qualified privilege in Hawaii

2010Even if a statement is defamatory, the author of the statement is protected by a qualified privilege when he or she "reasonably acts in the discharge of some public or private duty, legal, moral, or social, and where the publication concerns subject matter in which the author has an interest and the recipients of the publication a corresponding interest or duty." Russell v. American Guild of Variety Artists, 53 Haw. 456, 460 , 497 P.2d 40, 44 (1972).

2010Even if a statement is defamatory, the author of the statement is protected by a qualified privilege when he or she "reasonably acts in the discharge of some public or private duty, legal, moral, or social, and where the publication concerns subject matter in which the author has an interest and the recipients of the publication a corresponding interest or duty." Russell v. American Guild of Variety Artists, 53 Haw. 456, 460 , 497 P.2d 40, 44 (1972).

1983A qualified privilege “arises when the author of the defamatory statement reasonably acts in the discharge of some public or private duty, legal, moral, or social, and where the publication concerns subject matter in which the author has an interest and the recipients of the publication a corresponding interest or duty.” Aku v. Lewis, 52 Haw. 366, 371 , 477 P.2d 162, 166 (1970).

1983A qualified privilege “arises when the author of the defamatory statement reasonably acts in the discharge of some public or private duty, legal, moral, or social, and where the publication concerns subject matter in which the author has an interest and the recipients of the publication a corresponding interest or duty.” Aku v. Lewis, 52 Haw. 366, 371 , 477 P.2d 162, 166 (1970).

2010Whether a particular communication is privileged is "an issue of law to be determined by the court." Kainz v. Lussier, 4 Haw.

2004However, a qualified privilege is conditional and is lost by "[(1)] excessive publication, [(2)] use of the occasion for an improper purpose, or [(3)] lack of belief or grounds for belief in the truth of what is said." Calleon v. Miyagi, 76 Hawai`i 310, 319, 876 P.2d 1278, 1287 (1994); see Kainz v. Lussier, 4 Haw.

2004Guild of Variety Artists, 53 Haw. 456, 460 , 497 P.2d 40, 44 (1972); see Lauer v. Y.M.C.A, 57 Haw. 390, 396 , 557 P.2d 1334, 1338 (1976) (explaining that a qualified privilege "arises when the author of the defamatory statement reasonably acts in discharge of some public or private duty, legal, moral, or social, and the recipients of the publication [have] a corresponding interest or duty").

2004Guild of Variety Artists, 53 Haw. 456, 460 , 497 P.2d 40, 44 (1972); see Lauer v. Y.M.C.A, 57 Haw. 390, 396 , 557 P.2d 1334, 1338 (1976) (explaining that a qualified privilege "arises when the author of the defamatory statement reasonably acts in discharge of some public or private duty, legal, moral, or social, and the recipients of the publication [have] a corresponding interest or duty").

2007According to the "reasonable person" test, "in the instance where malice is alleged to extinguish a qualified privilege, defendant is required to act as a reasonable [person] under the circumstances, with due regard to the strength of his [or her] belief, the grounds that he [or she] has to support it, and the importance of conveying the information." Towse, 64 Haw. at 632-33 , 647 P.2d at 703 (quoting Russell, 53 Haw. at 463 n. 4, 497 P.2d at 45 n. 4 (quoting Prosser, The Law of Torts, 795-96 (4th ed.1971))) (quotation signals omitted).

2007According to the "reasonable person" test, "in the instance where malice is alleged to extinguish a qualified privilege, defendant is required to act as a reasonable [person] under the circumstances, with due regard to the strength of his [or her] belief, the grounds that he [or she] has to support it, and the importance of conveying the information." Towse, 64 Haw. at 632-33 , 647 P.2d at 703 (quoting Russell, 53 Haw. at 463 n. 4, 497 P.2d at 45 n. 4 (quoting Prosser, The Law of Torts, 795-96 (4th ed.1971))) (quotation signals omitted).

2025Bellamy argued there was sufficient evidence of malice to submit the issue to the jury, citing Runnels v. Okamoto, 56 Haw. 1, 5, 525 P.2d 1125, 1129 (1974) ("The existence or absence of malice is generally a question for the jury.").

2025Bellamy argued there was sufficient evidence of malice to submit the issue to the jury, citing Runnels v. Okamoto, 56 Haw. 1, 5, 525 P.2d 1125, 1129 (1974) ("The existence or absence of malice is generally a question for the jury.").

