qualified privilege in Iowa

2025In Barreca, our supreme court noted that its past cases “sometimes characterized [the] qualified privilege doctrine” as follows: A qualified privilege exists with respect to statements that are otherwise defamatory if the following elements exist: (1) the statement was made in good faith; (2) the defendant had an interest 13 to uphold; (3) the scope of the statement was limited to the identified interest; and (4) the statement was published on a proper occasion, in a proper manner, and to proper parties only. 683 N.W.2d at 118 (quoting Winckel v. Von Maur, Inc., 652 N.W.2d 453, 458 (Iowa 2002)

2025Luke’s was “pretext for [the defendants’] desire to push Christopher out because of her past involvement in [a] complaint about Pastor Schlimm’s husband.” For actual malice “to defeat a qualified privilege, a plaintiff must prove the defendant acted with knowing or reckless disregard of the truth of the statement.” Barreca v. Nickolas, 683 N.W.2d 111, 121 (Iowa 2004).

2021Qualified immunity is “an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). 867 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Iowa 2015) (second and third alterations in original).

2021Qualified immunity is “an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).

2004See Children v. Shinn, 168 Iowa 531, 549 , 150 N.W. 864 , 869 (1915) (“It was for the court to say whether or not the occasion was privileged, but as the privilege was a qualified one, it was for the jury to say under proper instructions whether or not the defendant abused his privilege.”) A qualified privilege is abused, for example, when a defamatory statement is published with “actual malice.” See Vojak, 161 N.W.2d at 105 .

2002For purposes of establishing the type of actual malice that will preclude a qualified privilege in defamation cases under Iowa law, this court has defined actual malice as statements made with “ill-will, hatred or desire to do another harm.” Vinson, 360 N.W.2d at 115 ; Vojak v. Jensen, 161 N.W.2d 100, 107 (Iowa 1968).

1989See Brown, 193 N.W.2d at 552-53 (“The qualified privilege by its very nature does not allow widespread or unrestricted communication.”); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 604 (1977).

1988In doing so, the court stated, “The qualified privilege, by its very nature, does not allow *310 widespread or unrestricted communication.” Id. at 552 .

2025Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015) (per curiam); see also Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009) (discussing the two-step qualified immunity analysis).

2023“Qualified immunity balances two important competing interests—‘the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.’ ” Minor v. State, 819 N.W.2d 383, 400 (Iowa 2012) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)).

2025“There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication.” Id. at 123 (quoting Caveman Adventures UN, Ltd. v. Press–Citizen Co., 633 N.W.2d 757, 761 (Iowa 2001)).

2019To show the “reckless disregard for the truth” required for “actual malice,” Cooper must provide “sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication. . . . [T]he actual malice standard require[s] a high degree of 8 awareness of . . . probable falsity.” Id. at 123 (quoting Caveman Adventures UN, Ltd. v. Press-Citizen Co., 633 N.W.2d 757, 762 (Iowa 2001)).

2015“Qualified immunity is a question of law for the court and the issue may be decided by summary judgment.” Dickerson v. Mertz, 547 N.W.2d 208, 215 (Iowa 1996); see also Garvis, 492 N.W.2d at 404 (affirming summary judgment based on section 232.73 immunity); Maples v. Siddiqui, 450 N.W.2d 529, 531 (Iowa 1990) (same).

2015“Qualified immunity is a question of law for the court and the issue may be decided by summary judgment.” Dickerson v. Mertz, 547 N.W.2d 208, 215 (Iowa 1996); see also Garvis, 492 N.W.2d at 404 (affirming summary judgment based on section 232.73 immunity); Maples v. Siddiqui, 450 N.W.2d 529, 531 (Iowa 1990) (same).

1997Bossuyt v. Osage Farmers Nat’l Bank, 360 N.W.2d 769, 778-80 (Iowa 1985).

1995Bossuyt v. Osage Farmer’s Nat’l Bank, 360 N.W.2d 769, 778 (Iowa 1985); see Hunter v. Board of Trustees, 481 N.W.2d 510, 518 (Iowa 1992); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 769 (1939).

2025Dist., 360 N.W.2d 108, 116 (Iowa 1984) (distinguishing between legal malice, which is presumed with statements that are defamatory per se, and actual malice, which is at issue in determining whether a qualified privilege has been abused). 20 There is no such evidence in the record before us—just Dr. Kettman’s after- the-fact acknowledgments in response to questions from Shock’s counsel that he had “no direct or personal knowledge” that Shock “had ever done anything illegal or nefarious.” See Mills v. Iowa, 924 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1037 (S.D.

