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33 Tennessee opinions name it 3 courts 1997–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Foster v. Harrisgreen2 sentences2013Our Supreme Court recently explained the discovery rule in medical malpractice actions: In Teeters v. Currey, 518 S.W.2d 512, 517 (Tenn.1974), this Court adopted the majority rule among the states that a medical malpractice action does not accrue until “the patient discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable care and diligence for his own health and welfare, should have discovered the resulting injury.” The Court concluded that no rule of law should require “that a plaintiff file suit prior to knowledge of his injury or ... sue to vindicate a nonexistent wrong, at a time when [the] injury is u 2013Our Supreme Court recently explained the discovery rule in medical malpractice actions: In Teeters v. Currey, 518 S.W.2d 512, 517 (Tenn. 1974), this Court adopted the majority rule among the states that a medical malpractice action does not accrue until “the patient discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable care and diligence for his own health and welfare, should have discovered the resulting injury.” The Court concluded that no rule of law should require “that a plaintiff file suit prior to knowledge of his injury or . . . sue to vindicate a nonexistent wrong, at a time when [the] injury i | 3 | 3 |
Teeters v. Curreygreen2 sentences2013Our Supreme Court recently explained the discovery rule in medical malpractice actions: In Teeters v. Currey, 518 S.W.2d 512, 517 (Tenn.1974), this Court adopted the majority rule among the states that a medical malpractice action does not accrue until “the patient discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable care and diligence for his own health and welfare, should have discovered the resulting injury.” The Court concluded that no rule of law should require “that a plaintiff file suit prior to knowledge of his injury or ... sue to vindicate a nonexistent wrong, at a time when [the] injury is u 2013Our Supreme Court recently explained the discovery rule in medical malpractice actions: In Teeters v. Currey, 518 S.W.2d 512, 517 (Tenn.1974), this Court adopted the majority rule among the states that a medical malpractice action does not accrue until “the patient discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable care and diligence for his own health and welfare, should have discovered the resulting injury.” The Court concluded that no rule of law should require “that a plaintiff file suit prior to knowledge of his injury or ... sue to vindicate a nonexistent wrong, at a time when [the] injury is u | 2 | 3 |
Jeanette Rea Jackson v. Bradley Smithgreen1 sentence2017From the record it appears that Petitioner sought neither of these actions; therefore, that Order regarding the distribution of the Decedent’s tangible personal property stands valid and bars this action. 9 Res judicata “bars a second suit between the same parties or their privies on the same claim with respect to all issues which were, or could have been, litigated in the former suit.” Jackson v. Smith, 387 S.W.3d 486, 491 (Tenn. 2012) (citing Creech v. Addington, 281 S.W.3d 363, 376 (Tenn. 2009); Richardson v. Tennessee Bd. of Dentistry, 913 S.W.2d 446, 459 (Tenn. 1995)). | 1 | 1 |
Creech v. Addingtongreen1 sentence2017From the record it appears that Petitioner sought neither of these actions; therefore, that Order regarding the distribution of the Decedent’s tangible personal property stands valid and bars this action. 9 Res judicata “bars a second suit between the same parties or their privies on the same claim with respect to all issues which were, or could have been, litigated in the former suit.” Jackson v. Smith, 387 S.W.3d 486, 491 (Tenn. 2012) (citing Creech v. Addington, 281 S.W.3d 363, 376 (Tenn. 2009); Richardson v. Tennessee Bd. of Dentistry, 913 S.W.2d 446, 459 (Tenn. 1995)). | 1 | 1 |
Richardson v. Tennessee Board of Dentistrygreen1 sentence2017From the record it appears that Petitioner sought neither of these actions; therefore, that Order regarding the distribution of the Decedent’s tangible personal property stands valid and bars this action. 9 Res judicata “bars a second suit between the same parties or their privies on the same claim with respect to all issues which were, or could have been, litigated in the former suit.” Jackson v. Smith, 387 S.W.3d 486, 491 (Tenn. 2012) (citing Creech v. Addington, 281 S.W.3d 363, 376 (Tenn. 2009); Richardson v. Tennessee Bd. of Dentistry, 913 S.W.2d 446, 459 (Tenn. 1995)). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Rhodengreen1 sentence2016Id.; see also Vizcarrondo- Casanova, 763 F.3d 89 , 103-04 & n.9 (1st Cir. 2014) (holding that the defendant did not establish that his filing of a motion to change his plea constituted detrimental reliance); Rhoden, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 825-26 (concluding that the defendant did not detrimentally rely on plea offer when she could have cross-examined a witness or requested a continuance to further prepare for the cross-examination). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Vizcarrondo-Casanovagreen1 sentence2016Id.; see also Vizcarrondo- Casanova, 763 F.3d 89 , 103-04 & n.9 (1st Cir. 2014) (holding that the defendant did not establish that his filing of a motion to change his plea constituted detrimental reliance); Rhoden, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 825-26 (concluding that the defendant did not detrimentally rely on plea offer when she could have cross-examined a witness or requested a continuance to further prepare for the cross-examination). | 1 | 1 |