2025“A cynic might say that with qualified immunity, government agents are at liberty to violate your constitutional rights as long as they do so in a novel way.” Green, 734 F. Supp. 3d at 540; Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986) (“As the qualified immunity defense has evolved, it provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”); Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100, 121 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“[The Court’s] one-sided approach to qualified immunity . . . tells the public that palpably unreasonable conduct will go unpunished.”).

1999The qualified immunity standard “gives ample room for mistaken judgments” by protecting “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Malley [v. Briggs ], 475 U.S. [335], 343 [ 106 S.Ct. 1092 , 89 L.Ed.2d 271 ] [ (1986) ].

2013Brown v. Thompson, 91 Hawai'i 1, 14 , 979 P.2d 586, 599 (1999) (quoting Pele Defense Fund v. Paty, 73 Haw. 578, 595 , 837 P.2d 1247, 1259 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 918 , 113 S.Ct. 1277 , 122 L.Ed.2d 671 (1993)).

2013Brown v. Thompson, 91 Hawai'i 1, 14 , 979 P.2d 586, 599 (1999) (quoting Pele Defense Fund v. Paty, 73 Haw. 578, 595 , 837 P.2d 1247, 1259 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 918 , 113 S.Ct. 1277 , 122 L.Ed.2d 671 (1993)).

2026A qualified privilege "arises when the author of the defamatory statement reasonably acts in the discharge of some public or private duty, legal, moral, or social, and where the publication concerns subject matter in which the author has an interest and the recipients of the publication a corresponding interest or duty." Vlasaty v. Pacific Club, 4 Haw.

2026A qualified privilege "arises when the author of the defamatory statement reasonably acts in the discharge of some public or private duty, legal, moral, or social, and where the publication concerns subject matter in which the author has an interest and the recipients of the publication a corresponding interest or duty." Vlasaty v. Pacific Club, 4 Haw.

2025“A cynic might say that with qualified immunity, government agents are at liberty to violate your constitutional rights as long as they do so in a novel way.” Green, 734 F. Supp. 3d at 540; Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986) (“As the qualified immunity defense has evolved, it provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”); Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100, 121 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“[The Court’s] one-sided approach to qualified immunity . . . tells the public that palpably unreasonable conduct will go unpunished.”).

2025“A cynic might say that with qualified immunity, government agents are at liberty to violate your constitutional rights as long as they do so in a novel way.” Green, 734 F. Supp. 3d at 540; Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986) (“As the qualified immunity defense has evolved, it provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”); Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100, 121 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“[The Court’s] one-sided approach to qualified immunity . . . tells the public that palpably unreasonable conduct will go unpunished.”).

2016See Morais v. Yee, 162 Vt. 366 , 648 A.2d 405, 410 (1994) (holding that where the Vermont Legislature enacted a statute similar to HRS § 291C-26, which established a statutory duty and liability for a breach of that duty for drivers of authorized emergency vehicles, the judicially created doctrine of qualified immunity did not apply).

2016See Morais v. Yee, 162 Vt. 366 , 648 A.2d 405, 410 (1994) (holding that where the Vermont Legislature enacted a statute similar to HRS § 291C-26, which established a statutory duty and liability for a breach of that duty for drivers of authorized emergency vehicles, the judicially created doctrine of qualified immunity did not apply).

2013Medical discretion is simply “not the sort of individual judgment sought to be protected by the qualified immunity bestowed upon public officials.” Sparks, 701 So.2d at 1118 (McRae, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).

2013Brown v. Thompson, 91 Hawai'i 1, 14 , 979 P.2d 586, 599 (1999) (quoting Pele Defense Fund v. Paty, 73 Haw. 578, 595 , 837 P.2d 1247, 1259 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 918 , 113 S.Ct. 1277 , 122 L.Ed.2d 671 (1993)).

2013Brown v. Thompson, 91 Hawai'i 1, 14 , 979 P.2d 586, 599 (1999) (quoting Pele Defense Fund v. Paty, 73 Haw. 578, 595 , 837 P.2d 1247, 1259 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 918 , 113 S.Ct. 1277 , 122 L.Ed.2d 671 (1993)).

