qualified immunity in West Virginia

2024Qualified immunity is a bar to recovery where “an objectively reasonable official, situated similarly to the defendant, could have believed that his conduct did not violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, in light of clearly established law and the information possessed by the defendant at the time of the allegedly wrongful conduct.” Hutchison v. City of Huntington, 198 W.

2023Qualified immunity is an immunity from suit afforded to public officials and State agencies under certain conditions. 25 It flows not from constitutional, sovereign 24 Id. at 150 , 479 S.E.2d at 660 . 25 Cf. Syl.

2025In its decision affirming the circuit court’s summary judgment order, the ICA appropriately noted that this Court has criticized the “discretionary” versus “ministerial” nomenclature as “highly arbitrary and difficult to apply.”16 In Chase Securities, we explained that the distinction between discretionary and ministerial functions was more fairly subsumed into the portion of the qualified immunity analysis that strips immunity for actors who violate clearly established rights or law of which a reasonable person would have known because ministerial functions, definitionally, are acts “so well

2016Given, that respondents’ employment actions involving petitioners constituted a discretionary governmental function, the qualified immunity analysis is governed by our holding enunciated in AB., as follows: To the extent that governmental acts or omissions which give rise to a cause of action fall within the category of discretionary functions, a reviewing court must determine whether the plaintiff has demonstrated that such acts or omissions are in violation of clearly established statutory or constitutional rights or laws of which a reasonable person would have known or are otherwise fraudul

2024Va. at 514 , 766 S.E.2d at 773 . 13 We have found hiring to be a discretionary, governmental function, too.26 Here, A.R. alleges that the Department failed to hire, train, and supervise Kinser and others, properly—alleged omissions that, in accord with A.B., “fall within the category of discretionary functions.” 27 So, we proceed to step (5) of the qualified immunity analysis: whether the amended complaint contains allegations that the Department hired, trained, or supervised in such a way as to violate A.R.’s “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights or laws of which a reasonabl

2024Va. at 492 , 766 S.E.2d at 751 (“Courts cannot concoct or resurrect arguments neither made nor advanced by the parties.”). 19 Petitioner’s references to the Human Rights Act, 40 the Human Trafficking Act, 41 and Article 3, § 10 of the West Virginia Constitution 42 also fail to overcome the Department’s qualified immunity defense.

2018“Qualified immunity is ‘justified and defined by the functions it protects and serves, not by the person to whom it attaches.’” Id. (quoting A.B., 234 W.Va. at 507-08 , 766 S.E.2d at 766-67 )).

2015See Clark, 195 W.Va. at 278-79 , 465 S.E.2d at 380-81 (Qualified immunity is not limited to claims for constitutional violations!).

2022A qualified privilege exists when a person publishes a statement in good faith about a subject in which he has an interest or duty and limits the publication of the statement to those persons who have a legitimate interest in the subject matter; however, a bad 12 Crump, 173 W.

2022Va. at 707 , 320 S.E.2d at 78 (stating that “[a]lthough motive is irrelevant when an absolute privilege is involved, a bad motive will defeat a qualified privilege defense”); RST. (2D) OF TORTS § 599 (1977) (“One who publishes defamatory matter concerning another upon an occasion giving rise to a conditional privilege is subject to liability to the other if he abuses the privilege.”). 17 Zsigray, 243 W.

2025Va. 654, 667 , 783 S.E.2d 75, 88 (2015) (Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense …); Grim v. Eastern Electric, LLC, 234 W.

2024Va. at 514 , 766 S.E.2d at 773 . 13 We have found hiring to be a discretionary, governmental function, too.26 Here, A.R. alleges that the Department failed to hire, train, and supervise Kinser and others, properly—alleged omissions that, in accord with A.B., “fall within the category of discretionary functions.” 27 So, we proceed to step (5) of the qualified immunity analysis: whether the amended complaint contains allegations that the Department hired, trained, or supervised in such a way as to violate A.R.’s “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights or laws of which a reasonabl

2011The Court in Saucier fashioned the following two-prong test that a court required to rule on the qualified immunity issue must consider: (1) Taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right? (2) If a violation could be made out on a favorable view of the parties' submissions, the next, sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly established[, that is] it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted. 533 U.S. at 201-202, 121 S.Ct.

2011The Court in Saucier fashioned the following two-prong test that a court required to rule on the qualified immunity issue must consider: (1) Taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right? (2) If a violation could be made out on a favorable view of the parties' submissions, the next, sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly established[, that is] it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted. 533 U.S. at 201-202, 121 S.Ct.

