concluded error in Florida

1998Id.

1996Id.

2015After noting that the fee award equaled a fee of $26.12 per hour, the court concluded that defense counsel suffered a double forfeiture in that “[n]ot only did he receive token compensation for his efforts, but his private practice suffered as a result of his service in this case.” Id.

2015After noting that the fee award equaled a fee of $26.12 per hour, the court concluded that defense counsel suffered a double forfeiture in that “[n]ot only did he receive token compensation for his efforts, but his private practice suffered as a result of his service in this case.” Id.

2015In Archer, this Court concluded that defense counsel’s testimony that he “[didn’t] have any independent recollection” and “[didn’t] recall if [he] was aware or not” of evidence about a codefendant’s involvement in a violent burglary “did not establish . . . that evidence of the Mississippi burglary was not disclosed.” Id. at 1202-03 .

2014In Archer , this Court concluded that defense counsel’s testimony that he “[didn’t] have any independent recollection” and “[didn’t] recall if [he] was aware or not” of evidence about a codefen-dant’s involvement in a violent burglary “did not establish ... that evidence of . the Mississippi burglary was not disclosed.” Id. at 1202-03 .- Likewise, here, counsel’s lack of memory does not establish that the State failed to provide defense counsel with a copy of the.

2025Citing Jackson, the court concluded the claim of error did not fall within the ambit of rule 3.800(b) because the defendant “allege[d] error in the sentencing process, not that 7 the alleged procedural error [was] apparent on the face of the order.” Id. at 481 .

2023The Court concluded its analysis by showing that a combination of factors created the competent substantial evidence of donative intent: While one factor independently—such as Wife signing the Warranty Deed or being listed on the mortgage, or Wife’s unfettered access to and autonomy in residing, maintaining, and improving [the marital residence]—does not establish an interspousal gift for purposes of equitable distribution in a dissolution of marriage, viewing Husband’s actions comprehensively leads us to conclude that competent, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that [th

2017Fla. Evergreen Foliage, 336 F.Supp.2d at 1271 (citing Chewning v. Ford Motor Co., 35 F.Supp.2d 487 (D.S.C. 1998)). 5 Regardless, whether or not a court has theoretical jurisdiction over an independent action' for relief from a judgment entered by a different court is not disposi-tive on the "issue of the frivolity" of the Appellant’s complaint in this case.

2017As a practical matter, by holding that redressable harm is not established for purposes of a legal malpractice claim “until the final judgment becomes final,” Silvestrone, 721 So.2d at 1175 , we substantially addressed the basic concern regarding undue disruption of the attorney-client relationship underlying the continuing representation doctrine.

2017Fla. Evergreen Foliage, 336 F.Supp.2d at 1271 (citing Chewning v. Ford Motor Co., 35 F.Supp.2d 487 (D.S.C. 1998)). 5 Regardless, whether or not a court has theoretical jurisdiction over an independent action' for relief from a judgment entered by a different court is not disposi-tive on the "issue of the frivolity" of the Appellant’s complaint in this case.

2016Id. at 458-59 .

2016Id. at 458-59 .

2015Id. at 453 . * Because the instruction negated Floyd’s sole defense, this court concluded the instruction was fundamental error.

2015Id. at 454 .

2014In that case, this Court concluded that defense counsel made a reasonable strategic decision not to call a mental health expert who had opined that “Everett demonstrated no signs of mental retardation or of a major mental illness” because trial counsel could reasonably determine that such “testimony was not favorable to Everett’s case.” Id. at 482 ; see also Davis v. State, 928 So.2d 1089, 1111-12 (Fla.2005) (concluding that trial counsel acted reasonably by not calling mental health expert who would have testified that defendant was violent but lacked any psychosis or any major mental problem

2013Id.

2013Id. at 1391 .

2013Id. at 968 .

2013In rejecting the claim, this Court concluded that the clause did “not represent an attempt by the legislature to abdicate its constitutional lawmaking responsibility,” finding to the contrary that the subject statute set forth “very specific and mandatory guidelines for the [PSC] to carry out the purpose of the legislation, and, in doing so, established] the [PSC] as a body with the appropriate expertise to evaluate the need, complex market conditions, environmental effect and other matters relating to a proposed pipeline, as well as the overall fitness of the applicant.” Id. at 944-45 .

2013Id. at 526-27 .

2013Id. in.

2012The court concluded that the hearing officer’s continuance to enforce the subpoena “added a procedural step to the review process that deprived the [suspendee] of a real opportunity to be heard and to challenge the suspension on the merits within thirty days.” Id.

2012In Bachrach , the court concluded that the requirement to attend class meetings is incident in the definition of “student.” See Bachrach, 114 Wis.2d at 138-39 , 336 N.W.2d at 702 .

2012In Bachrach , the court concluded that the requirement to attend class meetings is incident in the definition of “student.” See Bachrach, 114 Wis.2d at 138-39 , 336 N.W.2d at 702 .

2012Id. at 106 .

2011Ferrara, in turn, held that an attorney-in-fact must act in the best interests of the principal, which is consistent with the fiduciary duties that the courts have imposed on the attorney-in-fact. “[A] power of attorney ... is clearly given with the intent that the attorney-in-fact will utilize that power for the benefit of the principal” (Mantella v. Mantella, 268 A.D.2d 852, 852 , [ 701 N.Y.S.2d 715 ] [3d Dept.2000] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]).

2011Ferrara, in turn, held that an attorney-in-fact must act in the best interests of the principal, which is consistent with the fiduciary duties that the courts have imposed on the attorney-in-fact. “[A] power of attorney ... is clearly given with the intent that the attorney-in-fact will utilize that power for the benefit of the principal” (Mantella v. Mantella, 268 A.D.2d 852, 852 , [ 701 N.Y.S.2d 715 ] [3d Dept.2000] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]).

2011The court concluded that a clause which seeks to exonerate an attorney-in-fact from any and all liability runs afoul of the spirit of New York’s public policy and the duty of an attorney-in-fact as established under Ferrara [Matter of Ferrara, 7 N.Y.3d 244 , 819 N.Y.S.2d 215 , 852 N.E.2d 138 (2006) ].

2011The court concluded that a clause which seeks to exonerate an attorney-in-fact from any and all liability runs afoul of the spirit of New York’s public policy and the duty of an attorney-in-fact as established under Ferrara [Matter of Ferrara, 7 N.Y.3d 244 , 819 N.Y.S.2d 215 , 852 N.E.2d 138 (2006) ].

2010In Nowak, 546 So.2d at 124 , the court cited Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.620 2 which provides: “The court shall assure that in camera proceedings with a child outside the presence of other parties are recorded unless otherwise stipulated by the parties.” The court in Hathcock v. Hathcock, 680 So.2d 564, 565 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996), relied on Nowak when it held that a request that a court reporter transcribe a child’s in camera testimony “must be honored.” (Emphasis added.) See also Shaw v. Shaw, 455 So.2d 1156 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984) (reversing the trial court’s order summarily setting aside