State of Tennessee v. Susan Renee Bisegreen1 sentence2015The trial court concluded the hearing by stating that it “means to confine Mr. Cary so that he will never again threaten a free person” and that “Mr. Carey, you are the reason that we must have prisons.” Ordinarily, “sentences imposed by the trial court within the appropriate statutory range are to be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard with a „presumption of reasonableness.‟” State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682, 708 (Tenn. 2012). | 1 | 1 |
State of Tennessee v. Takeita M. Lockegreen1 sentence2014State v. Locke, 90 S.W.3d 663, 675 (Tenn. 2002). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Cannongreen1 sentence2013Id. at *5; see also Cannon, 661 S.W.2d at 899 (concluding that failure to provide recorded police report was harmless error where the officer’s testimony was cumulative of other witness testimony); David Louis Raybin, 10 Tenn. Prac. | 1 | 1 |
State ex rel. Moretz v. City of Johnson Citygreen2 sentences2009Moretz v. City of Johnson City, 581 S.W.2d 628, 631-32 (Tenn. 1979), this Court concluded that a challenge to the reasonableness of an annexation in quo warranto included the entitlement to a trial by jury, a development that, as a practical matter, had a significant adverse effect upon the expansion of municipal territories.5 In 1998 (shortly after the City of Memphis enacted Ordinance No. 4513 in regard to the annexation of Area 42) the General Assembly adopted additional amendments further refining the procedures for annexation and quo warranto challenges. 2009Moretz v. City of Johnson City, 581 S.W.2d 628, 631-32 (Tenn.1979), this Court concluded that a challenge to the reasonableness of an annexation in quo warranto included the entitlement to a trial by jury, a development that, as a practical matter, had a significant adverse effect upon the expansion of municipal territories. 5 In 1998 (shortly after the City of Memphis enacted Ordinance No. 4513 in regard to the annexation of Area 42) the General Assembly adopted additional amendments further refining the procedures for annexation and quo warranto challenges. | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Jacumingreen | 1 | 1 |
| Fahy v. Connecticutgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Gomezgreen2 sentences2013Id. 2008In addressing his sentencing claim, this Court concluded that the claim was not properly preserved, and, even if it had been, the claim lacked merit because State v. Gomez (“Gomez I”), 163 S.W.3d 632 (Tenn. 2005), overruled by State v. Gomez (“Gomez II”), 239 S.W.3d 733, 740-41 (Tenn. 2007), concluded Blakely did not impact Tennessee’s sentencing scheme. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Gomezgreen1 sentence2008In addressing his sentencing claim, this Court concluded that the claim was not properly preserved, and, even if it had been, the claim lacked merit because State v. Gomez (“Gomez I”), 163 S.W.3d 632 (Tenn. 2005), overruled by State v. Gomez (“Gomez II”), 239 S.W.3d 733, 740-41 (Tenn. 2007), concluded Blakely did not impact Tennessee’s sentencing scheme. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In re Marriage of Schmidt
green
2 sentences2002The Vick opinion relied heavily upon the rationale and analysis of In re Marriage of Schmidt, 292 Ill.App.3d 229 , 226 Ill.Dec. 152 , 684 N.E.2d 1355 (1997). 2002The Vick opinion relied heavily upon the rationale and analysis of In re Marriage of Schmidt, 292 Ill.App.3d 229 , 226 Ill.Dec. 152 , 684 N.E.2d 1355 (1997). | 2 | 2002–2002 |
State v. Nichols
green
2 sentences1998The court concluded that the instruction properly reflected “the evidentiary certainty required by the ‘due process’ clause of the federal constitution and the ‘law of the land’ provision in our state constitution.” Id. 1998The court concluded that the instruction properly reflected "the evidentiary certainty required by the 'due process' clause of the federal constitution and the 'law of the land' provision in our state constitution." Id. | 2 | 1998–1998 |
State v. Zimmerman
green
1 sentence2025In other words, there appears to have been no basis for the sudden change in strategy.” Id. at 226 . - 26 - Unlike Zimmerman, the record supports the post-conviction court’s finding that third trial counsel did not promise the jury that a DNA expert was going to testify for the defense. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Clanton v. Cain-Sloan Co.
