qualified privilege in Mississippi

2022A qualified privilege for communications between persons with a common interest in a subject matter exists under Mississippi law, as follows: A communication made in good faith and on a subject matter in which the person making it has an interest, or in reference to which he has a duty, is privileged if made to a person or persons having a corresponding interest or duty, even though it contains matter which without this privilege would be slanderous, provided the statement is made without malice and in good faith. 9 Eckman v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 893 So. 2d 1049, 1052 (¶9) (Miss. 2005).

2022A plaintiff must present affirmative evidence demonstrating actual malice to defeat the qualified privilege.” Barmada, 989 So. 2d at 364 (¶17) (citing Eckman, 893 So. 2d at 1054 (¶14)); S. Health Corp. of Houston v. Crausby, 174 So. 3d 916, 921 (¶20) (Miss.

2009“However, this qualified immunity only affords protection against suits arising out of the performance of discretionary duties.” Mohundro v. Alcorn County, 675 So.2d 848, 853 (Miss.1996) (citing Coplin, 631 So.2d at 753 ; Davis v. Little, 362 So.2d 642, 644 (Miss.1978)). ¶ 17.

2001Davis v. Little, 362 So.2d 642, 643 (Miss.1978).

2018Relying on Hayden , this Court ultimately held that the individuals to whom the communication was made "were directly interested in the matter; and therefore, the qualified privilege appli[ed]." Id. (citing Hayden , 407 So.2d at 537-38 ).

2008This Court held that "the persons present in those meetings were directly interested in the matter and that the qualified privilege prevailed...." Id. at 538 .

2001As for the existence of a qualified privilege, this Court provided the following in Louisiana Oil Corp. v. Renno, 173 Miss. 609, 618-19 , 157 So. 705, 708 (1934): A communication made in good faith and on a subject-matter in which the person making it has an interest, or in reference to which he has a duty, is privileged if made to a person or persons having a corresponding interest or duty, even though it contains matter which without this privilege would be slanderous, provided the statement is made without malice and in good faith. ¶ 8.

2001As for the existence of a qualified privilege, this Court provided the following in Louisiana Oil Corp. v. Renno, 173 Miss. 609, 618-19 , 157 So. 705, 708 (1934): A communication made in good faith and on a subject-matter in which the person making it has an interest, or in reference to which he has a duty, is privileged if made to a person or persons having a corresponding interest or duty, even though it contains matter which without this privilege would be slanderous, provided the statement is made without malice and in good faith. ¶ 8.

2014Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 818 F.2d 380, 386-87 (5th Cir.1987) (applying Mississippi law)).

2011Dupont de Numours & Co., 818 F.2d 380, 386-87 (5th Cir. 1987) (applying Mississippi law))).

1990In Hudson v. Rausa, 462 So.2d 689 (Miss. 1984), the Court said: The public officials of this state, elected or appointed, enjoy a qualified immunity to a civil action for damages when acting in the performance of official functions discretionary in nature.

1988The Court in Marshall, supra, at 1376, upheld Hudson and declined "to distinguish Hudson by arguing that Hudson was immunized from liability by his status as a health department official implementing a health policy enacted for the good of the people of the state as a whole, as opposed to Dr. Chawla who was `simply a physician employed by the state hospital to treat the general public and his actions of the treatment of patients was subject to the same standards of care as other physicians'." We believe under the principles stated in Rausa, supra, and reaffirmed in Marshall, supra, that Renake

1994In Hooks v. McCall, 272 So. 2d 925, 927 (Miss. 1973) this Court held that "a qualified privilege exists between those directly interested in the same matter and in the absence of malice no cause of action lies." Moreover, once the qualified privilege is established, "statements or written communications are not actionable as slanderous or libelous absent bad faith or malice if the communications are limited to those person who have a legitimate and direct interest in the subject matter." Benson v. Hall, 339 So. 2d 570 (Miss.1976) (citing Killebrew v. Jackson City Lines, 225 Miss. 84 , 82 So. 2

