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14 Nebraska opinions name it 2 courts 1960–2022 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Nebraska courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ketteler v. Danielgreen2 sentences2006In Ketteler v. Daniel, 251 Neb. 287, 298 , 556 N.W.2d 623, 630 (1996), when this court concluded that an instruction requested by the plaintiff should have been given, the court stated: First, the proffered instruction correctly stated the law. 2006In Ketteler v. Daniel, 251 Neb. 287, 298 , 556 N.W.2d 623, 630 (1996), when this court concluded that an instruction requested by the plaintiff should have been given, the court stated: First, the proffered instruction correctly stated the law. | 1 | 1 |
Ti Group Automotive Systems (North America), Inc. v. Vdo North America, L.L.C.green1 sentence2005See TI Group Automotive Systems v. VDO North America, 375 F.3d 1126 (Fed. | 1 | 1 |
Colwell v. Stategreen1 sentence2003Adopting a relaxed version of the Teague test which would permit retroactive application of a new constitutional rule if “it establishes] a procedure without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished,” the court concluded that the rule established by Ring did not meet this standard because “the likelihood of an accurate sentence was not seriously diminished simply because a three-judge panel, rather than a jury, found the aggravating circumstances that supported [the defendant’s death sentence.” Colwell v. State, 59 P.3d at 472, 473. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Nebraska. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Mettlen v. Sandoz
green
2 sentences1984In Oft v. Dornacker, 131 Neb. 644 , 269 N.W. 418 , and again in Mettlen v. Sandoz, 131 Neb. 625 , 269 N.W. 98 , this court concluded that the defense of recoupment or reduction ofplaintiff’s claim must arise out of the same transaction as plaintiff’s claim, and survives as long as plaintiff’s cause of action exists, even if affirmative legal action upon the subject of recoupment is barred by the statute of limitations. 1984In Oft v. Dornacker, 131 Neb. 644 , 269 N.W. 418 , and again in Mettlen v. Sandoz, 131 Neb. 625 , 269 N.W. 98 , this court concluded that the defense of recoupment or reduction ofplaintiff’s claim must arise out of the same transaction as plaintiff’s claim, and survives as long as plaintiff’s cause of action exists, even if affirmative legal action upon the subject of recoupment is barred by the statute of limitations. | 2 | 1960–1984 |
Oft v. Dornacker
green
2 sentences1984In Oft v. Dornacker, 131 Neb. 644 , 269 N.W. 418 , and again in Mettlen v. Sandoz, 131 Neb. 625 , 269 N.W. 98 , this court concluded that the defense of recoupment or reduction ofplaintiff’s claim must arise out of the same transaction as plaintiff’s claim, and survives as long as plaintiff’s cause of action exists, even if affirmative legal action upon the subject of recoupment is barred by the statute of limitations. 1984In Oft v. Dornacker, 131 Neb. 644 , 269 N.W. 418 , and again in Mettlen v. Sandoz, 131 Neb. 625 , 269 N.W. 98 , this court concluded that the defense of recoupment or reduction ofplaintiff’s claim must arise out of the same transaction as plaintiff’s claim, and survives as long as plaintiff’s cause of action exists, even if affirmative legal action upon the subject of recoupment is barred by the statute of limitations. | 2 | 1960–1984 |
Ermel v. SMA Enters.
green
1 sentence2022Cite as 30 Neb. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Ramaekers v. Creighton University
green
2 sentences2022CREIGHTON UNIVERSITY Cite as 312 Neb. 248 we can get something in place that can allow us all to breathe, then we can go back in and clean things up quite a bit.” The court concluded the hearing by taking the matter under advisement. 2022CREIGHTON UNIVERSITY Cite as 312 Neb. 248 The court concluded the hearing without providing a defini- tive answer on whether it still believed issues remained before it or whether its denial of Students’ request for a temporary injunction was a final order. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Barrera-Garrido
green
1 sentence2017The court concluded that this claim did not warrant an evidentiary hearing. - 652 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 296 Nebraska R eports STATE v. BARRERA-GARRIDO Cite as 296 Neb. 647 Barrera-Garrido appeals the district court’s order which overruled his motion for postconviction relief without conduct- ing an evidentiary hearing. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Armstrong
green
1 sentence2015Nebraska Advance Sheets STATE v. ARMSTRONG 1011 Cite as 290 Neb. 991 The court concluded that defense counsel’s representation of Armstrong was deficient. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Gibbs Cattle Co. v. Bixler
green
2 sentences2014Relying on Gibbs Cattle Co. v. Bixler, 285 Neb. 952 , 831 N.W.2d 696 (2013), the court determined that all pro- visions of the dormant mineral statutes should be construed in favor of the mineral owner. 2014Relying on Gibbs Cattle Co. v. Bixler, 285 Neb. 952 , 831 N.W.2d 696 (2013), the court determined that all pro- visions of the dormant mineral statutes should be construed in favor of the mineral owner. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Marshall v. Marshall
green
2 sentences2009The Court concluded that the claim at issue in Marshall did not involve the administration of an estate, the probate of a will, or any other purely probate matter, but, instead, that the claim alleged "a widely recognized tort" and that "[t]rial courts, both federal and state, often address conduct of the kind" alleged. 547 U.S. at 312 , 126 S.Ct. 1735 . 2009The Court concluded that the claim at issue in Marshall did not involve the administration of an estate, the probate of a will, or any other purely probate matter, but, instead, that the claim alleged "a widely recognized tort" and that "[t]rial courts, both federal and state, often address conduct of the kind" alleged. 547 U.S. at 312 , 126 S.Ct. 1735 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Hahn v. Neth
green
2 sentences2008The court concluded that the test to determine whether an omission on a sworn report is a jurisdictional defect rather than a technical one "should be whether, notwithstanding the omission, the sworn report conveys the information required by the applicable statute." Id. at 171 , 699 N.W.2d at 38 . 2008The court concluded that the test to determine whether an omission on a sworn report is a jurisdictional defect rather than a technical one "should be whether, notwithstanding the omission, the sworn report conveys the information required by the applicable statute." Id. at 171 , 699 N.W.2d at 38 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
In Re SB
green
1 sentence2006The court concluded that this principle was applicable under the facts of the case, finding, “On this record, we see no reason to suppose that [if] the juvenile court had been asked to find whether ‘active efforts’ had been made, rather than ‘reasonable efforts,’ it would have made a different finding.” Id. at 1165, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 736-37 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Cannon v. Mullin
green
1 sentence2003The decision in Cannon v. Mullin, 297 F.3d 989 (10th Cir. 2002), further supports the view that Ring does not fall within the second Teague exception. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Myszkowski v. Wilson & Co.
green
2 sentences1998This court concluded that the claim in Myszkowski was compensable because "[the] claimant did not leave his line of duty under his employment for purposes of his own." 155 Neb. at 720 , 53 N.W.2d at 208 . 1998This court concluded that the claim in Myszkowski was compensable because "[the] claimant did not leave his line of duty under his employment for purposes of his own." 155 Neb. at 720 , 53 N.W.2d at 208 . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.