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10 Hawaii opinions name it 2 courts 1996–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Hawaii courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Estradagreen2 sentences2008Ultimately, this court concluded that because defense counsel "had little opportunity to investigate the [reports] to prepare the defense" and the trial judge " made no inquiry regarding the reasons for [the prosecution's] failure to comply with HRPP Rule 16(b) or whether any prejudice resulted from [the prosecution's] misconduct, " the judge "should have allowed the trial continuance as an appropriate remedy to cure the harm created by [the prosecution's] unexplained delays in providing discovery of essential information." Id. at 216 , 738 P.2d at 821 (emphasis added). 2008Ultimately, this court concluded that because defense counsel "had little opportunity to investigate the [reports] to prepare the defense" and the trial judge " made no inquiry regarding the reasons for [the prosecution's] failure to comply with HRPP Rule 16(b) or whether any prejudice resulted from [the prosecution's] misconduct, " the judge "should have allowed the trial continuance as an appropriate remedy to cure the harm created by [the prosecution's] unexplained delays in providing discovery of essential information." Id. at 216 , 738 P.2d at 821 (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
Dorrance v. Leegreen2 sentences2007Applying the four-part collateral estoppel test announced in Dorrance v. Lee, 90 Hawai'i 143, 148 , 976 P.2d 904, 909 (1999), the court ruled that the Boundary Commission judgments entered in 1877 precluded Omerod and Kaluna Appellants’ claims in the instant action. 2007Applying the four-part collateral estoppel test announced in Dorrance v. Lee, 90 Hawai'i 143, 148 , 976 P.2d 904, 909 (1999), the court ruled that the Boundary Commission judgments entered in 1877 precluded Omerod and Kaluna Appellants’ claims in the instant action. | 1 | 1 |
State v. DeCastrogreen2 sentences2002The majority of this court concluded, based on State v. Kealoha, 9 Haw.App. 115 , 826 P.2d 884 (1992), and State v. DeCastro, 81 Hawai'i 147, 153 , 913 P.2d 558, 564 (App.1996) (Acoba, J., concurring), that the first and third conditions outlined in the trial court’s instruction were appropriate “considerations” for interpreting the first statutory requirement of HRS § 703-302(l)(a)—whether a defendant “reasonably believed it was necessary to commit a crime in order to avoid harm to himself or others.” Maumalanga, 90 Hawai'i at 103, 976 P.2d at 417 (emphases in original). 2002The majority of this court concluded, based on State v. Kealoha, 9 Haw.App. 115 , 826 P.2d 884 (1992), and State v. DeCastro, 81 Hawai'i 147, 153 , 913 P.2d 558, 564 (App.1996) (Acoba, J., concurring), that the first and third conditions outlined in the trial court’s instruction were appropriate “considerations” for interpreting the first statutory requirement of HRS § 703-302(l)(a)—whether a defendant “reasonably believed it was necessary to commit a crime in order to avoid harm to himself or others.” Maumalanga, 90 Hawai'i at 103, 976 P.2d at 417 (emphases in original). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Maumalangagreen2 sentences2002The majority of this court concluded, based on State v. Kealoha, 9 Haw.App. 115 , 826 P.2d 884 (1992), and State v. DeCastro, 81 Hawai'i 147, 153 , 913 P.2d 558, 564 (App.1996) (Acoba, J., concurring), that the first and third conditions outlined in the trial court’s instruction were appropriate “considerations” for interpreting the first statutory requirement of HRS § 703-302(l)(a)—whether a defendant “reasonably believed it was necessary to commit a crime in order to avoid harm to himself or others.” Maumalanga, 90 Hawai'i at 103, 976 P.2d at 417 (emphases in original). 2002The majority of this court concluded, based on State v. Kealoha, 9 Haw.App. 115 , 826 P.2d 884 (1992), and State v. DeCastro, 81 Hawai'i 147, 153 , 913 P.2d 558, 564 (App.1996) (Acoba, J., concurring), that the first and third conditions outlined in the trial court’s instruction were appropriate “considerations” for interpreting the first statutory requirement of HRS § 703-302(l)(a)—whether a defendant “reasonably believed it was necessary to commit a crime in order to avoid harm to himself or others.” Maumalanga, 90 Hawai'i at 103, 976 P.2d at 417 (emphases in original). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Maumalangagreen2 sentences2002On appeal, 90 Hawai'i 96, 103-04 , 976 P.2d 410, 417-18 (App.1998), this court concluded that the instruction was erroneous because the first and third conditions referenced in the instruction were derived from ease law that predated the adoption of the Hawai'i Penal Code and were not incorporated into the choice of evils defense following the enactment of -HRS § 703-302. 2002On appeal, 90 Hawai'i 96, 103-04 , 976 P.2d 410, 417-18 (App.1998), this court concluded that the instruction was erroneous because the first and third conditions referenced in the instruction were derived from ease law that predated the adoption of the Hawai'i Penal Code and were not incorporated into the choice of evils defense following the enactment of -HRS § 703-302. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Hawaii. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Lee
green
1 sentence2018In contrast, defense counsel in Lee , where the ICA held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the continuance, did not subpoena the potential defense witness. 9 Haw. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Valmoja
green
2 sentences2018In Valmoja , this court concluded that defense counsel exercised due diligence in serving subpoenas on the absent witnesses at a reasonable period of time prior to trial. 56 Haw. at 454 , 540 P.2d at 64 . 2018In Valmoja , this court concluded that defense counsel exercised due diligence in serving subpoenas on the absent witnesses at a reasonable period of time prior to trial. 56 Haw. at 454 , 540 P.2d at 64 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Feliciano v. Waikiki Deep Water, Inc.