2024Va. 492 , 507–08, 766 S.E.2d 751 , 766–67 (2014). 9 “Qualified immunity is an immunity afforded to government agencies, officials, and/or employees for discretionary activities performed in an official capacity.” Maston v. Wagner, 236 W.

2024Va. 488, 499 , 781 S.E.2d 936, 947 (2015).

2021Ed. 2d 411 ]; see also Gray-Hopkins v. Prince George’s County, Md., 309 F.3d 224 , 229 (4th Cir. 2002) (“Because qualified immunity is an immunity from having to litigate, as contrasted with an immunity from liability, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.”) (omitting internal citation); Jenkins v. Medford, 119 F.3d 1156, 1159 (4th Cir. 1997) (observing that denial of qualified immunity defense “subjects the [government] official to the burdens of pretrial 18 matters” and opining that “some of the rights inherent in a qualified immunity defense are [conseque

2013Postponing review of a ruling denying immunity to the post-trial stage is fruitless, as the United States Supreme Court reasoned in Mitchell, because the underlying objective in any immunity determination (absolute or qualified) is immunity from suit. 472 U.S. at 526-27 , 105 S.Ct. 2806 ; see also Gray-Hopkins v. Prince George’s County, Md., 309 F.3d 224 , 229 (4th Cir.2002) (“Because qualified immunity is an immunity from having to litigate, as contrasted with an immunity from liability, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.”) (omitting internal citation);

2021Ed. 2d 411 ]; see also Gray-Hopkins v. Prince George’s County, Md., 309 F.3d 224 , 229 (4th Cir. 2002) (“Because qualified immunity is an immunity from having to litigate, as contrasted with an immunity from liability, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.”) (omitting internal citation); Jenkins v. Medford, 119 F.3d 1156, 1159 (4th Cir. 1997) (observing that denial of qualified immunity defense “subjects the [government] official to the burdens of pretrial 18 matters” and opining that “some of the rights inherent in a qualified immunity defense are [conseque

2013Postponing review of a ruling denying immunity to the post-trial stage is fruitless, as the United States Supreme Court reasoned in Mitchell, because the underlying objective in any immunity determination (absolute or qualified) is immunity from suit. 472 U.S. at 526-27 , 105 S.Ct. 2806 ; see also Gray-Hopkins v. Prince George’s County, Md., 309 F.3d 224 , 229 (4th Cir.2002) (“Because qualified immunity is an immunity from having to litigate, as contrasted with an immunity from liability, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.”) (omitting internal citation);

2010In Harlow , the Supreme Court set forth the following qualified immunity test: “ ‘Government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’ ” Chase Sec., 188 W.Va. at 362 , 424 S.E.2d at 597 (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 , 102 S.Ct. 2727 ).

2010In Harlow , the Supreme Court set forth the following qualified immunity test: “ ‘Government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’ ” Chase Sec., 188 W.Va. at 362 , 424 S.E.2d at 597 (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 , 102 S.Ct. 2727 ).

2023Dist., 313 F. Supp. 3d 386, 409 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (“a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory” unless “the policies or customs it has sanctioned, led to an independent constitutional violation” or “inadequate training reflects deliberate indifference to constitutional rights”) (internal quotations omitted). 25 See, e.g., Brickey v. Hall, 828 F.3d 298, 303 (4th Cir. 2016) (“Qualified immunity shields government officials from personal liability when their conduct does not violate clearly established rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”) (c

2021Traditional appellate review of a qualified immunity ruling cannot achieve the intended goal of an 6 Chestnut Ridge asserts that the circuit court’s ruling on the declaratory judgment portion of the counterclaim is not “presently appealable because it does not meet the criteria for a collateral order.” 10 immunity ruling: “the right not to be subject to the burden of trial.” 223 W.

1985Kreese & Co., 104 W.Va. 168 , 139 S.E. 650 (1927); Stewart v. Riley, 114 W.Va. 578 , 172 S.E. 791 (1934); Swearingen v. Parkersburg Sentinel Company, 125 W.Va. 731 , 26 S.E.2d 209 (1943); England v. Daily Gazette Company, 143 W.Va. 700 , 104 S.E.2d 306 (1958).

1985Kreese & Co., 104 W.Va. 168 , 139 S.E. 650 (1927); Stewart v. Riley, 114 W.Va. 578 , 172 S.E. 791 (1934); Swearingen v. Parkersburg Sentinel Company, 125 W.Va. 731 , 26 S.E.2d 209 (1943); England v. Daily Gazette Company, 143 W.Va. 700 , 104 S.E.2d 306 (1958).

