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38 Tennessee opinions name it 3 courts 1916–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Langford v. Vanderbilt Universitygreen2 sentences2017The Smith court described the privilege as a qualified privilege that is available so long as the report (1) provides a ‘“correct and just impression of what took place in Court,”’ id. (quoting Langford, 318 S.W.2d at 574 ), and (2) is balanced and neutral, id. 2017The Smith court described the privilege as a qualified privilege that is available so long as the report (1) provides a ‘“correct and just impression of what took place in Court,”’ id. (quoting Langford, 318 S.W.2d at 574 ), and (2) is balanced and neutral, id. | 5 | 6 |
Malley v. Briggsgreen2 sentences1996Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344-45 , 106 S. Ct. 1092, 1097-98 (1986); Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. at 191, 195 , 104 S. Ct. at 3017, 3019 . -4- When the qualified immunity defense is raised in the context of a summary judgment motion, the appellate courts review orders denying the motion de novo. 1996Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344-45 , 106 S. Ct. 1092, 1097-98 (1986); Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. at 191, 195 , 104 S. Ct. at 3017, 3019 . -4- When the qualified immunity defense is raised in the context of a summary judgment motion, the appellate courts review orders denying the motion de novo. | 4 | 4 |
Morris Rodgers v. John Jabe, Jerry Hofbauer, and Robin Pratt, in Their Individual and Official Capacitiesgreen2 sentences2002Rogers v. Jabe, 43 F.3d 1082, 1085 (6th Cir. 1995). 2001Rodgers v. Jabe, 43 F.3d 1082, 1085 (6th Cir.1995). | 3 | 3 |
Harlow v. Fitzgeraldgreen2 sentences2011Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 814 (footnote omitted). -9- Qualified immunity is more than simply a defense to liability. 1992In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 , 102 S.Ct. 2727 , 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982), the court refined the scope of the qualified immunity explained earlier in its opinions in Scheurer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 , 94 S.Ct. 1683 , 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974) and Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 , 98 S.Ct. 2894 , 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978). | 2 | 6 |
Mitchell v. Forsythgreen2 sentences2011Its purpose is “to immunize a public official from the harassment, expense, and distraction caused by the lawsuit itself.” 2 Smolla § 14:51; see also Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232-33 , 111 S.Ct. 1789 , 114 L.Ed.2d 277 (1991) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 , 105 S.Ct. 2806 , 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985)); see also 4 Rotunda & Nowak § 19:29(a), at 585-86. 2009The qualified immunity privilege entitles a party to “immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). | 2 | 4 |
Lucas v. Stategreen2 sentences2013See Lucas v. State, 141 S.W.3d 121 (Tenn.Ct.App.2004). 2013See Lucas v. State, 141 S.W.3d 121, 134 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004). | 2 | 2 |
Fayne v. Vincentgreen2 sentences2011See Fayne v. Vincent, 301 S.W.3d 162, 171 (Tenn.2009). 2011See Fayne v. Vincent, 301 S.W.3d 162, 171 (Tenn. 2009). ______________________________ JANICE M. | 2 | 2 |
William Winchester v. Christy Littlegreen2 sentences2004Qualified immunity has been historically referred to as “good faith immunity.” See Winchester v. Little, 996 S.W.2d 818, 826 (1998), perm. app. denied July 6, 1999, cert. denied 528 U.S. 1026 , 120 S.Ct. 543 , 145 L.Ed.2d 421 (Nov.29,1999); Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 , 64 L.Ed.2d 572 , 100 S.Ct. 1920 , (1980); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 , 43 L.Ed.2d 214 , 95 S.Ct. 992 (1975). 2004Qualified immunity has been historically referred to as “good faith immunity.” See Winchester v. Little, 996 S.W.2d 818, 826 (1998), perm. app. denied July 6, 1999, cert. denied 528 U.S. 1026 , 120 S.Ct. 543 , 145 L.Ed.2d 421 (Nov. 29, 1999); Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 , 100 S.Ct. 1920 , 64 L.Ed.2d 572 , (1980); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 , 95 S.Ct. 992 , 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975). | 2 | 2 |
Sherman L.G. Noble v. Janice Schmitt and Connie Stevensgreen2 sentences2004See also Noble v. Schmitt, 87 F.3d 157, 161 (6th Cir.1996). 2004See also Noble v. Schmitt, 87 F.3d 157, 161 (6th Cir.1996). | 2 | 2 |
Rich v. City of Mayfield Heightsgreen2 sentences2004As to the procedural aspects of a qualified immunity defense, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has observed: “Qualified or ‘good faith’ immunity is an affirmative defense that is available to government officials performing discretionary functions.” Rich v. City of Mayfield Hts., 955 F.2d 1092 , 1094 (6th Cir.1992). 2004As to the procedural aspects of a qualified immunity defense, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has observed: “Qualified or ‘good faith’ immunity is an affirmative defense that is available to government officials performing discretionary functions.” Rich v. City of Mayfield Hts., 955 F.2d 1092 , 1094 (6th Cir.1992). | 2 | 2 |
