concluded error in California

2018Based on the totality of circumstances, including the colloquy and the defendant's prior experience with the criminal justice system, the court concluded that his waiver of a jury trial as to the guilt phase was knowing **8 and intelligent. ( Id. at p. 167, 219 Cal.Rptr.3d 265 , 396 P.3d 424 .) The court also found the waiver to be constitutionally adequate as to the special circumstance and penalty phases ( id. at pp. 171-176, 188-190, 219 Cal.Rptr.3d 265 , 396 P.3d 424 ) over the dissents of two justices ( id. at pp. 202-206, 212-214, 219 Cal.Rptr.3d 265 , 396 P.3d 424 (conc. & dis. opn. of

2018Based on the totality of circumstances, including the colloquy and the defendant's prior experience with the criminal justice system, the court concluded that his waiver of a jury trial as to the guilt phase was knowing **8 and intelligent. ( Id. at p. 167, 219 Cal.Rptr.3d 265 , 396 P.3d 424 .) The court also found the waiver to be constitutionally adequate as to the special circumstance and penalty phases ( id. at pp. 171-176, 188-190, 219 Cal.Rptr.3d 265 , 396 P.3d 424 ) over the dissents of two justices ( id. at pp. 202-206, 212-214, 219 Cal.Rptr.3d 265 , 396 P.3d 424 (conc. & dis. opn. of

2015As the Court of Appeal recognized in Madrid v. McMahon (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 151 [ 228 Cal.Rptr. 14 ] (Madrid): “The term ‘action’ in section 10950 must be given a commonsense construction in keeping with the legislative scheme of which it is a part. [Citation.] The Legislature could not have intended that every event occurring during the processing of an application and the delivery of benefits — no matter how trivial or inconsequential-could be the subject of a demand for an administrative fair hearing.” (Id. at p. 156.) In Madrid , the court concluded that the test for whether an agency act

2015As the Court of Appeal recognized in Madrid v. McMahon (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 151 [ 228 Cal.Rptr. 14 ] (Madrid): “The term ‘action’ in section 10950 must be given a commonsense construction in keeping with the legislative scheme of which it is a part. [Citation.] The Legislature could not have intended that every event occurring during the processing of an application and the delivery of benefits — no matter how trivial or inconsequential-could be the subject of a demand for an administrative fair hearing.” (Id. at p. 156.) In Madrid , the court concluded that the test for whether an agency act

2024(See People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377 .) The “hallmark features” of youth include “immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences.” (Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460, 477 .) Youth also “‘often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them,’” and “‘are more vulnerable or susceptible to . . . outside pressures’ than adults.” 15 (J.D.B. v. North Carolina (2011) 564 U.S. 261, 272 .) Even if the court concluded that these factors contributed to appellant’s solo crime spree generally or the

2013In light of the factors considered, the trial court’s decision was not “so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.” (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 377 .) Accordingly, we hold that it did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s Romero motion. 2 In his reply brief, defendant argues for the first time that the trial court considered “impermissible factors” in denying his Romero motion.

2024If the reviewing court cannot draw this conclusion, reversal is required.” (Aranda, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 368 .) 9 The court expressly disapproved Crawford, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th 815 and People v. Phillips (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 952 , to the extent they held omission of CALJIC No. 2.90 in violation of the federal Constitution is structural error and requires automatic reversal.

2021If the reviewing court cannot draw this conclusion, reversal is required.” (Aranda, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 368 .) 9 The court expressly disapproved Crawford, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th 815 and People v. Phillips (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 952 , to the extent they held omission of CALJIC No. 2.90 in violation of the federal Constitution is structural error and requires automatic reversal.

2024(In re R.L. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 125, 143 [when “a statute does not provide any consequence for noncompliance, the language should be considered directory rather than mandatory”]; In re C.T. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 101, 111 .) “Only in a ‘very limited class of cases’ has the Court concluded that an error is structural, and ‘thus subject to automatic reversal’ on appeal.” (Greer v. United States (2021) 593 U.S. 503, 513 .) The majority’s resolution of this appeal ignores the way we and lower courts have applied Watson in literally thousands of cases.

2024(In re R.L. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 125, 143 [when “a statute does not provide any consequence for noncompliance, the language should be considered directory rather than mandatory”]; In re C.T. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 101, 111 .) “Only in a ‘very limited class of cases’ has the Court concluded that an error is structural, and ‘thus subject to automatic reversal’ on appeal.” (Greer v. United States (2021) 593 U.S. 503 , 513.) The majority’s resolution of this appeal ignores the way we and lower courts have applied Watson in literally thousands of cases.

