concluded analysis in Ohio

2003However, in State v. Baird (Sept. 17, 1996), Franklin App. No. 96APA03-28, 1996 WL 532289 , unreported, the Franklin County Court of Appeals found "[t]he correct analysis focuses not upon muddled notions of 'pre'-arrest versus 'post'-arrest silence, but rather upon whether a criminal defendant's silence occurred before or after his receipt of the Miranda warnings.'' Id., at 128, citing and agreeing with State v. Sabbah (1982), 13 Ohio App.3d 124 , 468 N.E.2d 718 .

2003The Court concluded it was error for the state to attempt to elicit evidence of Leach's request. {¶ 86} However, in State v. Baird (Sept. 17, 1996), Franklin App. No. 96APA03-28, unreported, the Franklin County Court of Appeals found "[t]he correct analysis focuses not upon muddled notions of `pre'-arrest versus `post'-arrest silence, but rather upon whether a criminal defendant's silence occurred before or after his receipt of the Miranda warnings.'' Id., at 128, citing and agreeing with State v. Sabbah (1982), 13 Ohio App.3d 124 .

1979Id.

1978Id.

2024Id.

2022Putnam No. 12-09-09, 2010-Ohio-1498 , the court concluded that the defense had “opened the door to the topic of Roby’s post-arrest silence.” Id. at ¶ 16.

2019Id. at 532-533 .

2018Id. at 235 , 495 N.E.2d 939 . {¶23} The court concluded that the privilege applied to Surace's case.

2018Id. at 235 , 495 N.E.2d 939 . {¶23} The court concluded that the privilege applied to Surace's case.

2018Hamilton No. C-040390, 2005-Ohio-3171 , 2005 WL 1490100 , ¶ 10 (determining that passage of time between defendant's offense and second application to seal, along with defendant's continued difficulty finding employment, constituted change in circumstances). {¶ 26} In Young , for example, the court concluded that the doctrine of res judicata precluded the defendant's second motion to seal the record of his conviction.

2016You should weigh the evidence and give credit to the testimony in light of your own experience and observations in the ordinary affairs of life. {¶21} Id. at 909 . {¶22} In rejecting appellant’s claim that the instruction was error, the court concluded that this instruction was not a “presumption of truth” instruction that had met with disapproval in several federal circuits.

2016Id. at 910 .

2014Analysis (1) Judicial bias {¶ 77} Jackson argues that the trial court exhibited bias in conducting an Atkins hearing that defense counsel did not request. {¶ 78} “It is well settled that a criminal trial before a biased judge is fundamentally unfair and denies a defendant due process of law.” State v. LaMar, 95 Ohio St.Sd 181, 2002-Ohio-2128 , 767 N.E.2d 166, ¶ 34 , citing Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577 , 106 S.Ct. 3101 , 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986).

2014Analysis (1) Judicial bias {¶ 77} Jackson argues that the trial court exhibited bias in conducting an Atkins hearing that defense counsel did not request. {¶ 78} “It is well settled that a criminal trial before a biased judge is fundamentally unfair and denies a defendant due process of law.” State v. LaMar, 95 Ohio St.Sd 181, 2002-Ohio-2128 , 767 N.E.2d 166, ¶ 34 , citing Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577 , 106 S.Ct. 3101 , 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986).

2014Analysis (1) Judicial bias {¶ 77} Jackson argues that the trial court exhibited bias in conducting an Atkins hearing that defense counsel did not request. {¶ 78} “It is well settled that a criminal trial before a biased judge is fundamentally unfair and denies a defendant due process of law.” State v. LaMar, 95 Ohio St.Sd 181, 2002-Ohio-2128 , 767 N.E.2d 166, ¶ 34 , citing Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577 , 106 S.Ct. 3101 , 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986).

2014Analysis (1) Judicial bias {¶ 77} Jackson argues that the trial court exhibited bias in conducting an Atkins hearing that defense counsel did not request. {¶ 78} “It is well settled that a criminal trial before a biased judge is fundamentally unfair and denies a defendant due process of law.” State v. LaMar, 95 Ohio St.3d 181 , 2002-Ohio-2128 , 767 N.E.2d 166, ¶ 34 , citing Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577 , 106 S.Ct. 3101 , 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986).