2002For purposes of establishing the type of actual malice that will preclude a qualified privilege in defamation cases under Iowa law, this court has defined actual malice as statements made with “ill-will, hatred or desire to do another harm.” Vinson, 360 N.W.2d at 115 ; Vojak v. Jensen, 161 N.W.2d 100, 107 (Iowa 1968).

2026Ct., 986 N.W.2d 114, 117 (Iowa 2023) (discussing the “history leading up to our founding” to determine the scope of the constitutional right to bail); State v. Basquin, 970 N.W.2d 643, 657 (Iowa 2022) (explaining that to determine whether a branch exercised forbidden powers, “we first look to the words used by our framers to ascertain intent and the meaning of our constitution” (quoting State v. Thompson, 954 N.W.2d 402, 410 (Iowa 2021))); State v. Brown, 930 N.W.2d 840, 846 (Iowa 2019) (determining the original meaning of state constitutional search and seizure protections by examining the “1

2021See Baldwin v. City of Estherville, 915 N.W.2d 259 , 279–81 (Iowa 2018).

2025In Barreca, our supreme court noted that its past cases “sometimes characterized [the] qualified privilege doctrine” as follows: A qualified privilege exists with respect to statements that are otherwise defamatory if the following elements exist: (1) the statement was made in good faith; (2) the defendant had an interest 13 to uphold; (3) the scope of the statement was limited to the identified interest; and (4) the statement was published on a proper occasion, in a proper manner, and to proper parties only. 683 N.W.2d at 118 (quoting Winckel v. Von Maur, Inc., 652 N.W.2d 453, 458 (Iowa 2002)

2025Relying on that four-factor test, the parties in Barreca disputed whether the challenged statement “was made in good faith, published on a proper occasion, in a proper manner, and only to proper parties.” Id.

2021Qualified immunity is “an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). 867 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Iowa 2015) (second and third alterations in original).

2021See Nelson, 867 N.W.2d at 7-8 .

2015See, e.g., Wells Dairy, 690 N.W.2d at 43 (“Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.503(3) creates a qualified privilege . . . .”); Exotica Botanicals, Inc. v. Terra Int’l, Inc., 612 N.W.2d 801 , 804–05, 807 (Iowa 2000) (using “work product privilege” in three section headings and referring multiple times to the work product privilege).

2015See, e.g., Wells Dairy, 690 N.W.2d at 43 (“Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.503(3) creates a qualified privilege.... ”); Exotica Botanicals, Inc. v. Terra Int’l, Inc., 612 N.W.2d 801, 804-05, 807 (Iowa 2000) (using “work product privilege” in three section headings and referring multiple times to the work product privilege).

2004See Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273 , 113 S.Ct. at 2616 , 125 L.Ed.2d at 226 (“when a prosecutor ‘functions as an administrator rather than as an officer of the court’ he is entitled only to qualified immunity”) (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n. 33, 96 S.Ct. at 995 n. 33, 47 L.Ed.2d at 144 n. 33).

2004See Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273 , 113 S.Ct. at 2616 , 125 L.Ed.2d at 226 (“when a prosecutor ‘functions as an administrator rather than as an officer of the court’ he is entitled only to qualified immunity”) (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n. 33, 96 S.Ct. at 995 n. 33, 47 L.Ed.2d at 144 n. 33).

2023“Qualified immunity balances two important competing interests—‘the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.’ ” Minor v. State, 819 N.W.2d 383, 400 (Iowa 2012) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)).

2014In addressing a defendant’s claim of qualified immunity, “we consider, in any order, whether the facts alleged by the plaintiff ‘make out a violation of a constitutional right’ and whether that right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of defendant’s alleged misconduct.” Minor v. State, 819 N.W.2d 383, 400 (Iowa 2012) (quoting Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232, 236 ).

2021“Qualified privilege may be lost, however, if the speaker abuses the privilege by speaking with actual malice or excessively publishing the statement ‘beyond the group interest.’ ” Bandstra, 913 N.W.2d at 48 (quoting Kliebenstein, 663 N.W.2d at 407).

2020“Qualified privilege may be lost, however, if the speaker abuses the privilege by speaking with actual malice or excessively publishing the statement ‘beyond the group interest.’” Id. at 48 (quoting Kliebenstein v. Iowa Conference of United Methodist Church, 663 N.W.2d 404, 407 (Iowa 2003)).

2019Qualified Immunity A qualified privilege from liability for defamation applies to statements of members of subordinate legislative bodies if those statements are “made in the performance of their official duties ‘upon any subject matter pertinent and relevant’ to the occasion.” Barreca, 683 N.W.2d at 118 ; see also Mills v. Denny, 63 N.W.2d 222, 227 (1954) (stating qualified privilege applies to statements of a mayor).