2024If the reviewing court cannot draw this conclusion, reversal is required.” (Aranda, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 368 .) 9 The court expressly disapproved Crawford, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th 815 and People v. Phillips (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 952 , to the extent they held omission of CALJIC No. 2.90 in violation of the federal Constitution is structural error and requires automatic reversal.

2024If the reviewing court cannot draw this conclusion, reversal is required.” (Aranda, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 368 .) 9 The court expressly disapproved Crawford, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th 815 and People v. Phillips (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 952 , to the extent they held omission of CALJIC No. 2.90 in violation of the federal Constitution is structural error and requires automatic reversal.

2024(In re R.L. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 125, 143 [when “a statute does not provide any consequence for noncompliance, the language should be considered directory rather than mandatory”]; In re C.T. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 101, 111 .) “Only in a ‘very limited class of cases’ has the Court concluded that an error is structural, and ‘thus subject to automatic reversal’ on appeal.” (Greer v. United States (2021) 593 U.S. 503, 513 .) The majority’s resolution of this appeal ignores the way we and lower courts have applied Watson in literally thousands of cases.

2024(In re R.L. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 125, 143 [when “a statute does not provide any consequence for noncompliance, the language should be considered directory rather than mandatory”]; In re C.T. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 101, 111 .) “Only in a ‘very limited class of cases’ has the Court concluded that an error is structural, and ‘thus subject to automatic reversal’ on appeal.” (Greer v. United States (2021) 593 U.S. 503 , 513.) The majority’s resolution of this appeal ignores the way we and lower courts have applied Watson in literally thousands of cases.

2024(Elguera, supra, 8 Cal.App.4th at p. 1219 .) The court also concluded this error was not harmless even though (1) the trial court had given “virtually the full standard instruction on the subject in the morning at the start of jury selection”; (2) the reasonable doubt requirement had been repeatedly referenced to the venire and each prospective juror stated he or she understood it; (3) the oral and written instructions included reference to the reasonable doubt standard in the circumstantial evidence instruction; (4) the court reminded the jury just before argument that the prosecutor had the

2021(Elguera, supra, 8 Cal.App.4th at p. 1219 .) The court also concluded this error was not harmless even though (1) the trial court had given “virtually the full standard instruction on the subject in the morning at the start of jury selection”; (2) the reasonable doubt requirement had been repeatedly referenced to the venire and each prospective juror stated he or she understood it; (3) the oral and written instructions included reference to the reasonable doubt standard in the circumstantial evidence instruction; (4) the court reminded the jury just before argument that the prosecutor had the

2024Neither the instruction on the elements of the gang offense nor any other instruction given by the court “connected the reasonable doubt standard of proof to that charge.” (Aranda, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 361 .) The court concluded this error was amenable to the harmless error analysis under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (Chapman).9 The court explained the appropriate standard under Chapman to determine the prejudicial effect of the erroneous omission of the standard reasonable doubt instruction is this: “If it can be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury must have found

2021Neither the instruction on the elements of the gang offense nor any other instruction given by the court “connected the reasonable doubt standard of proof to that charge.” (Aranda, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 361 .) The court concluded this error was amenable to the harmless error analysis under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (Chapman).9 The court explained the appropriate standard under Chapman to determine the prejudicial effect of the erroneous omission of the standard reasonable doubt instruction is this: “If it can be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury must have found

2023As noted above, the Santos court rebuffed efforts by the plaintiff in that case to bring the facts within the holding of James W., finding the case before it “in sharp contrast.” (Santos, supra, 1 Cal.App.5th at p. 878 .) In James W., the court concluded that the immunity afforded under Penal Code section 11172 did not extend to conduct by foster parents and a family counselor, who, for over two and one-half years after the child victim had initially reported to hospital staff that a man had come through her bedroom window and hurt her, engaged in a “campaign to convict the father and have [th

2023As noted above, the Santos court rebuffed efforts by the plaintiff in that case to bring the facts within the holding of James W., finding the case before it “in sharp contrast.” (Santos, supra, 1 Cal.App.5th at p. 878 .) In James W., the court concluded that the immunity afforded under Penal Code section 11172 did not extend to conduct by foster parents and a family counselor, who, for over two and one-half years after the child victim had initially reported to hospital staff that a man had come through her bedroom window and hurt her, engaged in a “campaign to convict the father and have [th