2014Analysis (1) Judicial bias {¶ 77} Jackson argues that the trial court exhibited bias in conducting an Atkins hearing that defense counsel did not request. {¶ 78} “It is well settled that a criminal trial before a biased judge is fundamentally unfair and denies a defendant due process of law.” State v. LaMar, 95 Ohio St.Sd 181, 2002-Ohio-2128 , 767 N.E.2d 166, ¶ 34 , citing Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577 , 106 S.Ct. 3101 , 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986).

2014Analysis (1) Judicial bias {¶ 77} Jackson argues that the trial court exhibited bias in conducting an Atkins hearing that defense counsel did not request. {¶ 78} “It is well settled that a criminal trial before a biased judge is fundamentally unfair and denies a defendant due process of law.” State v. LaMar, 95 Ohio St.3d 181 , 2002-Ohio-2128 , 767 N.E.2d 166, ¶ 34 , citing Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577 , 106 S.Ct. 3101 , 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986).

2014Id. 6 {¶11} Even if Ms. Lee is correct that the excluded testimony suggested that Dr. Floros was biased or had a pecuniary interest in the outcome of the case, the crucial question is whether the evidence of bias is unfairly prejudicial.

2014Greene No. 02CA97, 2003-Ohio-5529 , a case Mr. Morris had cited for the proposition that an otherwise non-modifiable provision in a divorce decree dividing marital property may properly be the subject of a Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment. {¶ 20} The trial court concluded its analysis with: “The Magistrate considered the current status of both parties and concluded a modification would not be equitable.

2013Id. at 264 . 8 Both the Second and Tenth District relied on the rule announced in Wilmoth in reaching its conclusion.

2013Id., at paragraph three of the syllabus; Eberts, supra. {¶17} In Dombroski v. Wellpoint, Inc., 119 Ohio St. 3d 506 , 895 N.E.2d 538 (2008), the Supreme Court of Ohio addressed the question of “what conduct must be demonstrated to fulfill the second prong of the test for piercing the corporate veil created in Belvedere?” The Court concluded the test in Belvedere, if construed too strictly, “insulates shareholders when they abuse the corporate form to commit acts that are as objectionable as fraud or illegality” and thus was too limited to protect potential parties from the wide variety of egreg

2013Id., at paragraph three of the syllabus; Eberts, supra. {¶17} In Dombroski v. Wellpoint, Inc., 119 Ohio St. 3d 506 , 895 N.E.2d 538 (2008), the Supreme Court of Ohio addressed the question of “what conduct must be demonstrated to fulfill the second prong of the test for piercing the corporate veil created in Belvedere?” The Court concluded the test in Belvedere, if construed too strictly, “insulates shareholders when they abuse the corporate form to commit acts that are as objectionable as fraud or illegality” and thus was too limited to protect potential parties from the wide variety of egreg

2013Id., at paragraph three of the syllabus; Eberts, supra. {¶17} In Dombroski v. Wellpoint, Inc., 119 Ohio St. 3d 506 , 895 N.E.2d 538 (2008), the Supreme Court of Ohio addressed the question of “what conduct must be demonstrated to fulfill the second prong of the test for piercing the corporate veil created in Belvedere?” The Court concluded the test in Belvedere, if construed too strictly, “insulates shareholders when they abuse the corporate form to commit acts that are as objectionable as fraud or illegality” and thus was too limited to protect potential parties from the wide variety of egreg

2012After Foster, Ohio trial court judges “have full discretion to impose a prison sentence within the statutory range and are no longer required to make findings or give their reasons for -9- imposing * * * consecutive [sentences].” State v. Mathis, 109 Ohio St.3d 54 , 2006- Ohio-855, 846 N.E.2d 1 , paragraph three of the syllabus. {¶14} Three years after the Ohio Supreme Court found the Ohio consecutive sentencing provisions unconstitutional, the United States Supreme Court ruled in Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160 , 129 S.Ct. 711 , 172 L.Ed.2d 517 (2009), that a state statute requiring judicial find

2012After Foster, Ohio trial court judges “have full discretion to impose a prison sentence within the statutory range and are no longer required to make findings or give their reasons for -9- imposing * * * consecutive [sentences].” State v. Mathis, 109 Ohio St.3d 54 , 2006- Ohio-855, 846 N.E.2d 1 , paragraph three of the syllabus. {¶14} Three years after the Ohio Supreme Court found the Ohio consecutive sentencing provisions unconstitutional, the United States Supreme Court ruled in Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160 , 129 S.Ct. 711 , 172 L.Ed.2d 517 (2009), that a state statute requiring judicial find

