concluded waiver in Connecticut

1998The court concluded that to rule otherwise and to prohibit the search of the vehicle would be "contrary to settled law." Id. , See also United States v. Napoli, 530 F.2d 1198 , 1200-01 (5th Cir. 1976).

1998The court concluded that to rule otherwise and to prohibit the search of the vehicle would be "contrary to settled law." Id., See also United States v. Napoli, 530 F.2d 1198 , 1200-01 (5th Cir. 1976).

1998The court concluded that to rule otherwise and to prohibit the search of the vehicle would be "contrary to settled law." Id. , See also United States v. Napoli, 530 F.2d 1198 , 1200-01 (5th Cir. 1976).

1998The court concluded that to rule otherwise and to prohibit the search of the vehicle would be "contrary to settled law." Id., See also United States v. Napoli, 530 F.2d 1198 , 1200-01 (5th Cir. 1976).

1998CT Page 35 In Glenn v. Commonwealth, 390 S.E.2d 505 (Va.App.; 1990), 3.9 pounds of marijuana was found in a car pursuant to a search warrant for which probable cause existed only to search the house.

1998In Glenn v. Commonwealth, 390 S.E.2d 505 (Va.App.; 1990), 3.9 pounds of marijuana was found in a car pursuant to a search warrant for which probable cause existed only to search the house.

1976In Hartley v. Vitiello, 113 Conn. 74, 81 , in which the constitutional validity of General Statutes § 52-62, which authorizes personal jurisdiction over nonresidents in negligence actions arising from their operation of motor vehicles in this state, was upheld, the court concluded that the requirement of due process was satisfied by the protection afforded by the steps prescribed to secure a judgment against a nonresident, including particularly the “necessary continuances” provided by § 52-87.

1976In Hartley v. Vitiello, 113 Conn. 74 , 81 , in which the constitutional validity of General Statutes 52-62 , Which authorizes personal jurisdiction over non-residents in negligence actions arising from their operation of motor vehicles in this state, was upheld, the court concluded that the requirement of due process was satisfied by the protection afforded by the steps prescribed to secure a judgment against a nonresident, including particularly the "necessary continuances" provided by 52-87 .

2023The plaintiffs could not prevail on their claim that the geographic restriction impermissibly discriminated against interstate commerce, insofar as the restriction burdened renewable generating facilities located outside of the permitted control area by denying them access to Connecticut’s voluntary renewable market, while allowing generating facilities located within that area access to that market: This court concluded that the standard applicable to the plaintiffs’ claim was not strict scrutiny but, rather, the deferential balancing test articu- lated by the United States Supreme Court in P

2022The trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing the defendant on his felony murder conviction rather than his manslaughter conviction; pursuant to our Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Polanco ( 308 Conn. 242 ), and this court’s decision in State v. Holmes ( 209 Conn. App. 197 ), the trial court had authority to impose a sentence on the greater felony murder charge rather than the less serious manslaughter charge.

2022The court concluded that these factors satisfy the test set forth in State v. Porter, 241 Conn. 57 , 698 A.2d 739 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1058 , 118 S. Ct. 1384 , 140 L.

2022The court concluded that these factors satisfy the test set forth in State v. Porter, 241 Conn. 57 , 698 A.2d 739 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1058 , 118 S. Ct. 1384 , 140 L.

2022Rather, the court concluded that the claim was barred because ‘‘[t]he relief sought by [the] plaintiffs [namely, damages in excess of $20,000] is not what [the Unfair Insurance Practices] Act provides as a penalty for its violation.’’ Id., citing Nazer v. Safeguard Mutual Assurance Co., 293 Pa. Super. 385 , 439 A.2d 165 (1981); see Nazer v. Safeguard Mutual Assurance Co., supra, 387 (Pennsylvania act does not create private cause of action). 22 The majority points out that ‘‘this court consistently has applied the litigation privilege to attorneys, who, without a doubt, are in the business of

2022Rather, the court concluded that the claim was barred because ‘‘[t]he relief sought by [the] plaintiffs [namely, damages in excess of $20,000] is not what [the Unfair Insurance Practices] Act provides as a penalty for its violation.’’ Id., citing Nazer v. Safeguard Mutual Assurance Co., 293 Pa. Super. 385 , 439 A.2d 165 (1981); see Nazer v. Safeguard Mutual Assurance Co., supra, 387 (Pennsylvania act does not create private cause of action). 22 The majority points out that ‘‘this court consistently has applied the litigation privilege to attorneys, who, without a doubt, are in the business of

