158 Louisiana opinions name it 3 courts 1934–2023 10 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Louisiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Freeman v. Coopergreen2 sentences2017That protection is embodied in the qualified privilege that exists in Louisiana with respect to such speech.2 It is also reflective of a legislative 2 “Statements made in the course of a judicial proceeding are subject to a qualified privilege if the statements are material to the proceeding, and are made with probable cause and without malice.” Costello v. Hardy, 03-1146, p. 16 n.13 (La. 1/21/04), 864 So.2d 129 , 142 n.13 (citing Freeman v. Cooper, 414 So.2d 355 (La. 1982)). 3 recognition that any matter pending before the judiciary possesses some measure of “public significance” owing to the 2017Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the opinion to the contrary. 5 "Statements made in the course of a judicial proceeding are subject to a qualified privilege if the statements are material to the proceeding, and are made with probable cause and without malice." Costello v. Hardy , 03-1146, p. 16 n.13 (La. 1/21/04), 864 So.2d 129 , 142 n.13 (citing Freeman v. Cooper , 414 So.2d 355 (La. 1982) ). | 5 | 12 |
Moresi v. State, Dept. of Wildlife & Fisheriesgreen2 sentences2001Additionally, a qualified immunity generally applies to most acts of government officials." Lambert v. Riverboat Gaming Enforcement Div., 96-1856 at p. 5, 706 So.2d at 176 , citing, Moresi, 567 So.2d at 1084 . 1999Additionally, a qualified immunity generally applies to most acts of government officials. 2 Id. | 4 | 10 |
Kennedy v. Sheriff of East Baton Rougegreen2 sentences2022Kennedy, 2005-1418, p. 16, 935 So.2d at 681 . 13 Louisiana Civil Code Article 2315 states that “[e]very act whatever of man that causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it.” 23 Privilege is a defense to defamation, and statements made by law enforcement officers are protected from defamation claims by a qualified privilege during an ongoing investigation. 2014See Kennedy, supra. However, McConnell and Farquhar are police officers who enjoy a qualified privilege. | 3 | 12 |
Trentecosta v. Beckgreen2 sentences2014In Trentecosta v. Beck, 96-2388 (La.10/21/97), 703 So.2d 552 , the Louisiana Supreme Court determined that a qualified privilege exists in favor of police officers publishing information concerning an ongoing | T1investigation to the news media, but the court determined that the police had abused the privilege. 2006We granted certiorari in that case "primarily to address the question of whether the law enforcement officers enjoyed a qualified privilege in reporting on an investigation and a resulting arrest, and whether they abused the privilege." Trentecosta , 96-2388 at 7, 703 So.2d at 558 . | 3 | 5 |
Scheuer v. Rhodesred2 sentences2003See, e.g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 , 247-48 , 94 S.Ct. 1683 , 1692 , 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974), appeal after remand, 570 F.2d 563 (6th Cir. 1977) certiorari denied, 435 U.S. 924 , 98 S.Ct. 1488 , 55 L.Ed.2d 517 (1978) ("[I]n varying scope, a qualified immunity is available to officers of the executive branch of government, the variation being dependent on the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action on which liability is sought to be based.") [14] Until recently, the availability of qualified immun 2003See, e.g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 , 247-48 , 94 S.Ct. 1683 , 1692 , 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974), appeal after remand, 570 F.2d 563 (6th Cir. 1977) certiorari denied, 435 U.S. 924 , 98 S.Ct. 1488 , 55 L.Ed.2d 517 (1978) ("[I]n varying scope, a qualified immunity is available to officers of the executive branch of government, the variation being dependent on the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action on which liability is sought to be based.") [14] Until recently, the availability of qualified immun | 3 | 3 |