green
1 sentence2013Id. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
GODOY ETC. v. Hawaii County
green
2 sentences2009In Godoy , this court concluded that this rule was not violated, as it “does not cover the kind of situation we have in this case, where the purported illegality consists only of a lack of authority in the Bus Control Committee to fix the rate for parking fees.” Id. (emphases added). 2009In Godoy , this court concluded that this rule was not violated, as it "does not cover the kind of situation we have in this case, where the purported illegality consists only of a lack of authority in the Bus Control Committee to fix the rate for parking fees." Id. (emphases added). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Oyama
green
2 sentences2008Id. at 189 , 637 P.2d at 780 . 2008Id. at 189 , 637 P.2d at 780 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. El'Ayache
green
1 sentence2008The court concluded that defense counsel "made an appropriate tactical judgment" in stipulating to the witness testimony and "choos[ing] to concentrate his defense on the government's inability to prove that the clothing's value exceeded $200.00, in an attempt to spare his client a felony conviction." Id. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Wilson
green
2 sentences2007Id. at 51 , 987 P.2d at 274 . 2007Id. at 51 , 987 P.2d at 274 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Nakamura v. State
green
2 sentences2004In Kauai Elec. this court concluded that the standard to be applied in energy rate adjustments is whether the order in issue was "just and reasonable" because HRS § 269-16, expressly "requires that all rates and charges must be `just and reasonable.'" Nakamura, 98 Hawai'i at 275 , 47 P.3d at 742 (quoting Kauai Elec. at 181, 590 P.2d at 535 ). 2004In Kauai Elec. this court concluded that the standard to be applied in energy rate adjustments is whether the order in issue was "just and reasonable" because HRS § 269-16, expressly "requires that all rates and charges must be `just and reasonable.'" Nakamura, 98 Hawai'i at 275 , 47 P.3d at 742 (quoting Kauai Elec. at 181, 590 P.2d at 535 ). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
In Re Kauai Electric Division of Citizens Utilities Co.
green
2 sentences2004In Kauai Elec. this court concluded that the standard to be applied in energy rate adjustments is whether the order in issue was "just and reasonable" because HRS § 269-16, expressly "requires that all rates and charges must be `just and reasonable.'" Nakamura, 98 Hawai'i at 275 , 47 P.3d at 742 (quoting Kauai Elec. at 181, 590 P.2d at 535 ). 2004In Kauai Elec, this court concluded that the standard to be applied in energy rate adjustments is whether the order in issue was “just and reasonable” because HRS § 269-16, expressly “requires that all rates and charges must be ‘just and reasonable.’ ” Nakamura, 98 Hawai'i at 275 , 47 P.3d at 742 (quoting Kauai Elec. at 181, 590 P.2d at 535 ). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
State v. Kealoha
green
2 sentences2002The majority of this court concluded, based on State v. Kealoha, 9 Haw.App. 115 , 826 P.2d 884 (1992), and State v. DeCastro, 81 Hawai'i 147, 153 , 913 P.2d 558, 564 (App.1996) (Acoba, J., concurring), that the first and third conditions outlined in the trial court’s instruction were appropriate “considerations” for interpreting the first statutory requirement of HRS § 703-302(l)(a)—whether a defendant “reasonably believed it was necessary to commit a crime in order to avoid harm to himself or others.” Maumalanga, 90 Hawai'i at 103, 976 P.2d at 417 (emphases in original). 2002The majority of this court concluded, based on State v. Kealoha, 9 Haw.App. 115 , 826 P.2d 884 (1992), and State v. DeCastro, 81 Hawai'i 147, 153 , 913 P.2d 558, 564 (App.1996) (Acoba, J., concurring), that the first and third conditions outlined in the trial court’s instruction were appropriate “considerations” for interpreting the first statutory requirement of HRS § 703-302(l)(a)—whether a defendant “reasonably believed it was necessary to commit a crime in order to avoid harm to himself or others.” Maumalanga, 90 Hawai'i at 103, 976 P.2d at 417 (emphases in original). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
State v. Brighter
green
2 sentences1996Relying on State v. Brighter, 62 Haw. 25 , 608 P.2d 855 (1980), the court concluded that the claim of right instruction should have been given because that defense applies to robbery prosecutions. 1996Relying on State v. Brighter, 62 Haw. 25 , 608 P.2d 855 (1980), the court concluded that the claim of right instruction should have been given because that defense applies to robbery prosecutions. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.