concluded error in Oregon

2014In particular, the court concluded that the bar disciplinary process set out a comprehensive scheme for the adjudication and remediation of ethical vio- lations and that recognizing an independent private right of action sounding in tort for such violations would not advance the legislative purposes underlying the pertinent statute. 350 Doyle v. City of Medford Finally, in Cain v. Rijken, 300 Or 706 , 717 P2d 140 (1986), this court created a new private right of action for the tort of negligence based on the alleged violation of a statute that neither expressly nor impliedly created such a rig

2014In particular, the court concluded that the bar disciplinary process set out a comprehensive scheme for the adjudication and remediation of ethical vio- lations and that recognizing an independent private right of action sounding in tort for such violations would not advance the legislative purposes underlying the pertinent statute. 350 Doyle v. City of Medford Finally, in Cain v. Rijken, 300 Or 706 , 717 P2d 140 (1986), this court created a new private right of action for the tort of negligence based on the alleged violation of a statute that neither expressly nor impliedly created such a rig

2025Id. at 624-25 .

2025Id. at 624-25 .

1973The rule denied eligibility to any student "who transfers to a new school without a corresponding change in his parent's residence." The court concluded the rule was overbroad because: "* * * All students are covered by a blanket classification which has no relationship to whether a particular student's reasons for changing schools are athletic. * * *" 290 N.E.2d at 69 .

1973The rule denied eligibility to any student “who transfers to a new school without a corresponding change in his parent’s residence.” The court concluded the rule was overbroad because: “* * * All students are covered by a blanket classification which has no relationship to whether a particular student’s reasons for changing schools are athletic. * * *” 290 NE2d at 69 .

2024Thus, the court concluded that the error “was not harmless.” Id.

2022The court concluded that the error-of-judgment instruction given in Rogers “obscures the fact that, to avoid liability, the defendant must exercise the degree of care, skill, and diligence required by law.” Id.

2021Id. at 454 .

2021Id. at 103-04 .

2020Id. at 398 .

2019Id . at 133-34, 420 P.3d 9 .

2019With respect to the second and third factors-" 'the amount of time between the violation and any later statements' " and " 'whether the suspect remained in custody before making any later statements' "-the court concluded that those factors suggested that the "defendant's decision to take the breath test was the product of the immediately preceding Miranda violation" because "no time elapsed between the questions that [the officer] asked in violation of defendant's right to counsel and his question whether defendant would take a breath test," and because the "defendant remained in custody thro

2019With respect to the second and third factors-" 'the amount of time between the violation and any later statements' " and " 'whether the suspect remained in custody before making any later statements' "-the court concluded that those factors suggested that the "defendant's decision to take the breath test was the product of the immediately preceding Miranda violation" because "no time elapsed between the questions that [the officer] asked in violation of defendant's right to counsel and his question whether defendant would take a breath test," and because the "defendant remained in custody thro

2019With respect to the second and third factors-" 'the amount of time between the violation and any later statements' " and " 'whether the suspect remained in custody before making any later statements' "-the court concluded that those factors suggested that the "defendant's decision to take the breath test was the product of the immediately preceding Miranda violation" because "no time elapsed between the questions that [the officer] asked in violation of defendant's right to counsel and his question whether defendant would take a breath test," and because the "defendant remained in custody thro

2018Id. at 424 , 870 P.2d 185 .

2018Id. at 424 , 870 P.2d 185 .

2018Further, the Court concluded that a bar on payment "involves a limitation on political expression subject to exacting scrutiny." Id . at 420, 108 S.Ct. 1886 (citing Buckley v. Valeo , 424 U.S. 1 , 45, 96 S.Ct. 612 , 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) ).

2018Further, the Court concluded that a bar on payment "involves a limitation on political expression subject to exacting scrutiny." Id . at 420, 108 S.Ct. 1886 (citing Buckley v. Valeo , 424 U.S. 1 , 45, 96 S.Ct. 612 , 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) ).