2023As noted above, the Santos court rebuffed efforts by the plaintiff in that case to bring the facts within the holding of James W., finding the case before it “in sharp contrast.” (Santos, supra, 1 Cal.App.5th at p. 878 .) In James W., the court concluded that the immunity afforded under Penal Code section 11172 did not extend to conduct by foster parents and a family counselor, who, for over two and one-half years after the child victim had initially reported to hospital staff that a man had come through her bedroom window and hurt her, engaged in a “campaign to convict the father and have [th

2023As noted above, the Santos court rebuffed efforts by the plaintiff in that case to bring the facts within the holding of James W., finding the case before it “in sharp contrast.” (Santos, supra, 1 Cal.App.5th at p. 878 .) In James W., the court concluded that the immunity afforded under Penal Code section 11172 did not extend to conduct by foster parents and a family counselor, who, for over two and one-half years after the child victim had initially reported to hospital staff that a man had come through her bedroom window and hurt her, engaged in a “campaign to convict the father and have [th

2022Nevertheless, distinguishing Burns, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th 646 , the trial court concluded that although GuideOne should have paid Mountain Lakes on a pro rata basis 10 for the fire loss, Church Mutual could not succeed on its equitable contribution claim against GuideOne because “the two parties insured two different entities with two different insurable interests in the property” and “[Church Mutual] did not have an assignment from [Mountain Lakes] but rather the separate legal entity of California- Nevada . . . .” With respect to Church Mutual’s subrogation claim, the trial court concluded

2022Nevertheless, distinguishing Burns, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th 646 , the trial court concluded that although GuideOne should have paid Mountain Lakes on a pro rata basis 10 for the fire loss, Church Mutual could not succeed on its equitable contribution claim against GuideOne because “the two parties insured two different entities with two different insurable interests in the property” and “[Church Mutual] did not have an assignment from [Mountain Lakes] but rather the separate legal entity of California- Nevada . . . .” With respect to Church Mutual’s subrogation claim, the trial court concluded

2022On November 7, 2016 Covert served objections to the first section 998 offer, contending the offer was vague, ambiguous, and 4 In Goodstein, supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at pages 905-906 and footnote 4, this court concluded a defense settlement offer providing for dismissal of the action with prejudice was subject to former section 998, subdivision (b), which at the time applied to offers “to allow judgment to be taken in accordance with the terms and conditions stated at that time.” This court reasoned, “[A]s between the parties thereto and for purposes of enforcement of settlement agreements, a comp

2022On November 7, 2016 Covert served objections to the first section 998 offer, contending the offer was vague, ambiguous, and 4 In Goodstein, supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at pages 905-906 and footnote 4, this court concluded a defense settlement offer providing for dismissal of the action with prejudice was subject to former section 998, subdivision (b), which at the time applied to offers “to allow judgment to be taken in accordance with the terms and conditions stated at that time.” This court reasoned, “[A]s between the parties thereto and for purposes of enforcement of settlement agreements, a comp

2019Federal district courts, in contrast, proceed from, and find their origin in, the federal government." ( Id. at p. 1082.) Similarly, the forum selection clause at issue in American Soda provided that "the Courts of the State of Colorado/Arbitrator shall be the exclusive forum for the resolution of any disputes." ( American Soda , supra , 428 F.3d at p. 924 .) The court concluded that the clause "refers to sovereignty rather than geography." ( Id. at p. 926.) Because the federal district courts " 'indisputably proceed from, and find their origin in, the federal government,' [citation] not in th

2019Federal district courts, in contrast, proceed from, and find their origin in, the federal government.” (Id. at p. 1082.) 17 Similarly, the forum selection clause at issue in American Soda provided that “the Courts of the State of Colorado/Arbitrator shall be the exclusive forum for the resolution of any disputes.” (American Soda, supra, 428 F.3d at p. 924 .) The court concluded that the clause “refers to sovereignty rather than geography.” (Id. at p. 926.) Because the federal district courts “‘indisputably proceed from, and find their origin in, the federal government,’ [citation] not in the g

2018In Daniels, another capital case, the trial court advised the defendant (who elected to waive counsel) that if he waived a jury trial, the court alone would decide the question of guilt, but the waiver colloquy did not mention any of the other advisements we recommended in Sivongxxay. ( Daniels, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 986-989, 221 Cal.Rptr.3d 777 , 400 P.3d 385 (lead opn. of Cuéllar, J.).) "The court never asked defendant whether he understood ... the nature of the jury right he was waiving.

2018In Daniels, another capital case, the trial court advised the defendant (who elected to waive counsel) that if he waived a jury trial, the court alone would decide the question of guilt, but the waiver colloquy did not mention any of the other advisements we recommended in Sivongxxay. ( Daniels, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 986-989, 221 Cal.Rptr.3d 777 , 400 P.3d 385 (lead opn. of Cuéllar, J.).) "The court never asked defendant whether he understood ... the nature of the jury right he was waiving.

2018(Id. at pp. 786-787.) 6 14-301 rule 3-310, which does not require disqualification of an attorney representing interests adverse to a non-client.24 But the court concluded that rule 1-100 compelled the same result, stating that “Wright's actions would undermine the integrity of the legal profession if he is able to utilize a loophole in Rule 3-310 to avoid disqualification.”25 The court ruled that “Wright’s conflict of interest and the clear suggestion of impropriety” required disqualification, and must be “imputed to his entire firm.”26 To determine whether this ethical prohibition applies he

2018(Id. at pp. 786-787.) 6 14-301 rule 3-310, which does not require disqualification of an attorney representing interests adverse to a non-client.24 But the court concluded that rule 1-100 compelled the same result, stating that “Wright's actions would undermine the integrity of the legal profession if he is able to utilize a loophole in Rule 3-310 to avoid disqualification.”25 The court ruled that “Wright’s conflict of interest and the clear suggestion of impropriety” required disqualification, and must be “imputed to his entire firm.”26 To determine whether this ethical prohibition applies he

2018For example, in Sierra Club v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (E.D.Cal. 2013) 916 F.Supp.2d 1098, 1147 , the EIR examined “the noise impacts of the project’s construction activity based on the ‘worst-case scenario’ in which the three loudest pieces of equipment would be operating at the same time.” The court concluded that the analysis was sufficient because the analysis was “thorough and carefully detail[ed] the level of noise that will result from the project” at “all times of day.” (Id. at pp. 1148-1149.) While a project neighbor in that case could predict what noise levels would be at any

2018For example, in Sierra Club v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (E.D.Cal. 2013) 916 F.Supp.2d 1098 , 1147, the EIR examined "the noise impacts of the project's construction activity based on the 'worst-case scenario' in which the three loudest pieces of equipment would be operating at the same time." The court concluded that the analysis was sufficient because the analysis was "thorough and carefully detail[ed] the level of noise that will result from the project" at "all times *43 of day." ( Id . at pp. 1148-1149.) While a project neighbor in that case could predict what *488 noise levels would

2018Code, § 3600 )" under the worker's compensation statutes when the employee "engages in conduct reasonably directed toward the fulfillment of his employer's requirements, performed for the benefit and advantage of the employer." ( Smith, supra, 69 Cal.2d at pp. 819-820, 73 Cal.Rptr. 253 , 447 P.2d 365 .) The court concluded that a requirement to provide a car for work purposes limited the going and coming exclusion. ( Id. at p. 820, 73 Cal.Rptr. 253 , 447 P.2d 365 .) The employment relationship resumes "when the employer requires that the employee engage in conduct, whether prior to the workday

2018Code, § 3600 )" under the worker's compensation statutes when the employee "engages in conduct reasonably directed toward the fulfillment of his employer's requirements, performed for the benefit and advantage of the employer." ( Smith, supra, 69 Cal.2d at pp. 819-820, 73 Cal.Rptr. 253 , 447 P.2d 365 .) The court concluded that a requirement to provide a car for work purposes limited the going and coming exclusion. ( Id. at p. 820, 73 Cal.Rptr. 253 , 447 P.2d 365 .) The employment relationship resumes "when the employer requires that the employee engage in conduct, whether prior to the workday

2017(Id. at pp. 501–502.) The court cited Caldwell and other authority for the ―general rule‖ that a statutory immunity overrides a statute imposing liability, and concluded that ―Civil Code section 52.1 contains no indicia reflecting an intent that public employees may be sued despite a statutory immunity that would otherwise apply.‖ (Id. at p. 504.) In County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2009) 181 Cal.App.4th 218 , the court concluded that the immunity provided to public employees under Government Code section 821.6 for ―instituting or prosecuting any judicial or administrative proceeding‖

2017(Id. at pp. 501–502.) The court cited Caldwell and other authority for the ―general rule‖ that a statutory immunity overrides a statute imposing liability, and concluded that ―Civil Code section 52.1 contains no indicia reflecting an intent that public employees may be sued despite a statutory immunity that would otherwise apply.‖ (Id. at p. 504.) In County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2009) 181 Cal.App.4th 218 , the court concluded that the immunity provided to public employees under Government Code section 821.6 for ―instituting or prosecuting any judicial or administrative proceeding‖