Beene v. National Liquor Co.green2 sentences2000Co. v. Black, 136 Tenn. 391 , -5- 189 S.W. 86 1 (1916): Qualified privilege extends to all communications made in good faith upon any subject-matter in which the party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has a duty to a p erson hav ing a corresponding interest or duty; and the privilege embraces cases where the duty is not a legal one, but where it is of a moral or social character of imperfect obligation . . . 2000Co. v. Black, 136 Tenn. 391 , -5- 189 S.W. 86 1 (1916): Qualified privilege extends to all communications made in good faith upon any subject-matter in which the party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has a duty to a p erson hav ing a corresponding interest or duty; and the privilege embraces cases where the duty is not a legal one, but where it is of a moral or social character of imperfect obligation . . . | 2 | 2 |
Davis v. Scherergreen2 sentences1996Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344-45 , 106 S. Ct. 1092, 1097-98 (1986); Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. at 191, 195 , 104 S. Ct. at 3017, 3019 . -4- When the qualified immunity defense is raised in the context of a summary judgment motion, the appellate courts review orders denying the motion de novo. 1996Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344-45 , 106 S. Ct. 1092, 1097-98 (1986); Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. at 191, 195 , 104 S. Ct. at 3017, 3019 . -4- When the qualified immunity defense is raised in the context of a summary judgment motion, the appellate courts review orders denying the motion de novo. | 1 | 3 |
Donald Saucier v. Elliot M. Katz and in Defense of Animalsred2 sentences2011Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 , 200, 121 S.Ct. 2151 , 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). 2011Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 , 200, 121 S.Ct. 2151 , 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). | 1 | 2 |
Sandra L. Wallis v. Brainerd Baptist Churchgreen2 sentences2022We agree. “[I]ssues not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” Wallis v. Brainerd Baptist Church, 509 S.W.3d 886, 898 (Tenn. 2016). 2022We agree. “[I]ssues not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” Wallis v. Brainerd Baptist Church, 509 S.W.3d 886, 898 (Tenn. 2016). | 1 | 1 |
Armstrong v. McCluregreen1 sentence2017The Court qualified this rule, however, by explaining its general application “if there can be nothing in the terms or decree of sale providing otherwise.” See Pearson, 42 S.W. at 11 ; see also Armstrong, 51 Tenn. at 83 (stating that the purchaser is not entitled to rent before confirmation “if there is nothing in the terms of the sale, as contained in the decree which controls the question of rents.”). | 1 | 1 |
| Towse v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
Sanchez v. Coxongreen2 sentences2013The Supreme Court of Arizona discussed the rationale for extending the privilege to subordinate legislatures, stating: “The stated rationale supporting absolute immunity for council members varies but frequently includes attracting qualified council members, council members’ need for candor, and the chilling effect accompanying a qualified privilege.” Sanchez v. Coxon, 175 Ariz. 93, 96 , 854 P.2d 126, 129 (1993). 2013The Supreme Court of Arizona discussed the rationale for extending the privilege to subordinate legislatures, stating: “The stated rationale supporting absolute immunity for council members varies but frequently includes attracting qualified council members, council members’ need for candor, and the chilling effect accompanying a qualified privilege.” Sanchez v. Coxon, 175 Ariz. 93, 96 , 854 P.2d 126, 129 (1993). | 1 | 1 |
Chamberlain v. Mathisgreen2 sentences2013Similarly, in Chamberlain v. Mathis, the Arizona Supreme Court adopted a qualified privilege for the Director of the Arizona Department of Health Services, reasoning in that case that the rationale supporting absolute immunity is “countered by basic principles of equal justice.” 151 Ariz. 551 , 729 P.2d 905, 912 (1986). 2013Similarly, in Chamberlain v. Mathis, the Arizona Supreme Court adopted a qualified privilege for the Director of the Arizona Department of Health Services, reasoning in that case that the rationale supporting absolute immunity is “countered by basic principles of equal justice.” 151 Ariz. 551 , 729 P.2d 905, 912 (1986). | 1 | 1 |
| Scales v. District of Columbiagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Joseph M. Schultea, Sr. v. David Robert Wood, David Robert Wood, Homer Ford, W.F. \Slim\" Plagens and Warren K. Driver"green | 1 | 1 |