2004See Cowman v. LaVine, 234 N.W.2d 114, 124-25 (Iowa 1975) (city council member entitled to qualified privilege for statements made about police chiefs criminal history, during discussion at council meeting about the auxiliary police department; “qualified privilege is adequate to protect public officials who in good faith make bona fide statements upon any subject matter pertinent and relevant to the question on the privileged occasion”); Mills, 245 Iowa at 593 , 63 N.W.2d at 227 (for same reasons, qualified privilege available to the mayor of Des Moines, who allegedly slandered a *119 lawyer d

2015“Qualified immunity is a question of law for the court and the issue may be decided by summary judgment.” Dickerson v. Mertz, 547 N.W.2d 208, 215 (Iowa 1996); see also Garvis, 492 N.W.2d at 404 (affirming summary judgment based on section 232.73 immunity); Maples v. Siddiqui, 450 N.W.2d 529, 531 (Iowa 1990) (same).

2015“Qualified immunity is a question of law for the court and the issue may be decided by summary judgment.” Dickerson v. Mertz, 547 N.W.2d 208, 215 (Iowa 1996); see also Garvis, 492 N.W.2d at 404 (affirming summary judgment based on section 232.73 immunity); Maples v. Siddiqui, 450 N.W.2d 529, 531 (Iowa 1990) (same).

2015“Qualified immunity is a question of law for the court and the issue may be decided by summary judgment.” Dickerson v. Mertz, 547 N.W.2d 208, 215 (Iowa 1996); see also Garvis, 492 N.W.2d at 404 (affirming summary judgment based on section 232.73 immunity); Maples v. Siddiqui, 450 N.W.2d 529, 531 (Iowa 1990) (same).

2015“Qualified immunity is a question of law for the court and the issue may be decided by summary judgment.” Dickerson v. Mertz, 547 N.W.2d 208, 215 (Iowa 1996); see also Garvis, 492 N.W.2d at 404 (affirming summary judgment based on section 232.73 immunity); Maples v. Siddiqui, 450 N.W.2d 529, 531 (Iowa 1990) (same).

2014Tex. 1996) (“Obviously, surveillance evidence is gathered in anticipation of litigation and thus is generally protected as work product.”); Ford v. CSX Transp., Inc., 162 F.R.D. 108, 110 (E.D.N.C. 1995) (“Surveillance materials are clearly within the definition of work product since they are tangible and were prepared in anticipation of litigation by or for a party to the litigation.”); see generally Squealer Feeds v. Pickering, 530 N.W.2d 678, 688 (Iowa 1995) (“Documents prepared after the insured’s claim has been denied are clearly not a contemporaneous record of events leading to the denial

2003As we recognized in Squealer Feeds v. Pickering, 530 N.W.2d 678, 686 (Iowa 1995), that status gives IMT a qualified immunity from the discovery of its investigative files.

2014Robbins, 160 N.W.2d at 855-56 (citation omitted); see Keefe, 774 N.W.2d at 673 - 75 (“Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.503(3) codifies a qualified immunity from discovery of materials prepared in anticipation of litigation.”); Shook v. City of Davenport, 497 N.W.2d 883, 886-87 (Iowa 1993) (explaining the doctrine is referred to as a privilege but is a “qualified immunity” from discovery), abrogated on other grounds by Wells Dairy, 690 N.W.2d at 38 .

2009Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.503(3) codifies a qualified immunity from discovery of materials prepared in anticipation of litigation. 10 Shook, 497 N.W.2d at 886 .

2004See Children v. Shinn, 168 Iowa 531, 549 , 150 N.W. 864 , 869 (1915) (“It was for the court to say whether or not the occasion was privileged, but as the privilege was a qualified one, it was for the jury to say under proper instructions whether or not the defendant abused his privilege.”) A qualified privilege is abused, for example, when a defamatory statement is published with “actual malice.” See Vojak, 161 N.W.2d at 105 .

1954While we have found no cases in Iowa on the exact occasion involving a city council, in the case of Children v. Shinn, supra, 168 Iowa 531, 549 , 150 N.W. 864 , 869, we held that the privilege of a member of the board of supervisors, which is also a subordinate legislative body, was a qualified privilege.