Arthur Krause v. James A. Rhodesgreen2 sentences2003See, e.g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 , 247-48 , 94 S.Ct. 1683 , 1692 , 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974), appeal after remand, 570 F.2d 563 (6th Cir. 1977) certiorari denied, 435 U.S. 924 , 98 S.Ct. 1488 , 55 L.Ed.2d 517 (1978) ("[I]n varying scope, a qualified immunity is available to officers of the executive branch of government, the variation being dependent on the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action on which liability is sought to be based.") [14] Until recently, the availability of qualified immun 2002See, e.g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 , 247-48 , 94 S.Ct. 1683 , 1692 , 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974), appeal after remand, 570 F.2d 563 (6th Cir. 1977) certiorari denied, 435 U.S. 924 , 98 S.Ct. 1488 , 55 L.Ed.2d 517 (1978) ("[I]n varying scope, a qualified immunity is available to officers of the executive branch of government, the variation being dependent on the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action on which liability is sought to be based.") [14] Until recently, the availability of qualified immun | 3 | 3 |
Angelini v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2003See, e.g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 , 247-48 , 94 S.Ct. 1683 , 1692 , 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974), appeal after remand, 570 F.2d 563 (6th Cir. 1977) certiorari denied, 435 U.S. 924 , 98 S.Ct. 1488 , 55 L.Ed.2d 517 (1978) ("[I]n varying scope, a qualified immunity is available to officers of the executive branch of government, the variation being dependent on the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action on which liability is sought to be based.") [14] Until recently, the availability of qualified immun 2002See, e.g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 , 247-48 , 94 S.Ct. 1683 , 1692 , 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974), appeal after remand, 570 F.2d 563 (6th Cir. 1977) certiorari denied, 435 U.S. 924 , 98 S.Ct. 1488 , 55 L.Ed.2d 517 (1978) ("[I]n varying scope, a qualified immunity is available to officers of the executive branch of government, the variation being dependent on the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action on which liability is sought to be based.") [14] Until recently, the availability of qualified immun | 3 | 3 |
Gordon v. Commissionergreen2 sentences2003See, e.g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 , 247-48 , 94 S.Ct. 1683 , 1692 , 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974), appeal after remand, 570 F.2d 563 (6th Cir. 1977) certiorari denied, 435 U.S. 924 , 98 S.Ct. 1488 , 55 L.Ed.2d 517 (1978) ("[I]n varying scope, a qualified immunity is available to officers of the executive branch of government, the variation being dependent on the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action on which liability is sought to be based.") [14] Until recently, the availability of qualified immun 2002See, e.g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 , 247-48 , 94 S.Ct. 1683 , 1692 , 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974), appeal after remand, 570 F.2d 563 (6th Cir. 1977) certiorari denied, 435 U.S. 924 , 98 S.Ct. 1488 , 55 L.Ed.2d 517 (1978) ("[I]n varying scope, a qualified immunity is available to officers of the executive branch of government, the variation being dependent on the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action on which liability is sought to be based.") [14] Until recently, the availability of qualified immun | 3 | 3 |
Olinkraft, Inc. v. Louisianagreen2 sentences2003See, e.g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 , 247-48 , 94 S.Ct. 1683 , 1692 , 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974), appeal after remand, 570 F.2d 563 (6th Cir. 1977) certiorari denied, 435 U.S. 924 , 98 S.Ct. 1488 , 55 L.Ed.2d 517 (1978) ("[I]n varying scope, a qualified immunity is available to officers of the executive branch of government, the variation being dependent on the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action on which liability is sought to be based.") [14] Until recently, the availability of qualified immun 2002See, e.g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 , 247-48 , 94 S.Ct. 1683 , 1692 , 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974), appeal after remand, 570 F.2d 563 (6th Cir. 1977) certiorari denied, 435 U.S. 924 , 98 S.Ct. 1488 , 55 L.Ed.2d 517 (1978) ("[I]n varying scope, a qualified immunity is available to officers of the executive branch of government, the variation being dependent on the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action on which liability is sought to be based.") [14] Until recently, the availability of qualified immun | 3 | 3 |