2018Further, the Court concluded that a bar on payment "involves a limitation on political expression subject to exacting scrutiny." Id . at 420, 108 S.Ct. 1886 (citing Buckley v. Valeo , 424 U.S. 1 , 45, 96 S.Ct. 612 , 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) ).

2016An offense might have certain characteristics that suggest that the legislature classified the offense as civil to create a “procedural short-cut[]” in prosecuting the offense rather than reflecting “a genuine change in the public assessment of the conduct.” Brown, 280 Or at 102 .

2016In State v. Kell, 303 Or 89, 95-100 , 734 P2d 334 (1987), this court concluded that the rule in Edwards that police must cease interrogation once a defendant has invoked his Fifth Amendment rights is “equally applicable” to Article I, section 12.

2016In State v. Kell, 303 Or 89, 95-100 , 734 P2d 334 (1987), this court concluded that the rule in Edwards that police must cease interrogation once a defendant has invoked his Fifth Amendment rights is “equally applicable” to Article I, section 12.

2014Supanchick, 245 Or App at 660-61 .

2014Id. at 112 .

2013Citing Boise Cascade Corp. v. Board of Forestry, 164 Or App 114 , 991 P2d 563 (1999), rev den, 331 Or 244 (2000), cert den, 532 US 923 (2001), the court explained that a claim for a taking of a property interest under the United States Constitution “is not ripe until the government entity charged with implementing the regulations has reached a final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the property at issue.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Respondents correctly observe that petitioners have not explained why that ruling was incorrect either.

2013Citing Boise Cascade Corp. v. Board of Forestry, 164 Or App 114 , 991 P2d 563 (1999), rev den, 331 Or 244 (2000), cert den, 532 US 923 (2001), the court explained that a claim for a taking of a property interest under the United States Constitution “is not ripe until the government entity charged with implementing the regulations has reached a final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the property at issue.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Respondents correctly observe that petitioners have not explained why that ruling was incorrect either.

2013Citing Boise Cascade Corp. v. Board of Forestry, 164 Or App 114 , 991 P2d 563 (1999), rev den, 331 Or 244 (2000), cert den, 532 US 923 (2001), the court explained that a claim for a taking of a property interest under the United States Constitution “is not ripe until the government entity charged with implementing the regulations has reached a final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the property at issue.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Respondents correctly observe that petitioners have not explained why that ruling was incorrect either.

2012That subject, the court concluded was the requirement that the state “will protect some human life from fertilization until natural death.” Id. at 638 .

2012“A caption that catalogues the effect of a proposed measure, without identifying its subject matter,” the court stated, “is inadequate.” Id. at 637 ; see also Carson v. Myers, 326 Or 248, 254 , 951 P2d 700 (1998) (caption inadequate “because it cata-logues an effect of the proposed measure, rather than stating its ‘subject’ ”).

2011The court concluded that that principle meant that it would be inappropriate to treat a convicted offender as having been harmed by counsel’s negligence in conducting his or her defense unless the offender first showed that counsel had “failed to meet the established standards in a way that would make post-conviction relief appropriate.” Id. at 230 .

2010In light of those circumstances, and the fact that “there [was] nothing in the record to indicate that the testimony played no role in the trial court’s assessment[,]” id. at *478 566 (emphasis added), the court concluded the error was not harmless and reversed.

2010Ultimately, the court concluded that the analysis required for the admissibility of the prior bad act evidence offered in Johnson for the purpose of showing a lack of consent to sexual contact "falls somewhere in between Pinnell and Johns." Id. at 340, 131 P.3d 173 .

2007Based on its reasoning in Lotches, the court concluded that error apparent on the face of the record had occurred because, in part, error was obvious, i.e., not reasonably in dispute. 335 Or. at 627 , 75 P.3d 448 .

2007Based on its reasoning in Lotches, the court concluded that error apparent on the face of the record had occurred because, in part, error was obvious, i.e., not reasonably in dispute. 335 Or. at 627 , 75 P.3d 448 .

2005Id. at 51 .

2005Id. at 483-84 . 12 Thus, consistently with Sandin , even mandatory language in a state regulation does not necessarily create a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause.