concluded immunity in New Mexico

2014In Grogan, for example, the Court concluded that defense counsel’s action in failing to secure and review his own expert’s opinion, which was the most damaging evidence presented at trial, “constituted such obvious attorney incompetence, it cannot be rebutted.” 2007-NMSC-039, ¶ 17 .

2014In Grogan, for example, the Court concluded that defense counsel’s action in failing to secure and review his own expert’s opinion, which was the most damaging evidence presented at trial, “constituted such obvious attorney incompetence, it cannot be rebutted.” 2007-NMSC-039, ¶ 17 .

2006The Court concluded that immunity “is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution, and which they retain today.” Id. at 713 , 119 S.Ct. 2240 . {25} Based on Alden, this Court in Cockrell, 2002-NMSC-009, ¶ 1 , 132 N.M. 156 , 45 P.3d 876 , found that New Mexico’s constitutional sovereign immunity shielded the state from private FLSA suits brought in state court.

2006The Court concluded that immunity “is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution, and which they retain today.” Id. at 713 , 119 S.Ct. 2240 . {25} Based on Alden, this Court in Cockrell, 2002-NMSC-009, ¶ 1 , 132 N.M. 156 , 45 P.3d 876 , found that New Mexico’s constitutional sovereign immunity shielded the state from private FLSA suits brought in state court.

2006There, the Court concluded the rule, which is in place solely to deter police misconduct, would not apply when "an officer acting with objective good faith has obtained a search warrant from a judge or magistrate and acted within its scope.” 468 U.S. at 920 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 .

2006There, the Court concluded the rule, which is in place solely to deter police misconduct, would not apply when "an officer acting with objective good faith has obtained a search warrant from a judge or magistrate and acted within its scope.” 468 U.S. at 920 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 .

2006The Court concluded that immunity “is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution, and which they retain today.” Id. at 713 , 119 S.Ct. 2240 . {25} Based on Alden, this Court in Cockrell, 2002-NMSC-009, ¶ 1 , 132 N.M. 156 , 45 P.3d 876 , found that New Mexico’s constitutional sovereign immunity shielded the state from private FLSA suits brought in state court.

2006The Court concluded that immunity “is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution, and which they retain today.” Id. at 713 , 119 S.Ct. 2240 . {25} Based on Alden, this Court in Cockrell, 2002-NMSC-009, ¶ 1 , 132 N.M. 156 , 45 P.3d 876 , found that New Mexico’s constitutional sovereign immunity shielded the state from private FLSA suits brought in state court.

2016The court concluded that the hearing required by statute “serves a . . . limited purpose of forcing the government to provide some reasoning behind its decision to settle the case and giving the plaintiff-relators an opportunity to direct the court’s attention to facts or allegations that would suggest the settlement was not ‘fair, adequate],] and reasonable under all the circumstances].]’ ” Id.

2012Id. {16} The^rmenrfim'zCourtthenlookedto other indicia of legislative intent.

2011State v. Sandoval, 2010-NMCA-025, ¶ 34 , 147 N.M. 465 , 225 P.3d 795 , 12 rev’d by 2011-NMSC-022 , 150 N.M. 224 , 258 P.3d 1016 (Sandoval I).

2011State v. Sandoval, 2010-NMCA-025, ¶ 34 , 147 N.M. 465 , 225 P.3d 795 , 12 rev’d by 2011-NMSC-022 , 150 N.M. 224 , 258 P.3d 1016 (Sandoval I).

2011State v. Sandoval, 2010-NMCA-025, ¶ 34 , 147 N.M. 465 , 225 P.3d 795 , 12 rev’d by 2011-NMSC-022 , 150 N.M. 224 , 258 P.3d 1016 (Sandoval I).

2011State v. Sandoval, 2010-NMCA-025, ¶ 34 , 147 N.M. 465 , 225 P.3d 795 , 12 rev’d by 2011-NMSC-022 , 150 N.M. 224 , 258 P.3d 1016 (Sandoval I).

2011State v. Sandoval, 2010-NMCA-025, ¶ 34 , 147 N.M. 465 , 225 P.3d 795 , 12 rev’d by 2011-NMSC-022 , 150 N.M. 224 , 258 P.3d 1016 (Sandoval I).

2009Unpersuaded, we affirm. 3 A. Preliminary Hearing 4 Defendant argues that because the magistrate court did not conduct a 5 preliminary hearing within ten days as required by Rule 6-202 NMRA, the magistrate 6 court should have granted his motion to dismiss. [DS 7] In State v. Tollardo, 99 N.M. 7 115, 654 P.2d 568 (Ct. App. 1982), this Court concluded that the rule “does not 8 deprive the magistrate court of jurisdiction if the time limits . . . are not precisely 9 followed.” Id. at 116, 654 P.2d at 569 .

2009Unpersuaded, we affirm. 3 A. Preliminary Hearing 4 Defendant argues that because the magistrate court did not conduct a 5 preliminary hearing within ten days as required by Rule 6-202 NMRA, the magistrate 6 court should have granted his motion to dismiss. [DS 7] In State v. Tollardo, 99 N.M. 7 115, 654 P.2d 568 (Ct. App. 1982), this Court concluded that the rule “does not 8 deprive the magistrate court of jurisdiction if the time limits . . . are not precisely 9 followed.” Id. at 116, 654 P.2d at 569 .

2006Id. at 426, 99 S.Ct. 1182 . {17} The Court concluded that the waiver of immunity in both states was sufficiently different and to apply Nevada law would violate California’s public policy.

2004The Court also concluded the clause was permissive in that the contract stated that “[e]ach party consents to the jurisdiction and venue of the U.S. District Court for the District of Tennessee.” Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).

1998In addition, the court concluded that the requirement in Williamson of “severing collaterally neutral statements from each precise self-inculpatory remark deprives the jury of important context surrounding that self-inculpatory remark.” Id. “[T]he surgical precision called for by Williamson is highly artificial and nearly impossible to apply.” Id.

1998In addition, the court concluded that the requirement in Williamson of “severing collaterally neutral statements from each precise self-inculpatory remark deprives the jury of important context surrounding that self-inculpatory remark.” Id. “[T]he surgical precision called for by Williamson is highly artificial and nearly impossible to apply.” Id.

1991The only significant difference in the Wheeler test is that the defendant need not show that he is a member of the group against whom bias is shown, but must show instead that the excluded jurors belonged to a “cognizable group within the meaning of the representative cross-section rule.” Id., 22 Cal.3d at 273 , 583 P.2d at 764 , 148 Cal.Rptr. at 905 .

1991The only significant difference in the Wheeler test is that the defendant need not show that he is a member of the group against whom bias is shown, but must show instead that the excluded jurors belonged to a “cognizable group within the meaning of the representative cross-section rule.” Id., 22 Cal.3d at 273 , 583 P.2d at 764 , 148 Cal.Rptr. at 905 .

1991The only significant difference in the Wheeler test is that the defendant need not show that he is a member of the group against whom bias is shown, but must show instead that the excluded jurors belonged to a “cognizable group within the meaning of the representative cross-section rule.” Id., 22 Cal.3d at 273 , 583 P.2d at 764 , 148 Cal.Rptr. at 905 .