qualified immunity in Wyoming

2024This Court recognizes an exception to that rule, however, in cases involving the denial of a defendant’s claim of qualified immunity.” (citations omitted)); Watts, 2008 WY 19, ¶ 9 , 177 P.3d at 796 (“[L]ike an absolute immunity, [qualified immunity] is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.” (quoting Park County v. Cooney, 845 P.2d 346, 349 (Wyo. 1992))). [¶37] Substantively, reasonableness in the context of a qualified immunity analysis is defined “as having the faculty of reason; rational; governed by reason; being under the influence of reason; thinking, speakin

2024“Whereas differences of opinion might create disputed questions of fact in negligence situations, differences of opinion as to the propriety of an officer’s action have a different impact in determining whether a public official is entitled to qualified immunity.” Id. at ¶ 16, 286 P.3d at 143 . 13 [¶38] Qualified immunity serves important policy purposes—it recognizes the need to permit public officials “to perform their official functions free from the threat of suits for personal liability” and it protects law enforcement from the “risk of being mulcted in damages for mistakes [they] may mak

2024This Court recognizes an exception to that rule, however, in cases involving the denial of a defendant’s claim of qualified immunity.” (citations omitted)); Watts, 2008 WY 19, ¶ 9 , 177 P.3d at 796 (“[L]ike an absolute immunity, [qualified immunity] is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.” (quoting Park County v. Cooney, 845 P.2d 346, 349 (Wyo. 1992))). [¶37] Substantively, reasonableness in the context of a qualified immunity analysis is defined “as having the faculty of reason; rational; governed by reason; being under the influence of reason; thinking, speakin

2018Qualified immunity protects government officials from civil liability if "their conduct 'does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.' " Abell v. Dewey , 870 P.2d 363 , 367 (Wyo. 1994) (quoting Park Cty. v. Cooney , 845 P.2d 346 , 351 (Wyo. 1992), cert. denied , 510 U.S. 813 , 114 S.Ct. 60 , 126 L.Ed.2d 30 (1993) ).

2016Kelli Dolan, Property Officer at the Wyoming Medium Correctional Institution, is also a named Defendant, Appellees argue Director Lampert and Warden Hargett have qualified immunity from civil damages as government officials. «Chapman argues that "Itlhe Eleventh Amendment does not forbid suing state officials for damages in their individual capacities, and for declaratory or injunctive relief in their official capacities." Aside from arguing simply that these Ap-pellees "are not entitled to qualified immu- pity," Chapman does not provide a cogent argument in support of his contention. [¶21] We

2016Kelli Dolan, Property Officer at the Wyoming Medium Correctional Institution, is also a named Defendant, Appellees argue Director Lampert and Warden Hargett have qualified immunity from civil damages as government officials. «Chapman argues that "Itlhe Eleventh Amendment does not forbid suing state officials for damages in their individual capacities, and for declaratory or injunctive relief in their official capacities." Aside from arguing simply that these Ap-pellees "are not entitled to qualified immu- pity," Chapman does not provide a cogent argument in support of his contention. [¶21] We

2025The doctrine of qualified immunity precludes Mr. Drewry’s defamation per se and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims. [¶21] “Qualified immunity developed at common law and remains available through common law even if immunity is otherwise waived under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act.” Palm-Egle v. Briggs, 2024 WY 31, ¶ 33, 545 P.3d 828, 838 (Wyo. 2024) (citing Uinta Cnty. v. Pennington, 2012 WY 129, ¶ 13, 286 P.3d 138, 142 (Wyo. 2012)).

2025The doctrine of qualified immunity precludes Mr. Drewry’s defamation per se and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims. [¶21] “Qualified immunity developed at common law and remains available through common law even if immunity is otherwise waived under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act.” Palm-Egle v. Briggs, 2024 WY 31, ¶ 33, 545 P.3d 828, 838 (Wyo. 2024) (citing Uinta Cnty. v. Pennington, 2012 WY 129, ¶ 13, 286 P.3d 138, 142 (Wyo. 2012)).

2025See Kanzler v. Renner, 937 P.2d 1337, 1344 (Wyo. 1997) (“Under the common law, police officers . . . . enjoy only a limited immunity from tort liability.”).