Buckley v. Fitzsimmonsgreen2 sentences2022In Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 2591 113 S. Ct. 2606 , 125 L.Ed.2d 209 ( 1993), the United States Supreme Court held that while the actions of a prosecutor that are intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process and which occur in the ON course of a prosecutor' s role as an advocate for the state are entitled to absolute immunity, where prosecutors act in an investigatory, administrative, ministerial or other role that has no functional tie to the judicial process, only a qualified immunity is afforded. 2022In Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 2591 113 S. Ct. 2606 , 125 L.Ed.2d 209 ( 1993), the United States Supreme Court held that while the actions of a prosecutor that are intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process and which occur in the ON course of a prosecutor' s role as an advocate for the state are entitled to absolute immunity, where prosecutors act in an investigatory, administrative, ministerial or other role that has no functional tie to the judicial process, only a qualified immunity is afforded. | 2 | 5 |
Costello v. Hardygreen2 sentences2018The Louisiana Supreme Court has held that "[s]tatements made in the course of a judicial proceeding are subject to a qualified privilege if the statements are material to the proceeding, and are made with probable cause and without malice." Costello , 03-1146 at p. 16, n.13, 864 So.2d at 142, n.13 (citation omitted). 2017Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the opinion to the contrary. 5 "Statements made in the course of a judicial proceeding are subject to a qualified privilege if the statements are material to the proceeding, and are made with probable cause and without malice." Costello v. Hardy , 03-1146, p. 16 n.13 (La. 1/21/04), 864 So.2d 129 , 142 n.13 (citing Freeman v. Cooper , 414 So.2d 355 (La. 1982) ). | 2 | 5 |
Martin v. Lincoln General Hosp.green2 sentences2023Hosp., 588 So.2d 1329, 1333 (La. 1997"Communications between appropriate persons within an employer's walls, concerning allegations of conduct by an employee that bears on the employer's interest, are subject to the qualified privilege if made in good faith." Martin v. Lincoln General Hospital, 588 So.2d at 1333 . | 2 | 4 |
Anderson v. Creightongreen2 sentences1999(Citations omitted.) In Moresi, 567 So.2d at 1084-85 , the court noted, “[t]he decisions of the Supreme Court and the circuits demonstrate that the qualified immunity test covers all state and local government officers at all levels of responsibility with the exception of those who have absolute immunity.” “The standard applicable in determining whether qualified immunity should be recognized is ‘objective reasonableness.’ ” Breaux v. Jefferson Davis Sheriff's Dep’t, 96-944 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/5/97) ; 689 So.2d 615, 617 , citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 , 107 S.Ct. 3034 , 97 L.Ed.2d 5 1999(Citations omitted.) In Moresi, 567 So.2d at 1084-85 , the court noted, “[t]he decisions of the Supreme Court and the circuits demonstrate that the qualified immunity test covers all state and local government officers at all levels of responsibility with the exception of those who have absolute immunity.” “The standard applicable in determining whether qualified immunity should be recognized is ‘objective reasonableness.’ ” Breaux v. Jefferson Davis Sheriff's Dep’t, 96-944 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/5/97) ; 689 So.2d 615, 617 , citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 , 107 S.Ct. 3034 , 97 L.Ed.2d 5 | 2 | 4 |
Williams v. Touro Infirmarygreen2 sentences2007In Williams v. Touro Infirmary, 578 So.2d 1006, 1010 (La.App. 4 Cir.1991), this Court explained qualified privilege as follows: Under a qualified privilege defense certain statements which might otherwise be deemed defamatory are protected because the circumstances of the communication show an underlying public policy incentive for protection. 1999In Williams v. Touro Infirmary, 578 So.2d 1006, 1010 (La.App. 4 Cir.1991), this Court discussed the qualified privilege defense: Under a qualified privilege defense certain statements which might otherwise be deemed defamatory are protected because the circumstances of the communication show an underlying public policy incentive for protection. | 2 | 3 |
