qualified privilege in Ohio

2026In order to demonstrate a qualified privilege of the communication, Adena and the Board had to prove all these elements: “good faith, an interest to be upheld, a statement limited in its scope to this purpose, a proper occasion, and publication in a proper manner and to proper parties only.” Hahn v. Kotten, 43 Ohio St.2d 237, 246 (1975). {¶132} The following are the statements that the Doctors maintain were defamatory: • Board member Jennifer McKell stated that at the meeting they were informed that propriety information was downloaded.

2026It therefore applied the qualified privilege to “communications between insurers and insureds.” Id. {¶48} Hahn is distinguishable from this case on a number of fronts.

2026“In a qualified privilege case, ‘actual malice’ is defined as acting with knowledge that the statements are false or acting with reckless disregard as to their truth or falsity.” Jacobs v. Frank, 60 Ohio St.3d 111 , (1990) at paragraph two of the syllabus.

2026In doing so, 47 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO we opined that “[p]ublic policy concerns dictate that those who provide information to licensing boards pursuant to [former] R.C. 2305.25 be given a qualified privilege in order to aid in the dissemination of information to those boards, thereby improving the quality of health care administered to the general public.” Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus.

2026Id. {¶36} Courts have identified five elements to comprise the qualified privilege: (1) the publication was made in good faith, (2) there was an interest to be upheld, (3) the publication was limited in scope to that interest, (4) the publication was made on the proper occasion, and (5) the publication was done in a proper manner and to the proper parties.

2017Trades Council , 73 Ohio St.3d 1 , 7, 651 N.E.2d 1283 (1995). {¶ 37} A defendant can invoke the defense of qualified privilege to a claim for libel where "circumstances exist, or are reasonably believed by the defendant to exist, which cast on him the duty of making a communication to a certain other person to whom he makes such communication in the performance of such duty" or where "the person is so situated that it becomes right in the interests of society that he should tell third persons certain facts, which he in good faith proceeds to do." Hahn v. Kotten , 43 Ohio St.2d 237 , 245-246, 3

2026Safety, 2017-Ohio-9199, ¶ 36 (10th Dist.). {¶11} Defendant, in its motion for summary judgment, argues that “the allegedly defamatory statements are protected by qualified privilege . . . .” (Motion, p. 5.) “One of the defenses to a defamation claim is one of qualified privilege, in which the interest that the defendant is seeking to vindicate is conditioned upon publication in a reasonable manner and for a proper purpose.” DeGarmo v. Worthington City Schools Bd. of Ed., 2013-Ohio-2518 , ¶ 18 (10th Dist.). “‘A qualified privilege is an affirmative defense to a claim of defamation.’” Hill v. Oh

2025“One of the defenses to a defamation claim is one of qualified privilege, in which the interest that the defendant is seeking to vindicate is conditioned upon publication in a reasonable manner and for a proper purpose.” DeGarmo v. Worthington City Schools Bd. of Ed., 2013-Ohio-2518, ¶ 18 (10th Dist.). “‘A qualified privilege is an affirmative defense to a claim of defamation.’” Hill v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2021-Ohio-561, ¶ 17 (10th Dist.), quoting Morrison v. Gugle, 142 Ohio App.3d 244, 258 (10th Dist. 2001). {¶23} Concerning the nature of communications subject to a qualified privil

2026The work-product doctrine “provides a qualified privilege protecting the attorney’s mental processes in preparation of litigation, establishing ‘a zone of privacy in which lawyers can analyze and prepare their client’s case free from scrutiny or interference by an adversary.’” (Emphasis sic.) Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, L.L.P., 127 Ohio St.3d 161 , 937 N.E.2d 533 , 2010-Ohio-4469, at ¶ 55 , quoting Hobley v. Burge, 433 F.3d 946, 949 (7th Cir.2006).

2022And the interests of the clients and the cause of justice would be poorly served.” Addressing these concerns, the work-product doctrine provides a qualified privilege protecting the attorney’s mental processes in preparation of litigation, establishing “a zone of privacy in which lawyers can analyze and prepare their client’s case free from scrutiny or interference by an adversary.” Hobley v. Burge (C.A.7, 2006), 433 F.3d 946, 949 .