| Pearson v. Callahangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Terry A. Veney v. Michael Hogan Carol Hernandez Frank D. Fleischer and Martha Knicelygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Maestas v. State of Coloradogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Siegert v. Gilleygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ochser v. Funkgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Leo v. Trevinogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Venegas v. County of Los Angelesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Thompson v. Doudsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| John Burk v. Linda L. Beene, Doctor, in Her Individual and Official Capacity as Director of the Arkansas State Board of Private Career Educationgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Carlos D. Goad and Robert J. Wuchich v. Betty Mitchell, Jacqui Visintine, and M.A. Gilbertgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Fleming v. City of Bridgeportgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Kline v. KDB, INC.green | 1 | 1 |
| Fraidin v. Weitzmangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Jeffrey Moldowan v. Maureen Fourniergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Newton v. Coxgreen | 1 | 1 |
| cluster 765529green | 1 | 1 |
| Harrison v. Schradergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Edmonds v. Chamberlain Memorial Hospitalgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hansen v. Transworld Wireless TV-Spokanegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Boulevard Associates v. Sovereign Hotels, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Anderson v. Creighton
green
2 sentences2004Any lingering doubt that “discretionary function” immunity is, in fact, a qualified immunity and not an absolute immunity is settled by the United States Supreme Court in Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. *135 635, 107 S.Ct. 3034 , 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987) wherein the court observed the tension between government officials abusing their offices on the one hand and being honestly-mistaken as to their conduct on the other. 2004Any lingering doubt that “discretionary function” immunity is, in fact, a qualified immunity and not an absolute immunity is settled by the United States Supreme Court in Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. *135 635, 107 S.Ct. 3034 , 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987) wherein the court observed the tension between government officials abusing their offices on the one hand and being honestly-mistaken as to their conduct on the other. | 4 | 1998–2004 |
Scheuer v. Rhodes
red
2 sentences1992In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 , 102 S.Ct. 2727 , 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982), the court refined the scope of the qualified immunity explained earlier in its opinions in Scheurer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 , 94 S.Ct. 1683 , 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974) and Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 , 98 S.Ct. 2894 , 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978). 1992In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 , 102 S.Ct. 2727 , 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982), the court refined the scope of the qualified immunity explained earlier in its opinions in Scheurer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 , 94 S.Ct. 1683 , 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974) and Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 , 98 S.Ct. 2894 , 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978). | 3 | 1992–2004 |
Butz v. Economou
green
2 sentences1992In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 , 102 S.Ct. 2727 , 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982), the court refined the scope of the qualified immunity explained earlier in its opinions in Scheurer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 , 94 S.Ct. 1683 , 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974) and Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 , 98 S.Ct. 2894 , 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978). 1992In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 , 102 S.Ct. 2727 , 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982), the court refined the scope of the qualified immunity explained earlier in its opinions in Scheurer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 , 94 S.Ct. 1683 , 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974) and Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 , 98 S.Ct. 2894 , 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978). | 3 | 1992–2004 |
Southern Ice Co. v. Black
green
2 sentences2000Co. v. Black, 136 Tenn. 391 , -5- 189 S.W. 86 1 (1916): Qualified privilege extends to all communications made in good faith upon any subject-matter in which the party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has a duty to a p erson hav ing a corresponding interest or duty; and the privilege embraces cases where the duty is not a legal one, but where it is of a moral or social character of imperfect obligation . . . 2000Co. v. Black, 136 Tenn. 391 , -5- 189 S.W. 86 1 (1916): Qualified privilege extends to all communications made in good faith upon any subject-matter in which the party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has a duty to a p erson hav ing a corresponding interest or duty; and the privilege embraces cases where the duty is not a legal one, but where it is of a moral or social character of imperfect obligation . . . | 3 | 1996–2000 |
Lewis v. NewsChannel 5 Network, L.P.