2013Fostering a lower standard of medical care among prison physicians “is clearly not necessary, let alone effective, in promoting a rational prison objective.” Ross, 920 P.2d at 1176 (Stewart, C.J., dissenting) (citations omitted).

2008Qualified immunity is `an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation.'" Id. (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)).

2007Id. at 380 (citations omitted) (emphases added); see Fraidin v. Weitzman, 93 Md.App. 168 , 611 A.2d 1046, 1080 (1992) (stating that, “[t]o remove the qualified privilege, the attorney must possess a desire to harm which is independent of the desire to protect his client.

2007Id. at 380 (citations omitted) (emphases added); see Fraidin v. Weitzman, 93 Md.App. 168 , 611 A.2d 1046, 1080 (1992) (stating that, “[t]o remove the qualified privilege, the attorney must possess a desire to harm which is independent of the desire to protect his client.

2007Id. at 380 (citations omitted) (emphases added); see Fraidin v. Weitzman, 93 Md.App. 168 , 611 A.2d 1046, 1080 (1992) (stating that, “[t]o remove the qualified privilege, the attorney must possess a desire to harm which is independent of the desire to protect his client.

2004Motors Corp., 71 Haw. 1, 16 , 780 P.2d 566, 574 (1989). [45] Cross-Appellants and Plaintiff do not contest the court's conclusion that a qualified privilege existed. [46] "[I]t is well-settled that an appellate court will not pass upon issues dependent upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence[.]" Tachibana v. State, 79 Hawai`i 226, 239, 900 P.2d 1293, 1307 (1995) (quoting Domingo v. State, 76 Hawai`i 237, 242, 873 P.2d 775, 789 (1995)); Amfac, Inc. V.

2004Motors Corp., 71 Haw. 1, 16 , 780 P.2d 566, 574 (1989). [45] Cross-Appellants and Plaintiff do not contest the court's conclusion that a qualified privilege existed. [46] "[I]t is well-settled that an appellate court will not pass upon issues dependent upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence[.]" Tachibana v. State, 79 Hawai`i 226, 239, 900 P.2d 1293, 1307 (1995) (quoting Domingo v. State, 76 Hawai`i 237, 242, 873 P.2d 775, 789 (1995)); Amfac, Inc. V.

2004Motors Corp., 71 Haw. 1, 16 , 780 P.2d 566, 574 (1989). [45] Cross-Appellants and Plaintiff do not contest the court's conclusion that a qualified privilege existed. [46] "[I]t is well-settled that an appellate court will not pass upon issues dependent upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence[.]" Tachibana v. State, 79 Hawai`i 226, 239, 900 P.2d 1293, 1307 (1995) (quoting Domingo v. State, 76 Hawai`i 237, 242, 873 P.2d 775, 789 (1995)); Amfac, Inc. V.

2004However, a qualified privilege is conditional and is lost by "[(1)] excessive publication, [(2)] use of the occasion for an improper purpose, or [(3)] lack of belief or grounds for belief in the truth of what is said." Calleon v. Miyagi, 76 Hawai`i 310, 319, 876 P.2d 1278, 1287 (1994); see Kainz v. Lussier, 4 Haw.

2004However, a qualified privilege is conditional and is lost by "[(1)] excessive publication, [(2)] use of the occasion for an improper purpose, or [(3)] lack of belief or grounds for belief in the truth of what is said." Calleon v. Miyagi, 76 Hawai`i 310, 319, 876 P.2d 1278, 1287 (1994); see Kainz v. Lussier, 4 Haw.

2004Motors Corp., 71 Haw. 1, 16 , 780 P.2d 566, 574 (1989). [45] Cross-Appellants and Plaintiff do not contest the court's conclusion that a qualified privilege existed. [46] "[I]t is well-settled that an appellate court will not pass upon issues dependent upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence[.]" Tachibana v. State, 79 Hawai`i 226, 239, 900 P.2d 1293, 1307 (1995) (quoting Domingo v. State, 76 Hawai`i 237, 242, 873 P.2d 775, 789 (1995)); Amfac, Inc. V.

2004Francis DeSales, 609 N.E.2d 216, 223 (Ohio 1992).) But, as discussed, Plaintiff's evidence revealed significant discrepancies between Cross-Appellants' reports regarding Patient's condition on the night in question, as compared to the reports of other nurses on duty at the same time.