concluded error in Washington

2016A majority of the Court concluded that this presumption failed to distinguish unprotected threats from protected speech because it might allow convictions "based solely on the fact of cross burning itself," including cross burnings in a play or at a political rally. !d., at 365-366, 123 S.Ct. 1536 (plurality opinion); id., at 386 , 123 S.Ct. 1536 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("The provision will thus tend to draw nonthreatening ideological expression within the ambit ofthe prohibition of intimidating expression[.]").

2016A majority of the Court concluded that this presumption failed to distinguish unprotected threats from protected speech because it might allow convictions "based solely on the fact of cross burning itself," including cross burnings in a play or at a political rally. !d., at 365-366, 123 S.Ct. 1536 (plurality opinion); id., at 386 , 123 S.Ct. 1536 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("The provision will thus tend to draw nonthreatening ideological expression within the ambit ofthe prohibition of intimidating expression[.]").

2013Id. at 701 .

2013Id. at 701 .

2009Hoffman, 116 Wn.2d at 112 . ¶24 However in Ward, this court concluded that defense counsel’s tactical decision to pursue an all-or-nothing approach and to not request a lesser included instruction was ineffective because the decision was objectively unreasonable.

2009Hoffman, 116 Wash.2d at 112 , 804 P.2d 577 . ¶ 24 However in Ward , this court concluded that defense counsel's tactical decision to pursue an all or nothing approach and to not request a lesser included instruction was ineffective because the decision was objectively unreasonable.

2009Ward, 125 Wn.

2009Ward, 125 Wash.App. at 250 , 104 P.3d 670 .

2005App. 1 , 528 P.2d 271 (1974), this court concluded that claim preclusion did not bar a claimant from seeking an award for aggravation of a psychiatric condition where the original claim had not led to an unambiguous finding regarding the condition’s cause.

2005In King v. Department of Labor & Industries, 12 Wash.App. 1 , 528 P.2d 271 (1974), this court concluded that claim preclusion did not bar a claimant from seeking an award for aggravation of a psychiatric condition where the original claim had not led to an unambiguous finding regarding the condition's cause.

2005Serrano, 95 Wn.

2005Serrano, 95 Wash.App. at 709 , 977 P.2d 47 .

2004Briggs, 109 Wash. App. at 492 , 38 P.3d 349 .

2003The court concluded that the requirement that the offender have the weapon on his person “makes it far less likely [than in Anderson] that a person could be convicted under this section without knowledge of his or her criminal conduct.” Briggs, 109 Wn.

2003Alvarado, 89 Wn.

2003Alvarado, 89 Wash.App. at 550 , 949 P.2d 831 .

2001In In re Marriage of Kovacs, 121 Wn.2d 795, 809 , 854 P.2d 629 (1993), the Supreme Court held the Parenting Act “did not intend to create any presumption in favor of the primary caregiver but, to the contrary, intended to reject any such presumption.” To the extent the trial court’s finding applies a presumption in favor of Ms. Combs on the basis of her status as the temporary residential parent, it clearly was not based on tenable reasons and was an abuse of discretion.

2001In In re Marriage of Kovacs, 121 Wn.2d 795, 809 , 854 P.2d 629 (1993), the Supreme Court held the Parenting Act “did not intend to create any presumption in favor of the primary caregiver but, to the contrary, intended to reject any such presumption.” To the extent the trial court’s finding applies a presumption in favor of Ms. Combs on the basis of her status as the temporary residential parent, it clearly was not based on tenable reasons and was an abuse of discretion.

2001State v. Stein, 94 Wash.App. at 625, 972 P.2d 505 .

2001State v. Stein, 94 Wn.

2001In short, the court concluded that the doctrine of equitable estoppel “will not be applied where its application would interfere with the discharge of governmental duties or where the officials on whose conduct estoppel is sought to be predicated acted beyond their power.” Steinmann, 9 Wn.

2001In short, the court concluded that the doctrine of equitable estoppel "will not be applied where its application would interfere with the discharge of governmental duties or where the officials on whose conduct estoppel is sought to be predicated acted beyond their power." City of Mercer Island, 9 Wash.App. at 481 , 513 P.2d 80 .

1999Id. [15] There is no excuse for the use of physical restraints in this case.

1999Id. 15 There is no excuse for the use of physical restraints in this case.

1997Pelkey, 109 Wn.2d at 488 .

1997Pelkey, 109 Wash.2d at 488 , 745 P.2d 854 .

2025Cates, 183 Wn.2d at 535-536 .

2023Id. at 648-49 .

2022The court concluded that the instruction “allowed the jury to weigh [the alleged victim’s] testimony more heavily than other evidence that was not inconsistent with consensual sex.” Id. at 234 .

2021App. 869, 874 , 809 P.2d 209 (1991), the court concluded that an instruction could have cured any prejudice resulting from the prosecutor’s statement during closing argument: “in order for you to find the defendant not guilty on either of these charges, you have to believe his testimony and you have to completely disbelieve the officers’ testimony.

2021You have to believe that the officers are lying.” Id. at 874-75 . 9 54206-4-II We affirm.

2021Relying on Kenney v. Abraham, 199 Wash. 167, 170 , 90 P.2d 713 (1939), and other Washington cases, 3 the court reasoned that “a party must perform its duties and a failure to perform entitles the injured party to damages proximately caused by the breach” with limited exceptions. 4 Lake Hills, 14 Wn.

2021Relying on Kenney v. Abraham, 199 Wash. 167, 170 , 90 P.2d 713 (1939), and other Washington cases, 3 the court reasoned that “a party must perform its duties and a failure to perform entitles the injured party to damages proximately caused by the breach” with limited exceptions. 4 Lake Hills, 14 Wn.

2021Id. at 743 . 38 Family of Damarius Butts et al. v. King County Exec.

2020Bobenhouse, 166 Wn.2d at 894-95 .

2020Id. at 535-36 .

2020The Court concluded that the clause was unconstitutionally vague because “the indeterminacy of the wide- ranging inquiry required by the . . . clause both denies fair notice to defendants and invites arbitrary enforcement by judges.” Johnson, 576 U.S. at 597 .

2019The Court concluded that the rule stated in Miller was a “substantive holding that life without parole is an excessive sentence for children whose crimes reflect transient immaturity.” Id. at 735 .

2019Farina, 94 Wn.

2019Jones, 166 Wn.