green
2 sentences2017The court noted that the privilege is a qualified privilege rather than an absolute privilege, and then stated: “In order for the privilege to apply, the report must be ‘a fair and accurate summation of the proceeding,’ and must display balance and neutrality.” Lewis, 238 S.W.3d at 284 (quoting Smith, 944 S.W.2d at 625 ). “[A] report of a judicial proceeding will not be shielded by the privilege if it contains any false statement of fact regarding what occurred during the proceeding, any garbled or one-sided account of the proceeding, or any defamatory observations or comments.” Id. 2012Lewis, 238 S.W.3d at 284 ; Langford v. Vanderbilt Univ., 44 Tenn.App. 694 , 318 S.W.2d 568, 574 (1958). | 2 | 2012–2017 |
Coulibaly v. Immigration & Naturalization Service
green
2 sentences2004Qualified immunity has been historically referred to as “good faith immunity.” See Winchester v. Little, 996 S.W.2d 818, 826 (1998), perm. app. denied July 6, 1999, cert. denied 528 U.S. 1026 , 120 S.Ct. 543 , 145 L.Ed.2d 421 (Nov. 29, 1999); Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 , 100 S.Ct. 1920 , 64 L.Ed.2d 572 , (1980); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 , 95 S.Ct. 992 , 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975). 2004Qualified immunity has been historically referred to as “good faith immunity.” See Winchester v. Little, 996 S.W.2d 818, 826 (1998), perm. app. denied July 6, 1999, cert. denied 528 U.S. 1026 , 120 S.Ct. 543 , 145 L.Ed.2d 421 (Nov. 29, 1999); Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 , 100 S.Ct. 1920 , 64 L.Ed.2d 572 , (1980); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 , 95 S.Ct. 992 , 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975). | 2 | 2004–2004 |
Lenoir v. Kerley
green
2 sentences2004Qualified immunity has been historically referred to as “good faith immunity.” See Winchester v. Little, 996 S.W.2d 818, 826 (1998), perm. app. denied July 6, 1999, cert. denied 528 U.S. 1026 , 120 S.Ct. 543 , 145 L.Ed.2d 421 (Nov.29,1999); Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 , 64 L.Ed.2d 572 , 100 S.Ct. 1920 , (1980); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 , 43 L.Ed.2d 214 , 95 S.Ct. 992 (1975). 2004Qualified immunity has been historically referred to as “good faith immunity.” See Winchester v. Little, 996 S.W.2d 818, 826 (1998), perm. app. denied July 6, 1999, cert. denied 528 U.S. 1026 , 120 S.Ct. 543 , 145 L.Ed.2d 421 (Nov. 29, 1999); Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 , 100 S.Ct. 1920 , 64 L.Ed.2d 572 , (1980); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 , 95 S.Ct. 992 , 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975). | 2 | 2004–2004 |
Wood v. Strickland
green
2 sentences2004Qualified immunity has been historically referred to as “good faith immunity.” See Winchester v. Little, 996 S.W.2d 818, 826 (1998), perm. app. denied July 6, 1999, cert. denied 528 U.S. 1026 , 120 S.Ct. 543 , 145 L.Ed.2d 421 (Nov. 29, 1999); Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 , 100 S.Ct. 1920 , 64 L.Ed.2d 572 , (1980); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 , 95 S.Ct. 992 , 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975). 2004Qualified immunity has been historically referred to as “good faith immunity.” See Winchester v. Little, 996 S.W.2d 818, 826 (1998), perm. app. denied July 6, 1999, cert. denied 528 U.S. 1026 , 120 S.Ct. 543 , 145 L.Ed.2d 421 (Nov. 29, 1999); Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 , 100 S.Ct. 1920 , 64 L.Ed.2d 572 , (1980); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 , 95 S.Ct. 992 , 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975). | 2 | 2004–2004 |
Gomez v. Toledo
green
2 sentences2004Qualified immunity has been historically referred to as “good faith immunity.” See Winchester v. Little, 996 S.W.2d 818, 826 (1998), perm. app. denied July 6, 1999, cert. denied 528 U.S. 1026 , 120 S.Ct. 543 , 145 L.Ed.2d 421 (Nov. 29, 1999); Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 , 100 S.Ct. 1920 , 64 L.Ed.2d 572 , (1980); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 , 95 S.Ct. 992 , 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975). 2004Qualified immunity has been historically referred to as “good faith immunity.” See Winchester v. Little, 996 S.W.2d 818, 826 (1998), perm. app. denied July 6, 1999, cert. denied 528 U.S. 1026 , 120 S.Ct. 543 , 145 L.Ed.2d 421 (Nov. 29, 1999); Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 , 100 S.Ct. 1920 , 64 L.Ed.2d 572 , (1980); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 , 95 S.Ct. 992 , 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975). | 2 | 2004–2004 |