2025See Kanzler v. Renner, 937 P.2d 1337, 1344 (Wyo. 1997) (“Under the common law, police officers . . . . enjoy only a limited immunity from tort liability.”).

2024Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 , 129 S.Ct. 808, 815 , 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 , 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738 , 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982))). [¶34] With respect to the § 1983 claim against the Sheriff’s Office and the Jail, Mr. Leonhardt was required to show that these entities had a policy or custom which pla

2024Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 , 129 S.Ct. 808, 815 , 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 , 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738 , 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982))). [¶34] With respect to the § 1983 claim against the Sheriff’s Office and the Jail, Mr. Leonhardt was required to show that these entities had a policy or custom which pla

2025If the officer is entitled to the affirmative defense of qualified immunity, the conduct of the officer is not tortious, and no vicarious liability exists on the part of the governmental entity.”) (citing DeWald v. State, 719 P.2d 643, 655 (Wyo. 1986) (Thomas, C.J., specially concurring)); see also Pennington, 2012 WY 129, ¶ 27, 286 P.3d at 146 (“Based on our holding that Sheriff Napoli is entitled to qualified immunity, the ruling against the County and the Board must also be reversed.”). [¶22] Qualified immunity “is appropriate for disposition early in a case, prior to adjudication on the me

2025If the officer is entitled to the affirmative defense of qualified immunity, the conduct of the officer is not tortious, and no vicarious liability exists on the part of the governmental entity.”) (citing DeWald v. State, 719 P.2d 643, 655 (Wyo. 1986) (Thomas, C.J., specially concurring)); see also Pennington, 2012 WY 129, ¶ 27 , 286 P.3d at 146 (“Based on our holding that Sheriff Napoli is entitled to qualified immunity, the ruling against the County and the Board must also be reversed.”). [¶22] Qualified immunity “is appropriate for disposition early in a case, prior to adjudication on the m

2024While qualified immunity might not be appropriate for dismissal on a motion to dismiss, Darrar v. Bourke, 910 P.2d 572 , 577 9 The standard for qualified immunity under state common law is distinct from the federal standard.

1997The standard of qualified immunity established under our common law is distinct from the federal standard. 4 In Dar-rar v. Bourke, we reviewed the factors which would entitle a peace officer to qualified immunity from a tort suit brought pursuant to state law: 1) the officer was acting within the scope of his or her duties; 2) the officer was acting in good faith; 3) the officer’s acts were reasonable under the circumstances; and 4) the officer’s acts were discretionary duties and not merely operational or ministerial duties. 910 P.2d 572, 575-76 (Wyo.1996).

1992Even though we said in Cooney I, 792 P.2d at 1288 that we were “asked to decide * * * what level of immunity * * * we will extend to [the prosecutor],” the qualified immunity question has not been adequately presented in any phase of these proceedings. 21 In reaching this result and reversing particular aspects of Cooney I , we recognize a basic flaw in that case — it failed to account for the fundamental proposition that qualified immunity from civil liability is the rule rather than the exception.

1992Even though we said in Cooney I, 792 P.2d at 1288 that we were "asked to decide * * * what level of immunity * * * we will extend to [the prosecutor]," the qualified immunity question has not been adequately presented in any phase of these proceedings. [21] In reaching this result and reversing particular aspects of Cooney I , we recognize a basic flaw in that case—it failed to account for the fundamental proposition that qualified immunity from civil liability is the rule rather than the exception.

2025State Hosp. v. Romine, 2021 WY 47, ¶ 8, 483 P.3d 840, 844 (Wyo. 2021); Wallace v. Dean, 3 So.3d 1035, 1044–45 (Fla. 2009)).

2025State Hosp. v. Romine, 2021 WY 47, ¶ 8 , 483 P.3d 840 , 844 (Wyo. 2021); Wallace v. Dean, 3 So.3d 1035 , 1044–45 (Fla. 2009)).

2025The doctrine of qualified immunity precludes Mr. Drewry’s defamation per se and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims. [¶21] “Qualified immunity developed at common law and remains available through common law even if immunity is otherwise waived under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act.” Palm-Egle v. Briggs, 2024 WY 31, ¶ 33, 545 P.3d 828, 838 (Wyo. 2024) (citing Uinta Cnty. v. Pennington, 2012 WY 129, ¶ 13, 286 P.3d 138, 142 (Wyo. 2012)).