2012After Foster, Ohio trial court judges “have full discretion to impose a prison sentence within the statutory range and are no longer required to make findings or give their reasons for -9- imposing * * * consecutive [sentences].” State v. Mathis, 109 Ohio St.3d 54 , 2006- Ohio-855, 846 N.E.2d 1 , paragraph three of the syllabus. {¶14} Three years after the Ohio Supreme Court found the Ohio consecutive sentencing provisions unconstitutional, the United States Supreme Court ruled in Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160 , 129 S.Ct. 711 , 172 L.Ed.2d 517 (2009), that a state statute requiring judicial find

2012After Foster, Ohio trial court judges “have full discretion to impose a prison sentence within the statutory range and are no longer required to make findings or give their reasons for -9- imposing * * * consecutive [sentences].” State v. Mathis, 109 Ohio St.3d 54 , 2006- Ohio-855, 846 N.E.2d 1 , paragraph three of the syllabus. {¶14} Three years after the Ohio Supreme Court found the Ohio consecutive sentencing provisions unconstitutional, the United States Supreme Court ruled in Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160 , 129 S.Ct. 711 , 172 L.Ed.2d 517 (2009), that a state statute requiring judicial find

2010Id. {¶ 17} The concurring opinion agreed that Byrd was limited in its application to parties but, unlike the lead opinion, found that Dr. Sickles’s affidavit was “not unambiguously inconsistent with his prior deposition testimony.” Id. at ¶ 46-47. 4 January Term, 2010 {¶ 18} The dissenting judge found that Dr. Sickles’s affidavit completely contradicted his deposition testimony.

2010Id. {¶ 17} The concurring opinion agreed that Byrd was limited in its application to parties but, unlike the lead opinion, found that Dr. Sickles’s affidavit was “not unambiguously inconsistent with his prior deposition testimony.” Id. at ¶ 46-47. {¶ 18} The dissenting judge found that Dr. Sickles’s affidavit completely contradicted his deposition testimony.

2008Constitutional Law Found., Inc. (1999), 525 U.S. 182 , the court concluded that the requirement did "not, in any meaningful manner or degree, restrict or limit the ability of *Page 16 people to sign initiative petitions." Brooks at ¶ 14.

2008Id. {¶ 29} The Seventh District Court of Appeals reached a similar conclusion in Wilborn v. Bank One Corp. , supra. Wilborn involved a class action lawsuit challenging the collection of attorney fees as a condition of a mortgage reinstatement.

2007In considering whether evidence seized after a violation of the knock and announce rule occurred, the Court reasoned that "[w]hether the preliminary misstep had occurred or not, the police would have executed the warrant they had obtained, and would have discovered the gun and drugs inside the house." Id. at 2164 ; citing Segura v. United States (1984), 468 U.S. 796 , 815 , 104 S.Ct. 3380 . {¶ 37} The Hudson Court also explained the interests served by the knock and announce rule, which primarily include "protection of life and *Page 21 limb, because an unannounced entry may provoke violence i

2007In considering whether evidence seized after a violation of the knock and announce rule occurred, the Court reasoned that "[w]hether the preliminary misstep had occurred or not, the police would have executed the warrant they had obtained, and would have discovered the gun and drugs inside the house." Id. at 2164 ; citing Segura v. United States (1984), 468 U.S. 796 , 815 , 104 S.Ct. 3380 . {¶ 37} The Hudson Court also explained the interests served by the knock and announce rule, which primarily include "protection of life and *Page 21 limb, because an unannounced entry may provoke violence i

2007For instance, in Bram v. Cleveland (1993), 97 Ohio App.3d 718 , the plaintiff was making a claim similar to one Campbell is making in this case, the court concluded that a claim of wrongful demolition did not become a constitutional claim merely because due process issues were part of the case; the "essential nature" of the claim was still a tort claim for wrongful demolition.

2007Id. at 721 ; see also Browning v. Chillicothe (Dec. 20, 1995), 4th Dist.

2006The employer avoids liability not by isolating the equipment from all sources of voltage, but by providing protective equipment.” 2005-Ohio-1519 , 2005 WL 736638 , at ¶ 11. {¶ 11} Having determined that Lincoln had not satisfied the specific safety requirement, the court concluded that the doctrine of unilateral negligence did not apply.