concluded standard in Colorado

2016Id. (citation omitted).

2016Id. (citation omitted).

2026Id. at 1311 . ¶43 On these facts, the court concluded that the inquiry that class counsel had conducted was not unreasonable under the circumstances.

2026Id.

2025The court concluded that the defense did not apply unless the plaintiffs’ conduct was “outrageous,” but the law requires only “improper conduct” that “relate[s] directly to the underlying litigation.” Id.

2025Id. at 1323-24 .

2025In short, Spencer’s presentation on this claim at the postconviction hearing had too many holes in it to justify the conclusion that trial counsel’s decision not to call an eyewitness identification expert was anything other than a legitimate strategic decision — the kind that is 10 “virtually unchallengeable.” Ardolino, 69 P.3d at 76 .

2024He contends that he would have requested to bifurcate the charges and he would have opposed a continuance because he “intended to exercise his right to a speedy resolution of the case.” He relies on Key v. People, 865 P.2d 822 (Colo. 1994), to support that the pretrial readiness conference was “critical” because there existed “more than a ‘minimal risk’ that” his or counsel’s absence “might impair [his] right to a fair trial.” Id. at 825 (quoting Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 267 (1967)). 12 ¶ 33 Here, though, there was minimal risk of the court violating Toney’s rights because no subst

2024He contends that he would have requested to bifurcate the charges and he would have opposed a continuance because he “intended to exercise his right to a speedy resolution of the case.” He relies on Key v. People, 865 P.2d 822 (Colo. 1994), to support that the pretrial readiness conference was “critical” because there existed “more than a ‘minimal risk’ that” his or counsel’s absence “might impair [his] right to a fair trial.” Id. at 825 (quoting Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 267 (1967)). 12 ¶ 33 Here, though, there was minimal risk of the court violating Toney’s rights because no subst

2021The court also found relevant the discussions in Roper , Graham , and Miller regarding the unique characteristics of juvenile offenders, noting that "these distinctions between adults and juveniles are particularly relevant in the area of sexual offenses, where many acts of delinquency involve immaturity, impulsivity, and sexual curiosity rather than hardened criminality ... [or] ‘irretrievable depravity.’ " Id. at 19 ( quoting Miller , 567 U.S. at 471 , 132 S.Ct. 2455 ) .

2021The court also found relevant the discussions in Roper , Graham , and Miller regarding the unique characteristics of juvenile offenders, noting that "these distinctions between adults and juveniles are particularly relevant in the area of sexual offenses, where many acts of delinquency involve immaturity, impulsivity, and sexual curiosity rather than hardened criminality ... [or] ‘irretrievable depravity.’ " Id. at 19 ( quoting Miller , 567 U.S. at 471 , 132 S.Ct. 2455 ) .

2019Id.

2016The court's order specifically concluded that "Colorado society would agree that a parolee living at home has a reasonable expectation of greater privacy than a community corrections resident." The court also found that the search was done at a reasonable hour, was reasonable because it was not prolonged, and was not harassing. ¶ 26 As to the voluntariness of Triplett's statements to Kopp, the court concluded the test in Oregon v. Elstad , 470 U.S. 298 , 105 S.Ct. 1285 , 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985), was applicable.

2016The court's order specifically concluded that "Colorado society would agree that a parolee living at home has a reasonable expectation of greater privacy than a community corrections resident." The court also found that the search was done at a reasonable hour, was reasonable because it was not prolonged, and was not harassing. ¶ 26 As to the voluntariness of Triplett's statements to Kopp, the court concluded the test in Oregon v. Elstad , 470 U.S. 298 , 105 S.Ct. 1285 , 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985), was applicable.

2015In that context, the court concluded that the doctrine was "based upon a legal fiction unsupported by, and in direct opposition to, valid policy considerations." Id. at 139 .

2014Id. at 708 1 1 23 Here, the trial court's instruction went well beyond the instruction in Mares.

2013Id. 20 In Hodgson v. Prophet Co., 472 F.2d 196, 198-207 (10th Cir.1973), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that, for purposes of the overtime and minimum wage provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, a food service company that operated a college's dining facilities was engaging in retail sales.

2011Nonetheless, the court concluded that the clause was void as against public policy because the SSDI and UM/UIM benefits "overlap[ped] to some extent but [were] not duplicative." Id. at 1809 (quoting Newton, 197 Colo. at 468 , 594 P.2d at 1046 ).

2011Nonetheless, the court concluded that the clause was void as against public policy because the SSDI and UM/UIM benefits "overlap[ped] to some extent but [were] not duplicative." Id. at 1809 (quoting Newton, 197 Colo. at 468 , 594 P.2d at 1046 ).

2005Consequently, the court concluded that the instruction constituted reversible error because it allowed the jury to convict Vanrees “without necessarily finding beyond a reasonable doubt that he was aware that his conduct was practically certain to cause the proscribed results,” id. at 844 , and, in so doing, unconstitutionally lowered the prosecution’s burden of proof.

2001We are not persuaded otherwise by People v. Arevalo, supra. There, because the conflict between the statute and the rule concerned a procedural matter, a division of this court concluded that the rule prevailed.

2001Id. at 594 , 118 S.Ct. 2786 .

2001Id. at 46 , 99 S.Ct. 1572 .

2001Id. at 46 , 99 S.Ct. 1572 .

1999In People v. Arrington, 682 P.2d 490 (Colo.App.1984), another division of this court concluded that the doctrine of collateral estoppel precluded the prosecution from introducing evidence of a prior armed robbery for which defendant was acquitted.

1999In People v. Arrington, 682 P.2d 490 (Colo.App.1984), another division of this court concluded that the doctrine of collateral estoppel precluded the prosecution from introducing evidence of a prior armed robbery for which defendant was acquitted.

1998First, the court concluded that the analysis of McDonnell-Douglas and its progeny “represents a clear and thorough analytical framework for evaluating claims of employment discrimination.” Hence, it adopted that analytical model, but modified the language expressing the requirement for a prima facie case so as to “accommodate various kinds of employment decisions and various forms of discrimination.” Colorado Civil Rights Commission v. Big O Tires, Inc., supra, 940 P.2d at 400 .

1996The substance of that pattern instruction was approved by our supreme court in People v. Padilla, 638 P.2d 15 (Colo.1981) in which the court concluded that the instruction does not require “a unanimous decision on the greater offense before consideration of the lesser.” People v. Padilla, supra, 638 P.2d at 18 .

1996The substance of that pattern instruction was approved by our supreme court in People v. Padilla, 638 P.2d 15 (Colo.1981) in which the court concluded that the instruction does not require “a unanimous decision on the greater offense before consideration of the lesser.” People v. Padilla, supra, 638 P.2d at 18 .

1994The Mill III, 868 P.2d at 1103 .

1994The Mill III, 868 P.2d at 1103 .