concluded error in New Jersey

2025Ibid. (quoting Chapman v. California., 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)).

2024Ibid. (quoting Chapman v. California., 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)).

2024Citing the seminal case of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1986), among others, the court also concluded that defense counsel's failure to interview or properly investigate alibi witnesses constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.

2024In holding an arbitration clause like the one in Atalese unenforceable, the Court concluded the clause was not "written in plain language . . . clear and understandable to the average consumer." Ibid. (quoting Atalese, 219 N.J. at 446 ).

2024In holding an arbitration clause like the one in Atalese unenforceable, the Court concluded the clause was not "written in plain language . . . clear and understandable to the average consumer." Ibid. (quoting Atalese, 219 N.J. at 446 ).

2024It also cited to the length of the clause, 750 words running on in thirty-five unbroken lines, and stated that "[t]he best that can be said about the arbitration provision is that it is as difficult to read as other parts of the enrollment agreement." Ibid.

2021Id. at 162–63; see also State v. McIntyre-Caulfield, 455 N.J.

2018Id. at 446-49 .

2015Far more persons would suffer if government did not perform these functions at all than would be benefited by permitting recovery in those cases where the government is shown to have performed inadequately." [Creason, supra, 957 P.2d at 1332 .] We are mindful of the serious allegation here that Rachel lost her sight in one eye because of defendants' negligence in 25 A-0643-14T4 failing to perform a ministerial act.

2014In ruling on the motion, the court concluded that the waiver provision in the initial application "is clear" and "is clearly brought to the attention of anybody reading the document because of the capital letters and large print." Citing Mirra v. Holland America Line, 331 N.J.

2013For that reason, the court concluded that the rule was “narrowly drawn to materially advance the substantial government interest in protecting the public from misleading lawyer advertising.” Id. at 225-26 .

2013Ibid.

2012The court concluded that factors two and three in BroiAm weighed in favor of suppression because “the evidence was obtained by exploiting the original illegality.” Id. 291 Ill.Dec. 786 , 824 N.E.2d at 650 .

2012The court concluded that factors two and three in BroiAm weighed in favor of suppression because “the evidence was obtained by exploiting the original illegality.” Id. 291 Ill.Dec. 786 , 824 N.E.2d at 650 .

2012Twin Rivers, supra, 192 N.J. at 365 , 929 A.2d 1060 .

2012Twin Rivers, supra, 192 N.J. at 365 , 929 A.2d 1060 .

2012The Court concluded that the test articulated in State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535 , 423 A.2d 615 (1980), was the appropriate standard to apply to the dispute between the residents of Twin Rivers and the governing association.

2012The Court concluded that the test articulated in State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535 , 423 A.2d 615 (1980), was the appropriate standard to apply to the dispute between the residents of Twin Rivers and the governing association.

2008The historical context in which the Uniformity Clause was adopted as part of the 1947 New Jersey Constitution is extensively reviewed and discussed in New Jersey State League of Municipalities v. Kimmelman, 105 N.J. 422, 427-36 , 522 A.2d 430 (1987), in which the Court concluded that the clause was a compromise, whereby there would be no requirement that property be taxed at “true value,” but “would require that as to real property, then and now the lifeblood of local government, discriminatory burdens be forever barred.” Id. at 433 , 522 A.2d 430 .

2008The historical context in which the Uniformity Clause was adopted as part of the 1947 New Jersey Constitution is extensively reviewed and discussed in New Jersey State League of Municipalities v. Kimmelman, 105 N.J. 422, 427-36 , 522 A.2d 430 (1987), in which the Court concluded that the clause was a compromise, whereby there would be no requirement that property be taxed at “true value,” but “would require that as to real property, then and now the lifeblood of local government, discriminatory burdens be forever barred.” Id. at 433 , 522 A.2d 430 .

2008Id. at 253 , 300 A. 2d 337 .

2008Id. at 253 , 300 A. 2d 337 .

2005However, the Court concluded that the rule was inapplicable because “one of the essential components of the initial-permission rule is ‘continuous possession of the vehicle’ by the user following the grant of permission[,]” id. at 153 , 875 A.2d 943 (citation omitted), and the user in French did not remain in continuous possession of the car, id. at 153 , 875 A.2d 943 .

2005However, the Court concluded that the rule was inapplicable because “one of the essential components of the initial-permission rule is ‘continuous possession of the vehicle’ by the user following the grant of permission[,]” id. at 153 , 875 A.2d 943 (citation omitted), and the user in French did not remain in continuous possession of the car, id. at 153 , 875 A.2d 943 .

2005See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Wilkerson, 436 Mass. 137 , 763 N.E. 2d 508, 510 (2002) (where motor vehicle records were not under police control, probable cause was not negated when information about a driver's license later proved inaccurate); State v. Lanoue, 156 Vt. 35 , 587 A. 2d 405 (1991) (failure of agency responsible to update records did not undermine reasonableness of the stop); State v. Ewoldt, 448 N.W. 2d 676, 678 (Iowa App.1989) (knowledge of inaccuracy of motor vehicle data not imputed to officer who stopped a car based on that data); contra Shadler v. State, 761 So. 2d 279 (Fla.) (b

2005See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Wilkerson, 436 Mass. 137 , 763 N.E. 2d 508, 510 (2002) (where motor vehicle records were not under police control, probable cause was not negated when information about a driver's license later proved inaccurate); State v. Lanoue, 156 Vt. 35 , 587 A. 2d 405 (1991) (failure of agency responsible to update records did not undermine reasonableness of the stop); State v. Ewoldt, 448 N.W. 2d 676, 678 (Iowa App.1989) (knowledge of inaccuracy of motor vehicle data not imputed to officer who stopped a car based on that data); contra Shadler v. State, 761 So. 2d 279 (Fla.) (b

2005See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Wilkerson, 436 Mass. 137 , 763 N.E. 2d 508, 510 (2002) (where motor vehicle records were not under police control, probable cause was not negated when information about a driver's license later proved inaccurate); State v. Lanoue, 156 Vt. 35 , 587 A. 2d 405 (1991) (failure of agency responsible to update records did not undermine reasonableness of the stop); State v. Ewoldt, 448 N.W. 2d 676, 678 (Iowa App.1989) (knowledge of inaccuracy of motor vehicle data not imputed to officer who stopped a car based on that data); contra Shadler v. State, 761 So. 2d 279 (Fla.) (b

2005See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Wilkerson, 436 Mass. 137 , 763 N.E. 2d 508, 510 (2002) (where motor vehicle records were not under police control, probable cause was not negated when information about a driver's license later proved inaccurate); State v. Lanoue, 156 Vt. 35 , 587 A. 2d 405 (1991) (failure of agency responsible to update records did not undermine reasonableness of the stop); State v. Ewoldt, 448 N.W. 2d 676, 678 (Iowa App.1989) (knowledge of inaccuracy of motor vehicle data not imputed to officer who stopped a car based on that data); contra Shadler v. State, 761 So. 2d 279 (Fla.) (b

2005See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Wilkerson, 436 Mass. 137 , 763 N.E. 2d 508, 510 (2002) (where motor vehicle records were not under police control, probable cause was not negated when information about a driver's license later proved inaccurate); State v. Lanoue, 156 Vt. 35 , 587 A. 2d 405 (1991) (failure of agency responsible to update records did not undermine reasonableness of the stop); State v. Ewoldt, 448 N.W. 2d 676, 678 (Iowa App.1989) (knowledge of inaccuracy of motor vehicle data not imputed to officer who stopped a car based on that data); contra Shadler v. State, 761 So. 2d 279 (Fla.) (b