concluded doctrine in Oklahoma

2014The statutory beneficiaries under the wrongful death claim were not subject to the arbitration clause because the wrongful death statute confers an original and distinct claim for the damages sustained by the statutory beneficiaries named therein and is not derived from, nor a continuation of, claims that formerly existed in a decedent. 316 P.3d at 613 . ¶20 The Supreme Court of Illinois rejected a nursing home's argument that the personal representative is merely the conduit by which the rights of the decedent are litigated after his or her death.

2014The statutory beneficiaries under the wrongful death claim were not subject to the arbitration clause because the wrongful death statute confers an original and distinct claim for the damages sustained by the statutory beneficiaries named therein and is not derived from, nor a continuation of, claims that formerly existed in a decedent. 316 P.3d at 613 . ¶20 The Supreme Court of Illinois rejected a nursing home's argument that the personal representative is merely the conduit by which the rights of the decedent are litigated after his or her death.

1999Because the railroad was already operating within the City of Denver and sought only to build a spur track the court concluded that the privilege to extend the spur track that the city *520 granted to the railroad was "a license rather than a franchise." McPhee at 158 F. 11 . ¶ 8 Similarly, the majority's reliance on Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co. v. Total Energy, 1972 OK 108 ¶ 21 , 499 P.2d 917 , is misplaced.

1999Because the railroad was already operating within the City of Denver and sought only to build a spur track the court concluded that the privilege to extend the spur track that the city *520 granted to the railroad was "a license rather than a franchise." McPhee at 158 F. 11 . ¶ 8 Similarly, the majority's reliance on Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co. v. Total Energy, 1972 OK 108 ¶ 21 , 499 P.2d 917 , is misplaced.

2013Appellants asked the trial court to "adopt the new cause of action" because it is supported by a reasonable extension of Oklahoma common law. {13 In Tarrant v. Guthrie First Capital Bank, 2010 OK CIV APP 82, 115 , 241 P.3d 280, 284 , the court concluded it was error for the trial court to instruct the jury on the theory of "prima facie tort." The opinion states, "[UJntil the Supreme Court expressly adopts the prima facie tort theory of recovery, we are unwilling to do so." Tarrant v. Guthrie First Capital Bank, 2010 OK CIV APP 82, ¶ 15 , 241 P.3d 280, 284 . 14 We conclude the trial court did n

2013Appellants asked the trial court to "adopt the new cause of action" because it is supported by a reasonable extension of Oklahoma common law. {13 In Tarrant v. Guthrie First Capital Bank, 2010 OK CIV APP 82, 115 , 241 P.3d 280, 284 , the court concluded it was error for the trial court to instruct the jury on the theory of "prima facie tort." The opinion states, "[UJntil the Supreme Court expressly adopts the prima facie tort theory of recovery, we are unwilling to do so." Tarrant v. Guthrie First Capital Bank, 2010 OK CIV APP 82, ¶ 15 , 241 P.3d 280, 284 . 14 We conclude the trial court did n

2003Id. at 89 .

1998Citing, Chandler-Frates & Reitz v. Kostich, 1981 OK 74 , 630 P.2d 1287 , Fund argues that because the error was apparent from the face of the order it could be “corrected.” In Kostich the Court concluded that the error, the use of the wrong interest rate, was apparent on the face of the order and the setting of the interest rate was a mere clerical act and not dependent upon any facts submitted to the trial court.

1998Citing, Chandler-Frates & Reitz v. Kostich, 1981 OK 74 , 630 P.2d 1287 , Fund argues that because the error was apparent from the face of the order it could be “corrected.” In Kostich the Court concluded that the error, the use of the wrong interest rate, was apparent on the face of the order and the setting of the interest rate was a mere clerical act and not dependent upon any facts submitted to the trial court.

1997Following Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 , 100 S.Ct. 2069 , 65 L.Ed.2d 10 (1980) and Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 , 96 S.Ct. 1634 , 48 L.Ed.2d 96 (1976), the Court recognized that the state's taxing power may reach inside of Indian country and that the immunity doctrine does not shield an Indian tribe from all state-law obligations to assist in the collection of state taxes.

1997Following Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 , 100 S.Ct. 2069 , 65 L.Ed.2d 10 (1980) and Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 , 96 S.Ct. 1634 , 48 L.Ed.2d 96 (1976), the Court recognized that the state's taxing power may reach inside of Indian country and that the immunity doctrine does not shield an Indian tribe from all state-law obligations to assist in the collection of state taxes.

1997Following Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 , 100 S.Ct. 2069 , 65 L.Ed.2d 10 (1980) and Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 , 96 S.Ct. 1634 , 48 L.Ed.2d 96 (1976), the Court recognized that the state's taxing power may reach inside of Indian country and that the immunity doctrine does not shield an Indian tribe from all state-law obligations to assist in the collection of state taxes.

1997Following Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 , 100 S.Ct. 2069 , 65 L.Ed.2d 10 (1980) and Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 , 96 S.Ct. 1634 , 48 L.Ed.2d 96 (1976), the Court recognized that the state's taxing power may reach inside of Indian country and that the immunity doctrine does not shield an Indian tribe from all state-law obligations to assist in the collection of state taxes.

1996Id.

1995Triangle Mining Co., 753 F.2d at 742 .

1949In State v. Cephus, 6 Pennewill, Del. 160, 67 A. 150 , it was said: “In resisting an assault no more force may be used than is necessary, and if the person assaulted uses in his defense greater force he becomes the aggressor.” To the same effect is State v. De Paolo, 26 Del. 176 , 84 A. 213 .

1949In State v. Cephus, 6 Pennewill, Del. 160, 67 A. 150 , it was said: “In resisting an assault no more force may be used than is necessary, and if the person assaulted uses in his defense greater force he becomes the aggressor.” To the same effect is State v. De Paolo, 26 Del. 176 , 84 A. 213 .

1949In State v. Cephus, 6 Pennewill, Del. 160, 67 A. 150 , it was said: “In resisting an assault no more force may be used than is necessary, and if the person assaulted uses in his defense greater force he becomes the aggressor.” To the same effect is State v. De Paolo, 26 Del. 176 , 84 A. 213 .

1944Some of our own opinions are also cited, including Price v. Mahoney, 175 Okla. 355 , 53 P. 2d 257 , and Welborn v. Whitney, supra. Some of those opinions contain expressions to the effect that the statutes must be strictly followed, but those are cases wherein the court concluded that the error therein presented was such as to amount to a “total omission” to do the thing required by statute.

1944Some of our own opinions are also cited, including Price v. Mahoney, 175 Okla. 355 , 53 P. 2d 257 , and Welborn v. Whitney, supra. Some of those opinions contain expressions to the effect that the statutes must be strictly followed, but those are cases wherein the court concluded that the error therein presented was such as to amount to a “total omission” to do the thing required by statute.