2026“The doctrine of qualified immunity generally shields public officials performing discretionary functions from liability for civil damages to the extent that their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Cleveland Constr., Inc. v. Cincinnati, 2006-Ohio-6452, ¶ 80 (1st Dist.), overruled on other grounds, Cleveland Constr., Inc. v. Cincinnati, 2008-Ohio-2337 , citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

2026“The doctrine of qualified immunity generally shields public officials performing discretionary functions from liability for civil damages to the extent that their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Cleveland Constr., Inc. v. Cincinnati, 2006-Ohio-6452, ¶ 80 (1st Dist.), overruled on other grounds, Cleveland Constr., Inc. v. Cincinnati, 2008-Ohio-2337 , citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

2020To “defeat the qualified privilege, ‘there must be a showing that [any allegedly defamatory statements] were made with actual malice,’ ” i.e., “with knowledge of [the statements’] falsity or with reckless disregard of whether [the statements] were false or not.” McPeek at ¶ 10 , quoting Evely v. Carlon Co., Div. of Indian Head, Inc., 4 Ohio St.3d 163, 165 , 447 N.E.2d 1290 (1983); Sullins at ¶ 20.

2020To “defeat the qualified privilege, ‘there must be a showing that [any allegedly defamatory statements] were made with actual malice,’ ” i.e., “with knowledge of [the statements’] falsity or with reckless disregard of whether [the statements] were false or not.” McPeek at ¶ 10 , quoting Evely v. Carlon Co., Div. of Indian Head, Inc., 4 Ohio St.3d 163, 165 , 447 N.E.2d 1290 (1983); Sullins at ¶ 20.

2022See, e.g., Smith v. Ameriflora, 1992, Inc., 96 Ohio App.3d 179, 189 (10th Dist.1994) ("Ohio courts have recognized that the qualified privilege defense is applicable to actions for intentional infliction of emotional distress."); Gintert v. WCI Steel, Inc., 11th Dist. No. 2002-T-0124, 2007-Ohio-6737 ("When a privilege, qualified or absolute, attaches to statements made in a defamation action, those statements remain privileged for the purpose of derivative claims such as intentional infliction of emotional distress and tortious interference with a business relationship."). {¶ 71} Appellant als

2003See Smith v. Ameriflora 1992, Inc. (1994), 96 Ohio App.3d 179 , appeal not allowed, 71 Ohio St.3d 1427 (holding that statements by officers of construction management firm made regarding a construction coordinator for an exposition were qualifiedly privileged where the statements were made to a sponsor of the exposition for which the firm had been hired); Wilson, supra (holding a letter from a company representative to a contractor for the company regarding the contractor's employee was protected by common business interest privilege); Gaumont v. Emery Air Freight Corp. (1989), 61 Ohio App.3d

2026Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986) (“As the qualified immunity defense has evolved, it provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”).

2026Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986) (“As the qualified immunity defense has evolved, it provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”).

2026Safety, 2017-Ohio-9199, ¶ 36 (10th Dist.). {¶11} Defendant, in its motion for summary judgment, argues that “the allegedly defamatory statements are protected by qualified privilege . . . .” (Motion, p. 5.) “One of the defenses to a defamation claim is one of qualified privilege, in which the interest that the defendant is seeking to vindicate is conditioned upon publication in a reasonable manner and for a proper purpose.” DeGarmo v. Worthington City Schools Bd. of Ed., 2013-Ohio-2518 , ¶ 18 (10th Dist.). “‘A qualified privilege is an affirmative defense to a claim of defamation.’” Hill v. Oh

2025“One of the defenses to a defamation claim is one of qualified privilege, in which the interest that the defendant is seeking to vindicate is conditioned upon publication in a reasonable manner and for a proper purpose.” DeGarmo v. Worthington City Schools Bd. of Ed., 2013-Ohio-2518, ¶ 18 (10th Dist.). “‘A qualified privilege is an affirmative defense to a claim of defamation.’” Hill v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2021-Ohio-561, ¶ 17 (10th Dist.), quoting Morrison v. Gugle, 142 Ohio App.3d 244, 258 (10th Dist. 2001). {¶23} Concerning the nature of communications subject to a qualified privil

2026In Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 429 (1976), the Court explained that although government officials may enjoy immunity from civil liability, the public is not powerless to deter misconduct or to punish it when it occurs because government officials remain subject to criminal liability.

2018"However, 'absolute immunity does not extend to a prosecutor engaged in essentially investigative or administrative functions'[;] * * * [w]hile performing these functions, he is entitled to only a qualified immunity." (Citation omitted.) Id. {¶ 13} The trial court dismissed the Kennedys' Complaint on the grounds that Specht and Iarocci were entitled to prosecutorial immunity under the facts alleged.