1994In Hooks v. McCall, 272 So. 2d 925, 927 (Miss. 1973) this Court held that "a qualified privilege exists between those directly interested in the same matter and in the absence of malice no cause of action lies." Moreover, once the qualified privilege is established, "statements or written communications are not actionable as slanderous or libelous absent bad faith or malice if the communications are limited to those person who have a legitimate and direct interest in the subject matter." Benson v. Hall, 339 So. 2d 570 (Miss.1976) (citing Killebrew v. Jackson City Lines, 225 Miss. 84 , 82 So. 2

1994In Hooks v. McCall, 272 So. 2d 925, 927 (Miss. 1973) this Court held that "a qualified privilege exists between those directly interested in the same matter and in the absence of malice no cause of action lies." Moreover, once the qualified privilege is established, "statements or written communications are not actionable as slanderous or libelous absent bad faith or malice if the communications are limited to those person who have a legitimate and direct interest in the subject matter." Benson v. Hall, 339 So. 2d 570 (Miss.1976) (citing Killebrew v. Jackson City Lines, 225 Miss. 84 , 82 So. 2

1990In Hooks v. McCall, 272 So.2d 925 (Miss. 1973), this Court held that "a qualified privilege exists between those directly interested in the same manner and in the absence of malice, no cause of action lies." [ Hooks, 272 So.2d at 927 .] In Benson v. Hall, 339 So.2d 570 (Miss. 1976), the Court, relying on Killebrew , held "When qualified privilege is established, statements or written communications are not actionable as slanderous or libelous absent bad faith or malice if the communications are limited to those persons who have a legitimate and direct interest in the subject matter." [ Benson,

1999In Womble v. Singing River Hosp., 618 So.2d 1252 (Miss.1993), we stated that qualified immunity serves to protect the discretion of public officials so that such officials may make decisions and formulate policies for the public without the deterring concern of lawsuits.

1999Womble v. Singing River Hosp., 618 So.2d 1252, 1263 (Miss.1993). ¶ 51.

1994In Hooks v. McCall, 272 So. 2d 925, 927 (Miss. 1973) this Court held that "a qualified privilege exists between those directly interested in the same matter and in the absence of malice no cause of action lies." Moreover, once the qualified privilege is established, "statements or written communications are not actionable as slanderous or libelous absent bad faith or malice if the communications are limited to those person who have a legitimate and direct interest in the subject matter." Benson v. Hall, 339 So. 2d 570 (Miss.1976) (citing Killebrew v. Jackson City Lines, 225 Miss. 84 , 82 So. 2

1990In Hooks v. McCall, 272 So.2d 925 (Miss. 1973), this Court held that "a qualified privilege exists between those directly interested in the same manner and in the absence of malice, no cause of action lies." [ Hooks, 272 So.2d at 927 .] In Benson v. Hall, 339 So.2d 570 (Miss. 1976), the Court, relying on Killebrew , held "When qualified privilege is established, statements or written communications are not actionable as slanderous or libelous absent bad faith or malice if the communications are limited to those persons who have a legitimate and direct interest in the subject matter." [ Benson,

2022The trial court must first “determine whether the occasion calls for a qualified privilege[;] [if the court finds that] a qualified privilege does exist, the [c]ourt must then determine whether the privilege is overcome by malice, bad faith, or abuse.” Id. (citation omitted). ¶19.

2022A plaintiff must present affirmative evidence demonstrating actual malice to defeat the qualified privilege.” Barmada, 989 So. 2d at 364 (¶17) (citing Eckman, 893 So. 2d at 1054 (¶14)); S. Health Corp. of Houston v. Crausby, 174 So. 3d 916, 921 (¶20) (Miss.

2004Qualified immunity has therefore been recognized to protect "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 , 106 S.Ct. 1092 , 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986). ¶ 18.

2004Qualified immunity has therefore been recognized to protect "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 , 106 S.Ct. 1092 , 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986). ¶ 18.