green
1 sentence2025Id. at 444–45. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Lincoln General Insurance Co. v. Detroit Diesel Corp.
green
1 sentence2022The court concluded that the rule was appropriate because it “fairly balances the competing policy interests and clearly delineates between the law of contract and the law of tort.” Id. at 492 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Board of Professional Responsibility of The Supreme Court of Tennessee v. Loring Edwin Justice
green
1 sentence2021Justice, 577 S.W.3d at 925-26 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
STATE of Tennessee v. Courtney KNOWLES
green
1 sentence2020Applying a plain error analysis, a majority of the court concluded that the error “did not create a substantial risk of a non-unanimous verdict on the offense of rape of a child.” Id. at 425 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State of Tennessee v. Kacy Dewayne Cannon
green
1 sentence2017Id. at 299 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Turner
green
2 sentences2017The court concluded that the analysis in Samson “strikes the correct balance between the severely diminished privacy interests of a convicted felon serving the remainder of his or her sentence on parole release in the community, and -2- society’s interests in both reintegrating that felon and protecting itself against recidivism.” Id. at 165 . 2017In examining the nature of parole, the court recognized that “[o]n the continuum of possible punishments and reductions in freedoms, parolees occupy a place between incarcerated prisoners and probationers.” Id. at 162 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Brady v. Maryland
green
1 sentence2016Given that the information in the NCIC report was not material, the court concluded that no violation pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), occurred. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Faulkner
green
1 sentence2015Id. at 60 . -18- Turning to the instant case, the trial court did not instruct the jury that they had to find that the Defendant acting knowingly as to either the nature of his conduct or the result of his conduct. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Cherokee Country Club, Inc. v. City of Knoxville
green
1 sentence2012SNPCO, Inc. v. City of Jefferson City, 2010 WL 4272744 , at *2. 4 In addition, the court concluded that the test mandated by Cherokee Country Club, Inc. v. City of Knoxville, 152 S.W.3d 466 (Tenn.2004) to determine whether an ordinance must comply with the notice, hearing, and review requirements of the statutes governing the enactment of municipal zoning ordinances did not apply to determinations of Whether an ordinance was a “zoning restriction” for the purpose of the “grandfather” provision *472 in Tenn.Code Ann. § 13-7-208(b). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez
green
1 sentence2012Id. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
State v. Powers
green
1 sentence2012Powers, 101 S.W.3d at 401-02 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
State v. Hall
green
1 sentence2008Id. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Moore v. Moore
green
1 sentence2002The Court concluded that this rule is more consistent with the contract’s implied condition of reasonableness, as held in Moore v. Moore, 603 S.W.2d 736 (Tenn.App.1980). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Rickman v. Dutton green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
United States v. Cronic
green
2 sentences2002The court concluded that a presumption of prejudice was warranted pursuant to Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659 , 104 S. Ct. at 2047 . 2002The court concluded that a presumption of prejudice was warranted pursuant to Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659 , 104 S. Ct. at 2047 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Spinelli v. United States red | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Aguilar v. Texas red | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| State v. Cook green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| State v. Simpson green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Chapman v. California red | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Ezell v. Cockrell green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.