2025(Plaintiff’s Response, p. 4.) {¶28} “A qualified privilege may be defeated only by clear and convincing evidence of actual malice on the part of the defendant.” Stainbrook v. Ohio Secy. of State, 2017- Ohio-1526, ¶ 18 (10th Dist.). “‘In a qualified privilege case, “actual malice” is defined as acting with knowledge that the statements are false or acting with reckless disregard as to their truth or falsity.’” Jackson v. Columbus, 2008-Ohio-1041 , ¶ 9, quoting Jacobs v. Frank, 60 Ohio St.3d 111 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. {¶29} “The phrase ‘reckless disregard’ applies when a publishe

2025(Plaintiff’s Response, p. 4.) {¶28} “A qualified privilege may be defeated only by clear and convincing evidence of actual malice on the part of the defendant.” Stainbrook v. Ohio Secy. of State, 2017- Ohio-1526, ¶ 18 (10th Dist.). “‘In a qualified privilege case, “actual malice” is defined as acting with knowledge that the statements are false or acting with reckless disregard as to their truth or falsity.’” Jackson v. Columbus, 2008-Ohio-1041, ¶ 9, quoting Jacobs v. Frank, 60 Ohio St.3d 111 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. {¶29} “The phrase ‘reckless disregard’ applies when a publisher

2026The work-product doctrine “provides a qualified privilege protecting the attorney’s mental processes in preparation of litigation, establishing ‘a zone of privacy in which lawyers can analyze and prepare their client’s case free from scrutiny or interference by an adversary.’” (Emphasis sic.) Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, L.L.P., 127 Ohio St.3d 161 , 937 N.E.2d 533 , 2010-Ohio-4469, at ¶ 55 , quoting Hobley v. Burge, 433 F.3d 946, 949 (7th Cir.2006).

2026The work-product doctrine “provides a qualified privilege protecting the attorney’s mental processes in preparation of litigation, establishing ‘a zone of privacy in which lawyers can analyze and prepare their client’s case free from scrutiny or interference by an adversary.’” (Emphasis sic.) Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, L.L.P., 127 Ohio St.3d 161 , 937 N.E.2d 533 , 2010-Ohio-4469, at ¶ 55 , quoting Hobley v. Burge, 433 F.3d 946, 949 (7th Cir.2006).

2022See Mosley at 638 (no malice where church deacons "did have a factual foundation for their opinion concerning the effect of [the pastor's] health on his performance"). {¶ 59} Accordingly, as there are no genuine issues of material fact that the statements at issue are entitled to a qualified privilege, we find no error with the trial court's determination that appellees are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on appellant's claims of defamation, slander, libel, and false-light invasion of privacy. {¶ 60} Appellant further contends the trial court erred in failing to find genuine issues of

2022Ohio courts have also recognized the existence of a qualified privilege as to "church interests." See Mosley at 637 (church deacons entitled to defense of qualified privilege regarding letter distributed to church congregation concerning "various church interests" and expressing deacons' belief that reverend's health problems prevented him from performing his duties effectively); Austin v. Peterson, 9th Dist. No. 2735-M (Jan. 13, 1999), citing Baker v. Spinning Rd.

2025They further claim the trial court erred in finding that Perez’s statements to law enforcement were protected by the defense of qualified privilege. {¶ 39} “Qualified privilege is an affirmative defense to a defamation claim, and the defendant must plead it separately from a general denial.” Anderson v. WBNS-TV, Inc., 2024-Ohio-4880, ¶ 22 (10th Dist.), citing Cooper v. Grace Baptist Church, Inc., 81 Ohio App.3d 728, 734 (10th Dist. 1992), citing Douglas Elec.

2021"If a claimant establishes a prima facie case of defamation, a defendant may then invoke a conditional or qualified privilege." Jackson at ¶ 9, citing A & B-Abell at 7, citing Hahn v. Kotten, 43 Ohio St.2d 237, 243 (1975). {¶ 17} "A qualified privilege is an affirmative defense to a claim of defamation." Morrison v. Gugle, 142 Ohio App.3d 244, 258 (10th Dist.2001), citing Cooper v. Baptist Church of Columbus, Ohio, Inc., 81 Ohio App.3d 728, 734 (10th Dist.1992), citing Hahn at 243 .

2025“Evidence that establishes, at best, the publisher ‘should have known’ of the alleged falsity of the statement is insufficient to establish actual malice.” Varanese v. Gall, 35 Ohio St.3d 78, 82 (1988).