2025Instead, citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 593 (1977),6 the court held, “Our task is simply to determine whether the occasion of [the] statement was qualifiedly privileged; if the occasion was so privileged, it must then be determined whether that privilege was abused.” Id.; see also Bandstra v. Covenant Reformed Church, 913 N.W.2d 19, 48 (Iowa 2018) (“Qualified privilege may be lost, however, if the speaker abuses the privilege by speaking with actual malice or excessively publishing the statement ‘beyond the group interest.’” (citation omitted)).

2021“Qualified privilege may be lost, however, if the speaker abuses the privilege by speaking with actual malice or excessively publishing the statement ‘beyond the group interest.’ ” Bandstra, 913 N.W.2d at 48 (quoting Kliebenstein, 663 N.W.2d at 407).

2018Qualified privilege may be lost, however, if the speaker abuses the privilege by speaking with actual malice or excessively publishing the statement "beyond the group interest." Id. (quoting Brewer v. Second Baptist Church of L.A. , 32 Cal.2d 791 , 197 P.2d 713 , 717 (1948) (en banc)).

2018Qualified privilege may be lost, however, if the speaker abuses the privilege by speaking with actual malice or excessively publishing the statement "beyond the group interest." Id. (quoting Brewer v. Second Baptist Church of L.A. , 32 Cal.2d 791 , 197 P.2d 713 , 717 (1948) (en banc)).

2015See, e.g., Wells Dairy, 690 N.W.2d at 43 (“Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.503(3) creates a qualified privilege . . . .”); Exotica Botanicals, Inc. v. Terra Int’l, Inc., 612 N.W.2d 801 , 804–05, 807 (Iowa 2000) (using “work product privilege” in three section headings and referring multiple times to the work product privilege).

2015See, e.g., Wells Dairy, 690 N.W.2d at 43 (“Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.503(3) creates a qualified privilege.... ”); Exotica Botanicals, Inc. v. Terra Int’l, Inc., 612 N.W.2d 801, 804-05, 807 (Iowa 2000) (using “work product privilege” in three section headings and referring multiple times to the work product privilege).

2013See Cherry v. Des Moines Leader, 114 Iowa 298, 304 , 86 N.W. 323 , 325 (1901) (stating that “the editor of a newspaper has the right, if not the duty, of publishing, for the information of the public, fair and reasonable comments, however severe in terms, upon anything which is made by its owner a subject of public exhibition, as upon any other matter of public interest; and such a publication falls within the class of privileged communications, for which no action will lie without proof of actual malice”), abrogated in pari on other grounds by Barreca, 683 N.W.2d at 119-21 ; see also Haas v.

2013See Cherry v. Des Moines Leader, 114 Iowa 298, 304 , 86 N.W. 323 , 325 (1901) (stating that “the editor of a newspaper has the right, if not the duty, of publishing, for the information of the public, fair and reasonable comments, however severe in terms, upon anything which is made by its owner a subject of public exhibition, as upon any other matter of public interest; and such a publication falls within the class of privileged communications, for which no action will lie without proof of actual malice”), abrogated in pari on other grounds by Barreca, 683 N.W.2d at 119-21 ; see also Haas v.

2013See, e.g., Iowa Code §§ 659.2 , .3, .5 (2009). 38 Cherry v. Des Moines Leader, 114 Iowa 298, 304 , 86 N.W. 323 , 325 (1901) (stating that “the editor of a newspaper has the right, if not the duty, of publishing, for the information of the public, fair and reasonable comments, however severe in terms, upon anything which is made by its owner a subject of public exhibition, as upon any other matter of public interest; and such a publication falls within the class of privileged communications, for which no action will lie without proof of actual malice”), abrogated in part on other grounds by Bar

2013See Cherry v. Des Moines Leader, 114 Iowa 298, 304 , 86 N.W. 323 , 325 (1901) (stating that “the editor of a newspaper has the right, if not the duty, of publishing, for the information of the public, fair and reasonable comments, however severe in terms, upon anything which is made by its owner a subject of public exhibition, as upon any other matter of public interest; and such a publication falls within the class of privileged communications, for which no action will lie without proof of actual malice”), abrogated in pari on other grounds by Barreca, 683 N.W.2d at 119-21 ; see also Haas v.

2012Even if absolute immunity does not shield an official from liability, “the doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’ ” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 , 129 S.Ct. 808, 815 , 172 L.Ed.2d 565, 573 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 , 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738 , 73 L.Ed.2d 396, 410 (1982)); see also Leydens, 484 N.W.2d at 597 .

2012Even if absolute immunity does not shield an official from liability, “the doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’ ” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 , 129 S.Ct. 808, 815 , 172 L.Ed.2d 565, 573 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 , 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738 , 73 L.Ed.2d 396, 410 (1982)); see also Leydens, 484 N.W.2d at 597 .