2022Rather, the court concluded that the claim was barred because ‘‘[t]he relief sought by [the] plaintiffs [namely, damages in excess of $20,000] is not what [the Unfair Insurance Practices] Act provides as a penalty for its violation.’’ Id., citing Nazer v. Safeguard Mutual Assurance Co., 293 Pa. Super. 385 , 439 A.2d 165 (1981); see Nazer v. Safeguard Mutual Assurance Co., supra, 387 (Pennsylvania act does not create private cause of action). 22 The majority points out that ‘‘this court consistently has applied the litigation privilege to attorneys, who, without a doubt, are in the business of

2022The court concluded that these factors satisfy the test set forth in State v. Porter, 241 Conn. 57 , 698 A.2d 739 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1058 , 118 S. Ct. 1384 , 140 L.

2022The court concluded that these factors satisfy the test set forth in State v. Porter, 241 Conn. 57 , 698 A.2d 739 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1058 , 118 S. Ct. 1384 , 140 L.

2022The court concluded that these factors satisfy the test set forth in State v. Porter, 241 Conn. 57 , 698 A.2d 739 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1058 , 118 S. Ct. 1384 , 140 L.

2021This court concluded that the presumption of prejudice articulated in Remmer v. United States ( 347 U.S. 227 ) applies when a defendant demon- strates that a juror consulted a dictionary definition of a material term that substantively differed from the legal definition of that term provided by the trial court, thereby shifting the burden to the state to prove that the exposure to the definition was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; in the present case, the defendant established his entitlement to the presumption of prejudice, as the dictionary definition that the juror consulted was of an e

2018Id., at 169-71, 520 A.2d 190 .

2018Id., at 121, 536 A.2d 577 .

2018Id., at 510-11 , 903 A.2d 169 .

2018Id., at 510-11 , 903 A.2d 169 .

2015Similarly, in In re Robert H., supra, 199 Conn. 693 , this court examined statutory language to discern the legislature’s dominant purpose in enacting the statute.

2015Id.

2015Second, it noted that ‘‘subsequent to Arroyo, the United States Supreme Court decided Michigan v. [ Bryant, supra, 562 U.S. 344 ], which . . . shift[ed] [the focus] away from the declarant’s intent [and] toward [the intent] of the inter- rogator [for purposes of the determination of] whether the primary purpose of the statement is testimonial . . . . [Bryant] has been predicted to further restrict the admissibility of children’s hearsay statements in sexual abuse prosecutions.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Maguire, supra, 568–69.10 The court concluded its analysis by clarifyin

2011Id., at 124, 547 A.2d 10 .

2011This court subsequently rejected an attempt to limit the scope of the doctrine articulated in Fennell, concluding that the doctrine is not “limited to claims of implied contract that are based on pension or employee manuals.” Biello v. Watertown, 109 Conn. App. 572, 583 , 953 A.2d 656 , cert. denied, 289 Conn. 934 , 958 A.2d 1244 (2008).

2011This court subsequently rejected an attempt to limit the scope of the doctrine articulated in Fennell, concluding that the doctrine is not “limited to claims of implied contract that are based on pension or employee manuals.” Biello v. Watertown, 109 Conn. App. 572, 583 , 953 A.2d 656 , cert. denied, 289 Conn. 934 , 958 A.2d 1244 (2008).

2011This court subsequently rejected an attempt to limit the scope of the doctrine articulated in Fennell, concluding that the doctrine is not “limited to claims of implied contract that are based on pension or employee manuals.” Biello v. Watertown, 109 Conn. App. 572, 583 , 953 A.2d 656 , cert. denied, 289 Conn. 934 , 958 A.2d 1244 (2008).

2011This court subsequently rejected an attempt to limit the scope of the doctrine articulated in Fennell, concluding that the doctrine is not “limited to claims of implied contract that are based on pension or employee manuals.” Biello v. Watertown, 109 Conn. App. 572, 583 , 953 A.2d 656 , cert. denied, 289 Conn. 934 , 958 A.2d 1244 (2008).