1990(Emphasis added.) We therefore hold that the standard for actual malice announced in the syllabus of Hahn v. Kotten and approved in Worrell v. Multipress, Inc. applies in this casa We also note that appellant must show sufficient facts to demonstrate the actual malice so that a reasonable jury could find that the actual malice was shown with convincing clarity to defeat appellee's assertion of a qualified privilege, even in a summary judgment casa Varanese v. Gall, supra at paragraph one of the syllabus.

2026Fischer v. Kent State Univ., 2015-Ohio-3569, ¶ 25 (10th Dist.) (quotations omitted). {¶13} “‘“It is generally held that if the defendant publishes the defamatory words to the person interested at the latter’s request or solicitation, there is such a relationship between the parties to justify the communication.”’” Hahn at 246 , quoting West v. Peoples Banking & Trust Co., 14 Ohio App.2d 69, 74 (4th Dist. 1967), quoting 1 Harper and James, The Law of Torts, page 445, Section 5.26. {¶14} “A qualified privilege may be defeated only if a claimant proves with convincing clarity that the publisher a

2016The purpose of the privilege is to ensure " 'the necessity of full and unrestricted communication concerning a matter in which the parties have an interest or duty.' " Id. at 246 , quoting West v. People's Banking & Trust Co., 14 Ohio App.2d 69, 72 (4th Dist.1967). {¶ 44} A qualified privilege "can be defeated only by a clear and convincing showing that the communication was made with actual malice.

2024“A privileged communication is one which, except for the occasion on which or the circumstances under which it is made, would be defamatory, and actionable.” Id., citing 50 American Jurisprudence 2d, Libel and Slander, Section 192, at 695 (1995). {¶ 33} A qualified privilege may arise under the common law or by statute.

2001Such a qualified privilege may be overcome by “actual malice.” Costanzo v. Gaul (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 106, 111 , 16 O.O.3d 134, 137 , 403 N.E.2d 979, 983 .

2024See also Hatton v. Interim Health Care of Columbus, Inc., 10th Dist. No. 06AP-828, 2007- Ohio-1418, ¶ 14, quoting Hanly v. Riverside Methodist Hosp., 78 Ohio App.3d 73, 81 (10th Dist.1991) (stating that “ ‘a communication made in good faith on a matter of common interest between an employer and an employee, or between two employees concerning a third employee, is protected by qualified privilege’ ”). {¶ 23} “Once established, a qualified privilege can be defeated by a clear and convincing showing that the communication was made with actual malice.” Hill v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Di

2001This qualified privilege arises from communications “made in good faith * * * between an employer and an" employee, or between two employees concerning a third employee * * *.” Horsley v. Wal-Mart, Inc. (Dec. 23, 1997), Lawrence App. No. 97CA17, unreported, 1997 WL 799492 , at * 5, citing Evely v. Carlton Co. (1983), 4 Ohio St.3d 163, 165 , 4 OBR 404, 406-407, 447 N.E.2d 1290, 1292-1293 , and Hanly v. Riverside Methodist Hosp. (1991), 78 Ohio App.3d 73, 81 , 603 N.E.2d 1126, 1131-1132 .

2017Gray v. General Motors Corp., 52 Ohio App.2d 348 , 370 N.E.2d 747 (8th Dist.1977). {¶85} The elements of qualified privilege are: “[A] defendant must establish that (1) he acted in good faith; (2) there was an interest to be upheld; (3) the statement was limited in its scope to the purpose of upholding that interest; (4) the occasion was proper; and (5) the publication was made in a proper manner and only to proper parties.” Mosley v. Evans, 90 Ohio App.3d 633, 636 , 630 N.E.2d 75 (11th Dist.1993), citing Hahn at 246 . {¶86} A qualified privilege may be defeated only by clear and convincing ev

2017Gray v. General Motors Corp., 52 Ohio App.2d 348 , 370 N.E.2d 747 (8th Dist.1977). {¶85} The elements of qualified privilege are: “[A] defendant must establish that (1) he acted in good faith; (2) there was an interest to be upheld; (3) the statement was limited in its scope to the purpose of upholding that interest; (4) the occasion was proper; and (5) the publication was made in a proper manner and only to proper parties.” Mosley v. Evans, 90 Ohio App.3d 633, 636 , 630 N.E.2d 75 (11th Dist.1993), citing Hahn at 246 . {¶86} A qualified privilege may be defeated only by clear and convincing ev

2017"Discovery was hardly intended to enable a learned profession to perform its functions either without wits or on wits borrowed from the adversary." Id. at 516 (Jackson, J. concurring). {¶ 14} The Supreme Court of Ohio has explained that "the work-product doctrine provides a qualified privilege protecting the attorney's mental processes in preparation of litigation, establishing 'a zone of privacy in which lawyers can analyze and prepare their client's case free from scrutiny or interference by an adversary.' " (Emphasis sic.) Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, L.L.P. v. Givaudan Flavors Corp., 127 Ohi

2016The United States Supreme Court in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 508 , 67 S.Ct. 385 , 91 L.Ed. 451 (1947) explained that the work-product doctrine is a qualified privilege that protects the mental processes of the attorney.

