9 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1983–2022 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Holcomb v. Stategreen2 sentences2022As an initial matter, the court concluded that the presumption of prejudice, which this Court 2 Homicide by vehicle in the first degree as alleged in this case is in fact a felony, see OCGA § 40-6-393 (a), and second-degree homicide by vehicle is a misdemeanor, see OCGA §§ 40-6-393 (c), 17-10-3. 3 had previously applied upon a finding of juror misconduct, see, e.g., Holcomb v. State, 268 Ga. 100, 103 (2) (485 SE2d 192) (1997), did not survive enactment of the current Evidence Code and was therefore irrelevant in assessing prejudice under OCGA § 24-6-606 (b). 2022As an initial matter, the court concluded that the presumption of prejudice, which this Court 2 Homicide by vehicle in the first degree as alleged in this case is in fact a felony, see OCGA § 40-6-393 (a), and second-degree homicide by vehicle is a misdemeanor, see OCGA §§ 40-6-393 (c), 17-10-3. 3 had previously applied upon a finding of juror misconduct, see, e.g., Holcomb v. State, 268 Ga. 100, 103 (2) (485 SE2d 192) (1997), did not survive enactment of the current Evidence Code and was therefore irrelevant in assessing prejudice under OCGA § 24-6-606 (b). | 1 | 1 |
McCoy v. Louisianagreen1 sentence2021A structural error may be found where: (1) the right violated “is not designed to protect the defendant from erroneous conviction but instead protects some other interest, such as the fundamental legal principle that a defendant must be allowed to make his own choices about the proper way to protect his own liberty”; (2) the impact of the error is “too 9 the Court concluded that defense counsel’s insistence on conceding McCoy’s guilt during opening and closing arguments over his client’s “intransigent and unambiguous objection” to such a strategy violated McCoy’s Sixth Amendment rights and ent | 1 | 1 |
Cochran v. Stategreen2 sentences2004See Cochran v. State, 276 Ga. 283 (2) ( 576 SE2d 867 ) (2003). 2004See Cochran v. State, 276 Ga. 283 (2) ( 576 SE2d 867 ) (2003). | 1 | 1 |
Stephan v. Stategreen2 sentences1997Compare Stephan v. State, 205 Ga. App. 241, 243-244 (2) ( 422 SE2d 25 ) (1992). 1997Compare Stephan v. State, 205 Ga. App. 241, 243-244 (2) ( 422 SE2d 25 ) (1992). | 1 | 1 |
TLT v. Stategreen2 sentences1991T. v. State, 133 Ga. App. 895, 898 (2) ( 212 SE2d 650 ) (1975), three judges of this court concluded that the principle stated in OCGA § 24-4-8 should apply to juvenile proceedings. 1991T. v. State, 133 Ga. App. 895, 898 (2) ( 212 SE2d 650 ) (1975), three judges of this court concluded that the principle stated in OCGA § 24-4-8 should apply to juvenile proceedings. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Harris v. State
green
2 sentences2004In Harris v. State, 273 Ga. 608 (2) ( 543 SE2d 716 ) (2001), this Court concluded it was error in a murder trial for the trial court to instruct the jury it could infer the intent to kill from the use of a deadly weapon in the manner in which the weapon is ordinarily used by a person of sound mind and discretion who acted intentionally and without justification. 2004In Harris v. State, 273 Ga. 608 (2) ( 543 SE2d 716 ) (2001), this Court concluded it was error in a murder trial for the trial court to instruct the jury it could infer the intent to kill from the use of a deadly weapon in the manner in which the weapon is ordinarily used by a person of sound mind and discretion who acted intentionally and without justification. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Grinder v. Bryans Road Building & Supply Co.
green
2 sentences2002In light of these considerations, the court concluded that the rule was unsound and "creat[ed] more unjust results and generat[ed] more mischief than would a change in the law to a rule that looks to one satisfaction." Id. at 707, 432 A.2d 453 . 2002Accordingly, the court held "that a creditor who contracts with the agent for an undisclosed principal does not obtain alternative liability, that he may proceed to judgment against both, but that he is limited to one satisfaction." Id. at 707-708, 432 A.2d 453 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Evans v. Evans
green
2 sentences1995In reliance on Evans v. Evans, 237 Ga. 549 ( 228 SE2d 857 ) (1976), the court concluded that the claim for reimbursement ripened at the time that the improvements were made. 1995In reliance on Evans v. Evans, 237 Ga. 549 ( 228 SE2d 857 ) (1976), the court concluded that the claim for reimbursement ripened at the time that the improvements were made. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Enmund v. Florida
green
1 sentence1986Because of the trial court's instruction that "in order to warrant a conviction upon circumstantial evidence, the proven facts shall not only be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt, but shall exclude every other reasonable hypothesis, save that of the guilt of the accused[,]" id. at p. 1337, n. 8, the court also held that a reasonable juror could not have interpreted this portion of the malice instruction as reducing the prosecution's burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt circumstances that indicate malice. [4] In the applicant's direct appeal, he did argue, however, that the trial c | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos
green
1 sentence1983We raise these questions but do not answer them, since they are for the trial court in the first instance and since neither the trial nor appellate courts need deal with them unless there is sufficient evidence to submit to the jury either that the shipowner was aware of sufficient facts to conclude that the winch was not in proper order, or that the winch was defective when cargo operations began and that Scindia was chargeable with knowledge of its condition.” Id. at 178 . | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.