2002The distinction between the two is "that [if] the duty is one which has been positively imposed by law and in a manner or upon conditions which are specifically designated, the duty to perform under the condition specified, not being dependent upon the officer's judgment or discretion, the act and discharge thereof is ministerial." McFadden v. State, 580 So.2d 1210, 1216 (Miss.1991) (Citing McFadden v. State, 542 So.2d 871, 877 (Miss.1989)) (emphasis added). ¶ 43.

2000The distinction between the two is "that [if] the duty is one which has been positively imposed by law and in a manner or upon conditions which are specifically designated, the duty to perform under the condition specified, not being dependent upon the officer's judgment or discretion, the act and discharge thereof is ministerial." McFadden v. State, 580 So.2d 1210, 1216 (Miss. 1991) (Citing McFadden v State, 542 So.2d 871, 877 (Miss. 1989)) (emphasis added). ¶43.

2022See Staheli v. Smith, 548 So. 2d 1299, 1305 (Miss. 1989) (finding qualified privilege protected communications between college dean and faculty senate concerning plaintiff professor’s tenure application); see also Beauchene v. Miss.

1990In our state, there exist two ways to abuse a qualified privilege: (1) "excessive publication to persons not within the `circle' of those people who have a legitimate and direct interest in the subject matter of the communication," Staheli v. Smith, 548 So.2d 1299, 1305 (Miss. 1989) (cites therein); Holland v. Kennedy, 548 So.2d 982, 987 (Miss. 1989) (cites therein), and (2) publication beyond the scope of what is necessary.

2003Glenn v. City of Tyler, 242 F.3d 307, 312 (5th Cir.2001).

2003E.g., Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 , 107 S.Ct. 3034 , 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987); Glenn v. City of Tyler, 242 F.3d 307, 312-13 (5th Cir.2001); Fraire v. City of Arlington, 957 F.2d 1268, 1273 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 973 , 113 S.Ct. 462 , 121 L.Ed.2d 371 (1992).

2003E.g., Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 , 107 S.Ct. 3034 , 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987); Glenn v. City of Tyler, 242 F.3d 307, 312-13 (5th Cir.2001); Fraire v. City of Arlington, 957 F.2d 1268, 1273 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 973 , 113 S.Ct. 462 , 121 L.Ed.2d 371 (1992).

2002E.g., Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 , 107 S.Ct. 3034 , 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987); Glenn v. City of Tyler, 242 F.3d 307, 312-13 (5th Cir.2001); Fraire v. City of Arlington, 957 F.2d 1268, 1273 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 973 , 113 S.Ct. 462 , 121 L.Ed.2d 371 (1992).

2003Petta v. Rivera, 143 F.3d 895, 899 (5th Cir.1998).

2002Petta v. Rivera, 143 F.3d 895, 899 (5th Cir. 1998).

2003Sykes v. Grantham, 567 So.2d 200, 211 (Miss.1990). ¶ 16.

1999Sykes v. Grantham, 567 So.2d 200, 211 (Miss.1990)(holding that parole board entitled to qualified immunity when it substantially complied with duties and requirements set forth in statute and where there was no violation of their ministerial duties).

2003Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 , 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738 , 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982).

2003Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 , 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738 , 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982).

2021As stated above, actual malice “denotes ill will, a sentiment of hate or spite, especially when harbored by one person towards another,” and actual malice exists “when one with a sedate, deliberate mind and formed design injures another.” Id. at 364 (¶17) (quoting Young, 572 So. 2d at 385 ).

2008Id. at 384 .

1995Powers is protected from a slander suit if her statements about Beverly relate to "charges made against the employee affecting the latter's employment." Bush v. Mullen, 478 So.2d 313 , 314 (Miss. 1985).

1990Bush, 478 So.2d at 314 ; see also Staheli, 548 So.2d at 1305-06 ; Holland, 548 So.2d at 987 ; Hayden, 407 So.2d at 536 .

2018Eckman , 893 So.2d at 1052 (quoting Smith v. White , 799 So.2d 83 , 86 (Miss. 2001) ). ¶ 17.

2006Id. at 86-87 (¶ 8). ¶ 67.