2009Piphus v. Blum (1995), 108 Ohio App.3d 218 , 225 , 670 N.E.2d 518 ; (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth (1985), 472 U.S. 511 , 526 , 105 S.Ct. 2806 , 86 L.Ed.2d 411 ). {¶ 71} "Qualified immunity is a question of law, not fact, which can be properly determined by summary judgment." Cook v. Cincinnati (1995), 103 Ohio App.3d 80 , 85 , 658 N.E.2d 814 (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald (1982), 457 U.S. 800 , 818 ; Dominque v. Telb (C.A.6, 1987), 831 F.2d 673 , 676 ).

2009Piphus v. Blum (1995), 108 Ohio App.3d 218 , 225 , 670 N.E.2d 518 ; (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth (1985), 472 U.S. 511 , 526 , 105 S.Ct. 2806 , 86 L.Ed.2d 411 ). {¶ 71} "Qualified immunity is a question of law, not fact, which can be properly determined by summary judgment." Cook v. Cincinnati (1995), 103 Ohio App.3d 80 , 85 , 658 N.E.2d 814 (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald (1982), 457 U.S. 800 , 818 ; Dominque v. Telb (C.A.6, 1987), 831 F.2d 673 , 676 ).

2012Qualified immunity provides immunity not only from liability but from the “consequences” of a suit, including “‘the general costs of subjecting officials to the risks of trial-distraction of officials from their governmental duties, inhibition of discretionary action, and deterrence of able people from public service.’” Id., quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald (1982), 457 U.S. 800, 816 , 102 S.Ct. 2727 , 73 L.Ed.2d 396 .

2012Qualified immunity “is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; * * * it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.” (Emphasis sic.) Id. at 526 .

2021Accordingly, Ohio courts have consistently applied the qualified immunity recognized in Scholler and Simon to third party claims of tortious conduct directly related to an attorney’s representation of a client even when the cause of action asserted is not “legal malpractice.” See Hahn at ¶ 55-69 (applying rule to invasion of privacy claim against third party attorney); Omega Riggers at ¶ 22-44 (analyzing claims for negligence and violation of a fiduciary duty in the context of legal malpractice); Moffit v. Litteral, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 19154, 2002-Ohio-4973 , ¶ 75-82 (applying rule to clai

2007Hahn v. Satullo , 156 Ohio App.3d 412 , 2004-Ohio-1057 , at 69.

2020Immediate appellate review of a qualified immunity denial “is a federal procedural right that simply does not apply in a nonfederal forum.” Johnson v. Fankell (1997), 520 U.S. 911, 912 , 138 L.

2020Immediate appellate review of a qualified immunity denial “is a federal procedural right that simply does not apply in a nonfederal forum.” Johnson v. Fankell (1997), 520 U.S. 911, 912 , 138 L.

1999(Citations omitted.) Further, Ohio law has long held that "communications between an employer and an employee or between two employees concerning the conduct of a third or former employee made in good faith concerning a matter of common interest are within the doctrine of qualified privilege." Gaumont v. Emery Air Freight Corp. (1989), 61 Ohio App.3d 277 , 289 ; see, also, Holloman v. Rutman Wine Co. (1983), 11 Ohio App.3d 257 ; Gray v. Central Motors Corp. (1977), 52 Ohio App.2d 348 ; McKenna v. Mansfield Leland Hotel Co. (1936), 55 Ohio App. 163 .

1999(Citations omitted.) Further, Ohio law has long held that "communications between an employer and an employee or between two employees concerning the conduct of a third or former employee made in good faith concerning a matter of common interest are within the doctrine of qualified privilege." Gaumont v. Emery Air Freight Corp. (1989), 61 Ohio App.3d 277 , 289 ; see, also, Holloman v. Rutman Wine Co. (1983), 11 Ohio App.3d 257 ; Gray v. Central Motors Corp. (1977), 52 Ohio App.2d 348 ; McKenna v. Mansfield Leland Hotel Co. (1936), 55 Ohio App. 163 .