Mass. 26, 31-32 (1987), cert, denied, 485 U.S. 906 (1988).

1985See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-357 (1978) (judge immune from damages liability unless he acted in “clear absence of all jurisdiction”); Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 639 (1980) (“public officers are entitled to a qualified immunity from damages liability under § 1983); O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (superintendent of State hospital has qualified immunity); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) (Governor and other State executive officials have *130 qualified immunity); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-555 (1967) (§ 1983 did not abolish the “settled principle of law” o

1984In addition, since the United States Supreme Court has held that common law immunities survive a § 1983 claim (Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 [1974], holding that in claims under § 1983 executive officer of State and various officers of State national guard have qualified immunity for good faith conduct, and Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 [1975], holding that in § 1983 cause of action State school board officials had common law, qualified immunity for good faith, nonmalicious action), the plaintiff would have to overcome the qualified immunity of a public official expressed in Gildea v. Ell