Davis v. Scherergreen2 sentences1999See, e.g., Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 , 106 S.Ct. 1092, 1096 , 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986) (qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law”) id., [475 U.S.] at 344-345, 106 S.Ct. at 1097-1098 (police officers applying for warrants are immune if a reasonable officer could have believed that there was probable cause to support the application); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 528 , 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2816 , 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985) (officials are immune unless “the law clearly proscribed the actions” they took); Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 1999See, e.g., Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 , 106 S.Ct. 1092, 1096 , 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986) (qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law”) id., [475 U.S.] at 344-345, 106 S.Ct. at 1097-1098 (police officers applying for warrants are immune if a reasonable officer could have believed that there was probable cause to support the application); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 528 , 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2816 , 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985) (officials are immune unless “the law clearly proscribed the actions” they took); Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, | 2 | 3 |
Malley v. Briggsgreen2 sentences1999See, e.g., Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 , 106 S.Ct. 1092, 1096 , 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986) (qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law”) id., [475 U.S.] at 344-345, 106 S.Ct. at 1097-1098 (police officers applying for warrants are immune if a reasonable officer could have believed that there was probable cause to support the application); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 528 , 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2816 , 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985) (officials are immune unless “the law clearly proscribed the actions” they took); Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 1987The Court concluded that such officers are only qualifiedly immune, stating that the qualified immunity accorded an officer whose request for a warrant allegedly caused an unconstitutinal arrest is defined by the same standard of objective reasonableness applied in the context of a suppession hearing under United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984). 106 S.Ct. at 1098 . | 2 | 3 |
| Sabine Tram Co. v. Jurgensgreen | 2 | 3 |
| Danna v. Ritz-Carlton Hotel Co.green | 2 | 2 |
| Matherne v. Response Instrument Service & Engineering Corp.green | 2 | 2 |
| Regualos v. Community Hospitalgreen | 2 | 2 |
| Maewal v. Adventist Health Systems/Sunbelt, Inc.green | 2 | 2 |
| Austin v. McNamaragreen | 2 | 2 |
| Fobbs v. Holy Cross Health System Corp.green | 2 | 2 |
| Smith v. Our Lady of the Lake Hosp., Inc.green | 2 | 2 |
Harlow v. Fitzgeraldgreen2 sentences2021Furthermore, defendants filed a motion for partial summary judgment, contending there were no material issues of fact that plaintiffs are not entitled to injunctive relief, they have no liability for violations of the Sixth or Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, have no liability for violations of the Louisiana Constitution, and are otherwise entitled to statutory immunity.° The * In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 , 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738 , 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982), the United States Supreme Court articulated a new objective standard with regard to the qualified immuni 2021Furthermore, defendants filed a motion for partial summary judgment, contending there were no material issues of fact that plaintiffs are not entitled to injunctive relief, they have no liability for violations of the Sixth or Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, have no liability for violations of the Louisiana Constitution, and are otherwise entitled to statutory immunity.° The * In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 , 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738 , 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982), the United States Supreme Court articulated a new objective standard with regard to the qualified immuni | 1 | 12 |
