concluded defense in Maryland

2016The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit used the same comparative approach in Cunningham v. District Attorney's Office for Escambia County , 592 F.3d 1237 (11th Cir. 2010), to uphold Alabama's postconviction DNA testing statute under the Due Process Clause.

2016The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit used the same comparative approach in Cunningham v. District Attorney’s Office for Escambia County, 592 F.3d 1237 (11th Cir. 2010), to uphold Alabama’s postconviction DNA testing statute under the Due Process Clause.

2016Because a petitioner might make a prima facie showing of lack of tampering by pointing to the State’s duty to preserve all biological evidence related to a criminal case, the court concluded that this requirement did not “transgress[ ] any recognized principle of fundamental fairness in operation.” Id. (quoting Osborne, 557 U.S. at 69 , 129 S.Ct. 2308 ).

2016Because a petitioner might make a prima facie showing of lack of tampering by pointing to the State’s duty to preserve all biological evidence related to a criminal case, the court concluded that this requirement did not “transgress[ ] any recognized principle of fundamental fairness in operation.” Id. (quoting Osborne, 557 U.S. at 69 , 129 S.Ct. 2308 ).

2022In contrast, after examining the defense’s evidence, the Court concluded that the defense advanced “patently and totally inconsistent theories [that] could hardly have escaped the attention of the jurors.” Id. at 512 .

2022In contrast, after examining the defense’s evidence, the Court concluded that the defense advanced “patently and totally inconsistent theories [that] could hardly have escaped the attention of the jurors.” Id. at 512 .

2022Id. 8 at 275.

2022Id. 8 at 275.

2018Id. at 1415 .

2018Id. at 1415 .

2017The Court found the “enlargement” in Reed to be analogous to a local measure that had permissibly set a date certain—September 1—for an application-filing deadline, when State law required only that the application be filed before the annual revision of the tax list. 226 Md. at 248-49 (discussing Eastern Tar Products Corp. v. State Tax Comm., 176 Md. 290 (1939)).

2017The Court found the “enlargement” in Reed to be analogous to a local measure that had permissibly set a date certain—September 1—for an application-filing deadline, when State law required only that the application be filed before the annual revision of the tax list. 226 Md. at 248-49 (discussing Eastern Tar Products Corp. v. State Tax Comm., 176 Md. 290 (1939)).

2017The general principle that a trial judge's ruling does not bind another trial judge in the same case is fully consistent with the Court of Special Appeals's holding in Martin , 73 Md.App. at 698 , 536 A.2d at 133 -34 , in which the Court concluded that the doctrine of the law of the case applied to a jury's findings of a causal relationship between an employee's accidental personal injuries and his disability.

2017The general principle that a trial judge's ruling does not bind another trial judge in the same case is fully consistent with the Court of Special Appeals's holding in Martin , 73 Md.App. at 698 , 536 A.2d at 133 -34 , in which the Court concluded that the doctrine of the law of the case applied to a jury's findings of a causal relationship between an employee's accidental personal injuries and his disability.

2008Specifically, the Court observed that “the law of the case doctrine does not apply to” an appellate court such as itself, that “is required to review judgments of subordinate courts.” Loveday, supra, 296 Md. at 234 , 462 A.2d 58 .

2008Specifically, the Court observed that “the law of the case doctrine does not apply to” an appellate court such as itself, that “is required to review judgments of subordinate courts.” Loveday, supra, 296 Md. at 234 , 462 A.2d 58 .

2006Ford did not object to this instruction, and this Court concluded that the instruction, as given, was not reversible error. 330 Md. at 709, 625 A.2d at 997 .

1995The Court concluded that the doctrine should only apply when, without transferred intent, “the defendant could not be convicted of the crime at issue because the mental and physical elements do not concur as to either the intended or the actual victim.” Id. at 711 , 625 A.2d 984 .

1998Requisite procedural safeguards were present in an HCAO proceeding which was “at least as functionally comparable to a trial before a court as the administrative disciplinary proceedings involved in Miner.” Id. at 534 , 588 A.2d at 792 .

1998Requisite procedural safeguards were present in an HCAO proceeding which was “at least as functionally comparable to a trial before a court as the administrative disciplinary proceedings involved in Miner.” Id. at 534 , 588 A.2d at 792 .

1969The Court concluded that this clause contained inconsistent requirements; but, when the case again came to this Court, 181 Md. 171 , 28 A. 2d 830 , it was held that parol evidence and the proof of custom and usage were admissible to clear up the ambiguity.

1969The Court concluded that this clause contained inconsistent requirements; but, when the case again came to this Court, 181 Md. 171 , 28 A. 2d 830 , it was held that parol evidence and the proof of custom and usage were admissible to clear up the ambiguity.

1969The opinion in the first case, 180 Md. at page 277 , specifically pointed out that covenants to be placed in a mortgage, when they go beyond providing for the mere creation of a lien, are necessarily the subject of agreement between the parties; that matters such as whether the interest is to be paid annually, who is to be obligated to pay the taxes, or that the buildings should be insured are not essentially involved in a valid mortgage; and, if the contract between the parties be silent on such points, a provision therein for the execution of a mortgage is fully complied with by the executio

1958The opinion in the first case, 180 Md. at page 277 , specifically pointed out that covenants to be placed in a mortgage, when they go beyond providing for the mere creation of a lien, are necessarily the subject of agreement between the parties; that matters such as whether the interest is to be- paid annually, who is to be obligated to pay the taxes, or that the buildings should be insured are not essentially involved in a valid mortgage; and, if the contract between the parties be silent on such points, a provision therein for the execution of a mortgage is fully complied with by the executi

2023Id.

2022The Court concluded that the doctrine did not apply to the case before it because “there is no home at all in which discipline and tranquillity are to be preserved.” Id. at 68 .

2022The Court concluded that the claim was cognizable because the Governor’s discretionary veto “inhere[d] in a sentence of life with possibility of parole.” Id.

2021In Gilchrist, 340 Md. at 618 , 667 A.2d at 882 , where there had been two jury panels, this Court concluded that defense counsel’s acceptance of a second jury panel related only to the second jury panel and had no bearing as to whether the trial court erred in dismissing the first jury panel.

2021In Gilchrist, 340 Md. at 618 , 667 A.2d at 882 , where there had been two jury panels, this Court concluded that defense counsel’s acceptance of a second jury panel related only to the second jury panel and had no bearing as to whether the trial court erred in dismissing the first jury panel.

2021Stating that a trial court abuses its discretion in giving an anti-CSI effect instruction “where the defendant does not misstate the law,” the Court concluded that defense counsel had not misstated the law and that the trial court had abused its discretion in giving the instruction. 437 Md. at 540 .