Austin v. Memphis Publishing Co.
green
1 sentence2025Co., 655 S.W.2d 146 (Tenn. 1983)), which grants to news media a qualified protection from producing certain information and sources of information. - 34 - The court noted that, during the hearing on the motion, an affidavit filed by Granada on August 18, 2009, stated that Granada Entertainment didn’t have verbatim transcripts of the interviews or the Miranda procedure, but only editorial notes consisting of less than 4 minutes of the lengthy custodial interview of [Petitioner] by the police, and that “Granada employees do not transcribe police’s administering of Miranda warnings, because they | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Pearson v. Gillenwaters
green
1 sentence2017The Court qualified this rule, however, by explaining its general application “if there can be nothing in the terms or decree of sale providing otherwise.” See Pearson, 42 S.W. at 11 ; see also Armstrong, 51 Tenn. at 83 (stating that the purchaser is not entitled to rent before confirmation “if there is nothing in the terms of the sale, as contained in the decree which controls the question of rents.”). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Smith v. Reed
green
2 sentences2017The Smith court described the privilege as a qualified privilege that is available so long as the report (1) provides a ‘“correct and just impression of what took place in Court,”’ id. (quoting Langford, 318 S.W.2d at 574 ), and (2) is balanced and neutral, id. 2017The court noted that the privilege is a qualified privilege rather than an absolute privilege, and then stated: “In order for the privilege to apply, the report must be ‘a fair and accurate summation of the proceeding,’ and must display balance and neutrality.” Lewis, 238 S.W.3d at 284 (quoting Smith, 944 S.W.2d at 625 ). “[A] report of a judicial proceeding will not be shielded by the privilege if it contains any false statement of fact regarding what occurred during the proceeding, any garbled or one-sided account of the proceeding, or any defamatory observations or comments.” Id. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Gold Seal Chinchillas, Inc. v. State
green
1 sentence2013We note that “the overwhelming majority of cases have struck the balance in favor of encouraging public officials to speak with complete candor — and without fear of legal recourse — with respect to their official duties.” Gold Seal, 420 P.2d at 701 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Barr v. Matteo green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| cluster 655347 green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Schott v. Glover green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Reynolds v. Schrock green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Kahala Royal Corp. v. Goodsill Anderson Quinn & Stifel green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Mathews v. Pyle green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Hansen v. Transworld Wireless TV-Spokane, Inc. green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Handley v. May green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Joseph F. Morgan v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Oberkircher v. Chicago Transit Authority neutral | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Monroe v. Pape red | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Fann v. Brailey green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Owen v. City of Independence green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Procunier v. Navarette green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Apolinar Navarette, Jr., AKA Paul Medel Navarette v. Jiro J. Enomoto green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Cromwell General Contractor, Inc. v. Lytle green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Chambers v. Leiser green | 1 | 1916–1916 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.