Carter v. Catfish Cabingreen2 sentences1992Carter v. Catfish Cabin, supra; A qualified privilege applies if the communication is made: 1) in good faith; 2) on any matter in which the person communicating has an interest to be upheld or in reference to which he had a duty; 3) limited in scope to this interest; 4) on a proper occasion; 5) in a proper manner; and 6) to a proper person having a corresponding interest or duty. 1991Cangelosi v. Schwegmann Bros ., supra; Henderson v. Guillory, 546 So.2d 244 (La.App. 2d Cir.), writ denied 551 So.2d 635 (1989); Carter v. Catfish Cabin, supra; Jones v. Wesley, 424 So.2d 1109 (La.App. 1st Cir.1982); Ward v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 339 So.2d 1255 (La. | 1 | 5 |
Martin v. Markleygreen2 sentences1963To be actionable such statements must have been made maliciously, with knowledge of their falsity. * * * And although it can be argued that appellant’s position in the case at bar derives some support from language appearing in our decision in Flanagan v. Nicholson Publishing Company, 137 La. 588 , 68 So. 964 , L.R.A.1917E, 510, this court has pointed out in subsequent decisions that the Nicholson case is only authority for the proposition that Louisiana recognizes the doctrine of qualified privilege respecting fair comment and criticism of public officers and men in public life, but that 'the 1963To be actionable such statements must have been made maliciously, with knowledge of their falsity. * * * And although it can be argued that appellant’s position in the case at bar derives some support from language appearing in our decision in Flanagan v. Nicholson Publishing Company, 137 La. 588 , 68 So. 964 , L.R.A.1917E, 510, this court has pointed out in subsequent decisions that the Nicholson case is only authority for the proposition that Louisiana recognizes the doctrine of qualified privilege respecting fair comment and criticism of public officers and men in public life, but that 'the | 1 | 4 |
Knapper v. Connickgreen2 sentences2022Knapper, 681 So. 2d at 950 . 2022Knapper, 681 So. 2d at 950 . | 1 | 3 |
Imbler v. Pachtmangreen2 sentences2018The doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity evolved from the United States Supreme Court in the decision of Imbler v. Pachtman , 424 U.S. 409 , 96 S.Ct. 984 , 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976). 7 Imbler involved a suit against a prosecutor (and others) for malicious prosecution filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 . 8 The Supreme Court, concluding that "the same considerations of public policy that underlie the common-law rule [of immunity] likewise countenance absolute immunity," noted as follows: If a prosecutor had only a qualified immunity, the threat of [§] 1983 suits would undermine performance 2018The doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity evolved from the United States Supreme Court in the decision of Imbler v. Pachtman , 424 U.S. 409 , 96 S.Ct. 984 , 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976). 7 Imbler involved a suit against a prosecutor (and others) for malicious prosecution filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 . 8 The Supreme Court, concluding that "the same considerations of public policy that underlie the common-law rule [of immunity] likewise countenance absolute immunity," noted as follows: If a prosecutor had only a qualified immunity, the threat of [§] 1983 suits would undermine performance | 1 | 3 |
Elmer v. Coplingreen2 sentences2013A conditional or qualified privilege exists “if the communication is made (a) in good faith, (b) on any subject-matter in which the person 119communicating has an interest or in reference to which he has a duty, [and] (c) to a person having a corresponding interest or duty.” Elmer v. Coplin, 485 So.2d 171, 176 (La.App. 2 Cir.1986). 1999Elmer v. Coplin, supra . | 1 | 3 |
Butz v. Economougreen2 sentences2003Yet Scheuer and other cases have recognized that it is not unfair to hold liable the official who knows or should know he is acting outside the law, and that insisting on an awareness of clearly established limits will not unduly interfere with the exercise of official judgment. [63] Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. at 506 -07 , 98 S.Ct. at 2911 , 57 L.Ed.2d at 916 . [64] Accordingly, we believe that a qualified immunity is justified in an action against state officers or persons acting under color of state law for damages caused by a violation of Article I , § 5 of the Louisiana Constitution. 2003Yet Scheuer and other cases have recognized that it is not unfair to hold liable the official who knows or should know he is acting outside the law, and that insisting on an awareness of clearly established limits will not unduly interfere with the exercise of official judgment. [63] Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. at 506 -07 , 98 S.Ct. at 2911 , 57 L.Ed.2d at 916 . [64] Accordingly, we believe that a qualified immunity is justified in an action against state officers or persons acting under color of state law for damages caused by a violation of Article I , § 5 of the Louisiana Constitution. | 1 | 3 |
