concluded error in Texas

2008See id. at 942 ; Havard v. Brown, 577 S.W.2d 757, 759-60 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1979), aff'd, 593 S.W.2d 939 (Tex.1980).

2008See id. at 942 ; Havard v. Brown, 577 S.W.2d 757, 759-60 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1979), aff'd, 593 S.W.2d 939 (Tex.1980).

2025B., 988 S.W.2d 753, 758-59 (Tex. 1999). 63 Hawkins, 135 S.W.3d at 82 (quoting Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 172-73 ). 64 Greer v. United States, 593 U.S. 503 , 513 (2021) (“Only in a ‘very limited class of cases’ has the Court concluded that an error is structural, and ‘thus subject to automatic reversal’ on appeal.”). 65 Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 172-73 .

2025B., 988 S.W.2d 753, 758-59 (Tex. 1999). 63 Hawkins, 135 S.W.3d at 82 (quoting Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 172-73 ). 64 Greer v. United States, 593 U.S. 503 , 513 (2021) (“Only in a ‘very limited class of cases’ has the Court concluded that an error is structural, and ‘thus subject to automatic reversal’ on appeal.”). 65 Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 172-73 .

2025B., 988 S.W.2d 753, 758-59 (Tex. 1999). 63 Hawkins, 135 S.W.3d at 82 (quoting Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 172-73 ). 64 Greer v. United States, 593 U.S. 503 , 513 (2021) (“Only in a ‘very limited class of cases’ has the Court concluded that an error is structural, and ‘thus subject to automatic reversal’ on appeal.”). 65 Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 172-73 .

2025B., 988 S.W.2d 753, 758-59 (Tex. 1999). 63 Hawkins, 135 S.W.3d at 82 (quoting Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 172-73 ). 64 Greer v. United States, 593 U.S. 503 , 513 (2021) (“Only in a ‘very limited class of cases’ has the Court concluded that an error is structural, and ‘thus subject to automatic reversal’ on appeal.”). 65 Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 172-73 .

2015See Vosberg 6 v. State, 80 S.W.3d 320, 321 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2002).

2015See Vosberg 6 v. State, 80 S.W.3d 320, 321 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2002).

2012Id .; see also Walker Eng'g v. Bracebridge Corp. , 102 S.W.3d 837, 840-41 (Tex. App.--Dallas 2003, pet. denied) (enforcing explicit waiver of subrogation in contract).

2012Id.; see also Walker Eng’g v. Bracebridge Corp., 102 S.W.3d 837, 840-41 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, pet. denied) (enforcing explicit waiver of subrogation in contract).

2012Id. ; see also id. (stating that if police were permitted to give warnings not contemplated by transportation code, then suspects could easily be coerced into submission).

2012Id. ; see also id. (stating that if police were permitted to give warnings not contemplated by transportation code, then suspects could easily be coerced into submission).

2011See 860 S.W.2d 147, 151 (Tex. App.—Austin 1993), rev’d on other grounds, 897 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. Crim.

2011See 860 S.W.2d 147, 151 (Tex. App.--Austin 1993), rev'd on other grounds , 897 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. Crim.

2011See 860 S.W.2d 147, 151 (Tex. App.—Austin 1993), rev’d on other grounds, 897 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. Crim.

2011See 860 S.W.2d 147, 151 (Tex. App.--Austin 1993), rev'd on other grounds , 897 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. Crim.

2010I appreciate everybody’s hard work on this, and I will approve the agreement and render it as an order of the court this day .” [Emphasis added.] We hold that the trial court’s specific words of rendition show its present intent to orally render judgment on the parties’ agreement and that its statements about future acts show only its intent to sign the written memorialization of its rendition and to allow performance of the judgment at a later date. (footnote: 7) Cf. Samples Exterminators v. Samples , 640 S.W.2d 873, 874 (Tex. 1982) (holding that the trial court rendered judgment when it said

2010I appreciate everybody’s hard work on this, and I will approve the agreement and render it as an order of the court this day.” [Emphasis added.] We hold that the trial court’s specific words of rendition show its present intent to orally render judgment on the parties’ agreement and that its statements about future acts show only its intent to sign the written 6  Terry and his parents were to execute documents attached to the unsigned written settlement agreement within two weeks, and they were to pay TMS $6,000 within thirty days. 13 memorialization of its rendition and to allow performance

2010I appreciate everybody’s hard work on this, and I will approve the agreement and render it as an order of the court this day .” [Emphasis added.] We hold that the trial court’s specific words of rendition show its present intent to orally render judgment on the parties’ agreement and that its statements about future acts show only its intent to sign the written memorialization of its rendition and to allow performance of the judgment at a later date. (footnote: 7) Cf. Samples Exterminators v. Samples , 640 S.W.2d 873, 874 (Tex. 1982) (holding that the trial court rendered judgment when it said

2010I appreciate everybody’s hard work on this, and I will approve the agreement and render it as an order of the court this day.” [Emphasis added.] We hold that the trial court’s specific words of rendition show its present intent to orally render judgment on the parties’ agreement and that its statements about future acts show only its intent to sign the written 6  Terry and his parents were to execute documents attached to the unsigned written settlement agreement within two weeks, and they were to pay TMS $6,000 within thirty days. 13 memorialization of its rendition and to allow performance

2009Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 12, 17 (Tex. 2008). 6.

2009Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 12, 17 (Tex.2008). 6 .

2007The court concluded that a hearing authorized under the former article 46.03 section 4(d)(5) “must comply with those Mental Health provisions pertinent to conducting commitment hearings.” Id. at 183 (emphasis in original).

2007The court concluded that a hearing authorized under the former article 46.03 section 4(d)(5) A must comply with those Mental Health provisions pertinent to conducting commitment hearings. @ Id. at 183 (emphasis in original).

2008See id. at 942 ; Havard v. Brown, 577 S.W.2d 757, 759-60 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1979), aff'd, 593 S.W.2d 939 (Tex.1980).

2008See id. at 942 ; Havard v. Brown, 577 S.W.2d 757, 759-60 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1979), aff'd, 593 S.W.2d 939 (Tex.1980).

2025See id. at 50–51.

2023The court concluded this instruction did not specifically require a finding that the last act of sexual abuse occurred on at least the 29th day after the day of the first act, and this lack of clarity erroneously “allowed the jury to find appellant guilty so 14 long as two or more acts of sexual abuse occurred between December 2007 and September 2008 regardless of whether the acts occurred at least 30 days apart.” Id.

2025After a complete review of the error in the context of the record, this Court concluded that the error was harmless under Rule 44.2(b) “[g]iven the mildness of the [inappropriate] comments and the strength of the State’s case.” Id. at 260 ; see also id. at 259 (“We find that such comments constitute ‘other errors’ within the purview of Rule 44.2(b).”).

2025After a complete review of the error in the context of the record, this Court concluded that the error was harmless under Rule 44.2(b) “[g]iven the mildness of the [inappropriate] comments and the strength of the State’s case.” Id. at 260 ; see also id. at 259 (“We find that such comments constitute ‘other errors’ within the purview of Rule 44.2(b).”).

2011Id. at 353.

2011Id. at 353 .