2025The doctrine of qualified immunity precludes Mr. Drewry’s defamation per se and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims. [¶21] “Qualified immunity developed at common law and remains available through common law even if immunity is otherwise waived under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act.” Palm-Egle v. Briggs, 2024 WY 31, ¶ 33, 545 P.3d 828, 838 (Wyo. 2024) (citing Uinta Cnty. v. Pennington, 2012 WY 129, ¶ 13, 286 P.3d 138, 142 (Wyo. 2012)).

2024This Court recognizes an exception to that rule, however, in cases involving the denial of a defendant’s claim of qualified immunity.” (citations omitted)); Watts, 2008 WY 19, ¶ 9 , 177 P.3d at 796 (“[L]ike an absolute immunity, [qualified immunity] is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.” (quoting Park County v. Cooney, 845 P.2d 346, 349 (Wyo. 1992))). [¶37] Substantively, reasonableness in the context of a qualified immunity analysis is defined “as having the faculty of reason; rational; governed by reason; being under the influence of reason; thinking, speakin

2024This Court recognizes an exception to that rule, however, in cases involving the denial of a defendant’s claim of qualified immunity.” (citations omitted)); Watts, 2008 WY 19, ¶ 9 , 177 P.3d at 796 (“[L]ike an absolute immunity, [qualified immunity] is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.” (quoting Park County v. Cooney, 845 P.2d 346, 349 (Wyo. 1992))). [¶37] Substantively, reasonableness in the context of a qualified immunity analysis is defined “as having the faculty of reason; rational; governed by reason; being under the influence of reason; thinking, speakin

2024Qualified immunity is also an important offset to the investigatory chilling effect sometimes cited as a policy basis to bar claims for negligent investigation. 8 See, e.g., Wimer v. State, 841 P.2d 453, 455 (Idaho App. 1992) (“We agree with the policy that to hold investigators liable for their negligent acts would impair vigorous prosecution and have a chilling effect on law enforcement.” (citations omitted)); Dever v. Fowler, 816 P.2d 1237, 1242 (Wash. App. 1991) (“The reason courts have refused to create a cause of action for negligent investigation is that holding investigators liable for

2024Qualified immunity is also an important offset to the investigatory chilling effect sometimes cited as a policy basis to bar claims for negligent investigation. 8 See, e.g., Wimer v. State, 841 P.2d 453, 455 (Idaho App. 1992) (“We agree with the policy that to hold investigators liable for their negligent acts would impair vigorous prosecution and have a chilling effect on law enforcement.” (citations omitted)); Dever v. Fowler, 816 P.2d 1237, 1242 (Wash. App. 1991) (“The reason courts have refused to create a cause of action for negligent investigation is that holding investigators liable for

2024Boyer-Gladden v. Hill, 2010 WY 12, ¶ 23 , 224 P.3d 21, 30 (Wyo. 2010) (“[A] local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents.

2024Boyer-Gladden v. Hill, 2010 WY 12, ¶ 23 , 224 P.3d 21, 30 (Wyo. 2010) (“[A] local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents.

2024Qualified immunity is also an important offset to the investigatory chilling effect sometimes cited as a policy basis to bar claims for negligent investigation. 8 See, e.g., Wimer v. State, 841 P.2d 453, 455 (Idaho App. 1992) (“We agree with the policy that to hold investigators liable for their negligent acts would impair vigorous prosecution and have a chilling effect on law enforcement.” (citations omitted)); Dever v. Fowler, 816 P.2d 1237, 1242 (Wash. App. 1991) (“The reason courts have refused to create a cause of action for negligent investigation is that holding investigators liable for

2024Qualified immunity is also an important offset to the investigatory chilling effect sometimes cited as a policy basis to bar claims for negligent investigation. 8 See, e.g., Wimer v. State, 841 P.2d 453, 455 (Idaho App. 1992) (“We agree with the policy that to hold investigators liable for their negligent acts would impair vigorous prosecution and have a chilling effect on law enforcement.” (citations omitted)); Dever v. Fowler, 816 P.2d 1237, 1242 (Wash. App. 1991) (“The reason courts have refused to create a cause of action for negligent investigation is that holding investigators liable for