2006Randall, 186 W.Va. at 341-2 , 412 S.E.2d at 742-3 (emphasis in original, footnotes omitted).

2006Randall, 186 W.Va. at 341-2 , 412 S.E.2d at 742-3 (emphasis in original, footnotes omitted).

2015See also Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 , 106 S.Ct. 1092 , 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986) (“[(Qualified immunity ... provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who- knowingly violate the law.”).

2015See also Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 , 106 S.Ct. 1092 , 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986) (“[(Qualified immunity ... provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who- knowingly violate the law.”).

2021Payne v. Britten, 749 F.3d 697, 701 (8th Cir. 2014). 13 which is a type of burden distinct from appeals and other lawyer-driven aspects of a case. . . .

2021Payne v. Britten, 749 F.3d 697, 701 (8th Cir. 2014). 13 which is a type of burden distinct from appeals and other lawyer-driven aspects of a case. . . .

2019See Syl. pt. 5, James M. v. Maynard, 185 W.

2019See Syl. pt. 5, James M. v. Maynard, 185 W.

2015Div. of Corrections, 227 W.Va. 15, 20 , 705 S.E.2d 125, 130 (2010), it was dispositive that: “In the instant case, the insurance policy at issue .,. does not waive the Appellant’s qualified immunity.

2015Div. of Corrections, 227 W.Va. 15, 20 , 705 S.E.2d 125, 130 (2010), it was dispositive that: “In the instant case, the insurance policy at issue .,. does not waive the Appellant’s qualified immunity.

2014Va. 161 , 483 S.E.2d 507 (1996), settles the issue: “[T]he immunity of the State is coterminous with the qualified immunity of a public executive official whose acts or omissions give rise to the case.” Respondent contends, in essence, that this passage from Parkulo establishes a rote 6 respondeat superior liability for the State and its agencies since the State’s immunity is “coterminous” with that of the public official whose acts give rise to the case.

2014Va. Bd. of Probation and Parole, 199 W.Va. 161 , 483 S.E.2d 507 (1996), settles the issue: “[T]he immunity of the State is coterminous with the qualified immunity of a public executive official whose acts or omissions give rise to the case.” Respondent contends, in essence, that this passage from Parkulo establishes a rote respondeat superior liability for the State and its agencies since the State’s immunity is “coterminous” with that of the public official whose acts give rise to the case.

2020Va. at 720, 568 S.E.2d at 27 . 11 In addition to a bad motive, the Court in Crump noted four instances in which a qualified privilege may be defeated: 1) an intentional publication of false defamatory material; 2) a publication of false defamatory material in reckless disregard for its truth or falsity; 3) a publication of false defamatory material made to persons who have no reason to receive the information; and 4) a publication of false defamatory material with a primary purpose unrelated to the purpose of the privilege. 173 W.

2020Va. 712 , 568 S.E.2d 19 (2002) (“‘A qualified privilege exists when a person publishes a statement in good faith about a subject in which he has an interest or duty and limits the publication of the statement to those persons who have a legitimate interest in the subject matter; however, a bad motive will defeat a qualified privilege defense.’ Syl.

2009Qualified immunity provides "an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 , 105 S.Ct. 2806 , 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985); accord Pearson v. Callahan, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 808, 815 , 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009).

2009Qualified immunity provides "an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 , 105 S.Ct. 2806 , 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985); accord Pearson v. Callahan, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 808, 815 , 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009).

2015Qualified immunity strikes a balance between two competing interests: the “need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform them duties reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan 555 U.S. 223, 231 , 129 S.Ct. 808 , 172 L.Ed.2d 665 (2009).

2015Qualified immunity strikes a balance between two competing interests: the “need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform them duties reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan 555 U.S. 223, 231 , 129 S.Ct. 808 , 172 L.Ed.2d 665 (2009).

2019Va. State Police v. Hughes, 238 W.

2019Va. State Police v. Hughes, 238 W.

2014J.H., 224 W.

2014J.H., 224 W.Va. at 156-57 , 680 S.E.2d at 401-02 (citation omitted).

2022Va. 700, 709 , 104 S.E.2d 306, 311 (1958) (internal quotation omitted). 15 Id. 8 motive will defeat a qualified privilege defense.” Syl.

2022Va. 700, 709 , 104 S.E.2d 306, 311 (1958) (internal quotation omitted). 15 Id. 8 motive will defeat a qualified privilege defense.” Syl.