| Boyd v. Community Ctr. Credit Corp.green | 1 | 3 |
| Ward v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.green | 1 | 3 |
| Fowler v. Robertsgreen | 1 | 2 |
| Lees v. Smithgreen | 1 | 2 |
| Butler v. FOLGER COFFEE COMPANYgreen | 1 | 2 |
| Trahan v. Rittermangreen | 1 | 2 |
| Jacobs v. O'BANNONgreen | 1 | 2 |
| White v. Baker Manor Nursing Home, Inc.green | 1 | 2 |
| Cormier v. Blakegreen | 1 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Louisiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Madison v. Bolton
green
2 sentences2005In support of this proposition, plaintiffs cite Madison v. Bolton, 234 La. 997 , 102 So.2d 433 (1958) and Clements v. Ryan, 382 So.2d 279 (La.App. 4th Cir.1980). [7] While plaintiffs acknowledge that communications between an employer and the Department of Employment Security generally enjoy a qualified privilege, plaintiffs argue that the statements were not made in good faith, as the defendants did not have reasonable grounds for believing them to be true. 2005In support of this proposition, plaintiffs cite Madison v. Bolton, 234 La. 997 , 102 So.2d 433 (1958) and Clements v. Ryan, 382 So.2d 279 (La.App. 4th Cir.1980). [7] While plaintiffs acknowledge that communications between an employer and the Department of Employment Security generally enjoy a qualified privilege, plaintiffs argue that the statements were not made in good faith, as the defendants did not have reasonable grounds for believing them to be true. | 8 | 1960–2005 |
Toomer v. Breaux
green
2 sentences1997Particularly, the intermediate court reasoned that the statements were not privileged because defendants did not meet the criteria for asserting a qualified privilege set forth in Toomer v. Breaux, 146 So.2d 723 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1962). 1986Defendants further assert the qualified privilege of the proof of claim applies because it (a) was made in good faith, (b) on a subject matter in which the person initiating the communication has an interest or in reference to which he has a duty and (c) the communication was made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, citing Toomer v. Breaux, 146 So.2d 723 (La.App. 3d Cir.1962). | 8 | 1980–1997 |
Waldo v. Morrison
green
2 sentences1981The Louisiana Supreme Court, in Waldo v. Morrison, 220 La. 1006 , 58 So.2d 210 (1952), was faced with an issue concerning the nature of the qualified privilege accorded defamatory statements contained in a brief filed in a judicial proceeding. 1981The Louisiana Supreme Court, in Waldo v. Morrison, 220 La. 1006 , 58 So.2d 210 (1952), was faced with an issue concerning the nature of the qualified privilege accorded defamatory statements contained in a brief filed in a judicial proceeding. | 5 | 1969–1981 |
Kennedy v. Item Co.
green
2 sentences1963To be actionable such statements must have been made maliciously, with knowledge of their falsity. * * * And although it can be argued that appellant’s position in the case at bar derives some support from language appearing in our decision in Flanagan v. Nicholson Publishing Company, 137 La. 588 , 68 So. 964 , L.R.A.1917E, 510, this court has pointed out in subsequent decisions that the Nicholson case is only authority for the proposition that Louisiana recognizes the doctrine of qualified privilege respecting fair comment and criticism of public officers and men in public life, but that 'the 1963To be actionable such statements must have been made maliciously, with knowledge of their falsity. * * * And although it can be argued that appellant’s position in the case at bar derives some support from language appearing in our decision in Flanagan v. Nicholson Publishing Company, 137 La. 588 , 68 So. 964 , L.R.A.1917E, 510, this court has pointed out in subsequent decisions that the Nicholson case is only authority for the proposition that Louisiana recognizes the doctrine of qualified privilege respecting fair comment and criticism of public officers and men in public life, but that 'the | 5 | 1958–1966 |
Lescale v. Joseph Schwartz Co.
green
2 sentences1981While there was a conflict in the earlier cases, the rule has been settled since, Lescale v. Joseph Schwartz Co., 116 La. 293 , 40 So. 708 , that the common-law rule of absolute privilege has no place in the law of Louisiana; the privilege is, rather, qualified, and is subject to the rule that the comment made must be material, with probable cause and without malice." (Emphasis provided.) Thus, it can be seen that there is no requirement that the person claiming the benefit of a qualified privilege be shown to have made the defamatory statements with "actual malice" for the purpose of holding 1981While there was a conflict in the earlier cases, the rule has been settled since, Lescale v. Joseph Schwartz Co., 116 La. 293 , 40 So. 708 , that the common-law rule of absolute privilege has no place in the law of Louisiana; the privilege is, rather, qualified, and is subject to the rule that the comment made must be material, with probable cause and without malice." (Emphasis provided.) Thus, it can be seen that there is no requirement that the person claiming the benefit of a qualified privilege be shown to have made the defamatory statements with "actual malice" for the purpose of holding | 4 | 1969–1981 |
Smith v. OUR LADY OF LAKE HOSP.
green
2 sentences2013Smith v. Our Lady of the Lake Hospital, Inc., 639 So.2d at 749 . |min determining the applicability of the qualified immunity, a court must engage in a two-step analysis. 2004Smith v. Our Lady of the Lake Hospital, 93-2512 pp. 20-21 (La.7/5/94), 639 So.2d 730 , 746-747. | 3 | 2000–2013 |
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
green
2 sentences2007Moreover, even if Del Giorno's comments could be considered defamatory, they are protected speech and are subject to a qualified privilege under the test of New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 , 84 S.Ct. 710 , 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964), which balances the freedom of expression against the right to defend against defamation. 2007Moreover, even if Del Giorno's comments could be considered defamatory, they are protected speech and are subject to a qualified privilege under the test of New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 , 84 S.Ct. 710 , 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964), which balances the freedom of expression against the right to defend against defamation. | 3 | 1964–2007 |
| Oakes v. Walther green | 3 | 1938–1980 |
| Yount v. Handshoe green | 2 | 2017–2017 |
| Miskell v. Ciervo green | 2 | 2009–2014 |
| Lambert v. RIVERBOAT GAMING ENFORC. DIV. green | 2 | 2001–2008 |
| Clements v. Ryan green | 2 | 1983–2005 |
| Douglas v. Thomas green | 2 | 2004–2004 |
| Douglas v. Thomas green | 2 | 2004–2004 |
| Mitchell v. Forsyth green | 2 | 1996–1999 |
| Wolford v. JoEllen Smith Psych. Hosp. green | 2 | 1999–1999 |
| Soentgen v. Quain & Ramstad Clinic, P.C. green | 2 | 1994–1994 |
| Jones v. Wesley green | 2 | 1988–1991 |
| Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Melikyan green | 2 | 1986–1991 |
| State ex rel. Ladner v. Henderson green | 2 | 1975–1982 |
| Jones v. Davis green | 2 | 1975–1982 |
| Jones v. Davis green | 2 | 1975–1982 |
| Foster v. McClain green | 2 | 1978–1981 |
| Matassa v. Bel green | 2 | 1966–1975 |
| Walsh v. Bertel green | 2 | 1962–1974 |
| Berot v. Porte neutral | 2 | 1960–1963 |
| Otero v. Ewing green | 2 | 1958–1960 |
| Buisson v. Huard neutral | 2 | 1934–1960 |
| State v. Peart green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Cook v. American Gateway Bank green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Miller v. Acadian Ambulance Serv., Inc. green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Mcmanus Constr., LLC v. White-Spunner Constr., Inc. green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Van de Kamp v. Goldstein green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Rathey v. Priority EMS, Inc. neutral | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Massie v. Deloach neutral | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Rathey v. Priority EMS, Inc. green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Wood v. Del Giorno green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.